

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Politics, Development and Conservation in the International North

By Peter Jull

CARC POLICY PAPER 2

THE CANADIAN ARCTIC RESOURCES COMMITTEE

POLITICS, DEVELOPMENT AND CONSERVATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL NORTH

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Cover photograph: Reindeer grazing by the Barents Sea at abandoned fishing village of Hamningberg, Norway. Terje Brantenberg, 30 May 1985.

CARC POLICY PAPERS

The objective of this series of policy papers, published by the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, is to put into circulation information and opinion of immediate interest to researchers and policy makers. Works published in this series have received a minimum of editing by CARC, and therefore should be regarded as draft or working texts. The authors are responsible for the accuracy of the contents.

NOTE: In this paper, the words "aborig inal, " "native, " "indigenous" and, sometimes, "northern peoples" and "northerners" are used interchangeably. I recognise that the word "native" offends some groups, hut it is used by the aboriginal peoples themselves in the Northwest Territories, and I have used it frequently because of my familiarity with it from that area.

PETER JULL, born 1942, in Pembroke, Ontario, joined the Government of the Northwest Territories in time for the implementation of the Carrothers Commission report and the later establishment of the administration in Yellowknife. Serving as an assistant to two successive commissioners of the NWT, he dealt with many varied issues and travelled widely. Joining the Privy Council Office and Federal-Provincial Relations Office (PCO/FPRO) in 1968, he was able to continue to work with northern policy and native peoples' issues, among others. In 1976 he left to spend more than a year as secretary to the Cabinet for Economic Development in British Columbia during the establishment of a cabinet committee system there. Back with PCO/FPRO in 1977 he worked on northern and aboriginal policy issues full-time once more, and stayed to the end of 1979 as adviser on the Constitution (northern and native affairs). The constitutional work with aboriginal peoples having been established by prime ministers Trudeau and Clark by then, Peter Jull joined the Inuit as a political development and government relations adviser. In recent years he has written many articles, papers and briefs on northern political development in Canada and the international north. He has been the founding staff person of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference in Canada and a member of the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee.

C O N T E N T S

I - INTRODUCTION

Conservation in northern Canada is much more than an art to be considered in tranquility or an exercise in balancing ideals. Rather, it is the material of political passions, greed and occasional violence; the centre of political attention and object of the largest gambles; a subject of more deception, confusion and hypocrisy than any other. Straight answers are hard to find; undisputed data, rare; objectivity, a hope of only the gullible.

Conservation in the north is, obviously, a question of conserving what, for whom. The "what" usually means living species of wildlife and living environments and other resources inert or mobile. The national, or federal, government has the major say in this subject in the territorial north, and, not surprisingly, favours answers of "all Canada" or "all mankind" to the "whom" part of the question. The fact that the principal local northern users of resources are aboriginal men and women with limited skills in Canada's two official languages, and limited organisation or opportunities to communicate with governments, feeds this assumption, permitting remote and lofty officialdom to assume a protective role.

Northern peoples are the other part of this story. To official Ottawa, they mean duly constituted elected governments and legislatures in the north. But even federal cabinets, both Liberal and Conservative, have recognised in recent years-that in the north these are not enough. They recognise that the stable and enduring aboriginal cultures of Metis, Inuit, Dene and other Indians have their

own prerogatives far from adequately reflected or served in present political structures. Within the north these under-represented peoples consider themselves the real northern peoples, at home in their ancient territories or homelands, and they regard the official structures of government with skepticism, distance or even hostility.

The white population, a highly transient minority sufficiently regionally concentrated to impose its political agenda often enough, views matters differently. These residents argue for wide open categories - e.g., "northerners" - even wondering at times if "the natives" are "ready" to exercise any rights. Generally, these same white northerners would, however, fear that too open a view was a rather irresponsible liberty.

It should be evident without further explanation that there are some very difficult problems for the north. One level of government, often reinforced or imitated by its junior or creature governments in the territories, controls and regulates conservation matters. And the northern peoples neither fit nor accept official statuses, nor accept one another, in the discussion or management of conservation.

This is our starting point.

This pattern of division and complexity repeats itself around the northern circumpolar world, a polar necklace of peoples in homelands predating the political boundaries, states and flags which are now imposed on them. National Geographic's February, 1983, map reveals this dramatically

- one side shows "Peoples of the Arctic, " i.e. , old nations, and the other the nation states of today's world.

Denmark, in more or less its present form and with the same population group, has been constant since A.D. 800, and is by far the oldest and most constant northern nation. Eskimoan peoples have dwelt in what is now Denmark's Greenland home rule "province" for three times as long. So it is in the north. Inuit and Dene peoples occupied their present homelands long before France or Britain began to sort out their squabbling tribes in fights with Julius Caesar. The successive waves of peoples who landed in England as Angles, Saxons, Jutes, Danes and Normans, all related and assimilating one another while adopting the latest incoming styles, were like the Inuit peoples who as late as A.D. 1000 had regularly moved from Bering Strait across arctic North America.

But the northern peoples lived in harsh and out-of-the-way pl aces. They were not often bothered by intruders, but had plenty to occupy them with the hard life of feeding their families from land, ice and sea. Their societies, their small nations, changed slowly unless influenced by the occurrence of a major climate change, such as that in the late Middle Ages which forced Inuit whale hunters to become jacks of all trades. The same change drove the Vikings from Greenland. What sustained these peoples through the long dark period of winter in high latitudes, the storms and the grim toll of death on the seas was the seasonal round of activities in fishing, herding, hunting and gathering. It is the same today.

The full relationship of these northern peoples to their renewable resource base is not completely understood, but it underlies every aspect of their being, from songs and family customs to political organisation and the settlement of disputes. The relationship of a people to a territory was primarily based on resource use, and the style of managing that territory and allocating and sharing its yield, no less so. These values soak through the whole society. It is somewhat the same as the way farming and fishing interests survive in our industrial world, with their own tax and legal complexities and anomalies, untouchable political status and near-sacred mythology, while defying the statisticians and cost-benefit analysts who would reduce them to the small fractions they have become in today's economy. In the north, meanwhile, these traditional livelihoods and this totality of social organisation around the renewable resource base continue.

The northern peoples and their homelands were incorporated into the expanding nation states of the Enlightenment world and later. The greatest number of them lie in the Soviet north, of which we know little. It is to be hoped that new co-operative frameworks between Canada and the USSR will result in scholarly and cultural exchanges among northern areas, as well as mutual assistance in non-sensitive subjects like resource harvesting techniques. There is evidence, for instance, that the Soviets have applied research and official energy to traditional food production with a will and a success to be envied in other countries.

The rest of the circumpolar north was no less incorporated. Occasionally, this had obvious and immediate benefits, as in

the protection Denmark gave Greenland and the Faroe Islands against pirates. Sometimes it had obvious drawbacks, as with newcomers bringing fatal epidemics. Usually, it had none at all, initially.

These northern circumpolar peoples are not all aboriginal. The Faroese, the Icelanders and the Shetlanders are all prominent. In fact, it may be rather arbitrary to exclude some regions and peoples, and a more useful approach may be that adopted by a series of conferences around the North Atlantic world on "marginal areas."[1] But, in Canada, there are some good reasons to stay with the northern designation for my present purposes. For instance, in this country the northern three-quarters of the land will soon see control at local and regional levels in the hands of aboriginal peoples or authorities dominated by them. Considering the relatively small numbers of aboriginal peoples, this is a striking reminder of Canadian demography. Such control will also have much significance for Canadian conservation and economic development priorities and policy.

In Canada, national special interest groups and government policy have often defined "the north" as the Yukon and Northwest Territories, no matter that a much larger and poorer population lies in the northern areas of provinces from Labrador on the Atlantic to the Pacific northwest coast. When former Prime Minister Trudeau, thinking of those northern areas at a constitutional conference in late 1978, tried to press the provinces to accept a constitutional commitment to tackling regional disparities within their borders, he was rebuffed. But now the same social and political forces as have been evident for years

in the territorial' north are at work in northern provincial areas. Here, the north is moving south.

Throughout northern Canada and the northern circumpolar world, old peoples in ancient homelands are seeking new status and new means to control their lives and their territories. The front-lines of this struggle are conservation policies. In the first instance, the primary renewable resource base of the area is threatened by industrial projects - hydro-electric power development, oil and gas offshore, mining, industrial forest schemes, airports and military bases.[2] As the local residents challenge these, they discover just how powerless they are. Their rights to use resources and to exclude other users are denied by a state in which they are a minority people and a minority region. What is more, the state is often the real proponent of the development, and always much more than a disinterested party. The northerners quickly see that the comings and goings of test crews, planners and even oil executives bearing coffee and doughnuts for meet-the-public chats betoken something serious. They begin to look at the implications, and may even send a delegation abroad to look at a similar project area.

At about this time, some of the local leaders for whom progress is identified with "what is not local," and who dream of vast new buildings, riches from the spin-offs and more buyers in their shops, loudly support development and pooh-pooh the naysayers. The more experienced outside firms rely on local persons hired as labourers and advisers during the exploration phase to promote the development interest.

Some youth are attracted to change and excitement just for the sake of change and excitement. Others wonder aloud what will happen to community values and the stability of the young and of young families. Will the girls all run off with outside workers; will the boys, having joined the work crews, leave for the next job sites? Or will they all be left behind, bitter and disappointed? Will the local community organisations and decision-making be swept aside by larger forces from outside that will determine local conditions for motives unrelated to local need? And pollution: What damage will be done? The questions now are only tentative. Later they will become sharper, angrier, as the polarisation within the community grows.

Even an exploration or pre-development phase involves a lot of change. Residents are surprised by the numbers of newcomers, by all the planes taking off and landing. Inflation is remarked, and the money is burning holes in the pockets of the lucky youth who have the first jobs. Local skippers or family heads can't get experienced help fishing or hunting because these confident youngsters are chasing the new opportunities. And then it is all over. Everything stops. The market price has collapsed or a government subsidy has lured the company to another location.

The next time around some of these persons will be wiser. They will be much more sceptical, ask better questions, maybe get some help to research things, perhaps form an organisation;

It is at this human edge between two ways of life, two concepts of resource use and cultural values, two ethnic

groups, two forms of economic development - the sustainable and the temporary - where the pressures exist and the eruptions occur that shape the northern world. Here is where the decisions emerge from actual events more than from the pocket calculators of planners far to the south. Here are the embarrassments, angry outbursts and misunderstandings which provoke northern individuals to unite for new forms of action and to deny the pretensions of national governments to the sovereignty and ownership they claim in the north. This simple, unsophisticated world of fishing wharves and dusty air strips is where the action is. It is the inability or refusal of southern governments to understand this which has become the Achilles' heel of western democracy.

To put it another way, conservation is the fundamental issue of politics in northern areas. That conservation is of social tradition and cohesion as much as of the living environment. What is more, that attention to the social and human north is the main safeguard for the northern environment and its many plants and creatures, habitats and systems. The following chapters look at three cases in which these relationships are clear, and reveal the types of problems which typically arise for northern peoples in their conservation strategies and their conservation ways of life.

Not es

1. The latest of these, "International Seminar on Marginal Regions," took place in Galway, Ireland, July 7-12, 1985, with the theme "New Approaches to the Development of Marginal Regions." Prominent among the conference workshop material was Canadian material on Inuit.

2. A recent case is the cleaning up of toxic wastes at DEW-line sites across the north, many of them being also the site of Inuit communities. For a more dramatic story, see Jens Brösted and Mads Foegteborg, "Expulsion of the Great People. When US Air Force Came to Thule. An Analysis of Colonial Myth and Actual Incidents," in Native Power, ed. Brösted et al. (Oslo: Universitetsforl aget, 1985), pp. 213-238.


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Yukon Territory
Northwest Territories
British Columbia
Alberta
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N.B.
Nova Scotia
Proposed Nunavut Territory
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11 - NUNAVUT

The largest and most northerly homeland of a minority people in Canada is Nunavut, the Inuit region consisting of northern and eastern portions of the Northwest Territories. This is, in fact, several "homelands."[1] From east to west, following the general scheme of the latest reference masterwork on Inuit, the Smithsonian's volume on The Arctic,[2] are the South Baffin, Belcher Island, Iglulingmiut, Caribou Inuit, Netsilik, Copper and Western Arctic homeland areas. One could argue that there are even more than these seven, but when the maps are examined and the related smaller groups taken into account, it will be seen that this classification is adequate. All Inuit were one people with one lifestyle when the latest migration from the Bering Sea swept over the Canadian Arctic in the period A.Cl. 800-1000. However, worsening climate in the so-called Little Ice Age drove away the main food species - whales - and each region had to adapt to conditions, resources and materials locally available. These adaptations account for the varying cultures recorded by European visitors and anthropologists in recent times.

This composite nature of the Nunavut homeland has created its own problems. For instance, the major political issue holding up progress to create a Nunavut territorial government is the future of the western arctic coast - the Mackenzie River delta area and communities around the Beaufort Sea. This region has its own character and dialect. . Its people, who are almost entirely recent immigrants from the Inuit lands of north Alaska, are quite distinct from the Inuit farther east.

Neither the peoples of the south-western Northwest Territories (NWT) nor most federal decision-makers can accept this area's inclusion in Nunavut. It would give Nunavut two-thirds of the present NWT - and more like 80% if coastal seas are included! - and create a jurisdiction where all Canadian Inuit would be in a single political entity bordering ambitious Inuit governments striving for greater autonomy to the east and the west in Alaska and Greenland. In a country just recovering from the jitters of "Quebec separatism" and "western alienation," the vision of possible adventures among a little-known population of 20,000 holding more than 20% of Canada's land area in one chunk is not inviting. Inuit frequently point out, however, that far from wishing to separate from Canada, they are merely seeking full citizenship within it.

