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***Short Term Evaluation Of The Dene
Experience With The Norman Wells Project
And Recommendations For Future Projects***

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
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SHORT TERM EVALUATION OF THE DENE
EXPERIENCE WITH THE NORMAN WELLS
PROJECT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR

Sector: Mining/Oil/Energy

6-1-85

Analysis/Review*



SHORT TERM EVALUATION OF THE
DENE EXPERIENCE WITH THE
NORMAN WELLS PROJECT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE PROJECTS

PREPARED BY:

THE DENE NATION
MAY 1986

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In September 1985, four months after the official opening of the Norman Wells Pipeline, the Dene Nation prepared a mid-term evaluation of the Norman Wells **Oilfield** Expansion and Pipeline Project. The mid-term evaluation covered the results of the Dene Nation's conditional approval to the project, as well as specific areas of concern that arose during the life of the project.

This review of Dene involvement **in** the project and lessons learned is intended to complement the mid-term evaluation. It **is** not intended to be a comprehensive analysis of all areas of concern to the Dene Nation. Instead, the review focuses on four key areas:

- 1) Recommendations for future development projects proposed by **all** agencies involved with the project;
- 2) **An** evaluation of the extent of Dene Nation involvement **in** key decisions throughout the life of the project;
- 3) An evaluation of how well the aboriginal rights positions developed by the **Dene/Metis** Negotiations Secretariat address the recommendations put forward by the Dene Nation as a result of the Norman Wells experience;
- 4) Areas where further research is needed before definitive conclusions **can** be drawn about the project and its impacts-

Recommendations are arranged according to subject and originating agency. This format illustrates several areas where government agencies share Dene Nation concerns and support Dene Nation recommendations.

"The evaluation of the decision-making process lists" key decisions, together with the date, the responsible agency, and for process decisions, agencies involved on an on-going basis. This section illustrates that there was in fact virtually no meaningful involvement of the Dene Nation in any of the key decisions regarding the project; and that key Dene positions attached to the conditional approval were ignored.

The comparison of recommendations to aboriginal rights negotiating positions shows that in some areas, the positions do address lessons learned from the Norman Wells project; but in others, the positions do not include adequate safeguards, or are not specific enough, to prevent the frustrations of the Norman Wells project for the Dene from being repeated in the future.

INTRODUCTION

When the Norman Wells Monitoring Program was established, it was the intent of the Dene Nation to conduct a thorough final evaluation of the Norman Wells Oilfield Expansion and Pipeline project, and its impact on the Dene. Subsequent cuts in Norman Wells impact funding made it impossible for the Dene Nation to undertake a lengthy and expensive research project. It was decided instead to use the limited financial resources available to prepare a paper which would focus specifically on four areas:

- 1) A list of recommendations **resulting** from the project and a summary of those recommendations by subject and sponsor;
- 2) An evaluation of the decision-making process throughout the project and the extent of Dene involvement;
- 3) Areas in which further research on the project would be useful;
- 4) A comparison of recommendations relating to aboriginal rights with positions that have been tabled by the Dene/Metis at the negotiating table.

This paper contains the final results of (1), (2) and (3) above. The final section has been kept confidential because it contains references to negotiating positions which are not yet public information.

More than 60 documents related to the Norman Wells project were reviewed in preparing this overview. Some relevant papers or studies may have been overlooked. Other studies which are still not complete may eventually shed more light on the project than the present paper. However, it is hoped that the **information** contained herein will be of use both in evaluating the overall impacts of the Norman Wells project, and in planning for future development projects in Denendeh.

ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations are used throughout this paper:

CAC	Community Advisory Committee
CEIC	Canada Employment and Immigration Commission
COGLA	Canada Oil and Gas Lands Administration
DDC	Denendeh Development Corporation
DFO	Department of Fisheries and Oceans
DIAND	Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development

Note: Although the name of the department was subsequently changed to Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (**INAC**), the acronym **DIAND** is used **throughout for consistency. References to DIAND** are further sub-divided according to program, as follows:

I & IA - Indian and Inuit Affairs
 NAP - Northern Affairs Program
 Pco - Project Co-ordination Office

DOE	Department of Environment
EARP	Environmental Assessment and Review Panel
EMR	Energy, Mines and Resources Canada
FEARO	Federal Environmental Assessment and Review office
GNWT	Government of the Northwest Territories
I & IA	Indian and Inuit Affairs (DIAND)
IPLI NW	InterProvincial Pipeline (Norman Wells)
MDC	Metis Development Corporation
NAP	Northern Affairs Program (DIAND)
NEB	National Energy Board
NWPJEWG	Norman Wells 'Project Joint Environmental Working Group

PCC Project **Co-ordinating Committee** (Norman Wells)
Pco Project Co-ordination Office (Norman Wells)
P LCAC **Pipeline Contractors' Association** of Canada
TAC Technical Advisory Committee (NUT Water Board)

REVIEW OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Method:

The terms of reference called for the consultant to review all relevant materials and summarize recommendations; and to compile a matrix illustrating common recommendations, **vis-a-vis** the Norman Wells Expansion and Pipeline Project.

More than 60 documents were reviewed in total for this project. Of these, only 21 contain recommendations. Documents which contained recommendations which stem from the experience of the Norman Wells Project, and can be applied to future development projects, were considered relevant to this portion of the review. Thus documents which dealt with the project application and review process were omitted, as were descriptive/historical papers.

All the papers included in this section were prepared after the project construction period had begun, i.e. 1983 or later. Some editorial judgement *was* exercised by the consultant in assessing what constituted "recommendations" in the various papers reviewed. Some key papers from the construction period were omitted from this review either because there were no clear-cut recommendations, (e.g. Dene Nation Response to the Norman Wells Project Case Study, September 1984); or because the recommendations were intended as interim measures to be implemented during the life of the project (e.g. Dene Involvement in Environmental Monitoring of the Norman Wells Project: a proposal, December 1983).

All relevant recommendations contained in the 21 cited documents, quoted verbatim, are attached as Appendix I.

This section is a compilation of recommendations according to subject. Because of the large number and complexity of recommendations, this format was found to be more suitable than a matrix for cross-checking and comparison of recommendations.

Each recommendation was assigned one or more key words. Recommendations are listed according to key word. In this section, recommendations are not quoted verbatim; rather, they are paraphrased to give the reader a concise overview of what is intended. Recommendations that are worded differently but have the same intent are grouped together. Recommendations that are similar but have slightly different intent are placed next to one another.

Please note that the consultant has used editorial judgement in the interpretation and paraphrasing of recommendations in this section. Readers should refer to the verbatim wording of any recommendation in Appendix I-before quoting.

1. RECOMMENDATIONS RE: PROJECT MANAGEMENT

1.1 Structure:

Future Project Co-ordination Committees should have fewer federal representatives and should include members of groups representing communities.	InterGroup Consultants Ltd . for DIAND-NAP. 1985. (11.11)
An agency, board or commission should be set in place for co-ordination and monitoring:	Construction and General Workers Union. 1985. (13.6)
Chairman Co-chair Members	Fed. Govt . GNWT Dene/Metis Dene/Metis communities Proponent Organized Labour
All regulatory, environmental and socio-economic and other monitoring functions should report to the Co-ordination Office.	Construction and General Workers Union. 1985. (13.7)
The head of the Manpower Delivery System should report to the Co-ordinator.	Construction and General Workers Union. 1985. (13.8)
The word "federal" should be dropped from the Co-ordinator's office title.	Construction and General Workers Union. 1985. (13.9)

DIAND should not be the **co-ordinating** department.

Construction and General Workers Union. 1985. (13.11)

A (territorial) Project Co-ordination Office be established in **Yellowknife** to deal with specific projects.

GNWT. 1985. (15.2)

The developer should establish an infrastructure of **co-ordinating** groups .

Esso . 1985.(16.1)

Government should assign one Project **Co-ordinator.**

Esso. 1985.(19.2)

Developer's representative should be invited to sit on a **Technical** Advisory Committee or other committees .

Esso. 1985.(19.2)

Planning process should involve all key groups with **an** expressed interest in the project including proponents, federal government, territorial government, native organizations, DIZ groups and communities. . . The GNWT should provide leadership in the process.

Norman Wells Wrap-Up Session Chairman. 1985.(20.34)

A full public evaluation of the Norman Wells project should be conducted to examine the type of regulatory/management process to be established for future projects.

Dene Nation. 1985.(10.9)

In whatever **co-ordinating** mechanisms are established, all parties should agree to interim goals, and evaluate whether these have been achieved before proceeding to the next phase.

Fee-Yee Consulting for Dene Nation. 1985.(12.5)

Project Co-ordination office should involve both levels of government and native organizations and be set up early in the planning process.

DIAND-PCO. 1985. (20.18)

1.2 Authority

Dene Nation/communities must have more control over management of lands and resources.

Dene Nation. 1983.(3.1)

'No authority" approach be used in co-ordination for future major oil and gas projects.

InterGroup Consulting Economists Ltd. for **DIAND-NAP.** 1984.
(5 . 4 . 1)

More authority be given only if need is strongly substantiated.

InterGroup Consulting Economists Ltd. for **DIAND-NAP.** 1984.
(5.4.3)

A process should be established to resolve conflicting objectives of the **co-ordinating** agency.

InterGroup Consulting Economists Ltd. for **DIAND-NAP.** 1984.
(5.10)

GNWT should establish central complaints offices on future projects.

InterGroup Consultants Ltd. for **DIAND-NAP.** 1985.(11.5)

Project. **Co-ordinator** should have sufficient authority to allow decisions to be made.

Esso. 1985.(19.2)

1.3 Mandate

Decision must be made whether co-ordination mandate includes objective of resolving northern native concerns.

InterGroup Consulting Economists Ltd. for **DIAND-NAP.** 1984.(5.8)

Co-ordinating agency should play a communications co-ordination role as well as regulatory.

InterGroup Consulting Economists Ltd. for **DIAND-NAP.** 1984. (5.9)

A more active, audit-oriented co-ordination approach should be used on future projects.

InterGroup Consulting Economists Ltd. for **DIAND-NAP**. 1984.(5.11)

The **"by-exception"** approach to regulatory co-ordination should be adopted for future major projects.

InterGroup Consulting Economists Ltd. for **DIAND-NAP**. 1984.(5.13)

InterGroup Consultants Ltd. for **DIAND-NAP**. 1985.(11.3)

Mechanisms for **solving** co-ordination problems **should** be examined, including voluntary mediation, **binding** mediation, voluntary mediation with arbitration.

InterGroup Consulting Economists Ltd. for **DIAND-NAP**. 1984.(5.14)

A project mediator or arbitrator should be appointed by the federal government to deal with serious situations only.

InterGroup Consultants Ltd. for **DIAND-NAP**. 1985.(11.4)

Separate programs should be established for facilitating progress on projects (federal responsibility) and managing northern impacts (GNWT responsibility).

InterGroup Consultants Ltd. for **DIAND-NAP**. 1985.(11.1)

1.4 Timing

On future **projects**, the Co-ordination office be fully operational in the project planning stage, preferably as soon as an application for the project is received by government.

Dene Nation. 1983.(3.2)
InterGroup Consulting Economists Ltd. for **DIAND-NAP**. 1984.(5.5)
GNWT. 1985. (15.1, 20.12)
Esso. 1985. (19.2)
CEIC. 1985. (20.14)
DIAND-PCO. 1985. (20.18)

A planning process should be formulated prior to project approval and carried out in the year following approval.

InterGroup Consultants Ltd. for
DIAND-NAP. 1985.(11.2)

1s5 **Impact** Funding

Norman Wells project experience should be reviewed to determine more expeditious and less **cumbersome** authorization processes.

InterGroup Consulting Economists for **DIAND-NAP. 1984.**
(5.7, 5.7.1)
InterGroup Consultants Ltd. for
DIAND-NAP. 1985.(11.9)

Issue of eligibility for funding should be resolved at the outset.

InterGroup Consulting Economists Ltd. for **DIAND-NAP. 1984.(5.7.2)**

Workshops should be held with groups eligible for funding.

InterGroup Consulting Economists Ltd. for **DIAND-NAP. 1984.(5.7.3)**

Groups should make funding requests for projects that span several years, with contribution agreements broad enough to provide for adjustments.

InterGroup Consulting Economists Ltd. for **DIAND-NAP. 1984.(5.7.4)**

Federal government should use staff who are familiar with Treasury Board approval process.

InterGroup Consulting Economists Ltd. for **DIAND-NAP. 1984.(5.7.5)**

Impact -funding should be in two phases: 1) to assist groups to participate in impact management planning; 2) to support programs identified in first phase.

InterGroup Consultants Ltd. for
DIAND-NAP. 1985.(11.8)

Federal Government should not provide funding to compensate groups opposed to a project. However, if they do, it should be made as a grant.

InterGroup Consultants Ltd. for
DIAND-NAP. 1985.(11.10)

Funds for future projects should be controlled by a neutral body, and there should be clear terms for accessing funds.

Fee-Yee consulting Ltd. for **Dene**
Nation. 1986.(12.4)

GNWT must have a role in planning and **co-ordinating** the allocation of funds on future projects.

GNWT. 1985.(15.3)

There should be substantial funding without red tape for **Dene/Metis.**

Dene Nation. 1985.(20.23)

1.6 Community Involvement

Communities should have a greater role than in the **CAC...** including resources to operate their own secretariat, functional responsibilities in information dissemination and impact management programs.

InterGroup Consultants Ltd. for
DIAND-NAP. 1985. (11.13)
GNWT. 1985. (15.9)
DIAND-PCO. 1985. (20.20)

Comprehensive community planning is a priority.