The Copper people also have had a recent past different from those farther east, finding themselves in most ways regionally oriented for public set-vices and trade with the white, Dene and Metis area to the south. But other ties to the east have been strong, and now the Copper people and all the areas to the east are negotiating a single "land claims" settlement, the Nunavut claim. It was as an integral part of that claim that the concept of a political jurisdiction to be called Nunavut was first advanced. The term Nunavut, "our land," is unexceptional in the Inuit language and in daily use in its literal sense. This unity of land and politics is the essence of original peoples the world over. In the Nunavut area of northern Canada it grew from two phenomena. First was a southern government intruding and reshaping every aspect of life: the care and housing of

families; their daily food habits; the relocation of individuals from scattered tundra camps to villages, hospitals and residential schools and a-total re-education for southern industrial society. Somewhat later was a search for minerals, oil and gas, bringing in outsiders with polluting technologies and other nuisance habits, intruding in the sensitive wildlife habitat upon which Inuit depended for food and livelihood. This habitat includes the sea and sea ice, areas which, as Inuit argue, are at least as important and as much used for travel, camping and food-seeking as the land itself.

Nunavut, then, was a modern response by an ancient people to modern problems and pressures imposed by a modern industrial society. It was a strategy for managing change and protecting the natural environment and the traditional culture which went with it.

In essence, Nunavut is that simple, and was always that simple. Of course, in a country as fixated as Canada on constitutional gimcrackery, nothing can long remain that simple. Inuit were aware of how much trouble the Dene had created for themselves by describing their aspirations in words disquieting to southern whites. Few, if any, Inuit lay awake nights pondering the precise details of a constitutional settlement in the north. What they wanted was something which made use of the community and committee skills they were learning in the NWT which had been shaped around their new lifestyle; something which allowed them the use of their historical majority position to decide matters important to them; something which would be accepted by the Canadian government and something which gave them major

powers in respect of use of lands, waters and living species.

The Inuit hired promising southern whites with varying degrees of northern experience to help them package and negotiate these needs. Unlike Greenland, which has acquired a sizeable and well-educated élite, Nunavut had only one or two Inuit college graduates, few high school matriculants and few persons with advanced executive or professional skills. When one meets some of the gifted individuals whom the white administration did not deem worthy of more formal education, one correctly identifies the education establishment as a major problem in Nunavut. And despite vast sums of money spent on facilities, none has been spent to develop a higher facility in Nunavut to hold Inuit students and provide courses relevant to northern life and needs. With government as the major employer, and the public service likely to remain so, the lack of such a training institution as a priority of government is the more remarkable!

It is not really this lack of Inuit in the memo-writing professions that has much affected the form of the ultimate Nunavut. The problem has been in the relative lack of Inuit in the many negotiating and working situations which breed the self-confidence needed for the rough-and-tumble of later executive roles and ease in Canada's unique inter-governmental public management system.

The NWT situation is peculiar. All the efforts to create Nunavut, to negotiate a claims settlement and later to revise the national Constitution to enhance recognition of

Inuit rights and interests have been directed by Inuit to the national government in Ottawa. Yet, since 1966, when the first NWT elections were held in the" Nunavut area, Inuit have elected Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) and the all-intrusive, all-inclusive welfare state has been a function of territorial government.[3] Inuit have tended to look to Yellowknife for their daily bread and to Ottawa for their spirit and future. For the big issues, however, they turn to "the Inuit movement," primarily Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC), which has its headquarters in Ottawa.

ITC draws its legitimacy from an annual assembly of Inuit community delegates and regional association executives which reviews the work of the various Inuit organisations, much of which is specialised and technical and carried out by unique agencies with relatively large budgets. Anyone who would plot this organisational network on a chart for a southern political science class would despair, but it has worked, and its authority has been accepted. The president is now directly elected every two years by the Inuit in all Canada's Inuit communities. As with most bodies responsible to rural constituencies, the organisation and its principals tend to be grumbled about when they are absent, but when they visit there are emotional confirmations of support and "Inuit unity." Inuit have been tremendously loyal to their organisations, even though these have provided few, if any, tangible services to them.

But Inuit have always remained somewhat cool to the Yellowknife government, despite its very considerable underwriting of local well-being. The territorial elections are without political parties to date. Local personalities

vie for the honours and, as soon as elected, are accused of being "away in Yel lowknife" too much and not paying enough attention to local complaints against the administration. As will be discussed later, a somewhat more complex rivalry has now developed.

Although extensive Inuit land use and sea hunting from camps and the accompanying seasonal travels were seen by planners as replaceable, this has not been the case. The few major industrial projects have proven that they require skills little available in the north, and Inuit have not shown great readiness to take on those jobs available. Despite the continuing large government investment and incentives for industrial projects, notably mines, hydrocarbon drilling and means of transporting their products, almost nothing has been spent on the economy of renewable resources, which still is the principal economy for Inuit. Even today, renewable resource harvesting - full-time for many, part-time for many more, "some" time for all - predominates in the scattered bungalow communities of Nunavut with their deceptively modern public buildings and facilities. A walk among the houses reveals collections of tools and equipment, skins drying and evidence of meat butchered - that is, a way of life on the land that has always underpinned the Inuit society.

The evidence does not stop with statistics and material goods . At meetings which have taken place around the north for many years now and at hearings on this or that proposal or project, Inuit have been consistent in expressing lyrically their historical attachment to the land. This has never varied. But government, its organs and sponsored

inquiries have generally played down this response and chosen to hear the things which fit into their industrial-oriented, southern-developed programmed.[4]

Nobody doubts the fascination of Inuit youth with new technologies and job prospects. After all, having been taken away from the training for a livelihood provided traditionally by their families and placed in schools to learn new subjects, they would like their experience to count for something. And like youth everywhere they dream of excitement, material well-being and social prestige. Like those of youth everywhere, too, their dreams soon come face to face with realistic possibility. A social crisis exists in the Nunavut communities in the form of large numbers of youth with high expectations, unequipped for the traditional life of long weeks in hardship conditions on the land, and facing chronic unemployment and underemployment in villages where video games, drugs and alcohol may be all-too-present pastimes. Violence and accidents are the main cause of death among Inuit today.

It is little wonder that both an older generation uprooted and a young generation misled about its future prospects, now both wrestling daily with the negative and often tragic impacts in their own families, have little confidence in the promises of government. As they cast around for other answers, they may embrace belief in a community revival of old values, or evangelical Christianity or economic development.. Their sense of powerlessness deepens, self-confidence wanes and the population is ready for other proposals. Curiously, radical political ideology has not been a force to date. It is nevertheless a mistake for

federal planners in Ottawa and anti -Nunavut lobbyists in the western NWT to mistake such stillness for consent to the status auo.

An overall approach to the political settlement and structure of a Nunavut government was presented in Nunavut community hearings in late 1983. Certain issues surfaced everywhere. The importance of assuring the continuation and enhanced status of the Inuit language and traditional culture was one. Strong powers for Inuit in the face of government-sponsored exploration and transportation in the arctic seas, the most notable recent intrusion by the outside world into Inuit life, was another. The third universal issue was the unease about the state of job preparation among Inuit for the tasks of administering the territory. The two points here were that only a public service staffed largely by Inuit would be responsive to Inuit hopes and sensitivities, and that a lot of jobs were needed for local residents. Would Inuit be able to fill those jobs yet? A new influx of white southerners was definitely not wanted. These viewpoints are not endorsements of the current situation. Rather, they are strong statements of the desire for change, and change controlled by Inuit.

The work to create a suitable government had gone into high gear after a referendum in April, 1982, revealed that in the eastern half of the NWT - i.e., the Netsilik, Caribou, Iglulingmiut, South Baffin, Belcher and composite High Arctic regions - the preference was 4-1 for Nunavut. The voter turnout was the highest ever recorded. The message was clear.

Farther west, the message was not clear. The more westerly Inuit communities revealed confusion, ambivalence, and hesitation in both results and turnout. This was partly due to uncertainty about where the boundary would be and what its implications would be for access to traditional resource use areas. It was also due to the Copper and western Arctic communities being accustomed to schooling, medical care and other services shared with the whites, Dene and Metis to the south. Would they be minority regions with second-class services in a Nunavut whose centre of gravity lay to the east? The few whites who voted in the west were strongly opposed to dividing the NWT to create Nunavut. Dene and Metis voted strongly for Nunavut as a way of expressing their desire for change, although they feared becoming a minority in a residual territory dominated by the whites.

The result in the east was too strong to be ignored. Creation of Nunavut became stated government policy in the north and in Ottawa. The Nunavut Constitutional Forum was established by the NWT Legislative Assembly to allow its own representatives and elected leaders from the Inuit movement to work together in a body charged with the task of finalizing a blueprint for Nunavut. A similar body was set up for the western NWT, the Western Constitutional Forum, and it faced a much more daunting task because of the lack of consensus on the political future in that area.

The Nunavut Constitutional Forum, or NCF as it became known, played a remarkable role from its creation in August, 1982, to its apparent hemorrhaging (or hijacking, depending on one's viewpoint) in February, 1985. Political élites and

experts in Canada had spent years fighting out national constitutional accords behind closed doors, with the public finally battering its way in to influence the rights charter through marathon parliamentary committee hearings televised in winter 1980-81. But now, for the first time, a general public was involved in the preparation of a political settlement through sessions of unparalleled openness.[5] This was Canada's first exercise ever in developing a "people's constitution."

The technique was for open, seminar-like meetings to discuss issues in terms of both northern need and national political conventions (which were highly developed and somewhat doctrinaire as applied by the Trudeau government). These meetings were reported by print and broadcast media and followed closely by federal government observers. Additionally, research studies and background papers were prepared for NCF review and wide distribution, and a continuing dialogue was maintained between NCF and federal politicians and officials, as well as other experts close to national decison-making. In this way a set of proposals developed, comfortable within the norms and familiar structures of Canadian federalism but responsive to the special needs and requirements of Nunavut, its Inuit population and its renewable resource economic lifestyle.[6]

While the political structure proposed for Nunavut is unexceptional , it does have several particular features. Provisions are sought for making the Inuit language official alongside English and French. In offshore management, an active Nunavut government administrative partnership with the federal government is anticipated. A dispersal of

administrative units among existing communities would make good use of demonstrated Inuit aptitude for and interest in computer and telecommunications technology, while taking jobs to communities that trained personnel would not otherwise leave because of their extended family networks there. This latter approach would also mean more equal distribution of economic benefits and social impacts of growth throughout Nunavut. The tremendous need for accelerated training and skill upgrading and for new courses and course materials is now recognised and constantly restated, although little acted upon to date. (In this last case is a clear example of the familiarity with deliberative processes as opposed to project implementation characteristic of Nunavut and the Inuit movement.)

What is most unique about Nunavut is that although a political structure open to and serving all permanent residents is to be set up, a claims settlement is for Inuit alone. Recent provisions added to the Constitution make claims settlements a more important vehicle than ever for the protection of aboriginal rights in perpetuity. It is the linkage here, between political settlement and claims settlement, which provides the homeland guarantee for Inuit. Neither one alone is sufficient; each is required to complete the promise of the other. White observers, including federal claims negotiators, tend to see a claims settlement as an economic package which provides some development cash, a minimum land base for traditional harvesting and local development and a corporate entity for Inuit entry into industrial society.

Inuit see matters in quite another way. For them, claims settlements may properly deal with any subject of their culture and society because these are merely outgrowths of the use and conservation of the living environment. There is no indigenous tradition of political specialisation. Now, too, the constitutional amendments previously noted mean that any claims settlement provision is safe from "equal rights" challenges by non-Inuit, and therefore such security may be sought for several subjects. The difference of viewpoint between Inuit and southerners is critical because aboriginal

> groups ' "attachment to particular localities is one of their most notable and politically significant features" whereas "identification of self with locality is anathema to the logic of modern political economy." 7

On February 6, 1985, the federal minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, David Crombie, announced a target date for creation of Nunavut - 1987 - and the first elections to a Nunavut legislature at that time. He stressed that this was a response to the demands of the people of Nunavut and their leaders, and to their final resolution a few weeks earlier of the western boundary for Nunavut. That boundary agr-cement would locate the Beaufort Sea and Mackenzie delta communities in a western terr-itory, where strong regional guarantees for Inuit would be secured.[8] The Copper people's area would vote on whether to join an east-centred Nunavut or a western territory. While the minister pledged that he would launch talks on resource revenue sharing by Ottawa with territorial

governments and also directly with aboriginal peoples, the boundary agreement reached by Nunavut and western groups in January promised study of a resource revenue pooling arrangement so that neither the eastern nor the western territory would be unduly punished if the pace of development in one region lagged behind the other.

The importance of having a Nunavut government in place had been underlined by another announcement by the minister the previous night: the first project to produce and transport oil in the eastern arctic, the Bent Horn project, was approved. It had raised tremendous opposition from the nearby Inuit communities and their regional, national and international organisations a year earlier. Now it would proceed at a time when Inuit had no government of their own to deal with development impacts and while all the outstanding issues of marine development and management capability in the High Arctic were quite unresolved.

The day before the Nunavut speech the minister had met privately with the Nunavut and Western Constitutional forums. Mr. Crombie told the Dene, Metis and Inuit leaders and several MLAs (including NWT cabinet ministers) that the government supported continuation of the mixed-forum approach to constitution-making because the legislature alone was insufficient. (Indeed, it had long been an embarrassment to federal governments that the Legislative Assembly had so often been out of step with the native leadership across the north, a leadership representing the overwhelming majority of the permanent population. Ottawa for many years had keyed its acceptance of political and economic reforms to their acceptance by the native homeland

leaders.) Crombie had especially applauded the way the forums had been working to develop consensus, a theme recurrent in his public speech the following day. However, various members of the Legislative Assembly who had been peripheral to the constitutional development process were becoming restless and had decided to take control.

So, in February, 1985, the Nunavut forum was taken over by the leaders of the Legislative Assembly's Nunavut caucus, persons by no means all in favour of Nunavut, although not ready to say so openly, and representing the more western segments of the Nunavut area and the white, small-business, free-enterprise sector. Nunavut had been created, and until that moment led, by persons from the eastern segments of Nunavut, who favoured collective rights, strong Inuit identity, and a collective approach to economic development and benefits. In short, the shift in power, philosophy and interests could not have been more total.