GNWT. 1985.(15.4)

Developer should deal only with communities affected by the project.

Esso. 1985.(17.1)

Developer should determine specific community concerns and address these issues.

Esso. 1985. (17.1)

Developer should support **community-** based initiatives.

Esso. 1985.(17.1)

Communities should work through existing representative groups. -

Esso. 1985.(17.2)

Communities should recognize that funding programs are not developer's responsibility.

Esso. 1985.(17.2)

Developer should **limit** public meetings and hold more open house style meetings in communities.

Esso. 1985.(18.1)

Role of **DIZ** groups and Regional Councils should be clarified.

IPL(NW) Ltd. 1985. (20.4)
InterGroup Consultants for **DIAND-**
NAP. 1985. (11.12)

Communities should play a significant role. **in** the regulatory process.

Fee-Yee Consulting for Dene Nation.
1985. (8.1, 9.6)
PCC Wrap-Up Session Chairman. 1985.
(20.37)

Community permitting of research should be initiated.

Dene Nation. 1985.(10.6)

(Band) Council have on hand a readily available waiting list of potential employees.

Fort Simpson Dene Council. 1984.
(21.20)

The Dene Council have direct Input in hiring of local people.

Fort Simpson Dene Council. 1984.
(21.21)

The (Band) Council establish a Union type operation for the Dene.

Fort Simpson Dene Council. **1984.**
(21.22)

2. RECOMMENDATIONS RE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT

2.1 Regulatory Regime

Land and resource use should be coordinated by a single agency.

Dene Nation. 1983. (3.2)
Fee-Yee Consulting Ltd. for Dene
 Nation. 1985. (9.1)

The land and resource management agency should have extensive representation by northern native people.

Dene Nation. 1983.(3.2)

Monitoring agency should include membership of Dene Elders.

Fort Simpson Dene Council. 1984:
 (21.18)

The agency should replace COGLA for lands north of 60.

Dene Nation. 1983.(3.2)

Until it is disbanded, **COGLA** must be responsive to northern concerns, with significant **Dene** participation.

Dene Nation. 1983.(3.4)

Dene/Metis must have the right to meaningful participation in development of all resources - i.e. at least 50% representation on all boards, committees and institutions involved in decision-making.

Fee-Yee Consulting Ltd. for Dene
 Nation. 1985. (7.6)

The existing regulatory regime should be streamlined - i.e. improve on the present situation where jurisdiction is split among several government departments, resulting in confusion and duplication.

Fee-Yee Consulting Ltd. for Dene
 Nation. 1985. (7.6, 9.1)
DIAND-NAP (Land Resources). 1985.
 (14.1)
IPL(NW) Ltd. 1985. (20.3)
DIAND-NAP. 1985. (20.8)
 PCC Wrap-Up Session Chairman. 1985.
 (20.37)

There should be a review and resolution of jurisdictional problems.

Dene Nation. 1985. (10.4)
Construction and General Workers
Union. 1985. (13.12)
Esso. 1985. (19.2)

New management regime should guarantee a public review process for all proposed developments of a certain scale.

Fee-Yee Consulting Ltd. for Dene
Nation. 1985. (7.6)

New management regime should include a mechanism for direct involvement in the review process by the regions/communities most affected.

Fee-Yee Consulting Ltd. for Dene
Nation. 1985. (7.6)

Related government departments be assured intervenor status at **pre-**approval hearings and receive adequate funding to participate.

Fee-Yee Consulting Ltd. for Dene
Nation. 1985. (8.3)

EARP and/or equivalent assessment processes be given legislative authority and their **recommendations** made binding.

Fee-Yee Consulting Ltd. for Dene
Nation. 1985. (8.8, 9.2)
GNWT. 1985. (15.5)

Formal involvement of native resource users in all aspects of the environmental management regime.

Fee-Yee Consulting Ltd. for Dene
Nation. 1985. (9.4)
PCC Wrap-Up Session Chairman. 1985.
(20.37)

Native knowledge incorporated into all aspects of environmental management regime.

Fee-Yee Consulting Ltd. for Dene
Nation. 1985. (9.6)

There should be an improved environmental assessment process, with the Dene and **GNWT** as equal partners with federal government.

Dene Nation. 1985.(10.5)

GNWT should develop **its** own community-based project review and assessment process in the absence of federally-mandated hearings.

GNWT. 1985s (15.5)

2.2 Environmental Standards

EARP recommendations should be tightly written and specific to the relevant government department or agency. General recommendations should be avoided.

Dene Nation. 1983.(2.1,2.4)

Recommendations on terms and conditions ought to contain suggested sanctions (i.e. specific conditions under which an activity will be permitted).

Dene Nation. 1983.(2.2)

Native knowledge and understanding of the environment should be incorporated into all aspects of lands and resources management.

Fee-Yee Consulting Ltd. for Dene Nation. 1985.(8.1,8.10)

DIAND et al undertake to ensure compliance with **licenses** and permits, and resort to prosecution or cancellation when justified.

Fee-Yee Consulting Ltd. for Dene Nation. 1985. (8.7) .
GNWT. 1985. (15.17)

Standards and guidelines must **be** developed which reflect the northern environment, rather than imitating southern standards.

Fee-Yee Consulting Ltd. for Dene Nation. 1985. (9.3, 8.9)
GNWT. 1985. (15.17)

The use of general "umbrella-type" agreements should be evaluated. Agreements should be specific and detailed.

DIAND-NAP (Land Resources). 1985.
(14.2)

An Environmental Protection Plan should be produced on future projects, and **viewed** as a regulatory document. Contingency plans should be included.

GNWT. 1985. (15.14)

Regulations to more effectively deal with fish and water quality impacts should be considered.

PCC Wrap-Up Session Chairman. 1985.
(20.37)

NWT Water Board should establish water quality standards to be used
NWT **Water** Board should establish water quality standards to be used as Guidelines in setting terms and conditions.

Dene Nation. 1985. (6.2)

Needs and concerns of Dene harvesters be a priority in any construction on the land.

Fort Simpson Dene Council. 1984.
(21.19)

2.3 Environmental Monitoring

Impact prediction should be recognized as part of a cycle of monitoring, and results fed back into the predictive process for the next project.

Fee-Yee Consulting Ltd. for Dene Nation. 1985. (8.4, 9.7)

Long-term, cumulative impact monitoring should be a funding priority, including funding from industry as part of their rate base.

Fee-Yee Consulting Ltd. for Dene Nation. 1985. (8.6, 9.5)

DIAND et al ensure compliance with licenses and permits, and prosecute or cancel when justified.

Fee-Yee consulting Ltd. for Dene Nation. 1985. (8.7)
GNWT. 1985. (15.17)

The Dene should be guaranteed meaningful participation in surveillance and monitoring.

Fee-Yee Consulting Ltd. for Dene Nation. 1985. (8.9,9.4)

Government agencies responsible for monitoring should consider establishing monitoring committees that include members of the public.

InterGroup **Consultants** Ltd. for **DIAND-NAP**. 1985. (11.7) "

Current monitoring programs should be critically evaluated annually to determine if they address key issues .

DIAND-NAP (Land Resources). 1985.
(14.3)

Monitoring programs should be made more efficient and cost-effective through integration of activities of government departments.

DIAND-NAP (Land Resources). 1985.
(14.4)
GNWT . 1985. (15.15)

Monitoring should be designed and funded early in the project review/approval process.

DIAND-NAP (Land Resources). 1985.
(14.5)
Esso. 1985. (16.2)
DIAND-NAP. 1985. (20.9)

Industry should be funded by government to participate in Research and Monitoring programs.

Esso. 1985. (16.2)

There should be greater community involvement in monitoring.

DIAND-PCO. 1985. (20.20)

Monitoring agency should include the involvement of Dene Elders.

Fort Simpson Dene Council. 1984.
(21.18)

2.4 Baseline Data

Government and industry must recognize the need for thorough documentation of baseline data.

Fee-Yee Consulting Ltd. for Dene Nation. 1985. (9.5)

Funding for collection of baseline data must be ensured prior to project approval.

Fee-Yee Consulting Ltd. for Dene Nation. 1985. (8.2,8.3,9.5)

Local people be involved in baseline studies.

Fee-Yee Consulting Ltd. for Dene Nation. 1985. (8.2) .

Funding committed to address gaps in baseline data (e.g. fish, ungulates, fur-bearers) .

Dene Nation. 1985. (10.3)

Government should accept greater responsibility for collecting baseline data.

Esso. 1985. (16.2)

There should be better baseline information developed prior to project construction.

IPL(NW) Ltd. 1985. (20.6)

2.5 NUT **Water Board**

Water Board should not be replaced by, but should work closely with, a new lands and resources management agency.

Dene Nation. 1983. (3.2)

Water Board should conduct hearings under 5.15(1) of the Northern Inland Waters Act, relating to **its** objectives in this water management area.

Dene Nation. 1985. (6.1)

Water Board should establish water quality standards, and water use priorities, to be used as Guidelines in establishing terms and conditions.

Dene Nation. 1985. (6.2)

Water Board should give priority to traditional instream use of the Mackenzie River Basin by people of Dene descent.

Dene Nation. 1985. (6.3)

No further water licenses until above are accomplished.

Dene Nation. 1985. (6.4)

Water Board initiate more comprehensive monitoring, research and survey programs.

Dene Nation. 1985. (6.5) .

Water Board expand its staff to include research and analysis function, and enforcement capability.

Dene Nation. 1985. (6.6,10.7)
Fee-Yee Consulting Ltd. for Dene Nation. 1985. (8.5)

Water Board should **re-write** Water Licenses N3L3-0094 and **N3L3-0919**, to - ensure more stringent monitoring.

Dene Nation. 1985. (6.7)

2.6 Land Use Planning

New environmental management regime should be integrated with Land Use Planning Bodies.

Dene Nation. 1983. (3.2)

There should be no further major development projects until there is a Land Use Plan approved for the Western Arctic.

Fee-Yee Consulting Ltd. for Dene Nation. 1985. (7.1)

Immediate implementation of a Land Use Plan for **the Western** Arctic.

Dene Nation. 1985. (10.1)

3. RECOMMENDATIONS RE: SOCIO-ECONOMIC ISSUES

3.1 Terms and Conditions

On future projects, the need for a penalty or incentives system for **socio-economic** terms and conditions should be examined; with appropriate legislation if necessary. -

InterGroup Consulting Economists Ltd. for DIAND-NAP. 1984. (5.12)

Federal and territorial government **policy** should be established to determine who has responsibility in the **socio-economic** surveillance area.

InterGroup Consultants Ltd. for **DIAND-NAP**. 1985. (11.6)

Sub-contractors (northern and southern) should be held accountable to the **socio-economic** policies of the project.

CEIC. 1985. (20.17)

3.2 Monitoring

A more pro-active, systematic and intensive approach to **socio-economic** compliance monitoring should be established.

InterGroup Consultants Ltd. for **DIAND-NAP**. 1985.(11.6) .

Government agencies responsible should establish monitoring committees that include members of the public.

InterGroup Consultants Ltd. for **DIAND-NAP**. 1985. (11.7)

Northern residents must be involved in meaningful monitoring at the community level.

GNWT. 1985. (15.9)

Dene and Metis must be actively involved in monitoring of any training/employment programs. .

Construction and General Workers Union. 1985. (13.19)

Dept. of **Social** Services needs to develop and expand a data base and monitoring system.

GNWT. 1985. (15.13)

Developer **should** determine level of detail required to meet internal and external (government) requirements, and develop appropriate monitoring systems.

Esso. 1985. (18.1)

Socio-economic compliance and **post**-project monitoring program has to be strengthened, and the lead responsibility should be assigned to **GNWT**.

DIAND-PCO. 1985. (20.21)

There **should** be a strong central **socio-economic** government structure to monitor and deliver training, employment and economic development programs.

DIAND-NAP. 1985. (20.7)

3.3 **Baseline** Data

Dept. of Social Services needs to develop and expand a data base (re: social indicators).

GNWT. 1985. (15.13)

Government should collect baseline data necessary for management of northern development.

Esso. 1985. (16.2)

There should be better baseline information developed prior to construction.

IPL(NW) Ltd. (20.6)

3.4 **Training**

Shehtah Drilling should provide administrative and social skills training to facilitate control by **Dene/Metis**.

w. Erasmus for **Dene/Metis Negotiations** Secretariat. 1984. (4.1)

Dene Nation should establish a training/education unit.

Fee-Yee Consulting Ltd. for Dene Nation. 1986. (12.1)

Training policies should be geared to northern needs and **priorities**.

Fee-Yee Consulting Ltd. for Dene Nation. 1986. (12.2)

Dene Nation should become accredited by GNWT for delivery of training programs.

Training should take place as close as possible to actual job exposure.

Apprenticeships should be served on long-term jobs, rather than on mainline construction.

Cross-cultural seminars should be included in future training programs.

There should be cross-cultural training for all management and personnel of IPL and its sub-contractors, including the Unions.

Dene/Metis must become actively involved in all facets of monitoring employment and training programs.

The GNWT should have the lead role for training programs in the NWT.

Training should be provided for small businesses to participate more fully in development projects.

Developer should apply same standards to small contractors as to large ones.

Developer should conduct a study to identify and set priorities for training issues, and manage them carefully.

There should be a strong socio-economic government structure to monitor and deliver training programs.

Human resource development needs for a project should be identified early so training can be designed to meet the needs before, during and after.

Fee-Yee consulting Ltd. for Dene Nation. 1986. (12.3)

Construction and General Workers **Union.** 1985. (13.13)

Construction and General Workers **Union.** 1985. (13.13)

Construction and General Workers **Union.** 1985. (13.14)

Fort Simpson Dene Council. 1984. (21.10)

Construction and General Workers **Union.** 1984. (13.19)

GNWT. 1985. (15.18)

GNWT. 1985. (15.20)

Esso. 1985. (18.1)

Esso. 1985. (18.1)

DIAND-NAP. 1985. (20.7)

CEIC. 1985. (20.15)

Training for future projects should be done in the context of **long-range** needs of the population.

CEIC. 1985. (20.16)

Proponents should establish training on the job for permanent positions.

Fort Simpson Dene Council. 1984. (21.5)

Proponents should create more training **in** the areas of maintenance, and short term jobs such as welding.

Fort Simpson Dene Council. 1984. (21.6)

Proponents should place trainees in jobs for which they are qualified.

Fort Simpson Dene Council. 1984. (21.7)

Training positions should be expanded to **cover** more than one position, to increase the skills of trainees.

Fort Simpson Dene Council. 1984. (21.8)

Governments should establish more training courses in the community for heavy equipment operators, welding, pipefitting, etc.

Fort Simpson Dene Council. 1984. (21.9)

(CEIC) must assist Dene and northerners to get into training positions that will equip them for long-term employment.

Fort Simpson Dene Council. 1984, (21.14)

3.5 Employment

A policy statement from the **Dene/Metis** about short-term jobs is needed.

Construction and General Workers Union. 1985. (13.5)

Northern residency should be clearly defined before future development projects take place.

Construction and General Workers Union. 1985. (13.15)

Government must develop an exact figure of how many jobs are expected from a project, and use that as a guideline for hiring.

Construction and General Workers Union. 1985. (13.17)
DIAND-PCO. 1985. (20.19)

GNWT needs to **maintain** regular **labour** force data and to develop and implement employment guidelines.

GNWT. 1985. (15s19)

Developer should apply same employment standards to all contractors.

Esso. 1985. (18.1)

Developer should identify and set priorities on employment issues early in the project, and manage them carefully.

ESSO. 1985. (18.1)

Developer should ensure that employees who are hired by sub-contractors, know who their employer is. -

Esso. 1985. (18.1)

Government should release information on graduates of training **courses in** the NUT.

ESSO. 1985. (18.2)

(CEIC) must assist locals to get employment by confirming all applications filed.

Fort Simpson Dene Council. 1984. (21.14)

(Band) Council should have on hand a list of available potential employees, and proponents should hire according to the list.

Fort Simpson Dene Council. 1984. (21.20, 21.3)

Dene Council should have direct input into hiring of local people **on** any project **in** the area.

Fort Simpson Dene Council. 1984. (21.21)

(Band) Council establish a Union type operation for the Dene.

Fort Simpson Dene Council. **1984.** (21.22)

There should be an employment liaison counselor at each work camp or site.

Fort Simpson Dene Council. 1984. (21.1)

Proponents must respond to inquiries about employment and training.

Fort Simpson Dene Council. 1984. (21.2)

There should be a process to review cases of firing and quitting; under a Labour Board or GNWT Employment office.

Fort Simpson Dene Council. 1984. (21.4)

3.6 Unions

overlap in areas of geographical jurisdiction should be rectified.	construction and General Workers Union. 1985. (13.1)
Priority in grey areas should go to unions with demonstrated commitment to northern hire.	Construction and General Workers Union. 1985. (13.2)
Northern business must come to terms with unions and collective bargaining.	Construction and General Workers Union. 1985. (13.3)
GNWT should enact labour legislation to set objectives for union activity..	GNWT. 1985. (15.19)
Unions should establish northern hire officers in communities so local people can access employment.	Fort Simpson Dene Council. 1984. (21.11)
Unions should visit communities to explain their system and assist people to become members.	Fort Simpson Dene Council. 1984. (21.12)
(CEIC) should help to inform people about how to join the unions.	Fort Simpson Dene Council. 1984. (21.15)
There should be a political move by Dene politicians to cut out the Unions in the north due to experiences on the Norman Wells project.	Fort Simpson Dene Council. 1984. (21.13)

3.7 Business Opportunities

Before getting involved in joint ventures with industry, the Dene/Metis should consider maintaining the traditional process of community consultation; seeking professional advice; and providing information to the public on a regular basis.	W. Erasmus for Dene/Metis Negotiations Secretariat. 1984. (4.7)
Northern businesses must come to terms with unions and collective bargaining.	Construction and General Workers Union. 1985. (13.3)

- Clear business development objectives should be identified, reflecting regional differences, for any future projects. **GNWT.** 1985. (15.20)
- Developers should break work into small packages to help small firms participate in large projects. **Esso.** 1985. (18.1)
- Developers should set criteria for joint ventures and encourage those that offer skill development. **Esso.** 1985. (18.1)
- Developers should help northern businesses to obtain permits for work on union sites. **Esso.** 1985. (18.1)
- Government should provide new businesses with extra support, and funding assistance. **Esso.** 1985. (18.2)
- Government should provide better services to northern businesses to help them prepare for resource development opportunities. **IPL(NW) Ltd.** 1985. (20.5)
- Benefits and expectations should be defined clearly at the outset, including actual dollar value of contracts and in what areas these might be disbursed. **DIAND-PCO.** 1985. (20.19)

3.8 Shehtah Drilling

- Use Shehtah as a testing ground for possibility of applying traditional Dene values in an industrial setting. Fort Good Hope Council for Dene Nation. 1983. (1.1)
- Establish a clear process to monitor **Shehtah's** progress. Fort Good Hope Council for Dene Nation. 1983. (1.2)
- Set up a community advisory group of **Dene/Metis** members to implement a community-based hiring policy. W. Erasmus for **Dene/Metis** Negotiations Secretariat. 1984. (4.1)
- Dene/Metis** memberships should be continuously updated. W. Erasmus for **Dene/Metis** Negotiations Secretariat. 1984. (4.2)

Dene/Metis should utilize Shehtah as an opportunity to learn from **Esso's** experience in world-wide oil business.

W. Erasmus for **Dene/Metis**
Negotiations Secretariat.
1984. (4.4)

Dene/Metis should appoint alternate board members. to allow more people to participate in Shehtah operations.

W. Erasmus for **Dene/Metis**
Negotiations Secretariat.
1984. (4.6)

3.9 Compensation for Renewable Resource Harvesters

A comprehensive compensation program should be enforced with respect to any non-renewable resource development activity in Denendeh which causes damage to hunting grounds, fishing areas or traplines.

Dene Nation. 1983. (3.3)

Government should encourage community participation in developing compensation plans.

GNWT. 1985. (15.16)

IPL must address the question of compensation for all Dene harvesters that have been impacted by the pipeline project.

Fort Simpson Dene Council. 1984.
(21.24)

3.10 Day Care

Proponents must assist employees to obtain day care services. Fort Simpson Dene Council. 1984. (21.16)

3.11 Drug and Alcohol Abuse

Proponents must implement alcohol and drug awareness programs by having counselors in work camps. Fort Simpson Dene Council. 1984. (21.17)

4. RECOMMENDATIONS RE: CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

4.1 Aboriginal Rights Settlement

There should be no further major development projects approved until there is a negotiated aboriginal rights settlement with the **Dene/Metis**.

Fee-Yee Consulting Ltd. for Dene Nation. 1985. (7.1)
 Construction and General Workers Union. 1985. (13.18)
 Dene Nation. 1985. (20.24)
DIAND - I & IA. 1985. (20.29)

The **Dene/Metis** have the right to meaningful participation in development of resources - i.e. at least **50%** representation on all decision-making bodies.

Fee-Yee Consulting Ltd. for Dene Nation. 1985. (7.6)

The **Dene/Metis** have the right to identify research needs, to initiate and participate in research, and to have funds to do so.

Fee-Yee Consulting Ltd. for Dene Nation. 1985. (7.6)

The ability to conduct a northern impact management planning process depends on the settlement of the **Dene/Metis** land claims.

InterGroup Consulting Ltd. for **DIAND-NAP.** 1985. (11.2)
 PCC Wrap-Up Session Chairman. 1985. (20.33)

Education and training should be reinstated as items for negotiation at the aboriginal rights table.

Fee-Yee Consulting Ltd. for Dene Nation. 1986. (12.6)

4.2 Devolution

GNWT should be given responsibility for managing northern impacts.

InterGroup Consultants Ltd. for **DIAND-NAP.** 1985. (11.1,11.2)
 PCC Wrap-Up Session Chairman. 1985. (20.33)

DIZ groups or Regional Councils should be the main vehicle for representing communities on future developments.

InterGroup Consultants Ltd. for **DIAND-NAP.** 1985. (11.12)

During transfer of powers from federal government, a Department of **Labour** should be a GNWT priority.

Construction and General Workers Union. 1985. (13.16)

GNWT should become a participant in developing NEB guidelines.

GNWT. 1985. (15.6)

GNWT should develop **its** own legislative base for resource development, including building standards, **labour**, environmental protection and land use.

GNWT. 1985. (15.7, 20.10)

GNWT should concentrate **on devolution** to take full control and management of resources development.

GNWT. 1985. (15.8)

5. RECOMMENDATIONS RE: FURTHER RESEARCH

There should be a professional evaluation of the Bone study, review of impacts of project **wind-down**, and five-year evaluation of environmental impacts.

Fee-Yee Consulting Ltd. for Dene Nation. 1985. (7.5)

Funding commitments to complete the fish study; conduct professional evaluation of the Bone study; and evaluate the Community and Social Development program.

Dene Nation. 1985. (10.2,20.25)

A **full** and public evaluation of the Norman Wells project, publicly funded and conducted by an independent individual.

Dene Nation. 1985. (10.8) "

6. RECOMMENDATIONS RE: FUTURE PROJECTS

There should be at least a **five-year** delay on approval of the Polar **Gas** pipeline or any other major development .

Fee-Yee Consulting Ltd. for Dene Nation. 1985. (7.2)

7. MISCELLANEOUS RECOMMENDATIONS

The NWT Legislative Assembly should establish a Special Committee Inquiry on the economic and social future of the NWT.

Dene Nation. 1985. (10.11)

There should be an improved communication and consultation process on development projects.

GNWT. 1985. (15.10)

NEB. 1985. (20.28)

Esso. 1985. (20.31)

Proponents, **labour** unions and federal agencies should establish offices **in** the NWT for the duration of projects north of 60.

GNWT. 1985. (15.11)

Guidelines for NWT Safety Regulations should be developed before a project starts.

GNWT. 1985. (15.12)

Government should publish and disseminate research findings on development projects publicly.

Esso. 1985. (16..2)

Developers should avoid raising unrealistic expectations by taking too much of a sales approach to obtain project approval.

Esso. 1985. (17.1)

IPL(NW) Ltd. 1985. (20.1)

PCC Wrap-Up Session Chairman.
1985. (20.36)

Government should recognize the need to help communities and businesses cope **with** project **wind-down**.

PCC Wrap-Up Session Chairman.
1985. (20.38)

Clarification of roles and responsibilities of various groups with **an** interest in the project is needed.

Esso. 1985. (17.1,20.30,20.32)

IPL(NW) Ltd. 1985. (20.2)

CEIC. 1985. (20.13) .

GNWT. 1985. (20.11)

PCC Wrap-Up Session Chairman.
1985. (20.35)

Government departments in the north should have funding to undertake long-term co-ordinated programs.

NEB. 1985. (20.27)

Information from these programs
should be centralized in the **GNWT**.

NEB. 1985. (20.27)

**NORMAN WELLS PROJECT
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS**

The Dene Nation originally opposed construction of the Norman Wells **oilfield** expansion/pipeline project, but eventually changed that position to one of conditional approval. This approval was based on a set of conditions which were designed to allow the Dene the time and resources required to prepare communities for the project, to enable people to get some benefits, and to reduce the potential for negative social impacts. Three of the conditions which the Dene Chiefs attached to the project go-ahead were clearly intended to ensure Dene participation in the decision-making process, **viz:**

(3) -That a Monitoring Agency be established with Dene participation and adequate funding, and that the Monitoring Agency be given the authority to enforce rules and regulations;

(4) That funding be provided to the **Dene/Metis** based on an agreement with GNWT as follows:

- \$10.5 million for training
- \$1.5 million for a joint venture with Esso
- \$4.25 million for community development
- \$1.25 million for planning/monitoring
- \$1.0 million for a Community Advisory Committee
- \$3.0 **million** for the GNWT

(5) That a Management Committee be established with **50% Dene/Metis** and 50% government representation, with input into the project but with no regulatory authority.

The Dene Nation was quite confident that **DIAND** Minister **John Munro** had verbally agreed to their terms, and therefore they understood that there was a commitment to Dene involvement in the decision-making process, at least as outlined above.

This section illustrates to what extent the Dene Nation was involved in significant decisions about the project as it proceeded.

The list of decisions that follows and information on agencies responsible for, or involved in, each was compiled primarily from literature reviewed for this project (see Appendix II). Only decisions relating to the regulatory process, and involving government agencies or the Dene Nation, are included. To compile a complete list of significant decisions taken during the life of the project by all parties would scarcely be possible.

What follows is not intended to be an exhaustive review, **as** not all the key decisions which were made during the life of the project were a matter of public record.

When materials reviewed contained conflicting or unclear information as to dates of decisions or agencies involved, the information most frequently cited has been used **in** this paper.