The leader of this takeover group was a territorial minister and the de facto COPE leader, Nellie Cournoyea. She at least represented a homeland and had a not-very-hidden agenda of using whatever leverage was necessary to obtain the strongest possible regional powers for the western Arctic Inuit within whatever jurisdiction they finally found themselves. The Inuit movement of Nunavut, which was undergoing major leadership changes at the time and unprepared for and bemused by this Legislative Assembly coup, was pacified by the assurances of the new leadership that "Inuit unity" was important to preserve, that all Inuit would now be able to live together in a Nunavut whose boundary would be the tree-line, and that this would result

in the vast o revenues ying under the Beaufort Se falling into Nunavut Inu t hands.[9] Because there s virtually no ossibi ity that ottawa or outh tern NWT leaders wil accept it, this pos tion is being used as a stall ng tactic by some. Others genu nely be ieve, however, that such a Nunavut can be created.

As has been hinted at a ready, and w be discussed further in a later chapter, severa factors account for the slow-down in the Nunavut process. Whether these are ser ous or merely a trans tiona chang ng of gears remains to be seen; there is a strong case for e ther viewpoint. Meanwhile, Inu t will have no greater opportunity to manage their resources or to control industrial projects already proceeding; they will have no ab l ty to protect the regiona cond t ons on which their communities depend; they w l have no benefit from any resources under the Beaufort Sea or anywhere else; they have no instrument or group of staff n the r contro with which to promote or protect their objectives and they have no part n any process or structure in which they cou d practise those po tica skills that would lead to the accession to u majority status in the r own homeland. It is for these reasons that some observers refer to the takeover of February, 1985, as a "hijacking" rather than as a leg timate olitical event

A pause at this ass in the ife of Nunavut may not be all bad, however. Before cons dering the whole ssue of Nunavut's future and the future of o itics and conservation in northern Canada, we w ll look at two other northern and situations - A aska and arct c Norway - for a comparative view.

Notes

1. A general socio-political history simply called Nunavut, published in 1983 by the Nunavut Constitutional Forum, is available free of charge from its offices in Ottawa and Yellowknife. Building Nunavut (published by NCF, 1983) contains the overall outline for a Nunavut government and is also available from NCF. Many research papers, briefs, presentations for conferences, etc. which detail the work in taking Nunavut to the present point are available from NCF. An excellent general background work for understanding modern Nunavut is The White Arctic: Anthropological Essays on Tutelage and Ethnicity, ed. Robert Paine (St. John's: Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1977). I also draw on my own experience as the founding staff co-ordinator of the Nunavut Constitutional Forum.

2. Volume 5 in the series Handbook of North American Indians (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1985). David Damas, editor of this volume, is a Canadian, and Canadian and Scandinavian authorities are very well represented among the authors.

3. Certainly, few voters understood the purpose of those

three successful MLAs were whites. The assembly to which they were elected had no actual authority except in the running of the one liquor store which operated on-again, of f-again in Nunavut (at Frobisher Bay).

4. See, for example, the section on alcohol abuse in "The Human Environment," Beaufort Sea Hydrocarbon Production and Transportation Proposal, Report of the Environmental Assessment Panel (Ottawa: Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office, July, 1984), p. 42.

5. The lack of privacy in meetings and the inability of the dispersed NCF membership to meet informally - unlike WCF whose members worked in Yellowknife and could confer anytime - led to some embarrassing moments. In late April, 1983, the crucial position paper on resource and land management was handed to the press in error-ridden draft form before it had been studied. Consequently, some critics have noted certain inconsistencies in it.

6. Federal northern affairs observers, having failed to delay or deny Nunavut, attacked the blueprint developed by NCF as having been designed by "southern experts" and as being too esoteric. This sudden conversion to constitutional populism is, of course, suspect. It also demands a lot from a population with little formal education or preparation in subjects like history, legal drafting, etc. to work without assistance. The development of consensus within acceptable norms, and of any sort of useful discussion on complex issues, requires the offering of some material - some agenda - for debate. The federal side may also have failed to notice that the NCF staff was drawn

entirely from territorial government and Inuit movement personnel who had spent many years in community meetings throughout the north where the same issues were discussed by Inuit in one form or other. Now, however, federal officials' resistance seems to be slipping back to the technical reproach - i.e., that, really, NCF has oversimplified dreadfully complex problems!

7. Quoted in Robert Paine, "The Claim of the Fourth World," in Native Power: The Quest for Autonomy and Nationhood of Indigenous Peoples, ed. Brösted et al. (Oslo: Universitetsforl aget, 1985), p. 53.

8. The Committee for Original Peoples' Entitlement (COPE), representing the people in question, was working with even more options to secure its homeland. It had obtained a final land claims settlement in 1984, but sought a regions'l government with the combined advantages of Alaska's North Slope Borough (see next chapter), a territorial region, and an "Indian government" as proposed in such federal draft legislation as Bill C-52 (June, 1984).

9. I have examined and discussed these events and their implications more fully in "Dividing the North," Policy Options 6:4 (May, 1985), pp. 10-13.

III - ALASKA

Alaska's land claims settlement of 1971 had a great impact on Canadian thinking about aboriginal rights policy and northern development.[1] But, in general, Canadians have known little about Alaska. Alaska is especially interesting because its differences from, and its similarities to, Canada are so clear and sharp. Government neglect (or is it public resistance?) in the USA in matters of providing public services and redistributing income surprises Canadians, but on the North Slope, where Inuit have done it all themselves, they have achieved astonishingly more, faster, than we in our own arctic. Things can happen quickly and dramatically in Alaska. When the State of Alaska lost one court case, it had to provide - at once! - more than 90 new high schools.

Probably the most significant "comparative study" in circumpolar experience is that now concluded by Canada's Judge Tom Berger. Following two years of community hearings and workshops of experts and research in many fields, his Alaska Native Review Commission, established by the Inuit Circumpolar Conference at the initiative of North Slope Inuit, has reported on how the 1971 claims settlement has worked and what may be done to improve or revise it. During the course of his work, Judge Berger brought spokesmen from abroad to report on developments such as the Scandinavian Sami rights movement and government response, Greenland's home rule and the work to create Nunavut. His report reflects this input and will, one hopes, provide a stimulus for new ideas and projects in other circumpolar areas like Canada.


Alaska
USSR
70°
North Slope Borough
Bering Sea
Chukchi Sea
Arctic Sea
Barrow
Prudhoe Bay
Beaufort Sea
ALASKA
Fairbanks
Herschel Island
King Point
Tuktoyaktuk
Cape Bathurst
Parry Peninsula
BANKS ISLAND
Anchorage
Cook Inlet
Mackenzie Delta
Inuvik
Prince of Wales St
Amundsen Gulf
Gulf of Alaska
YUKON TERRITORY
Mackenzie River
Whitehorse
PACIFIC OCEAN
Juneau
NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

In Alaska, one is aware of how American culture differs from our own. Perhaps, put most simply, the two great differences, two sides of one coin, are that Canadians see social consensus and regional balance as more important than a single-minded pursuit of liberty wherever it may lead, and we accept a major role for government in shaping and consolidating consensus through policy and public services. Americans assume that Canadians are less democratic, but we define our democratic values differently. Canadians, for our part, are disturbed by the divisions and disparities in American life. Canada clearly needs a stronger sensitivity to civil liberties, but then so does every society. Our courts' handling of the new Constitution may be moving us that way, but probably few of us would go to the point of discarding some of our other socio-political traditions. The fact is that in the United States dazzling possibilities - or dizzying lurches, depending on one's reaction - still exist. And in Alaska, the title of a popular book, Going to Extremes, expresses the results!

Anchorage, on Cook Inlet, is the metropolis of Alaska. It is the business centre, linked to Seattle and Chicago as lifelines more than to its own hinterland. It is in the north, but not of it. South in the Panhandle is Juneau, the capital. Fairbanks is to the north. These three centres are predominantly "white towns" and hold most of the state's population. Surrounding them, along the coasts where Inuit, Aleut and Haida-Tlingit Indians live, and inland in the Dene homeland, is the "other Alaska." Made up of some 200 native villages, this Alaska is called "Bush Alaska" or "Native Alaska." In this rural world are several

Inuit "nations" - the Inupiat, the Yupik, the Aleut (many of whom, however, resist the term Inuit and prefer to be identified as a separate group) and Suqpigaq, who do not identify as Inuit and who include an assimilated group of Dene![2]

The Inuit follow a marine lifestyle for the most part, but up-river groups in the south-west have a distinct variation. It has now been demonstrated that inland groups among the Inupiat of the north, however, are not historically separate but are off-shoots of coastal groups. The North Slope of Alaska provides a continuum with the western arctic coast of the Northwest Territories. Indeed, the Inuvialuit of the COPE claims area are an Alaska people who moved eastwards to fill a vacuum left by the extinction of the Mackenzie Eskimos, only a handful of whom remained earlier in the twentieth century. The Inupiat have always lived from the whales which pass close to their shores in Chukchi and Beaufort seas, walrus and other sea mammals, the great caribou herds inland, ducks, geese, and fish. Now, in an age when oil development at Prudhoe Bay has been massive and has re-oriented not only the North Slope but also the whole State of Alaska, what is remarkable is the continuity on the North Slope, not merely the social impacts.

There have been social impacts.[3] Social problems have increased, but the 30-fold leap in household incomes, total change in family living conditions, vast infusion of community services, massive educational upgrading and retraining of the entire population and availability of secure wage and salaried employment for all are the other side of the coin. These improvements constitute the success

story of the North Slope Borough, a unique Inuit-run government, and also of the regional and village corporations created by the claims settlement.

The focus of Judge Berger's report, entitled Village Journey, is clear enough. The 200 villages around native Alaska are centres of ancient lifestyles and current aspirations. They have three main needs: protection of the subsistence economy and the environments of land, rivers and seas on which it depends; social, communityandeconomic improvements of many sorts and the self-management and ability to deal with the wider world that comes with self-government.

The 1971 claims settlement vested the native land allotment in native profit corporations from which, after 1991, it can be alienated. Furthermore, only the living native peoples of the time were included in the settlement, so there is no provision for social continuity in claims benefits. These deficiencies mark the settlement as a business deal, a one-time settlement, rather than as a political or social accommodation of another group of peoples. It provides no base for conservation, i.e., for a continuing and sustainable society or economy.

The improvements at community level are made difficult in many ways by the small size of villages. Barrow, Nine, Bethel and Kotzebue are large enough to do a great deal, but most villages are not. And a more complex social element is at stake. If a society is to survive, it benefits from more size and variety, more sources of ideas and skills, than one village or one occupational group. The small subsistence

village is necessarily weak against a world in which change, the forces of nature and environmental chain degradation are no respecters of jurisdictional boundaries. Nor can one occupational group - the subsistence hunters - provide all the skills of a thriving people in today's world. Specialists and leadership élites, informed persons, managers and good financial heads are all needed too. There are many of these already in Alaska and whether at home in the villages or based in Anchorage, the traditional subsistence lifestyle plays an important part in their yearly calendar. They may have left the land or sea, but they return to it regularly to help feed their family, just for recreation or for recovery of that unity of being with nature which is the support structure of their culture.

The region, a natural tribal or ethnic one - the homeland - has many potential advantages as a unit of organisation, and some Alaska peoples are acting on this. The North Slope Inupiat have worked on this basis from the beginning of their modern emergence, and to good effect. The variety of ideas and skills, the breadth of talent and potential, the possibility of services and institutions on a larger scale, larger budgets, and the chance to maintain control of a larger physical environment from which to develop economic diversification of products and marketing - and from which also to negotiate with the world around for economic, social or political benefits - are all strong attractions of a regional or homeland basis for self-government. Then growth and change are possible - and every society must grow and change, or it dies.

To be most effective, the Alaska communities may have to seek groupings together on the basis of historical or other common interests and then develop their strength from there. It may be that they will consider even wider federations of homelands or institutions within Alaska in order to exert maximum influence in the state. The alternative, a small village government isolated from state authorities and linked only to the distant and dubious federal bureaucracy for Indian Affairs, is no alternative at all: it is a choice of pessimism, defeat and slow death in a vigorous Alaska.

Physical services, too, would no doubt benefit from a greater "Alaska connection" in most villages where infrastructure has been sadly neglected. The proliferation of community facilities and services in northern Canada and Norway is quite unknown in Alaska, except where the local residents have undertaken it themselves in recent years with new revenues.

Self-government in a larger area with a social and economic base could provide the strength which native Alaskan society needs to gain the self-confidence to deal as equals within the state as well as with Washington. Isolation is a source of strength only in emergencies; otherwise, an outgoing relationship of interaction and strong pursuit of group interests is preferable. At any rate, these issues are being hotly debated by the native peoples all over Alaska.

One striking case is the North Slope Borough (NSB), which was established under the state constitution. Inupiat in the NSB now are no more numerous than the whites, most of

whom are temporary workers at Prudhoe Bay. But through American constitutional traditions different from our own, i.e., the residual powers not specified at higher levels of government devolving to lower ones, and the lack of revenue equalisation among regions, the NSB has paralleled the most active phase of Prudhoe Bay with a massive capital development programme and a reorganisation of regional employment and economy. When the revenues fall, which is expected in a few more years, these plans will have finished their high-cost phase, and when Prudhoe Bay declines it is expected that the Inupiat population will again become dominant. In fact, virtually all political initiative in the NSB comes from the Inupiat.

The people of the North Slope have lived and worked as a region for a long time. They recognise that to the southwest they are bordered by another vigorous Inupiat region which, what is more, has often supplied the North Slope with immigrants; however, they feel a rivalry with this neighboring region and prefer to function as a coherent unit unto themselves. The North Slope is dominated by Barrow, a community of about 5000, with more than half a dozen villages making up the rest of the region. Public services were next to non-existent at the beginning of the 1970s, with sewage running in streams through the lanes to the Chukchi Sea. All that has changed as a result of the massive capital plan of the NSB, which has brought high quality housing, community services, high-style bus shelters in cedar and-glass, public transportation, the highest per-student education cost commitment in the world, an instant university (briefly), the most ambitious and significant coastal zone management plan ever devised,

employment for all and, as an afterthought, the sponsoring of an international organisation for Inuit to promote their cultural, economic, environmental and self-government needs, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference.