DECISION/DATE**RESPONSIBLE
AGENCY****PARTICIPATING
AGENCIES****May 1980**

Federal Environmental
Assessment and Review
Panel appointed

Ministers of **DIAND** and
DOE

FEARO

January 1981

EARP report and
recommendations issued

DOE

FEARO

July 1981

Norman Wells Expansion
and **Pipeline** project
approved **with**
commitment to impact
funding "

Federal Cabinet

July 31, 1981

Impact funding
allocations amended;
\$1.5 million taken from
training pot for
Project Co-ordination
Office

Federal Cabinet (in the
absence of **DIAND**
Minister)

Note: Decision contradicted funding commitments negotiated by
DIAND Minister John **Munro** with the **Dene/Metis**, and publicly
announced by him in Yellowknife on the same date.

November 6, 1981

Certificate of Public
Convenience and
Necessity issued to IPL
(NW) Ltd. for Norman
Wells pipeline,
conditional upon
submission of
additional research and
documentation (e.g.
Environmental
Protection Plan).

NEB

Note: De ne Nation position was that Certificate should not be issued until IPL had submitted all the required documents, and **until** they could be scrutinized and commented upon by interveners as well as the NEB.

Winter-Spring 1982

Terms of reference and
operating procedures
established for Project
Co-ordination Office

DIAND-NAP
DIAND-PCO

Note: In spite of commitments by **DIAND** Minister John **Munro** to **Dene/Metis** involvement in project management, the structure and mandate established by **DIAND** ignored **Dene/Metis/GNWT** proposals for project management put forward in 1981; and **failed** to give any meaningful participatory role to **Dene/Metis**. The Dene Nation was not consulted on the terms of reference or structure.

March 12, 1982

Joint Needs Assessment Committee established	DIAND-NAP structure and controlled funding)	(approved and	Dene Nation Metis Association GNWT
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Summer 1982

Interim Project Co-ordinator "appointed (John Scullion)	DIAND-NAP
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July 1, 1982

Water License issued to Esso Resources for Norman Wells Expansion (N3L30919)	NWT Water Board	Through TAC: DFO; DOE; GNWT Renewable Resources; DIAND-NAP
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Note: Dene Nation and communities had limited input through the public hearing process; but the Water Board chose not to pursue the Dene Nation recommendation that the required research, studies and contingency plans should be submitted to the Board for "review and approval before the license was issued.

September 1982

Norman Wells Project Research and Monitoring Group established	DOE (at the request of GNWT Renewable Resources)	DOE ; DIAND-NAP ; EMR ; DFO ; GNWT Renewable Resources
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Note: No attempt was made to invite Dene Nation input until the Dene Nation approached the group in November 1983. Spokesmen for the group indicated that community concerns had not been ignored, as they had reviewed transcripts of EARP and Water Board public hearings to identify monitoring priorities. Yet Mackenzie River water quality, the concern most often raised at community hearings, was not determined a monitoring priority by the group until Dene Nation and community lobbying in 1983-84 re-focused

attention on the issue.

September 20, 1982

Terms of reference prepared for a socio-economic monitoring program

DIAND-NAP

Dr. R.M. Bone

Note: Study proposal was not put out to tender but **was** prepared by Dr. Bone in response to a direct request from **DIAND** Project Co-ordination staff. The Dene Nation was not consulted on terms of reference, or contractor; and was not contacted directly by the contractor until February 1984.

September 28, 1982

Socio-Economic Agreement: Norman Wells Project signed

DIAND-NAP

DIAND-NAP; ESSO -

Socio-Economic Agreement: Norman Wells Project signed

DIAND-NAP

DIAND-NAP; IPL (NW) Ltd.

Environmental Agreement: Norman Wells Pipeline signed

DIAND-NAP

DIAND-NAP; IPL (NW) Ltd .

Note: No attempt was made by **DIAND** to consult the Dene Nation on terms of reference for the agreements.

Early 1982

Environmental overview of the project conducted, to determine monitoring requirements

DIAND-NAP

Regional **Environmental** Review Committee

Note: In spite of repeated expression of concern by the Dene Nation about environmental impacts, verbal commitments by **DIAND** Minister John **Munro** to Dene involvement in monitoring, and establishment of a Monitoring Agency being one of the Dene conditions attached to approval of the project; the Dene Nation was not informed of these discussions or invited to participate.

December 1, 1982

Project Co-ordinating Committee established and first meeting held	DIAND-NAP	DIAND-PCO, Esso, IPL, CEIC, Dene Nation, Metis Association
Management Committee established and first meeting held	DIAND-NAP	DIAND-PCO, NEB, GNWT

Note: The structure and membership of these committees changed during the course of the project. Dene Nation and Metis Association, as well as other agencies, were subsequently added to the membership of the Management Committee. The membership of the PCC was also considerably enlarged during the life of the project - to the point where there were often more than 50 people at-attending meetings. Although the Dene Nation was a member, terms of reference and mandate for both groups were formulated internally by DIAND and were not acceptable to the Dene Nation, resulting in Dene Nation refusal to actively participate until November 1983. Furthermore, the term "Management Committee" was misleading, as this group had no real authority over project management.

December 2, 1982

Community Advisory Committee established and first meeting held	DIAND-PCO	Community representatives appointed by Minister upon recommendation from municipal councils
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Note: In negotiating terms and conditions for the project with DIAND Minister John Munro, the Dene Nation had requested the establishment of a Community Advisory Committee which would provide a forum for focusing concerns of native communities, and which would have some authority over project management. The CAC as established by DIAND made no distinction between Band Councils and municipal councils of impact area communities, thus making the CAC primarily a forum for non-native interests and concerns. The Dene Nation was not involved in establishing terms of reference. There was no opportunity for direct liaison between the CAC and Dene Nation. At different times, two Dene bands - Fort Good Hope and Fort Simpson - boycotted the CAC and made their reasons known to DIAND-PCO.

December 10, 1982

Socio-Economic
Agreement Norman Wells
Project signed

DIAND-NAP

DIAND-NAP; GNWT

Winter 1983

Water Use
Authorizations issued
for pipeline
construction

DIAND-NAP
Resources)

(Water

Note: Subsequently terminated by Order-in-Council, February 1984.

Land Use Permit issued
for pipeline
construction (N83P906)

DIAND-NAP
Resources)

(Land

Note: Communities in the area were given the usual opportunity to comment on Land Use applications (i.e. copies mailed out with a deadline for comment). In spite of the size of the project and widespread concern and opposition, no attempt was made to encourage response, or provide technical assistance to communities.

January 1, 1983

IPL's Water Licenses
issued (N3L61126-A,B)
issued

NWT Water Board

Through TAC: DIAND-NAP,
DFO, DOE, GNWT
Renewable Resources

January 1983

GNWT Project co"
ordinator appointed
(Darryl Bohnet)

GNWT Executive Council

Federal Project Co-
ordination staff
appointed (John Mar,
Jim Wallace, Al
Everard)

DIAND-NAP

Note: Dene Nation was not invited to sit on the interview boards, suggest potential candidates, or participate in any other way.

March 23, 1983

Norman Wells Project Agreement signed	Pipeline Contractors' Association of Canada	PLCAC and four pipeline craft unions
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April/May 1983

Training program for 34 northerners at Norman Wells	CEIC (funding)	CEIC, Northern Loram, Esso, GNWT, Construction and General Workers Union
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Note: This and subsequent training **initiatives** were developed without reference to the JNAC recommendations and without any consultation or input by Dene Nation.

June 19, 1983

IPL given leave to construct	NEB
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June 30, 1983

Shehtah Drilling incorporated	DIAND-NAP (funding); Esso; Dene Nation; Metis Association	Dene Nation, DDC, Metis Association, MDC, Deh-Cho Drilling Ltd., Esso
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July 7, 1983

Workshop in Calgary to discuss socio-economic monitoring projects under way re: Norman Wells	DIAND-PCO (?)	DIAND-PCO, NEB, GNWT, Esso, IPL, Dr. Bone
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Summer 1983

Training courses held at Norman Wells in heavy equipment operation, tubular steel scaffolding	CEIC (funding)	Northern Loram, Partec-Lavalin (Esso sub-contractors)
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Note: (See note re: training initiatives above)

November 1983

Norman Wells-based Co-ordination Officer appointed (Walter Blondin) **DIAND-PCO**

November 1983

Dene Nation sets up Norman Wells Monitoring Program Dene Nation **DIAND-NAP (funding)**

November/December 1983

Labourers' training course held at Norman Wells **CEIC (funding)** **CEIC, IPL. Pe-Ben, Construction" and General Workers Union**

January 1984.

Membership of Research and Monitoring Group expanded **DOE** **DOE, DIAND-NAP, DIAND-Pco, EMR, DFO, GNWT Renewable Resources, Dene Nation, Esso, IPL**

January 19. 1984

Esso informed of additional requirements to their Norman Wells water license re: contingency plan **NWT Water Board** **Through TAC: DOE, DFO, GNWT Renewable Resources, DIAND-NAP, Fort Good Hope Community Council**

February 1. 1984

Norman Wells Project Joint Environmental Working Group established and first meeting held **DIAND-PCO** **DIAND-NAP, GNWT, Dene Nation, Metis Association**

Note: This group was established at the request of the Dene Nation as a last-ditch effort to negotiate a minimal role in

environmental monitoring.

February 1984

Esso granted exemption **COGLA**
from requirement to
install sub-surface
safety valves in wells
drilled on artificial
islands.

Note: NWT Water Board TAC met to discuss this decision, with representation from Fort Good Hope. Esso also flew to Fort Good Hope to discuss the decision with the community. However, **COGLA** made it quite clear that the decision was theirs alone.

August 1984

Dene **Gondie** study Dene Nation
initiated

Dene Nation, University
of British Columbia
School of Community and
Regional Planning

Note: Decision was taken after Dene Nation and **DIAND** failed to reach a satisfactory compromise on Dene Nation involvement in the Bone study.

April 17, 1985

IPL (NW) Ltd. granted **NEB**
leave to open pipeline

May 15, 1985

Pipeline officially
opened

Esso, **IPL,** **DIAND**
Minister, GNWT Leader

Note: Dene Chiefs boycotted the opening and met instead in Fort Simpson

Spring 1985

Esso and IPL (NW) Ltd.
offices in Yellowknife
closed

Esso/IPL (NW) Ltd.

Summer 1985

CEIC expenditures
charged against Norman
Wells training funds so
that federal government
can claim the \$21
million was allocated

Treasury Board

GNWT Co-ordination
office closed

GNWT Executive Council

September 1985

Construction and
General Workers Union
Yellowknife office
closed

Construction and
General Workers Union

October 1985

Federal Project Co-
ordination Office
closed

DIAND-NAP

March 1986

Treasury Board decision
re: funding forces Dene
Nation to discontinue
research and monitoring
programs, and community
development program,
prematurely

Treasury Board

FURTHER RESEARCH

The review of Norman Wells-related literature reveals that some issues still require further documentation or clarification before conclusions can be drawn, or recommendations incorporated into the planning process for future projects. These include:

1) **Training:** Several useful research initiatives are outlined in the report prepared by Fee-Yee Consulting, "An Assessment of Training Initiatives Associated with the Norman Wells Pipeline Project":

a) Review and analyze **final** reports of other research initiatives which address the training issue - including the Native Employment and Training Study; Dene **Gondie** Report; **DIAND Socio-Economic** Monitoring Program final report; and **InterGroup** Consulting's final report on Special Federal Programs.

b) **Obtain names of trainees involved in CEIC-sponsored** training programs, to enable a follow-up study directly with recipients of training which will help to determine more precisely the effectiveness of training programs that were held.

c) Research to determine precisely how many long-term jobs were created by **Esso/IPL** as a result of the project; how that total compares with federal **government's** 1981 commitments; how many are filled by people of Dene descent; and how many of those individuals benefited from training which enabled them to occupy their present positions.

2)' **Decision-Making Process:** The preceding documentation of decision-making is based only on information that **is** publicly available. A key question that remains unanswered by **this** analysis is why **DIAND** Minister John **Munro's** commitments to Dene involvement were not honoured by bureaucrats at all levels of his department. An in-depth study which attempted to document the decision-making process **within** **DIAND** on such key issues as establishment of a management regime, assignation of responsibilities for environmental monitoring, and how the socio-economic monitoring regime was determined, would shed light on this process and help the Dene Nation plan how best to ensure meaningful involvement in future projects.

3) **Business Opportunities:** The question of how well business opportunities were accessed by native businesses, and whether there could have been more effective involvement of native businesses, has never been thoroughly addressed. In the Dene

Nation's 1985-1987 Norman Wells funding impact proposal, the following terms of reference for such a study are outlined:

"...include the documentation of government and industry commitments and of native expectations and an analysis of any discrepancy between them; an historical analysis of the formation of businesses and development corporations to take advantage of project-related opportunities; the evaluation of 'let-down' impacts; the availability and quality of contracts, and the ease in getting access; the percentage of business which went to native contractors and to northern non-native contractors; and evaluation and recommendations for future projects."

4) Analysis of Success of Sheh-tah Drilling: In spite of recommendations approved by the Dene National Assembly in 1983, there has never been - at least to the knowledge of the Dene Nation - a thorough evaluation of the success of Sheh-tah Drilling both as a financial investment, and as a training ground for an entirely" native-operated industrial venture. While the DDC has divorced its operations quite thoroughly from the Dene Nation's activities, the Dene Nation should still retain an interest in DDC activities at the policy level. Recommendations contained in the 1983 report to the National Assembly prepared by Fort Good Hope are out of date and would have to be updated to be effective.

5) "Let-down Impacts": Again as outlined in the 1985-1987 funding proposal, an analysis of effects felt by the communities who were involved in the business and employment opportunities created by the project would be useful.

6) Unions: A final evaluation of the role that unions played in the project; their relationships with northern businesses; and how they helped or hindered native people from finding employment on the project, should be undertaken, including recommendations on a Dene Nation position on large industrial unions in the north, and specific steps to take to improve the situation on future projects.

7) Baseline Data: One area where there seems to be universal agreement is that there is a significant lack of baseline data, both environmental and socio-economic, which is required to design and implement effective monitoring programs. Government agencies and native groups would benefit from an explicit listing of what would be considered an adequate data base, what the gaps are in the existing data base, and what kinds of studies/data collection techniques should be done to address the deficiencies. Separate studies would be required for environmental and socio-economic arenas, although the two cannot be divorced completely.

8) Socio-Economic Impacts: The Dene Gondie study report also outlined some further research requirements. Some duplicate recommendations in the Assessment of Training Initiatives Associated with the Norman Wells Pipeline Project, and are outlined in Section (1) above. Others include:

- a) the need to collect more data to supplement Dene Gondie figures on the unemployed, the self-employed, and UIC and Social Assistance recipients;
- b) comparison of figures on hunting and trapping to other available data sources;
- c) more accurate data on the number of jobs and business opportunities resulting from the project;
- d) more data on perceived social impacts, e.g. alcohol and drug abuse, family stress, and suicide.

9) Community Involvement: The main goal of the two-year delay period on the Norman Wells project was to ensure effective community participation in project benefits, and to give communities time to prepare for negative impacts. There appears to be general agreement that these goals were not achieved. Further research in this area should focus on two issues:

- a) how to implement long-term community development programs which will effectively assist communities to develop the skills and the mechanisms needed to cope with the impacts of large projects;
- b) effective mechanisms for community participation in " decision-making structures, especially given the number and variety of community and regional groups competing for authority in many areas.

Comparative experiences from other developing regions would be useful; however, such research initiatives cannot be effective unless community residents themselves are active participants.

APPENDIX II RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Report and Recommendations on the Joint Venture.

Fort Good Hope Dene Community Council. Resource Development Impact Project.
September 5, 1983.

1.1 Use the (Shehtah Drilling) Joint Venture as a **testing** ground for the possibility of applying traditional Dene values in the context of an industrial setting.

1.2 A process must be identified by the assembly for the Executive to follow before making major decisions of this kind in the future.

1.3 The -assembly should establish a clear-cut on-going review **process** to monitor the progress of the joint venture.

1.4 When the current drilling contracts expire (around the end of June 1985), (the Dene Nation) should be prepared to review all aspects of the joint venture and decide whether (the Dene Nation) want(s) to seek another drilling contract and perhaps buy out **Esso's** interest; or whether the time has come to ask **Esso** to buy (the Dene Nation) out.

1.5 If the assembly decides to accept the above recommendations, and if several months down the road there has still been no progress on negotiation of a settlement on ownership of resources at Norman Wells; and if the federal government has not moved to take the first steps in setting up a monitoring agency; then the leadership should seriously **re-examine** its participation in the joint venture.

2. An Example from the Norman Wells Experience: Handling and Storage of Fuels, Lubricants and Other Toxic Substances, Including Spill Contingency Plans.

Dene Nation. Yellowknife, N.W.T.
December 1983.

2.1 (**EARP**) Recommendations must be tightly written. They ought to be specific to the government department, agency or enforcement body for which they are intended.

2.2 Recommendations ought to contain suggested sanctions. For example, "It **is** recommended that an activity not be permitted by **licence** or otherwise unless and until the competent authority is satisfied that. .."

2.3 Where a project cannot be assessed because of lack of information or the incomplete state of preparedness, the EARP function is not to guess at possible consequences. It is rather to state that the project cannot be environmentally assessed in that regard, The **Panel** may wish to recommend a method by which assessment should be conducted.

2.4 If the EARP Panel concludes that **specific** things are required for environmental protection, a general recommendation should be avoided. To make one may well be environmentally impossible.

2.5 The EARP Panel should assess and must be aware of what powers and duties are vested in licensing bodies, regulatory agencies and enforcement personnel. Recommendations should only be made based on a complete understanding of post-EARP possibilities.

3. Recommendations of the Dene Nation to the Beaufort EARP Panel.

Dene Nation. Yellowknife, N.W.T.
December 1983.

3.1 The Dene Nation and Dene communities must have greater control and management of land and resources within Denendeh.

3.2 **For** comprehensive management and environmental protection, land and resource allocation and use should be **co-ordinated** by a single agency which **is** not under the control of any government department.

a) **It** should be an independent organization with extensive representation by northern native peoples and should be located **in** the North.

b) It should be integrated with the land use planning bodies which are currently being set up. This would allow for better **co-**ordination of information and the regulation of protection respecting the environment and traditional activities.

c) COGLA should be dismantled **in** so far as lands North of 60 are concerned and the activities it currently oversees should come under the aegis of this new Northern Agency.

d) It is not suggested that this agency and the **N.W.T.** Water Board merge into one entity However, the two agencies should work closely together in any situation where **NIWA** and the **Territorial Lands Act** and their respective regulations both apply to the same project.

e) co-ordination efforts should begin at the inception of a project. . .

2.3 With respect to **any** non-renewable resource exploration or development activity on the land or water within Denendeh which causes damage to Dene hunters, trappers or fishermen or their hunting grounds, fishing areas or **traplines**, a comprehensive and equitable compensation program should be enforced

2.4 Until COGLA is disbanded, it should be made responsive to Northern institutions, and concerns. The Dene Nation must be recognized and involved as a party to the negotiations of any new or renewed exploration agreements and production licenses on Dene lands.

4. **The Joint Venture between the Dene Nation, Metis Association of the N.W.T., and Esso Resources.**

Prepared by William Erasmus for the Dene/Metis Negotiations Secretariat. Yellowknife, N.W.T.
July 23, 1984.

4.1 **Community Involvement.** In order for the communities to participate daily in the joint venture and feel a sense of responsibility to Shehtah Drilling, a mechanism has to be established. One approach is by developing a hiring policy whereby communities are directly involved

A community advisory group of Dene and Metis members recognized by all parties can be set up to complement the local employment agencies. . .

4.2 **Communication.** . . . The Dene and Metis must **continuously** "update their memberships and the general public on the status of Shehtah Drilling. Not only because it has received much attention to date but also because of the potential uniqueness of the company operation. . .

4.3 **Training:** To make Dene and **Metis** staff take over more **complete(sic)**, more training in administration i.e. writing skills and social training i.e. alcohol counseling is required. . . Shehtah should seriously consider working in conjunction with COGLA who are ultimately **responsible for** drilling on Canada lands. A special **training** program can be designed to accommodate the sensitive environment and harsh working conditions. . . Shehtah employees and board members should be prepared to work with local high schools

4.4 The Dene and Metis should be taking every opportunity possible in utilizing **Esso's** expertise in the oil business. ..have some Shehtah board members and employees tour some world wide operations. Or, set up an exchange program where Shehtah employees can get direct experience in alternative types of drilling. . .

4.5 The Dene and **Metis** must direct **Shehtah** Drilling to begin seeking new contract possibilities immediately

4.6 The Dene and **Metis** should consider providing alternate board members. ..**this** situation would provide for more participation and shared knowledge by Dene and **Metis**.

4.7 If the Dene and Metis plan to engage in future joint ventures, there are some procedures they may want to consider. They include:

a) Maintaining the traditional process of community consultation established by their respective organizations (corporations);

b) Continue to seek professional advice, so Dene and **Metis** are equals when negotiating with other parties;

c) Provide information on the Joint Venture to the general public on an on-going basis.

5. Mid-Project Evaluation of Selected Issues Related to the Norman Wells project co-ordination office.

Prepared for: Evaluation Branch, **DIAND**; by InterGroup Consulting Economists Ltd., Winnipeg.
October 1984.

5.1 the degree of authority over regulatory activities given to the **NWPCO** remain unchanged during the remainder of the Norman Wells project;

5.2 the initiatives presently underway to raise the reporting level of the Norman Wells Project **Co-ordinator** within **DIAND** be supported by **DIAND** Senior Management;

5.3 the end-of-project evaluation include further investigation and elaboration of the factors that contributed to the finding that the degree of authority given to the **NWPCO** for regulatory co-ordination was appropriate . It may also be beneficial to compare the Norman Wells experience with related management practices in areas outside of the resource management and development field to determine whether the conclusions presented in this report fit with experience elsewhere;

5.4.1 the "no authority" (**NWCPO**) approach be taken **as** the starting point in designing the regulatory co-ordination approach for future major oil and gas projects;

5.4.2 a careful assessment be made of the regulatory environment affecting a future project to determine if this level of authority is appropriate;

5.4.3 more authority be given only **if** the need **is** strongly substantiated. Such substantiations would have to demonstrate clearly that several of the factors that enabled the "no authority" approach to function on the Norman Wells project would not and could not exist for the future project being examined;

5.4.4 if there is doubt about giving more authority, then no more authority should be provided.

5.5 on future projects, the Co-ordination Office be **fully** operational in **the** project planning stage, preferably as soon as an application for the project is received by the government. To be most effective, there should be an high degree of continuity in the co-ordination office staff, especially regarding the position of the **Co-ordinator**.

5.6 every effort be made to get the sizable remainder of the impact management funds disbursed as soon as possible. **..As** there is not enough time or activity left in the construction phase to use the funds properly, the eligible period for funding should, if possible, be extended into the operations phase of the project to maximize the time available to use the funds;

5.7 **DIAND** Senior Management explore alternative authorization processes that could reduce the delays inherent in the current system. If on future projects impact funding is to be used and Treasury Board approval is required, the Department should:

5.7.1 review in detail the experience of the Norman Wells project. **..Separate** manuals could be prepared for groups that would apply for funds, the Co-ordination Officer in **DIAND** and the financial administration staff of **DIAND**;

5.7.2 resolve broad issues of **eligibility** for funding with potential recipients before the availability of funding is announced. **..At** the time of the announcement of the availability of impact funding, make it very clear that Treasury Board authorization is required and how much time the authorization process can take;

5.7.3 . . hold workshops in the North with groups eligible for funding describing what is required in a proposal, how to develop proposals, what happens to a proposal once **it is** received, and

what kinds of terms and conditions are **likely** to be applied to funding;

5.7.4 encourage and **assist** groups applying for funds to make requests that will provide funding for several years. **..Make** contribution agreements sufficiently broad so their interpretation can permit some adjustment in the use of such funds as needs are clarified or modified;

5.7.5 use staff who are knowledgeable about the complexities of the Treasury Board approval process.

5.8 **NWPCO's** mandate be adjusted to accommodate the objective "to resolve northern **native** concerns that might impede progress on the Norman Wells Project." . . . On future projects, a conscious decision should be made regarding the inclusion of a similar objective in the mandate of a federal project co-ordination and management- agency;

5.9 . . .On future projects consideration should be given to a communications coordination role parallel **to** the agency's regulatory coordination role, to ensure some coherence to federal communications **vis-a-vis** the project. . .

5.10 **in** future projects, as **in** the Norman Wells project, no particular priority in terms of the attention to be devoted to each objective be attached in advance to the objectives for a federal project co-ordination and management agency. However, **if** the agency's objectives conflict, a process should be established to provide the **co-ordinator** with ready access to senior **decision-**makers to resolve those conflicts;

5.11 in future projects, consideration be given to a more active, audit-oriented approach to complement the response-to-complaint approach used **in** the Norman Wells project. . .

5.12 in planning for future projects, the need for either a penalty or an incentives system for **socio-economic** terms and conditions be examined and **if** deemed necessary, appropriate legislation established;

5.13 the "by exception" approach to regulatory co-ordination, as used on the Norman Wells project, be adopted for future major hydrocarbon and pipeline projects **in** the North, unless some strong rationale can be established. . .

5.14 more work be carried out on mechanisms for solving regulatory co-ordination problems within the "by exception" approach. Particular attention should be given to the following mechanisms or combination of mechanisms:

a) voluntary mediation;

- b) **blinding** mediation;
- c) voluntary mediation with arbitration as a recourse of last resort;

5.15 . . much more attention be given to experience in this area ("by-exception" approach), both on the Norman Wells project and on other projects that involve impact management, and to the identification and assessment of appropriate problem solving mechanisms for impact management problems. . .

6. Submission by the Dene Nation to the N.W.T. Water Board re: Licenses N3L3-0094 and N3L3-0919, Norman Wells N.W.T. Dene Nation. Yellowknife N.W.T. February 27, 1985.

General Recommendations:

6.1 That the **N.W.T.** Water Board conduct hearings under 5.15(1) of the Northern Inland Waters Act, relating to its objects within this water management area;

6.2 That the **N.W.T.** Water Board **derive** prescribed water quality standards, and water use priorities, to be used as Guidelines for establishment of terms and conditions;

6.3 That the **N.W.T.** Water Board protect and **give** priority to traditional **instream** uses of the Mackenzie River Basin by people of Dene descent before these waters can be further licensed for use. by the applicant and others associated with this and related and unrelated industrial undertakings;

"6.4 That no further Water **Licence** be granted in the **Mackenzie** River Basin until 1-4 above are accomplished;

6.5 That the Water Board actively solicit and support proposals for more comprehensive monitoring, research and survey programs, based on recognition of the necessity of this information for determining appropriate water quality standards and for discharging its license responsibilities;

6.6 That the **N.W.T.** Water Board expand its support staff to include a research and analysis function; and expand its jurisdiction to include enforcement capability. In the interim, the Board should require a greater commitment of time and input from **T.A.C.** members.