The presence of a strong leader, Eben Hopson, determined to seize the initiative and use revenues from the Prudhoe Bay development to secure and strengthen - to conserve - the lifeways and the natural environment which constituted the Inuit world, accomplished this. The battles in court and regular inability of NSB to pay its staff when funds were impounded made this one of the wildest west stories. But Mayor Hopson prevailed, and soon, with funds and capable associates and advisers, was launching the most far-reaching plans. Barges were ploughing through the Bering Strait laden with houses, plumbing, cars and trucks, and all manner of facilities shipped from Seattle. All work was to be carried on as on-the-job training for local persons, and upgrading courses of all kinds were made available. Virtually the whole population was re-educated and retrained - a striking precedent for the building of Nunavut.

Meanwhile, the tribal government structure in the North Slope region did not die, but instead carried on some useful activities. Among many Inuit leaders there is now interest in recasting that Inuit government form so that a purely Inuit homeland government could replace the NSB as the main political power in the region. This would provide greater security of land and resource use for Inuit if it covered the whole NSB area, of course. Otherwise, it is uncertain what precise benefits would accrue. Is it not possible that

such a move is unnecessary, and risks more than it gains in polarizing ethnic relations within the state?

Parallel to and closely linked with the development of the North Slope Borough has been its conservation planning. A comprehensive plan for the whole borough and a coastal zone management plan developed at local initiative but with full involvement of all levels of government, industry, local villagers and others have centred the traditions and preferences of Inuit in the political process. The process has been difficult, with the local participants feeling they were taking on the whole world and certainly fighting the strongest and most expert opponents: the US government and the major oil companies. But by developing a complete regional plan, by learning about the needs and imperatives of other development interests, by fighting their way through countless processes only to begin again when it became clear they would not gain approvals, the residents have defined a strong sense of regional interests. What is more, it has been defined in terms useful for dealing with other governments and developers; it is politically useful and coherent and it can be fought for.

This is a tremendous story of determination and collective education. At the same time it has cleared the way for orderly development of all types. In the process, a variety of competing and traditionally inimical interests have come to understand and respect one another's views, even to collaborate to strengthen the final plan. The planning and zoning potential available legally through a borough structure was indeed a major reason why Inupiat organised the North Slope Borough in the first place.[4]

Alaska is a state like no other. It has traditionally attracted southern Americans in something like gold rush fever - hopes of quick wealth. But the allure of Alaska, and of any other northern area, for its settlers has rarely been its wealth, which goes to a very few. It has been the relative freedom from regulation, the relative openness of social opportunities, the possibilities to create and to build in an environment not yet overcrowded or defined and the novelty and diversity of a dramatic physical nature amidst which live diverse and vital cultures of great antiquity. It has been these things whose appeal has held those who have ventured north, regardless of initial motives or continuing myths. As northern experience in Canada has taught us, those who go north do not go to replicate the south, but to loosen the constraints the south has put on them. Once they begin to impose their inherited southern values on the north, however, the trouble starts.

In Alaska, as in northern Canada, and perhaps in northern Norway, the opportunity exists for a "historic compromise." The homelands and the conservation of their living resources could be managed for the well-being of whole regions while their residents could participate fully in the life of the state. In return, the settler majority would gain access for various forms of development, be able to conduct state-wide planning and management functions, provide those public services which homelands might most efficiently receive from that source, and maintain overall coherence as a political entity vis-à-vis Washington and outside business interests. Without this, the political authority and credibility of Alaska will be fragmented as is that in

the Northwest Territories today, and this will weaken the whole state - native homelands and white towns alike - in bargaining with powerful forces. A constitutional compromise would also provide all Alaskans with a political settlement ensuring the protection and continuance of diversity and freedom rather than growing homogenisation and "southernisation. " The trust and self-confidence for such a settlement do not exist at present, but in time a pluralism at state level could be adopted in law and in fact - a sort of federated Alaska.

If this sounds like a Canadian proposing un-American approaches, it is. On the other hand, it is a tradition for American cities to bargain among major ethnic and cultural groups to secure the aspirations of each in a multi-cultural environment. Such a constitution for Alaska might be accompanied by a move beyond land checkerboards to a broader and more sophisticated type of land use zoning, to protect the use and development values of all, rather than one exclusive use here and a free-for-all there.

Meanwhile, it is hard to feel insecure about the Inuit future on the North Slope. In Barrow, outside the old, comfortable do-it-yourself homes and the new, fancy pre-fabs, are usually two vehicles: a new station wagon and a umiak, the traditional Inuit skin boat with a creamy-coloured walrus hide stretched over a wooden frame. The umiak is still the essential item in the annual whale hunts, which are the centre of the North Slope's social and cultural life. The whaling captains have great prestige, and the "houses," or mess halls, whereby the crew form a sort of men's club year-round are now being seen by

anthropologists as a proto-political form which may account for some of the unique and dynamic action and competition typical of the Inupiat.

The beaches of the Chukchi Sea are full of history. As Inuit have passed by for millennia on their way east to populate Greenland and northern Canada, there must have been many whale feasts and festivals. Ruins of houses and upright whale-ribs, reminders of the classical forms of the Thule Inuit migration, are seen everywhere sticking from the ground. Layer upon layer of society lies in the sandy banks of that sea, while within hundreds of yards one watches the many species of whale blowing on their migrations north and east between shore and pack ice. In Barrow is the most modern technology that industrial man can devise, and there are Inupiat nuclear engineers, rocket experts and users of the most complex laser and computer technologies in work related to mapping and resource development.

But the arctic is as ageless here as elsewhere, and the glimpses of ruins beneath the turf and the ancient litter around even the most modern houses reveal a life on land and sea in search of food which predates all else, and give the visitor a very strange sensation. Inupiat are using their new wealth, education and technology to redevelop, research and better articulate their traditions and roots, to bring the structures and habits of an old society into the council chambers and schools to manage the new and exciting world they live in. Until a few years ago, here was the most remote corner of the world, but now young Inupiat board the many-times-daily jets bound for Anchorage and then on to Barrow business and technical interests in Chicago, the

Bahamas or Copenhagen. As rambunctious in their dealings with the oil majors and the US government as among themselves when jousting for where the North Slope's future lies, these young men and women show clearly that a northern people can take charge quickly in their homeland.

Not all of native Alaska has the financial resources or the other advantages of the North Slope. But the North Slope shows some of the things that are possible. If poor communities elsewhere in Alaska opt for long-term isolation, they may remain poor. Perhaps some of the areas of modest means where regrouping is underway may show the value of economies of scale, and regional homelands may bargain a better Alaska native deal within the state and within the American Republic.

Notes

1. There are many sources on Alaska, and I also relied much on visits there and contacts through the Inuit Circumpolar Conference. The indispensable source on the development of the North Slope Borough is Gerald McBeath's North Slope Borough Government and Policymaking, in the Man in the Arctic Program series, monograph #3 (Fairbanks: University of Alaska, Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1981). I am especially indebted to McBeath's earlier work with Thomas Morehouse, The Dynamics of Alaska Native Self-Government (Lanham, Md: University Press of America, 1980), an earlier draft of which I read and which first oriented me towards the Alaska experience. Judge Berger has

also shared with me a draft of his report Village Journey, for which I am very grateful. For the North Slope, an obvious and virtually encyclopedic source is the North Slope Borough Coastal Management Program Background Report, Maynard and Patch Woodward-Clyde Consultants, 1984, available with an accompanying atlas from the North Slope Borough in Barrow.

2. See "People of the Gulf Coast," in Alaska's Native Peoples, published as Alaska Geographic 6:3 (1979), p. 175.

3. The full scope of these impacts is revealed in a remarkable book by Klausner and Foulks, Eskimo Capitalists: Oil, Politics and Alcohol (Totowa, New Jersey: Allanheld, Osmun, 1982).

4. This story is clearly and dramatically told by Shehla Anjum in "Land-use Planning in the North Slope Borough," in National and Regional Interests in the North: Third National Workshop on People, Resources, and the Environment North of 60 Degrees (Ottawa: Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, 1984), pp. 269-289.


Norway
Ny Alesund
Longyearbyen
Svalbard
Bjornoya
Norwegian Sea
Vadso
Hammerfest
U.S
S.R
Tromso
Finland
Bodo
Arctic Circle
Namsos
Sweden
Flora
Oslo
Stavanger
Farsund
Kristiansand
North Sea

IV - NORWAY'S NORTH

Canada is committed to providing its armed forces to northern Norway in the event of an international emergency, but, despite this unique tie, Canadians know very little about northernmost Europe.[1]

North Norway begins with Nordland, the narrowcounty straddling the Arctic Circle, with Bodo its main city. To the north is Troms, with the main centre of the far north, Tromsö, a beautiful and vigorous city on an island in a spectacular arctic fjord. Across the top of Europe's map lies Finnmark, "Lapland" in old Norwegian.Thenominal capital, Vadsö, is a quaint and pretty small town on the north shore of Varanger Fjord, the east-west fjord which faces Russia.

North Norway may be simply described as follows. Inland are high lands where the Reindeer Sami keep their permanent homes and have their winter pasture. This is the heart of Samiland (as the modern-day Sami, or "Lapps," prefer to call "Lapland"), where in an area of strong, clear and undivided Sami society four modern states emerging from three old empires have drawn their frontiers, erected their national flags and guard-houses and placed uniformed officials speaking alien languages. In the northern part of this region is the Finnmark Plain, a rolling land of twisted dwarf birches, giving way in the south to bush and pine parkland familiar from the Canadian north.

Then there are the outer coasts and islands, beautiful and mountainous, where for centuries Norwegian fishermen have

combined their homesteads with meagre farming while catering to the great fish commerce of Europe and its outpost in west Norway's old city of Bergen. Archaeology reveals that settlement patterns here in historical times have responded very much to market conditions in this great fish trade, although the area has been permanently settled now for centuries.

In the fjords and the coastal and inner islands are Sea Sami, or Coastal Sami, who mix local fishing and farming with hunting and gathering and, more recently, with road maintenance and other seasonal work. In the north-eastern part of the region, Finnish migrants during difficult years in recent centuries have moved into the fjord bottoms, important to Sami as wood lots, hunting areas, etc. Thus occupied, valuable Sami land has been lost.

The larger centres, and in some areas whole farming or fishing communities, have been built up by more recent Norwegian migrants from the south. The Norwegians are a sizeable population majority, although the inland districts around Karasjok and Kautokeino are predominantly Sami, and the rural area as a whole is more balanced. Statistics are not very helpful because many "Norwegian" coastal villages are now recognizing or re-asserting their Sami identity after a long period in which Norwegianisation policies and a massive infusion of government benefits on the basis of social equality made Sami identity seem a liability or an ingratitude. 'Many Sami also live in the towns, perhaps Tromsö being the largest "Sami city." (Oslo, too, has a sizeable Sami minority.) But on the national day, May 17, when Norwegians proudly wear their regional clothing and

ornaments, there are virtually no Sami clothes to be seen in Tromsö!

North Norway may thus be simply divided by geography and ethnic background. Of course, there is social and ethnic mixing, and in an area which has always known hardship and a lifestyle based on hard outdoor work all persons share many values, experiences and problems. The north has always been exploited - by the Russians and Swedes in their expansionist moments as well as by southern Norway. Strangely, it has few means of resisting. There are embryonic county councils, but these have not yet developed real power or personality. Ethnic cleavages are a problem, too, although it is worth noting that most Sami political personalities also are active in Norwegian political parties. But perhaps most important is that north Norwegians participate in national decision-making through occupational and interest groups bargaining nationally with considerable power, e.g., the fishermen's association, the farmers, the Sami reindeer herders, the Labour party, the unions. In these groups, northerners are always a minority, although within the north these sectoral and interest affiliations keep northerners divided from one another.

Nevertheless, there are some broad issues of regional identity. North Norway is different from the rest of Norway, and northerners are proud of it. No history of north Norway has been written, however, even though it is a remarkable history and an old one. Today there is a long- and well-established radical political tradition. There is the sense of being ignored or misunderstood or exploited - or all of those - by the southern centres of political and

economic power. There is the strong dependence on public services and institutions for maintaining living standards in a chronically poor area. There is the proximity of the vast Soviet military power in the Kola Peninsula, frequent NATO exercises, visits by allied defence committees or personnel and suspected Soviet submarine probes and listening ships in northern waters. And there is the fundamental economy of the region based on the renewable resources of land and sea.

To most Canadians today, Norway is known for its offshore oil programme. Now that oil development is reaching the north, where fish is the main economic commodity, tensions are developing. There is the obvious concern about pollution, some of the most likely oil prospects being located smack in some of the best fishing grounds. Norway is an environmentally sensitive country at all times, where virtually every individual in the north or the south spends much recreational time enjoying the well-preserved and protected outdoors. In a straight fight between offshore oil and a fishery which is virtually the emblem of north Norway in Norwegian minds, much public sympathy would be on the side of fish and the fishermen.

But matters are not so simple. North Norway is politically sophisticated, and concerns about offshore development are many. First, the decisions are made far away where officials know, little and care less about the environment and regional interests of north Norway. Secondly, the tension in the western world and NATO over secure oil supply, and the attractions of a major find (as north Norway promises) in a NATO country, invite the notion that a

bellicose and dangerous US president and an industrial world with a gluttonous appetite are pressuring "little Norway. " Thirdly, as a well-informed people dependent on renewable resources and service sectors, north Norwegians question the oil and industrial economy of the west generally. Fourthly, the best studies available show that one or perhaps two centres where onshore facilities would be sited would obtain local economic benefits from the offshore, but other local and regional spin-offs would be few. And fifthly, north Norwegians are mindful of the many social and economic problems which accompany such development, including inflation, transient and unruly work forces, etc.

Of course, there are other views in the north. Some think of the benefit of oil production to Norway as a whole. Certainly, Norway has shown - despite many fears to the contrary - that sudden wealth can be managed with dignity and widely distributed in benefits. Then there are those, as in all northern areas, who are always counting on the next boom. This is faith, not economics. Then there are the progressives of former days, union members and the Labour party faithful, who identify development with progress. They have worked hard and long bringing to north Norway its great infrastructure of today, but time moves on. Symbols are important - like Tromsö's great bridge and modern buildings replacing old worker houses - however much these are now in demand for renovation and heritage values. Old houses remind these persons of how poor they once were and how much-has changed by strong central government action, knocking down the local privileged classes and wiping out poverty with a total and massive social and material reconstruction in the north. A new generation

which has forgotten or not known those times may view conservation differently. A current favourite project of the older group is a "national unity" railway, inspired by Canadian TV films of the construction of the CPR. To shove the railhead north from Bodo would create a few seasons of construction work, and construction has been a mainstay of Labour politics and symbols. Would the railway pay in an area of narrow coast where every village is a natural harbour, open year round to excellent and cheap shipping? It certainly would create an environmental furore.

But North Norway is more than a difficult area in Norwegian politics. It is also a very large part of Samiland, and the part containing the majority of the world's Sami. Northern development hopes, as well as national security concerns, have created artificial boundaries in the heart of Samiland. But northern development has also created tension among Sami themselves. As Norwegian settlement on the outer coasts and other areas and Finnish settlement have reduced traditional Sami pasture, fishing areas and woodland, so have roads, airports, hydro-electric projects and other activities promoted by the government. Because particular- projects can always be considered limited or inoffensive in themselves, the deception of innocent increments and encroachments means that the Sami often lose. What is more, as their old cultural ties have broken down under Norwegianisation pressures and their environment is squeezed, the Reindeer Sami are no longer always seen as friends and trading partners on the coast. Often, Coastal Sami see them as a nuisance, their reindeer trampling the fields and the Reindeer Sami as overbearing with their proud Sami costume and identity, and the power of a government law and capable

industry lobby behind them. In former times the close partnership of Coastal and Reindeer Sami families was an essential feature of economic life, but its increasing problems today place a great strain on the already strained reindeer economy.

The Reindeer Sami, living in a style which has many traditional features in an area where they are still a majority, pursuing an ancient economic form, have felt sure of their identity. Because of the extensive land use of their occupation and its utterly unique features, it has required national legislation which bears on various soc al and cultural matters as well as purely "pastoral" ones. In other words, Reindeer Sami at-e sure they are Sami and are well recognised as such by the government and public. However, development, international boundaries (and the periodic changes in policy and regulation involving these) and Coastal Sami opposition hem them in. As well, of course, as a minority in a strongly nationalistic country they feel constant pressure on their society and culture. In recent years they have been represented by a Sami herders' association, NRL (Norske Reindriftsamers Landsforbund), which has made use of modern North American-style lobbying techniques as well as excellent staff work to pursue its interests effectively. NRL has also been important in Sami politics and in representing Sami political interests at the national level.

The Norwegian Sami Association (NSR) has among its active membership many of the better educated (including highly educated) Sami. It has a wide range of viewpoints, but includes a strong "radical" wing.[2] The central leadership

usually strives to maintain unity and balance. NSR is committed to the recognition of Sami rights, conspicuously the amendment of the Norwegian constitution to recognise Sami as a distinct people with distinct rights, and an elected Sami assembly to represent Sami interests nationally. NSR has, as much by its high-brow tone as its specific policies, tended to make many coastal Sami uneasy. Those rural residents who have found it desirable to play down Sami identity and special interests for fear of Norwegian backlash and who find NSR arguments arcane have formed a group of their own, SLF (Samenes Landsforbund). SLF has caused much bitterness among politically active Sami because it has been seen to oppose recognition of Sami rights and openly to oppose the more "radical" NSR and NRL at key moments on key issues. This view now seems too simplistic.

Calling themselves "the forgotten people," SLF members have managed to mobilise many previously passive Sami. Some who were "simply Norwegians" have now joined a Sami organisation, i.e., SLF. More and more families and whole communities along the north Norway coast are "rediscovering" their Sami identity and reasserting traditions and language. There has been much academic discussion in Norway about how the Sami "disappeared." That term is now becoming a sinister joke among Sami activists, much as the assertion by a former senior official in Canada's Northwest Territories that "We're all northerners!" had the improbable result of becoming an ironic rallying cry for native rights. The disappeared-are returning. How quickly, and in what numbers and to what effect is unknown. This process is just beginning. A newly published local history of the

Kvaenangen Fjord in eastern Troms has become an unlikely national success, breaking out of the usual plodding mould of such works to describe the conflicts and processes which over time have altered the Sami character of Kvaenangen to a Norwegian one. "It has given us back our history," is a typical reaction of local Sami to the book. But some SLF members worry that such recollections may endanger ethnic relations. Because Sami-Norwegian relations are played out almost entirely at the local level, with virtually no national interest, debate or media coverage, except of occasional "safe" cultural and educational subjects, this is a real worry. The Sami organisations have neglected to develop that national public relations capability which in Canada has proven indispensable in changing public attitudes and government policies in respect of minorities.

During summer 1985 a major report was discussed at the SLF annual assembly. Brought forward by the Porsanger SLF local, it called for recognition of Coastal Sami rights to harvests offshore, recognition and protection of the lifestyle and coastal lands and resources of Sami, funds for Coastal Sami economic development and a working out of problems between Coastal and Reindeer Sami. Although written so as to minimise offence to other groups, these proposals brought a quick and negative response from the powerful fishermen's association. What had escaped some observers was that the Coastal Sami were not so much opposed to Sami rights as they were to having those rights and Sami identity defined exclusively by Reindeer Sami. Indeed, the Reindeer Sami are the best known internationally, even though they make up less than 10% of the Sami community.

A few years ago, the controversy about building a dam on the Alta River, Norway's last great salmon river and a place of incredible beauty, became the first major conflict in the Sami rights movement. Hunger strikes, sit-ins, mass arrests and massive police actions shocked the Norwegian public and radicalised many Sami and their supporters. But SLF supported the Alta project for several reasons, of which "loyalty" to the national decision-making process and opposition to NSR were major. That conflict, which ended in defeat for everyone (although a version of the original project is still being prepared, with some doubts on economic grounds as to whether it can be proceeded with), has become the archetype of "native rights" and conservation struggle. One of the interesting features was that some proponents, including SLF, wanted it to proceed finally just to show that the government would not back down. Despite the many irregularities in planning and approval processes revealed in court, a bloody-minded portion of Norwegian political and public opinion insisted that the legitimacy of the government was in question! Unfortunately, the same admirable qualities in Norwegian culture which have helped Norwegians survive centuries of poverty, hardship and foreign occupation sometimes produce such rigid positions in public affairs. Conflict in Norway can be very sharp, and the future is therefore not entirely reassuring.

The same forces which found themselves fighting against the Alta project may be in for another battle. Some insiders predict that the Norwegian government, a strongly centralist administration by tradition and ready to indulge the national passion for "rational planning," will attempt to "rationalise" the reindeer herding industry. It is, after

all, untidy, with wild creatures running all over the place, and is offensive to the disciplined mind. No matter that herding is in fact a very painfully learned art and full of complex factors and equations! Such an assault by Oslo planners on a central feature of Sami culture, and one clearly designed to strengthen government's hand *vis-à-vis* Sami, should provide a very fine cause for a passionate international defence of aboriginal society and values.

Although Alta has become an icon, the 1972 struggle against Norway's membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) may be a better case study. In that case, national, urban and southern opinion seemed to favour membership, but an incredible (in content as in fervour) campaign developed with a very strong northern component fighting for renewable resource values, traditions of culture and lifestyle, anti-industrialism and, for good measure, a resurrected image of the jack-booted German threatening Norway. The debate tore the country apart and devastated the main political parties which had supported EEC entry.

Now, many years later, north Norway is full of young, reforming and often radical brains and talent. Despite sectoral and ethnic cleavages, important elements of this leadership are able to and wish to work across lines and develop a wider regional consensus. And, clearly, consensus- and bridge-building are the most important political tasks needed for regional progress.

So, in north Norway there exist major issues, an entire regional identity and an aboriginal homeland at stake. It

is difficult to see ahead. This situation is important to watch, however, because here are the oldest ethnic relations and regional development records in the circumpolar north. It is clear that problems neither fade away nor resolve themselves by cultural assimilation as is so glibly assumed by pro-development opinion in Canada. Indeed, two government-sponsored committees resembling Canadian "royal commissions," the Sami Rights Committee and Sami Culture Committee, have come forward with major recommendations in their initial reports in the last year.

The Sami Rights Committee seeks a constitutional amendment specifying the right of Sami to means and institutions to protect their unique identity and homeland. The committee placed the highest obligation on the Norwegian society to ensure the well-being of Sami culture in the Sami homeland, including the protection of Sami rights to the material base - land, waters and resources - of that culture. An elected Sami assembly representing all Norwegian Sami, including those living far from the Sami core areas, e.g., in Oslo, is proposed and would have a direct and close working relationship and advisory role with the national Parliament. (NSR and NRL seek more than merely "advisory" powers for the Sami assembly, or Sameting, and this will be an important subject in the committee's second report, including a possible territorial government or administrative role for the Sameting in respect of Sami core areas in the north.) Sami would also have the right to establish local and county level Sami assemblies. A national Sami Act would incorporate these various measures and require regular parliamentary debates and reviews of Sami policy to establish clear guidelines and to monitor implementation.

The forthcoming committee' reports will deal with the potentially explosive question of Norwegian Crown title in Finnmark, Sami land, water and resources rights there - including rights in salt water areas - and Sami rights elsewhere in Norway.

The finest thing about the Sami Rights Committee report may be the tone and style of the synthesis. In a quiet but unambiguous manner, an official body of a modern country has set an example of enlightened re-examination almost impossible to surpass. The conditions under which the committee worked led few to expect such results, and the chairman, *Oslo university* professor Carsten Smith, deserves most of the credit. As a method of social change, one can hardly imagine a more opposite approach than that of Alaskan Inupiat free-wheeling on the American frontier.

The Sami Culture Committee proposed a Sami language law which would recognise the equality of Sami and Norwegian languages, give every child in Norway the right to a full education in the Sami language (where numbers warrant a classroom), have Sami language taught as a subject in Sami area schools, have Sami join Norwegian as an official language in public affairs at the national level and in public offices in Sami areas with preference given to Sami-speaking job applicants in such areas. The report is very clear on the point that Sami are Sami, i.e., they are not merely Norwegians who sometimes speak another language. This concept-of a dual society, which along with the other recommendations was strongly supported by the SLF leader, may be the most difficult for many Norwegians to accept. In Scandinavia the long struggle for equality, a radical

struggle which those countries have carried further than any other developed countries, has made those old and overwhelmingly homogeneous cultures suspect "difference." Pluralism, like any non-conformity, is not easily accepted.

One may see hopes for a more viable Sami society within Norway over the next years as a result of acceptance of some of the proposals of the Sami policy committees. For international Samiland it is harder to say. National frontiers, even ones which do not seem to make much sense, are more jealously guarded by national governments than anything else. But, of course, there is an international Sami movement, represented by the Nordic Sami Council, and it in turn is sponsored in part by the Nordic Council of Scandinavian and Finnish governments. Some international recognition exists, and as the Sami Rights Committee and others delve deeper into the erosion and loss of Sami rights since, for instance, the Lappacodicilen of 1751, important findings may push the governments of Finland, Sweden and Norway to permit greater cultural and regional unity in the north. An initial campaign with the limited objectives of reducing border formalities and other such barriers for bona fide residents of Samiland and promoting economic co-operation across borders in the region may be most successful.

The whole of north Norway, or of northern Scandinavia in general, is a region where conservation and renewable resource interests are felt deeply, and where they have provided social stability and cultural continuity through the ages. Ancient rock carvings along the sea coast record Sami culture and economic activities, activities which may

still be seen today. The modern age is only more complex, not fundamentally different. There is definitely a north Norway identity, a personality, in spite of the many differences among peoples and interests and sub-regions. What is lacking is a regional political structure, or even a forum through which to achieve one, as well as a practical consensus or a plan on how conservation of renewable resources and environment can be turned to everyone's benefit.

All the ingredients and skills are available, but a forum is not. Regional "zoning" of activities, Sami claims settlements in coastal and inland areas, more regional development control at regional levels and new political bodies - are all possible elements for improving the situation. Possibly more exciting, and certainly more risky, is the potential for north Norway political interests to forge a regional unity in national struggles - e.g., over offshore development, economic development orientations, etc. - and play a much more powerful role in determining national policies. Unfortunately, this latter seems at the moment more plausible as a negative sanction than a daily, workable solution.

Notes

1. I owe much here to many individuals in north Norway, especially the Sami and non-Sami staff and students of the University of Tromsö, as well as government officials,

academics, staff and principals of Sami associations, and others in all parts of Norway, many of. whom I have known for years. Above all, I must thank Terje Brantenberg, Ivar Björklund, Harald Gaski and Per Mathiesen for answering so many questions and guiding me, sometimes truly literally, through mountains and through mountains of information.

2. In ethno-politics, who are the conservatives and who the radicals? Between North America and Scandinavia, who are they on issues like pluralism, economic development, etc? Such terms become a liability in a cross-cultural situation.

v - CONSERVATION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

There are two crucial aspects of conservation in the northern circumpolar world. The first, of course, is the supply and health of living species and resources upon which northern peoples depend for food and income. The second is the structures and styles by which these are managed, exploited and conserved.

Reindeer breeding in Norway, for example, is a national activity organised by the government through a specific act of Parliament and a reindeer administration in the agriculture department. It is also a core activity of Sami and northern culture. If the supply of meat and compatibility with other forms of development are national goals in "rationalizing" the industry, that is only part of the story. The impact on Sami culture and lifeways, on a way of life which permits the industry to continue, is also fundamental. It is hard to see a species like reindeer surviving a long struggle with industrialisation without a society committed to that survival. The symbiosis of reindeer and man becomes clear.

Norwegian anthropologist Georg Henriksen 's research shows that the administration of reindeer in one of the more marginal Sami areas by an industrial country with all its logic and imperatives is highly problematical The administration may be effectively pushing the reindeer Sami life to extinction there. It may be that reindeer will become a delicacy in some few fine restaurants or a cultural memory if this process continues.