Recommendations specific to water quality associated with the Norman Wells development:

6.7 That the Water Board immediately initiate the necessary proceedings to **re-write** Water Licenses **N3L3-0094** and **N3L3-0919**, in order to ensure a more stringent monitoring regime;

6.8 That the water Board take into consideration the **EPS**-sponsored study on Mackenzie River Water Quality, and the concerns outlined above, in **re-drafting Esso's** licenses;

6.9 That the Board delay any decision on **Esso's** request on decantment of sump fluids until the sub-committee recommendations are finalized, and until the Guidelines referred to in Recommendation A-2 have been established.

7. The Dene Experience with the Norman Wells Pipeline: an Interim Evaluation.

Prepared for the Dene Nation, Norman Wells Monitoring Program, by **Fee-Yee** Consulting Ltd.
July 09, 1985.

General Recommendations:

7.1 There should be no further major development projects approved for Denendeh until:

a) The **Dene/Metis** have a negotiated aboriginal rights settlement, which guarantees participation in the management of resources and resource development along the principles outlined below; and

b) until there is an overall Land Use Plan approved for the Western Arctic.

7.2 Failing the above, there should at be at least a five-year delay on approval of the Polar Gas project or any other **major** developments, to allow long-term assessment of the impacts of Norman Wells, and to enable the Dene and northern communities to take measures to lessen the negative impacts and maximize the benefits.

7.3 The Dene leadership must provide clear direction to headquarters staff about what the position is on future projects. . .

7.4 . . .there must be a well-organized staff component at the head office keeping on top of project proposals and lobbying government. . .

7.5 Recommendations on further research and follow-up:

- a) a professional evaluation of the Bone study;
- b) review of the impacts of project wind-down;
- c) environmental impacts (monitored and a five-year report produced);

7.6 Recommendations on principles of a negotiated agreement on lands and resources:

a) The **Dene/Metis** have the right to meaningful participation in the development of all resources - i.e. at least 50% representation on all boards, committees, and other institutions involved in decision-making;

b) **The Dene/Metis** have the right to identify research needs, initiate and participate in research; and to have adequate funding to do so as part of the settlement;

c) A new management regime should be negotiated for land and resources which takes over responsibility which is now divided among at least 8 government departments and agencies, and which has the following features:

-does away with the present situation where jurisdiction is split among several government departments, resulting in confusion and duplication;

-guarantees a public review process for all proposed developments of a certain scale;

-includes a mechanism for direct involvement in the review process by the regions/communities most affected.

8. A Downstream Perspective: Dene Concerns with the Environmental Assessment, Monitoring and Surveillance of the Norman Wells Project, with Particular Reference to Fish and Water Quality.

Prepared for the Dene Nation, Yellowknife N.W.T., by Fee-Yee Consulting Ltd.
August 1985.

8.1 That local and particularly native knowledge and understanding of the environment be accepted as equal to that of the "experts" . . .

8.2 That long-term funding for collection of baseline data and on-going impact monitoring be assured prior to project approval. And that local people, through their own governing institutions, be the decision-makers in such studies. . .

8.3 That related Agencies such as DFO be assured of full intervener status **at** every **pre-approval** process and (receive) adequate funding to address both baseline data and impact monitoring needs.

8.4 That impact prediction be recognized as part of a cycle of monitoring, so that the results. . are fed back into the predictive process for the next project.

8.5 That the Water Board be **provided** with **adequate** staff resources to conduct on-going **research** and **analysis** on issues affecting NWT waters; and further that the Board take over enforcement of its licenses from INAC;

8.6 That long-term, cumulative monitoring become a funding priority, including funding from industry as part of **their** rate bases at the time of approval;

8.7 That **DIAND**, among others, undertake to ensure compliance with land use permits, and Water licenses, including prosecution and permit-cancellation when justified;

8.8 That the EARP process and/or other environmental assessment processes be given some kind of legislative base and authority to ensure inclusion of their recommendations in terms and conditions applied to projects;

8.9 That the Dene be guaranteed a meaningful and funded role in project surveillance and monitoring, and that this include the raising of environmental standards where national standards are insufficient to protect Dene land;

8.10, That the knowledge of local people be recognized and included on an on-going basis i.e. during surveillance and monitoring as well as assessment. . .

9. **Environmental Regulation and Monitoring of the Norman Wells Project: a case history of dene involvement.**
Prepared for the Dene Nation by Fee-Yee consulting Ltd.
September 1985.

9.1 The impact assessment and regulatory review process must be improved and streamlined. Responsibility for environmental regulation and management should **reside** with a single agency.

9.2 Recommendations of EARP panels and/or other assessment processes should be binding on regulatory agencies.

9.3 Standards and guidelines which reflect the northern environment, and **which may** be more stringent than existing federal guidelines, should be set.

9.4 Provision must be made for the formal involvement of native resource users in all aspects of the impact assessment and review process, in establishment of environmental standards and regulations, in surveillance monitoring and impact monitoring. . .

9.5 Government and industry **must** recognize the need for more thorough documentation of baseline data . . . Long-term funding for collection of baseline data and on-going monitoring should be assured prior to project approval.

9.6 The knowledge of native resource users **should** be recognized . and incorporated into baseline documentation, **impact** assessment and monitoring.

9.7 Impact prediction must be recognized as part of a cycle of **monitoring** so that results are fed into the predictive processes for other-projects.

10. The Dene Experience with the Norman Wells Pipeline Project:
Mid-Term Evaluation.

Dene Nation, Yellowknife N.W.T.
September 1985.

10.1 Immediate implementation of an accepted Land Use Plan for the Mackenzie Valley and Delta, and implementation of that plan.

10.2 Firm funding commitments to finish up unfinished business **re: Norman Wells**. This includes several years funding for the fish study and the water quality study and funding for a professional, outside evaluation of the socio-economic monitoring study ("Dr. Bone") and an evaluation of our Community and **Social** Development Program.

10.3 Guaranteed funding commitments to **fill** remaining gaps in baseline data (ex. ungulates, **fish** and fur-bearers).

10.4 A serious review of jurisdictional problems, especially as they affect DFO and EPS.

10.5 The negotiation of an improved Environmental Assessment Process, to include the Dene and GNWT as equal partners with the federal government. . . This should be done with reference to the content of aboriginal rights negotiations so that the transfer will be smooth.

10.6 The initiation of community permitting of research, in conjunction with the licensing system of the NWT Science Institute.

10.7 The transfer of enforcement **powers** for **Water Use** Licenses from INAC to the Water Board, with the necessary staff resources and funding.

10.8 That a full and public evaluation of the Norman Wells Project be undertaken, including the approval, decision making, management and regulations associated with it. This evaluation should be publicly funded and conducted by an independent individual. . . .

10.9 That this evaluation closely examine the type of regulatory/management process to be established for future projects **in light** of past **Dene/Metis** proposals for equal representation in the Norman **Wells** regulatory/management process and the current implementation of a **N.W.T.** land use planning process and aboriginal rights negotiations.

10.10 That this evaluation be a forum for communities to measure and assess their own impacts and to respond with recommendations accordingly and that they be given the resources to conduct this assessment prior to the public evaluation.

10.11 The establishment of a **NWT** Legislative Special Committee Inquiry on the Economic and Social Future of the N.W.T. . . .

10.12 Firm enforcement of the above recommendations before another project can reach the hearing stage. . . .

11. Special Federal Programs for the Norman Wells Project: Evaluation and Review of Alternatives.
Prepared for Evaluation Branch, **DIAND**, by InterGroup Consultants Ltd., Winnipeg, Manitoba.
October 1985

11.1 To the extent practicable, have separate programs to deal with the objectives of facilitating progress on the project and managing northern impacts. The federal government should maintain responsibility for programs addressing the former objective and the GNWT should be given responsibility for the latter objective.

11.2 A planning process for northern impact management should be formulated prior to project approval and carried out in the year immediately following project-approval. The ability to conduct such a program effectively depends significantly on settlement of

the **Dene/Metis** land claim and on **resolving** the **devolution** of authority for northern impact management to the GNWT by the time the planning process begins.

11.3 . . . If a regulatory co-ordination office is deemed necessary, the approach used should be similar to that of Norman Wells, i.e., problem-solving through **suasion** on a by-exception basis.

11.4 A project mediator or arbitrator should be appointed by the federal government to deal with serious situations only. This should be on a part-time, as-needed basis.

11.5 The GNWT should establish one or more central complaints offices for the project to attract, filter and follow up on project-related complaints.

11.6 Federal and territorial government policy should be established to determine who has responsibility. **in** the socio-economic surveillance area. A more pro-active, systematic, and intensive approach to **socio-economic** compliance monitoring should be established.

11.7 Government agencies responsible for environmental and socio-economic compliance monitoring should consider establishing monitoring committees that include members of the public.

11.8 Impact funding should take place in two phases. Phase 1 funding would **assist** groups to participate in the impact management planning process. . . Phase 2 funding would support programs identified by this process that require funding. Only clearly specified programs should be funded.

11.9 Treasury Board and **DIAND** should establish a review committee to determine how processing of impact funding proposals can be streamlined. . .

11.10 The federal government should avoid providing funding to compensate groups which oppose a project. However, if this **is** done, it should be explicitly recognized as such as funds should be given as a grant.

11.11 Future Project Co-ordination Committees should have less federal representation and include **members of** groups representing communities. Their main role should be recognized as information exchange and discussion of selected key issues.

11.12 Senior government should strive to make DIZ groups or Regional Councils the main vehicle for representing communities on future developments. DIZ groups and native organizations will have to resolve their roles **in** this regard.

11.13 Group(s) representing communities should have a much greater role than the Community Advisory Committee had on the Norman Wells project. They should be supplied with resources to operate their own secretariat as well as being considered for functional **responsibilities** in **such** areas as disseminating project-related information **in** communities and administering impact management monitoring programs. Such groups should be operating prior to project approval.

12. **An Assessment of Training Initiatives Associated with the Norman Wells Project.**
 Prepared for the Dene Nation, Yellowknife N.W.T., by **Fee-Yee Consulting Ltd.**
April 1986.

Policy Recommendations:

12.1 The Dene Nation should establish a permanent Education and Training Unit. The first tasks of that unit should include:

a) a **co-ordinated** review of all training and adult education initiatives in the N.W.T., in consultation **with the Metis Association, Native Women's Association, Native Communications Society, Regional Councils** and other appropriate organizations;

b) a review of current **GNWT/CEIC** relationship, agreements and commitments;

c) an up-to-date review of CEIC national criteria and their implications for the **Dene/Metis**;

d) development of a five-year action plan.

12.2 The Dene Nation should initiate an intensive lobbying effort at both a political, and administrative level, for policies more geared to northern needs and priorities.

12.3 The Dene Nation, or an appropriate arm of the organization, should investigate the possibility of becoming accredited as a training institute by the **GNWT**. This would enable the organization to determine priorities, implement and deliver training programs, and access CEIC funds.

12.4 For specific future development projects, training funds should be controlled by a neutral body, and there should be clearly negotiated terms of reference before any actors are allowed to access the funds.

12.5 In whatever coordinating mechanisms are established for future projects, all parties should agree to **interim goals, and** to

evaluate whether these goals have **been** achieved before proceeding to the next phase of the project.

12.6 Education, and training as part of that, should be reinstated as an item for negotiation at the aboriginal rights table. . .

13. The Norman Wells Pipeline Project: a report on labour and employment issues.
 James M. Evoy, Construction and General Workers Union,
 Yellowknife N.W.T.
 September, 1985.

Note: This document contains numerous and detailed recommendations regarding the role of unions on future projects, camp site and working conditions, safety, management/employee relations, etc. We have omitted from this paper those recommendations which relate to the details of project implementation, and included only those with a **policy** thrust. All the recommendations should be considered carefully, however, in planning for any future pipeline projects in the north.

13.1 The overlap in union areas of geographical jurisdiction (known to unions as territorial jurisdiction) should be rectified before any further development takes place in the North.

13.2 The **grey** areas of work jurisdiction, where it **is** not clear which union should have jurisdiction, should automatically be given to those unions which are demonstrating their commitment to Northern hire.

13.3 Northern businesses must come to terms **with** unions **and** collective bargaining and not try to argue for their exemption from the same **labour** relations conditions which apply throughout the country.

13.4 The Collective Agreement should be consistent in its treatment of northern hiring practices.

13.5 A **policy** statement from the Dene Nation and **Metis** Association about short-term "bubble" jobs is of paramount importance. people such as myself are left totally confused by the contradiction between public statements opposing short-term seasonal jobs and the demand from unemployed **people** in the communities for mainline jobs.

13.6 . . .an agency, board *or* commission should be set in place to carry out co-ordination and monitoring. (Proposed structure to look like this:

Co-ordinator	Chairman	Federal Government
Member	co-chairman	GNWT
Members	Dene/Metis	Executive
Members	Dene/Metis	Community rep.
Member	Industry	Proponent
Member	Organized Labour	Manpower Delivery System)

13.7 **All** regulatory, environmental and socio-economic and other monitoring functions should "report directly to the Co-ordination Office.

13.8 The head of the Manpower Delivery System should report to the **Co-ordinator**.

13.9 The word Federal should be dropped from the title of the (**co-ordinating**) office.

13.10 Most of the groundwork and rules will be in place before the start of the next project, but the **Co-ordinator**, in conjunction with his select "**super-committee**" could act more as an ombudsman/arbitrator during the project.

13.11 **DIAND** should not be the department used for the co-ordination function."

13.12 Jurisdictional debates between the federal and territorial governments, and between various departments, over areas relating to the next phase of development **must be resolved before** the next project begins.