Norway's leading anthropology experts on the reindeer culture told me that pressure in the government would surely lead to a major overhaul of the whole industry in the future. They believe that the planning officials simply will be unable to leave alone something as untidy, as "backward," as reindeer pastoralism. Indeed, there are many problems, and not a few with which the more numerous Coastal Sami tax the Reindeer Sami. This is a major theme of a new Coastal Sami position paper on political aspirations.[2]

In Canada, Quebec premier Robert Bourassa urges much more massive development of hydro power in the Quebec peninsula's north-flowing rivers.[3] In his remarkable book, entitled Power from the North, Bourassa proposes the complete reorientation and reorganisation of the waters of a very large region of North America. Acknowledging neither environmental nor social implications, he slyly suggests that the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement settled and satisfied for all time the concerns of the aboriginal Cree, Naskapi and Inuit populations of the area. The abundant wildlife of Quebec receives no mention. Creating a vast reservoir out of James Bay, his plan would flood much of the homeland of the Crees of Ontario and Quebec. The rivers dammed would finish the riverine lifestyle of the native peoples. The Inuit there, for instance, have virtually all their communities at river mouths to take advantage of both marine and riverine milieux. This is the same Robert Bourassa, it will be recalled, who a few years ago said that any water not driving a turbine was wasted.

In both these cases we see how an industrial area plans for northern living resources, and how its notion of

conservation is threatening. Yes, water is a renewable resource, and would be conserved under Bourassa's plan, but not in an environmentally balanced way. One wonders what would happen to the native peoples in his view. And in Norway, the reindeer would, no doubt, vanish over time.

The autumn, 1984, caribou disaster in northern Quebec, when some 20,000 animals perished as a result of cavalier hydro-electric dam control, was a dramatic case of the collision of values. Clearly, the Crees, Naskapis and Inuit would benefit from sitting down with Sami and talking about water power and caribou/reindeer. Both Sami and Inuit organisations have their lawyers drafting international conventions as models for recognition of aboriginal rights. These have slim hopes of early passage by the United Nations. Meanwhile, there is little or no co-operative action on more fundamental and more practical issues. In modern liberal democracies like Norway and Canada with their mass media and high education levels, it would be easy enough to alert the public to the needs of the northern environment and the economy based on it.

In autumn 1984, Mark R. Gordon, the Canadian vice-president of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, who had personally supervised the clean-up of the northern Quebec carcasses of drowned caribou, visited Copenhagen to speak at a workshop organised mainly by supporters of Sami rights. He took with him photos of the carnage, and in long evening discussions with the leaders of the Reindeer Sami and their Norwegian organisation, NRL, he talked about reindeer/caribou and politics, about protecting the environment against industrial-minded governments, about the Alta struggle in

Norway and the native claims process in Canada. As Mark Gordon's assistant, I outlined the work to create a Nunavut government and its origins in the social and environmental threats to the Inuit way of life and economy. Other representatives - of Greenland Inuit and Canadian Indians . added their experience. Encroachments on northern homelands of military, energy and settlement activities as these affected homeland economies were the spur to political action in all cases. Discussion centred on how to respond politically to these intrusions. The answers seemed to be wider control of wildlife habitats onshore and offshore and the establishment of new political jurisdictions in the hands of northern peoples.

In Alaska, Judge Berger's report has provoked considerable discussion. His powerful message, drawing together the words and emotions of aboriginal men and women around the coasts and through the interior of Alaska, is that the wildlife and habitat base of ancient societies must be protected. A transfer of the claims settlement lands to tribal governments where the people would have them secure forever, inalienable, as proposed by Berger would reverse the direction of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. Far from pushing the native peoples towards assimilation in the structures and livelihoods of industrial America, it would secure their traditional base. From that base and, one hopes, with the added heft of their educated and urban youth, native Alaskans would embark on a new search for political accommodation with development-minded whites. If those two groups of Alaskan natives can join hands and work together, their power to influence the political and constitutional future of Alaska is very great.

Judge Berger's book is creating no less interest in Canada. This may seem surprising because the Alaska problem of lands put at risk in corporations and newly born natives excluded from the 1971 settlement are unknown in Canada and in Canadian claims settlements which, on these points, protect native interests. His report has once again stirred old arguments about the viability of native traditions at a time when Canadian claims policy is up for review by a federal task force. The fact that these old arguments are not settled despite the existence of land claims settlements among two groups of Inuit and Quebec Cree and Naskapi, and despite many years of publicity, public sympathy and government action for native conservation interests, is revealing. We have here, it seems, no mere historical fallacy which can be disposed of, but rather an archetypal and ever-recurring dispute. In that case, aboriginal concerns cannot be secured without formal structures such as claims settlements and government powers accorded to aboriginal collectivities.

In autumn, 1985, there were other signs of the times. In north Norway a large gathering of concerned Sami in Tromsö discussed the adequacy of political structures faced with new environmental threats such as offshore oil. They looked enviously at the generous government funding of Canadian aboriginal groups, and considered the techniques of national-level action carried out by northern Canadian native peoples. The model of the Nunavut Constitutional Forum to bring together rival groups and interests in the name of political consensus was canvassed. The attempt to put together a comparative study project on the experience

of Alaska and Canadian Inuit with offshore oil was again made. Yet the search for consensus within northern peoples' groups is not always easy. In Tromsö the deep divisions and clashes of economic interest among some of the more established Sami movement personalities and those who see no cause for complacency was evident. It is likewise in Alaska with rifts between some of the 1971 settlement proponents and those who now seek a tribal government solution.

And it is likewise in Nunavut. Inuit leaders, increasingly anxious about the federal policy of "evolution" - of devolving powers and budgets from Ottawa to Yellowknife - and fearful that this was only adding to the security of the status quo in NWT political circles, met in Frobisher Bay in November, 1985. The leaders of the Inuit organisations sensed a conflict of view between themselves and the NWT Legislative Assembly. They had a full discussion and drafted a strong letter to the federal minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development demanding that devolution be halted. Not devolution, but "division" - dividing the NWT to create Nunavut - must be the goal, they said. What had most deeply upset the Inuit was an agreement by which conservation and renewable resource management were to be given over largely to the NWT government without involvement of the Inuit who were and had long been negotiating claims settlements. There were also fears about a federal policy on the subject of oil and gas known to be in preparation, and about the role of native peoples in controlling impacts on the natural environment and society.

When the Inuit leaders followed up that letter with a face-to-face meeting with the minister, he promised to

accommodate them. In a short background note provided to the minister the Inuit pointed out that a policy of federal laissez-faire was in fact a departure from the active neutrality which successive federal governments had maintained in defending native interests against territorial administrations. That policy would need to continue until a Nunavut claims settlement and a Nunavut government were complete. The new NWT "premier" (formally the "Government Leader"), himself a Dene and strong native rights exponent, also was quick to accommodate the Inuit.

On another level, Inuit of Alaska, Canada and Greenland have taken action in 1985 through their international organisation, ICC. A newly created environmental commission headquartered in Copenhagen is attempting to define policies and standards which would provide and promote conservation and sustainable development in the arctic. It takes its inspiration from the World Conservation Strategy. In the words of the ICC brief to Canada's special joint parliamentary committee on international relations in December, 1985,

> the Inuit Regional Conservation Strategy will also ensure that the responsibility for the implementation of conservation measures will remain in the hands of those who are most directly affected by its management - the people in the communities and the outpost camps. If conservation lessons have been learned at all elsewhere, they teach that those who use a resource are those best suited to ensure its survival, provided they have adequate control. The Environmental Commission is a direct result of the insistence by people who are on

> the front line that something should be done to protect and maintain the environment on which Inuit depend. The need has been articulated by the grass roots, and the grass roots will ensure its subsequent success, if Inuit can obtain sufficient measure of authority and of self-government to implement the Environmental Commission's work.[4]

The brief goes on to propose that the Canadian government, together with Inuit and other northern peoples, initiate an active network of co-operation among the lands around the circumpolar north. In a similar vein, the Nunavut Constitutional Forum urges the same committee to recommend a "commonwealth" of arctic peoples, which would share social, economic, and environmental information and help balance conservation and development in the international north.

This growing awareness among the peoples of the international north of the problems and politics they share is introducing a new dimension into arctic politics. Precedents among liberal democracies and moral support among peoples with few political resources are useful in the struggle to reshape northern policies and politics. Conservation issues are usually the jumping-off point. The conservation of species of plants and animals and lands and waters is little valued by industrial society. Planned recreation areas may find favour near cities, but the "vast northland" is assumed to be a reservoir of industrial resources. These are mined or logged, the boomtown dies, and developers move on.

Northern people must upgrade the value society places upon their living environments. But in Nunavut we see the opposite occurring. Just as a whole system of public administration has been imported from the south, so have the industrial values of the industrial south where it originated. It has become common for senior- territorial officials and ordinary folk to identify progress and wealth with industrial projects. Economic development of simple and abundant traditional resources gets scant attention in comparison with the service, manufacturing and extractive sectors. I believe that the problem is attitudinal. Rather than question basic values, the political leaders of Nunavut - MLAs and ministers, regional and national association and regional council heads - seem to accept certain values and assumptions which are inherent in a southern society intruding northwards through a public administration designed by southerners. There is too little realisation that matters could be organised otherwise.

This brings into focus the second point, the manageability of development and change by northerners. In the fiercely proud, small island nations of Iceland and the Faroe Islands, as in the independent-minded Shetland Islands, the peoples have developed their own local companies, co-operatives, technology and methods for managing resources and livelihoods. These have reflected their cultural values of which respect for living resources and the environment are paramount. They have resisted the industrial hegemony of Denmark and Britain and successfully controlled such incursions. But in Canada, the native north has so far been little able or ready to resist the white industrial south,

although the survival of the creatures and habitats of the north depend on such resistance.

If northern people are to organise and stabilise their societies in the face of rapid change and industrialisation, they must take control of those societies. As Inuit leaders like Eric Tagoona have wisely said, many of the problems of youth vandalism, including vandalism towards wildlife, result from the powerlessness experienced by aboriginal peoples in their homelands. A Dene woman I know who shot and ate a whooping crane for lunch and buried its identification tag had never had an overtly political thought. Her act was a form of protest against a white authority which valued one species over other wildlife values or even over the human values of the Indian population.

But even those institutions managed and controlled by northern peoples, such as development corporations established as part of claims settlements in Alaska and Canada, do not necessarily ensure control by northerners or a dominant northern conservation outlook. The lack of professionally trained and managerially experienced northerners may lead to outsiders being hired to run things. These individuals naturally establish systems which reflect their experience in the south. Of course, to be effective, northern institutions must be able to hold their own with southern ones. But does this mean that they have to be copies of southern models? A major cause of the Inuit movement which has led to Nunavut was purely and simply the desire to put power back in Inuit hands. A major worry

among ordinary people in Nunavut today is that the new government may require outsiders to run it.

Judge Berger identifies this same problem as a major cause of the failure of the Alaska claims settlement. People speaking at his community meetings reported that by importing southern business styles and experts, the Alaska natives had created bodies which were not truly governed by them, and perhaps could not be so governed. Soon these hybrid organisations may themselves promote and join in the very types of development opposed by the communities. When this happens the political credibility of the whole northern people is put at risk, of course. This has occurred in northern Canada as well.

In Canada, too, Inuit in communities have wondered why the benefits of claims settlements seem to go to white southerners working in native development corporations and other bodies. Northern peoples have often been content to hire white "experts" to look after technical matters. While this is inevitable to some extent, there has been a lack of determination by the leadership and by government to prepare a first generation of native managers. And often the very individuals who have acquired most executive skills and who could best supply effective management - the young political leaders - are too proud to take executive upgrading courses which would imply that they had more to learn!

Sparse population and a scattered settlement pattern, as well as distinct cultural ways, require new forms of northern administration, whether for development or for government. In Alaska, Mayor Hopson turned the regional

infrastructure improvement programme into a massive retraining operation for his Inuit people. The problem is highlighted in Greenland where the centuries-old KGH (Royal Greenland Trade Department), a Crown monopoly which owns and operates most aspects of Greenland's economy, is now being turned over to the Inuit home rule government and to Inuit communities. Although KGH has had an admirable record of Inuit employment, well over 80%, the managerial and technical levels at the top have been largely staffed by outsiders. Greenland is seeking both new management forms and a supply of new Inuit managers to bring the economy home.

But to some, the presence of expensive professionals and flashy southern work styles in northern organisations are themselves desirable as status symbols. Without doubt, the new glitzy organisations which northern peoples have been able to afford with various sources of funding, whether claims settlements or government grants, have enabled them to send out well prepared leaders to deal with big government and big business. This is desirable. But also desirable is the establishment of enterprises and services which not only serve northern need but can be managed by local northern persons. That way the social and financial benefit is really for the northern community, rather than a southern form of siphoning off of the northern economy and co-opting of northern leadership to do so.

It would be dangerous to create a division between a sophisticated business and political élite and the people in the traditional communities and occupations. This has been a threat in A aska since the 1971 claims settlement.

To be strong, and to survive as cultures and homelands in a modern world full of industrial ising pressure, conservation of the social and cultural base in the renewable resource economy is required, together with a diversity of other skills which conserve the homeland as a full society. In old days the northern community could survive because it was not pressured from outside. It could rely on those skills which its members combined with their daily occupations. But in today's world there is a need for more specialised skills - in management, information systems, the professions, politics, and public administration.

As we have seen again and again, the south will not protect the north. The fact that the northern department of government in Ottawa had the north's "national resources" as part of its name, and that these are now styled "Canada lands," even when under water, tells all. Only northerners have a real stake in protecting the north, and if they do not, its conservation is lost.

The inability of officialdom to cope with matters of the Inuit lifestyle are well illustrated in the folklore of northern peoples faced with the fragmentary knowledge and limited management imperatives of white wildlife biologists. Milton Freeman, in a distinguished new essay, makes the point well.[5] The native peoples manage their wildlife within the total context of the living environment of their region, and the complex set of inter-relationships enables them to perceive even minor changes from a variety of information bases which, when all their experience is assembled in the group, provide a wiser overview and one

which, unsurprisingly, has been the basis of stable and continuing economies for untold centuries.

The ability of man and living creatures to sustain each other in the north depends on these relationships being maintained. It requires that sort of knowledge, but it also requires more. It requires that the native peoples be in charge of enough facets of their surroundings to protect the variable factors on which regional change depends. This means not only being in charge of wildlife and the living environment to a significant degree, but also being in charge of the other elements of a life whose core may continue to be that traditional harvesting.

In the south the industrial interests of a modern country are nevertheless balanced by the “farm lobby” and the “fishing lobby,” those representatives of our own ancient industries. Putting a knowledgeable person with farming and fishing background or roots in such a region in the cabinet to take charge is a political “must.” It is understood that questions of scale and relationships among productive factors are essential, yet different from industry. The north needs the same consideration, and its producers need the same organisational heft as the farmers.

The balance, the harmony, the seasons in the northern countries have always been determined by the demands of the wildlife cycles and mankind’s organisation of society around them. The health of those societies is intimately bound up with these cycles. If a society loses control and becomes assimilated into industrial values and uses of the environment incompatible with these, it becomes disoriented

and the conservation of nature is put at risk. 'One sees these elements warring today in the changing societies of the North Slope of Alaska, coastal Samiland and Nunavut. If management of public affairs and economic development is kept local and regional, tradition will win and conservation will be assured. If the north, as new studies like the report of the Macdonald Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada would urge, is progressively assimilated into national systems dictated and generated from the south, then all is in doubt.

Maximum decision-making in the north, by northerners, is required to protect the living environment. In practice, much has been tending this way. The Quebec Inuit, through their claims settlement vehicle, Makivik, have a fine research department which has become the de facto arbiter for northern Quebec wildlife interests, although it has always a powerful opponent in Hydro-Québec. In Nunavut and elsewhere in the Northwest Territories, the growing role of hunters' and trappers' societies in wildlife management is demonstrably beneficial. The same applies in Norway and Alaska. Much remains to be done, however. A clear transfer of jurisdiction to northern peoples may be required.

Notes

1. Georg Henriksen, "Norwegian Administration and the Saami Community in Helgeland," in Native Power: The Quest for Autonomy and Nationhood of Indigenous Peoples, ed.

Brösted et al. (Oslo: Universitetsforl aget, 1985), pp. 137-154.

2. Aboriginal Coastal Rights in Norway, a partial translation of Porsanger SLF's Fastboendes Rettigheter i Samiske kyst- og fjordströk, translated by the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Canada, 1985.

3. Robert Bourassa, Power from the North (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1985).

4. Brief to the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations, undated [December, 1985], submitted by Mark R. Gordon and Rhoda A. Innuksuk, Inuit Circumpolar Conference (Canada Office), Ottawa.

5. Milton M. R. Freeman, "Appeal to Tradition: Different Perspectives on Arctic Wildlife Management," in Native Power, pp. 265-281. See above, note 1.

VI - WHAT DOES IT MEAN?

The similarities among the three northern regions I have described are obvious. They are also typical of the rest of the circumpolar north, where other peoples, both aboriginal and northern European, experience the same situations. Elsewhere, I have summarised these similarities following a survey of the circumpolar world. It may be useful to note that we find

small and distinctive cultures occupying relatively large and "undeveloped" northern areas

- struggles by these societies to protect their social structures and livelihoods from the disruption of large population influxes

- legal and political conflicts [over] the claims to land and resources, and their use and benefit, [between] northern peoples and the governmental and industrial development interests which would exploit these for southern use

- the celebration and retention of distinct languages and cultures

condescension in southern decision and opinion centres, whether Moscow, Copenhagen, or Toronto, towards the demands of northerners for strengthening and continuing their distinct lifestyles

- stable societies based now as traditionally on the harvesting of renewable resources

- the utility and success of locally manageable and locally managed commercial, industrial, or public bodies for development

- the frequency and bitterness of environmental protection battles

- a general antipathy to industrialisation

-the emphasis on resources development questions both on and offshore as an essential element of political conflicts and aspirations

- demands for greater legal rights to lands and resources and for more self-governing powers and stronger representative institutions by northern peoples

- an ultimate willingness to accept political accommodations within existing state structures, with the potential these have to offer, rather than to pursue separation.[1]

As we have seen, the push of southern power into northern areas becomes critical when it threatens environmental conservation and the sustainable economy of northern living resources. These threats are both direct - use or pollution - or indirect - through legal claims to ownership or

jurisdiction. The threats mobilise a complex political response which brings in many diverse elements of human life and culture because the conservation of living resources is the heart and soul of the northern peoples and their history.

These conflicts usually represent a new phase in northern peoples' understanding of their situation within nation-states. They mobilise new talents and ideas, or bring others from the libraries and schools into use. What began as a simple disagreement over siting a facility or avoiding sensitive wildlife habitat quickly becomes a focal point for a full political re-evaluation by a people. In other words, once begun, these processes develop a life of their own. Resource use issues and conservation remain crucial data, but not the only data, and the nature of a resolution expands to larger areas of politics and legal rights. Because these northern homelands have been imperfectly assimilated to nation-states - negligently treated or mistreated, without fair compensation in morality or law, and without the full citizenship benefits the national state is intended to confer - new political settlements are required. These may contain various elements - "claims" settlements and setting aside of lands, or even national constitutional adjustments. It is not surprising that these events appear to represent "a newdeal" for northern peoples, a new opportunity.

But this is not in itself threatening to national governments. After all, the old deal is continued: that of a small northern population continuing to use and monitor large expanses of "national"territory in return for

protection and services from that national state. Only the terms of the arrangement are renewed. But because such renegotiation, implicit or formal, is "constitutional" in the pure sense, it may involve some time, much consideration and debate and many anxieties and prejudices on all sides. As has been frequently noted in recent years, constitutions are changed quickly only following a t-evolution or national collapse, and thus many of the world's fundamental covenants are "emergency measures."

Because these situations are novel, they may require novel processes for resolution. In Canada, a unique constitutional renegotiation launched by the Trudeau government in 1978 and continued by the Clark and Mulroney governments, as well as claims settlements and Indian and northern self-government development processes, have been ongoing. A related question is whether existing political parties are up to the task. All Canada's national parties have some progressive elements and this accounts for the frequent unanimity of work in the Standing Committee of the House of Commons on Indian Affairs and Northern Development. But all parties also have other elements less friendly to northern and aboriginal aspirations.

In the after-math of the 1981 betrayal and restoration by Canadian governments of constitutional clauses relating to aboriginal rights, serious work was done on the possibility of a party espousing the aboriginal people's cause This may seem improbable, but there is already evidence of a national ideology, which I have called "the aborig nal option":

[Thel "native movement" (i.e. the political movement of aboriginal Inuit, Indian, and Métis peoples) of recent years has constituted a radical critique of Canadian history and society, and proposed some radical alternatives.

The alternatives put forward by aboriginal peoples' groups across the country oppose many fundamental features of North American life. Aboriginal peoples see history in reverse from the "discovery and settlement" mentality of the white population. The r commitment to the natural environment and renewable resources is opposed to important assumptions of industrial society and the industrial exploitation (f resources. Aboriginal customs of land and water use and communal sharing are at odds with Canada's European legal system built on private and exclusive ownership. Police and court systems have not seemed protectors as much as alien and often oppressive forces. "Consumerism" and acquisitive habits have not been traditional among most aboriginal groups. The strength of community and extended family ties and values in aboriginal society have been particularly appreciated in recent years by Canadian society as a whole as it undergoes a period of social confusion.

The power of such a programme of human values is immense, the more so because it stems not from a theoretical statement but from the experience of human societies with still-inhabited homelands and a very long tradition. This is having an effect on Canadian politics in many parts of Canada, notably in western

> and northern regions, and nowhere more than in the Northwest Territories. Indeed, many Canadians have been attracted by various features of the aboriginal "option." With the spread of regional aboriginal and aboriginal-dominated governments and other public authorities, there may be significant implications for Canada's public policies in the future. This applies not only to cultural and social directions, but also to other matters. The conventional economic and resources development mentality and idea about economic enterprise in large areas of the country may be questioned and altered. Over the next decade this could all add up to a fundamental change in the make-up of Canada. It is fitting that the aboriginal people who have been so long left out of the formation of the Canadian state should now prove a major dynamic element in the political future. It should also be welcomed by all Canadians, what is more, that a "made in Canada" political ideology is at last emerging.[2]

It is of no importance that many Canadians would consider such talk mere "moonshine." Just as they do not see that it is significant when the prime minister and ten premiers sit down for two days yearly to debate, on national television, with a young generation of aboriginal leaders the future of this country, neither do they see this other Canada. It is this neglect by mainstream Canada of the lands, waters and resources of the continent and ignorance of the cultures and homelands imprinted upon its topography that demand attention and action. It is in this era of neglect, of the much-quoted "absence of mind" about the north remarked by

Prime Minister St. Laurent, that conservation and northern peoples' politics converge.

A few years ago, northern Canada - the provincial north and the territorial north - was seen as waiting to be developed. It was empty, waiting to be filled by an expanding southern Canada. Today that attitude has changed, at least in government offices, because the peoples of the north are speaking out. But the process is disappointingly slow. As we have seen in Alaska, Norway and Nunavut, local northern political action requires an echo in larger groupings and requires vehicles and energies to be carried to success. And successes in winning high opinion must be matched by local follow-through. It has been usual in this country to "solve" matters by processes, by structural accommodations of the public administration. But nobody in power is going to realign the country for the fun of it. The northern peoples are invisible, their homelands mythical or-, worse, unknown. The northern economy of resource harvesting in rivers, forests and sea and every single seal, duck and moose could die quietly and there would not be a squawk or flickering eyelid in Ottawa.

Northern peoples have to mobilise effectively to make their case. They must make practical proposals and be ready to take power. In other words, the main responsibility is upon northern peoples themselves to make things work. If the homelands have persisted it has been because the peoples there - individuals and families and communities for many generations - have sustained them. It has not been government with its overlay of jurisdictions and boundaries

and administrative districts and its frequent disenfranchising of the native peoples themselves.

At times, it has seemed that northern peoples have been so exhausted, understandably, from the struggle to survive that when finally at the point of success they abandon their ideas and ideology too easily and simply grasp at the forms - whether corporate structures or white man's politics - of the dominant society. This is dangerous to the group, and requires institutions, perhaps indigenous political movements, which nurture and convey the group values.

But just as native peoples must carry forward their own struggle, all Canadians have a stake in the foregoing ideology. It is fitting that a conservationist ideology for the continent emerge from the original peoples. But it must be carried forward by all. It has the ability to enrich Canadian politics at the national and regional level, and this is a task for all of us. Everyone should feel a responsibility to support the struggle of native peoples in their homelands and to support the redevelopment of Canadian politics in line with their ideology.

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Nunavut, in many ways, dominates this paper. It is the clearest and the boldest homeland proposal in Canada. It has been accepted for implementation by both Liberal and Conservative. national governments. In 1985, it seemed stalled, and yet it already had profoundly affected Canadian thinking. In the national constitutional talks where provincial premiers looked blank or incredulous at the early

demands by aboriginal peoples for self-government, Nunavut was a concrete and living proposal which. they could study. They did. They found that northern peoples and a cultural community descended from neither French nor English Canadians were responding to local conditions and problems within the institutional norms and framework of the Canadian political tradition. They observed a progressive and dynamic development, with full community involvement and drawing on some of the expertise which they themselves had been developing over the years within the national constitutional context. They saw nothing to fear. Whatever the future of the Nunavut project, it has been the stalking horse for all aboriginal peoples and their political deve" opment in Canada. By its matching of homeland with terr torial jurisdiction it has shown the way ahead for the next stage of development.

Yet t has had its problems. The fact that economic management is so little developed, that so few Inuit are highly trained and in executive positions, that there are no expert or research resources available to the Nunavut peoples except the meagre ones of the Inuit movement and so few practised negotiators and fully developed politicians remind us of the limited manpower development promoted by governments to date. A Nunavut government should redress this with its responsiveness to Inuit villages. Unfortunately, some persons, including some Inuit leaders, have argued that only a community revival will help, that natives must. take better hold of their family lives at the community level before daring to take on the large tasks of self-government. If the region and territory were safe, that might be possible. But they are not. American

military vessels are ploughing through the Inuit maritime heartland of Lancaster Sound and oilmen are setting the pace and tone of northern offshore and onshore development. A territorial government has been set up and well funded by Ott awa. Just as some Indian chiefs were chosen in the last century to sign the surrender of the north's resources over to southern-based industrial interests, some critics see the territorial government in the same role today. There is nobody looking after Nunavut specifically, and so the peoples themselves must work at both the community and the regional Nunavut-wide level to protect their own interests. They will certainly do this. But time is short.

In the north - from Labrador and Lake Superior to the Pacific northwest coast and the arctic islands - political development to be just, to be related to economic reality, and to ensure sound and stable management by the permanent population must accommodate first and foremost the aboriginal homelands. Canada in the north is not white men's idea but the aboriginal peoples' domain. As Canadian Inuit international spokesman Mat-k R. Gordon pointed out at an Ottawa panel discussion on the American icebreaker Polar Sea and its intrusion into the Inuit ocean of the arctic, it is Inuit hunters and families, not foreign or southern ships, who establish Canada's sovereignty.

At the constitutional tables in Ottawa where aboriginal rights are being renegotiated, it has not been the northern governments established by Ottawa which have led the way, despite their plentiful staff and funds, but rather the northern peoples' groups sitting at the end of the table. It is Inuit, Metis and Dene who have made the proposals and

fought for the future. The governments one would expect to show leadership, being the only governments at the table with profound experience in dealing with aboriginal issues and with aboriginal cabinet ministers in their ranks, have been content to pose for the cameras and look as much like southern governments as possible. If northerners are to be represented by leaders who simply wish to sell out, blend in and assimilate, they will have lost everything. It is the native movement and the homeland which must be the source of change and the centre of the political future.

A curious footnote to northern homeland and Nunavut issues is provided by Norway. Modern Norway has been the leading country in fighting for aboriginal peoples' rights around the world. In 1930, when it waived its claim to the arctic islands of Nunavut, it stipulated - and Canada agreed through the British-led negotiators - that forever the wildlife harvesting of Inuit must be the first priority of Canadian policy in the area. Regardless of enforceability in international law, an honorable government cannot ignore such a commitment.