13.13 Training should be timed so that it is as close **as** possible to actual job exposure. **Apprenticeships** would be better served on the pump stations, camp construction and maintenance, than on mainline construction.

13.14 Cross-cultural seminars should be included **in** future training programs.

13.15 Northern residency should be clearly defined before future development takes place.. My recommendation for residency requirement is the same as that of the Dene Nation - ten years.

13.16 During the transfer of powers from the federal government to the **GNWT**, a department of Labour **should** be a **top** priority.

13.17 Government **must** develop an exact **figure** of how many jobs they expect from the next pipeline project, and this 'could be used as the guideline for hiring.

13.18 A land claims or aboriginal rights settlement should be negotiated with the Dene and Metis before any further major projects are allowed to go ahead.

13.19 The Dene and **Metis** must become actively involved in all facets of monitoring of any employment and training programs and **must** be funded accordingly.

14. An Appendix to Norman Wells Project Co-Ordinator: a Retrospective Reflection. An Environmental Review.

Prepared by Land Resources, INAC, N.W.T. Region. Yellowknife N.W.T.
September 1985.

14.1 The current regulatory framework which oversaw pipeline construction should be reviewed with the objective of clarifying the roles of the **many agencies** involved to simplify and strengthen the environmental management task.

14.2 The use of general 'umbrella'-type agreements **should** be evaluated to determine their effectiveness. If employed in future projects, these agreements should be crafted to reflect more precision in the results intended and more detail **in** the measurable efforts expected.

14.3 Current monitoring programs should be critically evaluated annually to determine if existing programs address key environmental protection (and **geotechnical**) issues. . .

14.4 **All** attempts should be made **to** increase efficiency and decrease costs of monitoring programs, without adversely affecting quality of monitoring, through continued integration of activities of government departments.

14.5 Monitoring programs should be designed to **provide** data useful for evaluation construction techniques and mitigative measures against the objective of environmental protection. Monitoring **is** a key **element of the project management and regulatory** framework and as such should be designed and funded early in the project review and approval process.

15. Norman Wells Review.

Government of the N.W.T. Yellowknife, N.W.T.

September, 1985.

15.1 A project **co-ordinating** office must be established with sufficient lead time to deal with all aspects of development projects commencing with project planning.

15.2 A (territorial) Project Co-ordination Office be established in **Yellowknife** to deal with specific projects

15.3 A revenue-sharing agreement **must be negotiated**. The GNWT must have a role in planning and **co-ordinating** the allocation of funds to all agencies involved.

15.4 Priority must be placed on comprehensive community planning for communities likely to be affected by similar projects. . .

15.5 The GNWT should not necessarily support the use of **EARP** review **for** each specific hydrocarbon project in the Beaufort and Mackenzie Valley. . .The GNWT should develop its own **community-based** project review and assessment process **to** deal with environmental and **socio-economic** matters **in** the absence of federally-mandated hearings. . . Where appropriate, the recommendations of the project review should be tied into the regulatory process. . .

15.6 GNWT needs to change its role from intervener to a position where the GNWT is a participant in developing the guidelines used by the NEB.

15.7 The GNWT should develop its own legislative base for resource development, including building standards, **labour**, environmental protection and land use.

15.8 The GNWT **must put top priority and concentrate maximum energy on devolution** in order to take full control and **management of** resource development. This will, of necessity, include roles presently performed by **COGLA, CEIC** and NAP.

15.9 The GNWT needs to improve **its** data base from which to monitor socio-economic and environmental effects Regional participation **in** monitoring at the community level must be expanded so that northern residents are more involved in meaningful social, economic and environmental monitoring.

15.10 Assign the Energy, Mines and Resources Secretariat the task of defining and designing an acceptable program of northern consultation and communication with respect to resource development. Use the GNWT Project **Co-ordinator** as the focal point of (information) contact.

15.11 **proponents, labour unions,** and federal agencies, like the NEB and **FEARO,** should establish offices **in** the NWT for the duration of projects north of 60.

15.12 Guidelines, safety programs and understanding of the **NWT** Safety Regulations should be developed before the project starts. . .

15.13 . . . Department of Social Services need to develop and expand a data base and monitoring system. . .

15.14 An Environmental Protection Plan should be produced by the company and approved as a regulatory document. . . Contingency plans should be part of this document. Government agencies and industry should work co-operatively to amend the EPP to meet their requirements . . .

15.15 Government should consider a more co-operative approach to environmental inspection. This may require a team approach similar to the Joint Fish and Wildlife Advisory Team used in Alaska.

15.16 Government must encourage community participation **in** developing compensation plans for development projects. . .

15.17 Government must recognize the need to establish high standards of environmental operating procedures and ensure there is an adequate level of **enforcement to** ensure compliance with the standards in every case.

15.18 The GNWT must have the lead role for training programs in the NWT..

15.19 The GNWT should enact **labour** legislation that would set out GNWT objectives for union **activity.** The GNWT needs to maintain regular and reliable **labour** force data and to **develop** and implement employment guidelines. . .

15.20 Clear, specific, business-development objectives and priorities should be identified and should reflect regional and community differences. . . Training should be provided for small businesses in order for them to participate fully in resource development projects.

16. Norman Wells Expansion Protect. Wrap-Up Review.
Environmental Impacts and Their Management.

J.W. Deyell, Production Projects Manager, Esso Resources
Canada Ltd., Calgary, Alberta.
September 26, 1986.

16.1 The developer should:

a) develop a regulatory approvals and compliance planning system early **in** the project to ensure that good control systems are in place from the start;

b) aggressively pursue approvals to satisfy regulatory requirements;

c) establish open, cooperative relationships **with** all stakeholders and set up an infrastructure of coordinating groups early in the project. . .

1-6.2 Government should:

a) accept greater responsibility for collecting baseline data necessary for the responsible management of northern development;

b) develop realistic monitoring strategies for large projects at project inception. . .;

c) provide adequate funding and encourage industry participation in Research and Monitoring Working Groups;

d) develop a program to publish and disseminate research findings publicly.

17. Norman Wells Expansion Project. Wrap up Review. Community Impacts and their Management.

J.W. Deyell, Production Projects Manager, Esso Resources .
Canada Ltd., Calgary, Alberta.
September 25, 1986.

17.1 The developer should:

a) avoid raising unrealistic expectations by taking too much of a sales approach to obtain project approval;

b) work closely with the communities to establish realistic expectations and customize the approach to achieve them;

c) confine negotiations and consultation to the communities that need to be negotiated and consulted with;

d) determine precisely. what concerns the local community

has, then address these specific issues, rather than only **supply** vast quantities of information about the project. . .;

e) support community-based initiatives as much as possible;

f) work with all the key stakeholders. . .to provide a framework in **which** responsibilities are well defined and to understand their viewpoints and values.:

17.2 The communities should:

a) work through existing, representative community groups that have clear responsibilities and mandates, such as **hamlet or band councils**, and avoid creating ad hoc committees;

b) recognize that funding community infrastructure and programs that are not managed and controlled by the developer are not the developer's responsibility.

18. Norman Wells Expansion Project. Wrap-Up Review. Economic Development Impact.

J.W. Deyell, Production Projects Manager, Esso Resources Canada Ltd., Calgary, Alberta.
September 24, 1986.

18.1 The developer should:

a) apply the same employment and training standards to small contractors as are applied to large ones. . .

b) have a study done early in the project to identify and prioritize the potential employment and training issues that need to be managed, then manage the issues, including the public image of them, carefully;

c) ensure that all employees hired to work for a contractor or subcontractor through the developer's employment office clearly understand that they are working for a contractor or subcontractor. . .

d) determine the level of detail required to meet internal and external requirements for monitoring both project and contractors' performance, then develop appropriate monitoring systems and methods.

e) look for ways to break work down into small packages to help small firms participate in the business opportunities available;

f) set criteria for joint ventures and encourage those that offer skill development, not just financial benefits;

g) help inexperienced northern businesses to obtain permits for work on union sites;

h) limit the use of **public** meetings and hold more open house meetings at which **individual** issues can be dealt with more effectively.

18.2 Government should:

a) consider releasing information to the developer about candidates **who** have successfully completed government training programs;

b) provide new businesses with the extra support they need;

c) consider funding courses for new businesses that are starting up;

d) work special funding, such as ARDA, early and aggressively.

19. Norman Wells Expansion Project. Wrap up Review.

Regulatory and Government Management.

J.W. Deyell, Production Projects Manager, Esso Resources Canada Ltd., Calgary, Alberta.
September 25, 1986.

19.1 The developer should:

a) start discussions with the federal department sponsoring the project and with advisory departments as early as possible;

b) allow enough time to conduct the required **impact** assessments and firm up project design before applying for approvals;

c) assign responsibility for managing the impact assessments to the team that will be responsible for designing the project and for obtaining project approval. . .

d) obtain a thorough understanding of the formal and informal government review processes. . .;

e) establish computerized regulatory control systems at the start of the project;

f) ensure that all project contractors comply with the project's **socio-economic** initiatives.

19.2 Government should:

a) assign one Project Coordinator exclusively to a project as soon as a project application has been filed. . .;

b) ensure that the Project Coordinator has sufficient authority to allow rapid, decisive decisions to be made;

c) improve communications and coordination between regulatory agencies that have overlapping jurisdictions;

d) ensure that all government departments likely to be involved in the regulatory process thoroughly understand the technical aspects of the project before they become involved in a **public** hearing process;

e) consider inviting a developer's representative to join Technical Advisory or other committees to ensure that concerns relevant to the developer are addressed immediately and productively.

20. PCC Wrad-Ud Review of Norman Wells Project: Proceedings and Papers.

Prepared by InterGroup Consultants Ltd., Winnipeg, Manitoba, and Rosemary Cairns, Yellowknife N.W.T.
September 24-26, 1985

Recommendations proposed by **IPL(NW)** Ltd.:

20.1 Proponents, agencies, governments and the public must be more specific in spelling out their expectations and tying those expectations to what is achievable. . .

20.2 The roles of the various groups involved must be clearly defined and understood.

20.3 There needs to be a better delineation of the roles and responsibilities of government agencies involved in regulating major projects. Something should be done to streamline the regulatory process and improve co-ordination among regulatory agencies. . .another northern Pipeline Agency is not needed.

20.4 The role of **DIZ** groups and Regional Councils should be clarified in regard to community impact for future projects.

20.5 Government should provide better services to northern business so that they can more effectively prepare for resource development opportunities. . .

20.6 There should be better environmental and **socio-economic** baseline information developed prior to construction.

Recommendations proposed by DIAND-NAP:

20.7 There be a strong central **socio-economic** government structure to monitor and deliver training, employment and economic development programs;

20.8 Regulatory framework be reviewed to clarify roles, simplify and strengthen environmental management tasks;

20.9 Environmental monitoring programs be designed, co-ordinated and funded early in the project review and approval process.

Recommendations proposed by the **GNWT:**

20.10 The GNWT should pursue the transfer of authority through **devolution** and development of a legislative base (in such areas as resource development, **labour** and building standards) internally to take on that task;

20.11 Defining of roles and responsibilities is needed prior to project approval;

20.12 Impact management planning should begin prior to project approval.

Recommendations proposed by **CEIC:**

20.13 Clearly-defined roles, responsibilities and accountabilities are needed at the outset of the project;

20.14 An impact planning process and project **co-ordination** should be in place before project approval;

20.15 Early identification of human resource requirements of the project so that employment and training can be designed to meet needs before, during and after the project.

20.16 Any future project should be done **in** the context of the long-range needs of the population which is being affected. **Don't** look at a project as a project unto itself; look at the total picture.

20.17 Sub-contractors in both the north and the south should be held accountable to the **socio-economic** policies of the project.

Recommendations proposed by **DIAND-PCO**:

20.18 Early establishment of a major projects co-ordination or management **office** involving both levels of government and native organizations which would be responsible for the project from 'cradle to **grave**" from planning to post-construction monitoring.

20.19 Benefits and expectations should be defined very clearly at the outset of the project, including a description of how many jobs might be available, the dollar value of contracts and **in** what areas these contracts might be disbursed in the north.

20.20 Greater community Involvement in the project as a whole including 'training, access to jobs, contracts, on-going impact. monitoring; such involvement to take place from the planning stages .

20.21 The socio-economic compliance and **post-project monitoring process** has to be **strengthened**, and the **lead responsibility** should be assigned to the **GNWT**.

Recommendations proposed by the **Metis** Association of the NUT:

20.22 ..there must be a resolution of native claims In the N.W.T

Recommendations proposed by the Dene Nation:

20.23 Substantial funding provided without red tape must **be** available to the Dene and Met is. . .

20.24 Aboriginal land rights must be settled before any more developments of this kind are allowed to go ahead. . .

20.25 Ongoing funding should be provided to study the fish problems in the Mackenzie River.

Recommendations proposed by the NEB:

20.26 A framework for impact management, planning and problem resolution similar to an expanded **FEARO** or **DIZ** process which would allow government to -set its priorities in a pro-active rather than reactive manner would be very beneficial in the North where resources are limited.

20.27 Government departments **in** the North should have funding to undertake **co-ordinated** long-term programs; performance guidelines should be appended to these programs; and information which develops from all projects, not just energy projects, should be centralized within the **GNWT**.

20.28 Better communication of project opportunities and limitations.

Recommendations proposed by **DIAND-I** & IA:

20.29 No further development take place **until** land claims are settled. **At** that time, all the other recommendations can be addressed..

Recommendations proposed by Esso Resources Ltd.:

20.30 A clarification of the roles of the various groups involved is needed.

20.31 Communication is vitally important and must be constantly worked at.

20.32 Define early on the people who have a stake in the project and what their role is.

Recommendations proposed by Wrap-Up Session Chairman:

20.33 **...every** effort should be made to achieve expeditious **devolution** of responsibilities for impact management from the federal government to the GNWT and settlement of the Dene/Metis land **claims**.

20.34 **...A** framework for the planning process needs to be developed prior to approval and the planning process **must** begin immediately after approval. This process should meaningfully involve all key groups with an expressed interest in the project including proponents, federal government, territorial government, native organizations, **DIZ** groups and communities. The planning process should anticipate impact, identify impact management programs, resolve roles and responsibilities for these programs and determine requirements for impact funding. The GNWT should provide leadership in the **process**.

20.35 Roles and responsibilities and accountability for impact management, particularly in the areas of training, environmental monitoring and **socio-economic compliance monitoring** should be clarified and resolved prior to project approval or soon thereafter.

20.36 Government and industry should be more accurate and complete in the information that they provide to northern residents about a proposed project during the **pre-approval** and **pre-construction** periods. . .

20.37 The federal government and the GNWT should try to streamline the regulatory process. . . At the same time, regulations to more effectively deal with fish and water quality impacts should be considered. A significant role for native organizations and communities in the regulatory process should be examined.

20.38 Government should recognize in their programming the need to help northern residents, communities and especially businesses cope with the reduced level of activity that occurs after the construction phase of a major project has been completed.

21. Socio-Economic Impact Evaluation of the Norman Wells Pipeline Project.

Dene Band Council. Fort Simpson NWT.
September 1984.

Note: Recommendations which were applicable only to the duration of the Norman Wells project have been excluded. Those which could apply on future projects have been included.

21.1 There **is** a dire need for an employment liaison **counsellor** at each work/camp site.

21.2 IPL and sub-contractors must respond to inquiries about employment, any applications received and training requests.

21.3 IPL and sub-contractors hire according to a list of people provided by the Dene Council.

21.4 That there be set up a process to review cases, of unfair firings or people who were forced to quit. **..This** could be carried - (out) by either the Labour Board or Manpower Office of the Government of NWT.

21.5 IPL establish training on the job for the nine (9) permanent positions **in** Fort Simpson. . .

21.6 IPL create more training **in** the areas of **mantainance** (sic) and for short term positions **ie:** welding, **pipefitting**, etc. . .

21.7 IPL place trainees in job positions that they are **qualified** for...

21.8 (Training positions).. **.should** be expanded to include more than one position, as to increase the **skills** of interested Dene. . .

21.9 That the Governments involved establish more training courses in the community regarding Heavy Equipment Operators, Welding, **Pipefitting**, etc.

21.10 There be a cross-cultural training for all management and personnel of IPL and its sub-contractors, including the Unions.

21.11 **The** Unions are to establish Northern hire officers in the communities so local people can access and ensure employment on construction.

21.12 Community visits by the various Unions to explain their system and assist people to enter a Union should be compulsory.

21.13 **(CEIC)** must **asssist** locals to get employment by confirming all applications filed.

21.14 **(CEIC)** **must** assist Dene and Northerners (to) get into training positions so that they can eventually have long term employment.

21.15 **(CEIC)** must inform the people of how they can get into the Unions so they can get jobs.

21.16 The Proponent assist in getting day care services **for** families that are employed by them.

21.17 IPL implement alcohol and drug awareness programs by having counselors suited to this role in the camps.

21.18 That the establishment of a monitoring agency include the membership of Dene Elders.

21.19 That needs and concerns of affected Dene Harvesters areas be the main concern on any construction (on) the land.

21.20 The Council have on hand a readily available waiting list of potential employees for any type of employment available.

21.21 The Dene Council have direct input **in** the hiring of local people on any development project in (the) area.

21.22 The Council establish a **Union** type operation for the Dene to work on the Pipeline.

21.23 That there be a political move by the Dene Politicians to cut out the Unions in the North due to the experiences of the Dene over the last winter.

21.24 **IPL** must **address** the compensation for all the Dene Harvesters that have been impacted by the Pipeline Project.

21.25 IPL must contact the Fur Harvesters about pipeline activities **in their** areas "prior to commencement of activities. This must not be done through letters but on a face to face basis.

APPENDIX II: DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

1) Documents prepared by or for the Dene Nation:

1981

"Memorandum" . Fred Gudmundson to Georges Erasmus et al.
November 19, 1981.

"Imposition of the Dene Nation on the Norman Wells Project."
Dene Nation. Prepared for the Minister of Indian Affairs
and Northern Development. December 7, 1981.

1983

"Dene Involvement in Environmental Monitoring of the Norman Wells
Project: a proposal". Dene Nation. Submitted to Project Co-
ordinating Committee. November 30, 1983.

"Design Elements of Dene Monitoring Program for Esso Norman Wells
and IPL Pipeline Development. (Draft) ". Hatfield Consultants
Ltd. for Dene Nation. December 1983.

"Discussion Paper on the Monitoring of the Norman Wells Oilfield
and Pipeline." Dene Nation. August 1983.

"E.A.R.P. and N.E.B.: The Norman Wells Experience." Dene Nation.
Supporting Document to Dene Nation Brief to Beaufort Sea
Environmental Assessment Panel. December 1983.

"An Example from the Norman Wells Experience: handling and
storage of fuels, lubricants and other toxic substances,
including spill contingency plans." Dene Nation. Supporting
document to Dene Nation Brief to Beaufort Sea Environmental
Assessment Panel. December 1983.

"From Norman Wells to the Beaufort Sea: lessons to be learned."
Dene Nation: Georges Erasmus. Brief to Beaufort Sea
Environmental Assessment Panel. December 9, 1983.

"Interim Agreement for the Ownership, Operation and Monitoring
of the Norman Wells Oilfield and Pipeline." Dene Nation.
August 1983.

"Land and Resources Current and Potential Administration and
Management." Dene Nation: Stephen Kakfwi. Brief to Beaufort
Sea Environmental Assessment Panel. December 9, 1983.

"Recommendations of the Dene Nation to the Beaufort EARP Panel."

Dene Nation. December 9, 1983.

'Reports on Norman Wells Monitoring Agency and Norman Wells Funds." Dene Nation: Fred Gudmundson and Debbie DeLancey. December 12, 1983.

1984

"**Dene** Nation Report to Norman Wells **Co-ordinating** Committee." Dene Nation. December 1984.

"Fort Good Hope Oil Spill Contingency Plan Research." Dene Nation. March 1984.

"**Norman** Wells Database Project: a critique." Dene Nation. February 1984.

"Progress"Report on Dene Nation Norman Wells Monitoring Program." Dene Nation. Prepared for presentation to Project Co-ordinating Committee. February 29, 1984.

"Response to Norman Wells Project Case Study." Dene Nation: Kate Irving and Debbie DeLancey. Prepared for Banff Seminar on **Project Assessment: Prefect Audit.** September 1984.

"A Review of the **Interprovincial** Pipeline (NW) Ltd. Draft Oil Spill Contingency Plan." Hatfield Consultants Ltd. for Dene Nation. December 5, 1984.

"**Socio-Economic** Impact Evaluation of the Norman Wells Pipeline Project." Fort Simpson Dene Band Council for Dene Nation. September 1984.

"Unions and the Dene: discussion paper." Dene Nation. June 1984.

1985

"The Dene Experience with the Norman Wells Pipeline: an interim evaluation." Fee-Yee Consulting Ltd. for Dene Nation. **July 9, 1985.**

"The Dene Experience with the Norman Wells Pipeline Project: mid-term evaluation." Dene Nation. September 1985.

"**Dene** Nation 1985-1987 Impact Proposal. Norman Wells Pipeline Project." Dene **Nation.March** 1985.

"**Dene** Statement on the Opening of the Norman Wells Pipeline."

Dene Nation. May 15, 1985.

"A Downstream Perspective: Dene concerns with the environmental assessment, monitoring and surveillance of the Norman Wells project, with particular reference to fish and water quality." Fee-Yee Consulting Ltd. for Dene Nation. August 1985.

"Environmental Regulation and Monitoring of the Norman Wells Project: a case history of Dene involvement." Fee-Yee Consulting Ltd. for Dene Nation. September 1985.

1986

"Annual Report: Community Development Program." Dene Nation. 1986.

"An Assessment of Training Initiatives Associated with the Norman Wells Pipeline Project." Fee-Yee Consulting Ltd. for Dene Nation. April 1986.

"The Dene **Gondie** Study: Dene perceptions of the impacts of the Norman Wells Project." Dene Nation. April 1986.

"Year-End Report-.1985-86. Cultural Survival." Dene Nation. 1986.

"Year-End Report - 1985-86. Interpreter Training." Dene Nation. 1986.

"**Year-End** Report - 1985-86. Monitoring." Dene Nation. 1986

".Year-End Report - 1985-86. Norman Wells Pipeline **Impact** Programs." Dene Nation. 1986.

2) Documents Prepared by or for the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND) (during the life of the project this department's name was changed to Indian and Northern Affairs Canada. Until the acronym DIAND remained in use) :

. 1981

"Discussion Paper: Norman Wells Oil Field Expansion and Pipeline Project." **DIAND: Minister** of Indian Affairs and Northern Development; and Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources. June 26, 1981.

1982

"**The** Norman Wells Monitoring Program: A proposal for the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs as part of the Norman Wells Project." Prepared by Dr. R.M. Bone for **DIAND**. September 20, 1982.

1984

"Mid-Project Evaluation of Selected Issues Related to the Norman Wells Project Co-ordination Office." InterGroup Consulting Econom-ists Ltd. for Evaluation Branch, **DIAND**. October 1984. .

"The Norman Wells Project Case Study." **DIAND**. Prepared for Banff Seminar on Project Assessment: Project Audit. September 1984.

1985

" An Appendix to: Norman Wells Project **Co-ordinator** - a retrospective reflection." **DIAND**: Land Resources. September 1985.

"Norman Wells AProject Co-ordination - a Retrospective Reflection." **DIAND**: John Mar. September 1985.

"**P.C.C.** Wrap-Up Review of Norman Wells Project: Proceedings and Papers." InterGroup Consultants Ltd. and Rosemary Cairns . for **DIAND**. September 24-26, 1986.

"Special Federal Programs for the Norman Wells Project: Evaluation and Review of Alternatives." InterGroup Consultants Ltd. for **DIAND**. October 1985.

'Special Federal Programs for the Norman Wells Project: Lessons and Recommendations for the Future." InterGroup Consultants Ltd. for **DIAND**. December 1985.

"**The DIAND** Norman Wells **Socio-Economic** Monitoring Program: Reports 2 - 9." **DIAND**. 1982-1984.

"Information Pipeline." Monthly issues published from January 1983 until August 1985. **DIAND**: Project **Co-ordinator's**

Office.

3) Documents Prepared by or for the GNWT :

No Date

"Norman Wells **Oilfield** Expansion and Pipeline **Project.**" GNWT: ,
Environmental Planning and Assessment Division, Dept. of
Renewable Resources. Circa 1982.

1985 -

"Norman Wells Review." GNWT. September 1985.

4) Documents Prepared by or for Esso Resources Canada Ltd. :

No Date

"Norman Wells Expansion Project." Esso Resources.

1983

"Norman Wells Expansion Project: Northern Employment Report."*
Esso Resources. Submitted to the Beaufort Environmental
Assessment Review Panel. October 1983.

1985

"Norman Wells Expansion Project: Wrap-Up Review."
"Community Impacts and their Management."
"Economic Development Impact."
"Environmental Impacts and their Management."
"Opening Position Paper."
"Regulatory and Government Management."
Esso Resources. September 25, 1985.

6) Documents Prepared by or for IPL (NW) Ltd. :

1985

"1985 Monitoring Report. Executive Summary."

7) Miscellaneous Documents

Bone, Robert M. and Robert J. Mahnic. "Norman Wells: the Oil Center of the Northwest -Territories." in **Arctic**. Vol. 37 No. 1. March 1984.

Erasmus, William. "The Joint Venture between the Dene Nation, Metis Association of the NUT and Esso Resources." for **Dene/Metis** Negotiations Secretariat. July 23," 1984.

Evoy, James M. "The Norman Wells Pipeline **Project**: a report on **labour** and employment issues." Submitted to John Mar, Federal **Co-ordinator**, Norman Wells Project Office. September 1985.

Department of Environment. Environmental Protection Service. "Norman Wells Research and Monitoring Program. Status Report." June 27, 1984.

Department of Environment. Environmental Protection Service. "Norman Wells Research and Monitoring Program: Second Annual Summary Report." April 1985.

Fort Good Hope Dene Community Council. "Report and Recommendations on the Joint Venture." Prepared for Dene Nation Executive and National Assembly. September " 5, 1983.

Lange, Lynda. "Employment of Native Women at the Norman Wells **Oilfield** Expansion and Pipeline Project: Goals and Problems." **July**, 1984.

Native Employment Training Study. "Preliminary Report." June 1985.

National Energy Board. "The Mandate of the National Energy Board and its Role in the Norman Wells Project of **Interprovincial** Pipe Line (NW) Ltd.". September 1985.

Rees, William E. and Muriel **Kerr**. "Planning for **Socio-Economic** Impact Management: the Norman Wells Project Special Initiatives." (Draft for discussion **only**). March 1986.

Savoie, Donat and Sheila Meldrum. "The Norman Wells Oil Field Development and Pipeline Project." in Social Impact Assessment. Jan.-Feb.-March 1984.

Note: Also reviewed were selected newspaper clippings from various northern and southern newspapers, from 1981 until 1985. As little of substance was found in these articles they are not documented separately.