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Before I conclude I must broach one final subject. Defence policy and strategic considerations are sometimes cited by officials as reasons not to accommodate northern peoples' interests, especially their demands for land and water rights and for jurisdictional change. A facile equation is made between regional self-determination and political fragmentation. This is particularly unacceptable in a

country like Canada where the ideology of federalism celebrates the strong region and strong centre equally.

More and more, defence issues are of concern to all Canadians, including northern Canadians. They will continue to be. Northerners are grateful for certain aspects of military development, notably aviation technology and airports, which have provided cheaper and more predictable supplies and a means of evacuating the ill. But like other parts of the western world, northern regions have become caught up in discussions about the pros and cons of the NATO alliance, its nuclear capability and strategy and the whole question of what Marshall McLuhan called "war and peace in the global village." These questions are complex, and sometimes are viewed generationally when the complexities overawe easy choices. In an international symposium of the sorts of public persons who have the burden of choosing ultimate strategies, 35 Years in NATO brings out some important points rather clearly.[3]

One is that NATO stands for the desire of western pluralistic states to continue to be democratic and pluralistic. "A pluralistic society is one that recognizes the legitimacy of different centres of power, not only political but social and cultural."[4] But also, as several authors point out, social consensus within NATO countries in support of particular policies is necessary if the alliance is to function. This requires both more public discussion and information, and more evident commitment by the alliance to article 2 of the treaty which, as Lane Kirkland, President of the AFL-CIO, notes in his piece, includes a commitment to peace "by strengtheni rig.. .free institutions,

by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being."[5] Some NATO founders had wished to go a good deal further in outlining human rights and democratic goals, but detailed demands were thought to be impractical at the time. The fact is, NATO has always been sensitive about the democratic credentials of its members and has suffered during those periods when a member country lapsed.

Surely, the disaffection and regional politics of frustration which are emerging in northern areas of NATO countries violate the spirit of consensus. What is more, anti-NATO feeling has often accompanied such disaffection. Yet NATO has not shown an appreciation of the character of northern regionalism or its dynamics nor taken seriously, it would seem, the fact that this northern phenomenon is general in the alliance's northern lands. Just as the military are the ultimate central planners, so are they vulnerable to charges of insensitivity to northern peoples. The way in which the European Economic Community, a body heavily overlapping with NATO in its composition and direction, failed ever to comprehend the needs or motives of Greenland during its long withdrawal from Europe is indicative of the state of innocence about the north in higher political circles. As Greenland social affairs minister Moses Olsen spelled out, the withdrawal issue was essentially one of conservation, and the politics of conservation, "notably the coherence between the establishment of Home Rule and local control over the fishery and whaling."[6] For Greenlanders, political development and conservation were one and the same.

If the contentment and self-fulfillment of the constituent parts of the western countries and the matching of political institutions with a continuing economy and local needs are not central to security, then what is?

Notes

1. Peter Jull, "The Aboriginal Option: A Radical Critique of European Values," Northern Perspectives 13:2 (March-April, 1985), pp. 10-11 (Ottawa: Canadian Arctic Resources Committee).

2. Ibid., pp. 11-12.

3. 35 Years in NATO: A Transatlantic Symposium on the Changing Political, Economic and Military Setting, ed. Joseph Godson (New York: Dodd Mead, 1985), (originally published as articles in The Times of London, 1984).

4. Sidney Hook, "Pluralistic Societies at Stake," in 35 Years in"NATO, p. 145. See above, note 3.

5. Lane Kirkland, "NATO's global interests," in 35 Years in NATO, p. 105. See above, note 3. See also The NAT(I Handbook (Paris: Palais de Chaillot, 1953), p. 12.

6.- Moses Olsen, "Greenland: On leaving the EEC, " Northern Perspectives 13:2 (March-April, 1985), p. 5. See above, note 1.

VII - NORTHERN HOMELANDS:

FROM EUPHEMISM TO MANAGEMENT TOOL

The northern peoples' homelands are meaningful units in a part of the world where national governments have tried to wish away logic and history, culture and social values. The desire of national governments to homogenise their norths, sometimes by means of resettlement policies and incentives for new settlement, has been a blatant effort to secure a political control whose only functional value until recent years has been the economic potential thought to lie in the forests, rocks and waters of these areas.

But in a world where inter-dependence is more clear every day, these political arrangements have much creative potential. They can be adjusted. Meanwhile, we have learned that complete sovereignty may not always convey genuine independence or even management of one's own affairs. The number of countries in Africa and elsewhere where nominal sovereignty may permit the issuing of postage stamps but little more is a case in point.[1] A larger population and a diversity of interests within a state offer many advantages to the component units, and create a richer and greater whole.

The homeland is the territory, the traditional world, the location of identity and identification for northern peoples. It also can be the organizing basis for conservation of resource and cultural values, and of material resources and culture themselves. This requires a degree of self-government and self-management. As the Sami

Rights Commission in Norway argues, this is the minimum responsibility of enlightened countries towards their minority homelands. It also requires significant management and decision-making powers in respect of living resources and their habitat, and some secure source of revenue such as block funding grants and revenues from other (e.g., non-renewable resources) development. As a result of recent constitutional changes in Canada won by Inuit and other groups, it is quite within reason to protect homeland political arrangements, constitutions or charters in the national constitution. Certainly, native peoples would wish some such protection.

For national governments, the homeland can be the management tool needed to maintain sovereignty effectively and to conserve and manage resources "wisely" (as the Inuit Circumpolar Conference charter aptly puts it). This implies many things. It implies the maintenance of demographic stability in remote areas and the maintenance of the living environment, for ecological health generally as for its provision of a continuing economy and the continuation of unique cultures and values which underpin the well-being of the peoples of the region and enrich the larger national and international community. The good federalist reasons for assigning resources management and local development to regions vested in provincial governments in the Canadian constitution are still valid. What has been lacking to date is the legal recognition of aboriginal peoples' rights in respect of lands and resources long held and used, leaving them expropriated without compensation in their own homelands. Claims settlements are an important means of righting that wrong. "Equal rights" in Canadian society has

meant giving land and resource rights to anyone off a boat while taking away - and keeping away - those of the genuine owner<, the aboriginal peoples. This is a situation Canadians must not tolerate any longer.

Provincial governments have been strangely wary of aboriginal self-government, even though they have so much to gain from it. While isolated and neglected rural settlements send frustrated and poor persons to urban centres where they often require large social expenditures to maintain them, viable homeland development would profit the provincial economy and keep many natives at home. But provinces have apparently not made the link between their soaring social costs in respect of native peoples and arguments for self-government. The further point, of tout-se, is that public services, now so notoriously ineffectual in respect of native communities, would be better delivered by the local persons themselves.

In northern Canada, it is possible through claims and political development processes to develop homelands as vehicles for planning and administration, as well as for the self-government and self-fulfillment of the first peoples of this land. As recognition of a third order of government approaches in Canada - in fact, despite some official misgivings about the name - essential powers for northern areas must include “surface resources” and a strong role in offshore management. As Inuit leaders have pointed out, the question of shipping in the arctic to prove sovereignty is not nearly as strong a case for Canada as the Inuit use of sea and sea ice, a usage ancient in time and extensive in the arctic islands.

There is no absolute model for a homeland self-governing structure. It may be a Nunavut government alongside a Nunavut claims settlement and the authorities set up under claims, or a collection of authorities and tribal councils in an Indian valley homeland on the British Columbia coast. The essential thing is the way in which the issue is approached; then the specific imp"lementing bodies are matters of detail.

First of all, the home'land, Nunavut, or other homelands of other peoples, must be seen as a whole planning unit. As with a river basin for water management planning, or any other comprehensive regional plan, one must look at the homeland as a whole. This then becomes the focus for political management by the northern peoples in question, and of other conservation measures. There would be no point feeling proud that Canada taught Inuktitut in schools in one community if the language and its use by the whole people were dying. The language must be used and taught wher-ever there ar-e Inuit, as part of a living language and heritage with a future, and as part of a dynamic regional community. Other-wise, it is merely a curiosity, a dusty museum piece.

The overall needs for renewable resource conservation and management, and for the survival and development of economic life based on them, must then be assessed. Only then can specific projects, let alone regulations, be worked out. The trouble is that regulation and project development in northern Canada are almost always taken in isolation, without a wider sense of conservation. The beauty of a wider plan is that it provides the much-needed flexibility

which permits accommodations of other interests and projects while guaranteeing that the irreducible value is the survival of an economy, an environment yielding that economy and a way of life (i.e., a people) anchored and sustained by that economy. This approach is in direct opposition to the usual approach of giving some people the least land possible in a claims settlement and then leaving them to cope, wondering why they do not feel their culture and future are secure. Viability homeland-wide must be the criterion in planning, whether planning for language development or conservation of species.

The land use of northern peoples has always been extensive, and in the case of northern Canada they have enjoyed almost unlimited and prior rights to wildlife harvesting even under modern Canadian laws. The use of settler groups, however, is spatially limited and intensive. As industrial and often transient groups, their commitment to the conservation of the region is minimal, except for their favourite outdoor recreation area. They need small acreages for home-building, factories or mines, etc. Principal powers over northern lands and surface resources have already been recommended for vesting in homeland authorities, subject to whatever agreements with senior governments are needed to provide due access for legitimate reasons. Another technique suitable in some areas might be to “zone” the region for different uses, with a homeland authority responsible-for some lands entirely and sharing decisions with other authorities for others. What is important for northern peoples is use and controls on use so that crucial environments are not damaged. What is important for them and for all other Canadians is that the vast spaces of

northern and rural Canada are coherently and comprehensively managed by responsible and interested authorities. Beyond that, revenue provisions should have some linkage, whether a block grant or some other means, to rates and scale of development. The latter has some advantage to senior governments by providing an incentive to homeland authorities to encourage some development.

Secondly, the homeland must possess sufficient jurisdiction to manage a sufficient range of issues of importance. This may vary from region to region, depending on local interests and needs. The Haida may have quite different concerns from the Inuvialuit, although both are maritime peoples. Nor should the conventions of the Canadian constitutional division of powers be a limitation. Because any settlements with northern peoples must be sponsored by the Canadian government, in both the provinces and the territories, it has power to modify or develop past conventions, and to seek delegations of provincial powers, along with its own, to homeland governments or other homeland authorities. This was proposed by Mr. Justice Patrick Hartt in his excellent early report in northern Ontario's long-running environment commission, noting that neither level of government alone possessed all the elements needed to provide a minimum viable base for Indian communities there.

Unless the homeland is genuinely self-governing within the Canadian federation, the people will have neither the incentive nor the sense of responsibility to act as national trustees of homeland conservation. That must be a goal - from the point of view of national policy - of political and claims settlements with northern peoples. If conservation

is managed primarily by the populations which have the greatest stake in it, and for their economic benefit in the long-term, it will be more balanced and comprehensive management than sectoral or ad hoc planning by distant governments. Nor will the homeland authorities resist all other development with its employment and training potential, but they will no doubt try to ensure more local benefits and spin-offs. This is as it should be. But at least there are plans, tradeoffs. As it is now, northern Canada is simply a vast national reserve being steadily eroded according to no plan, no sense of balance, no thought for tomorrow - and no thought for the resident population's long-term survival.

The third and final general conclusion is that homelands must be linked with other public authorities at the regional level. The remote reserve with a tenuous link with a national bureaucracy, whether Washington in Alaska's case or Ottawa in northern Canada's, is only a nurturing relationship when the native community is weak, poor and in jeopardy of collapse. Better that native communities and homelands develop their strengths within sure borders (both physical and jurisdictional) and then deal with other communities and jurisdictions in their part of the world from positions of security and strength as equals. This may be controversial in some quarters, especially where national governments have been seen as allies of embattled local bands or minorities against local redneck attitudes.[2] But ultimately it is only the course of realism.

If homeland development and survival of human communities is to be assured, then the care and safekeeping of the whole

region requires that homeland authorities share responsibility and develop understandings with other populations and governments in the region. The Nunavut political settlement would create a single government in which Inuit predominate, for the time being at least, and a claims settlement with various exclusively Inuit agencies. In other areas, native authorities may group together a number of villages and valleys, for instance, while a nearby city of predominantly non-native population had a separate government; however, the native authority might run a school for its people in the city and manage the lands and environment or large areas of these in the area around the city. The challenge of reconciling these various forms and peoples will be met in many ways. We have seen that North Slope Alaska and northern Norway have particular problems and needs, and that these differ from Nunavut, which in turn differs from the Dene homeland with large, mostly white towns amid Dene villages and camps.

It is a fact of life that pluralistic solutions will best stand the test of time and be most likely to attract real authority. No population in Canada or the rest of the circumpolar world is free from the human rights demands of the United Nations. Just as minorities argue for these in their own protection, they must honour them and accord them to others. Reciprocal agreements among peoples and authorities in a region may be desirable and efficient, as well as creating a better climate for the mutual respect of each other people and of minority pockets left behind across a border. The case of a native-run school transmitting traditional culture to residents of a city has been mentioned, and this is an example of inter-jurisdictional

tolerance and co-operation. Elsewhere it may be easiest for a homeland government to purchase municipal services from a city for a homeland village close by, rather than providing homeland services at higher capital cost. But beyond such concrete and obvious advantages lie bigger concerns.

A Nunavut village cannot withdraw into itself and hope that history and development will pass it by until it has achieved some mythical or mystical inner peace. Neither can northern peoples expect the forces of history, superpower rivalry, technological advance such as arctic navigation or deep-sea mineral extraction, commodity shortages, or security dangers to leave them alone. In recent months the Soviet navy has dramatically shown north Norwegians that it already includes them in its motherland defence, and be they Sami or Norwegian, this generates certain common interests.

Northern homelands and peoples must have the strongest power possible at their regional level while also participating at higher, national levels of decision-making. This means regional and national political integration and representation, either as collectivities or as individuals. In many cases they may have both - as, for instance, Sami may soon vote for Sami regional councils and Sami national councils but also vote in general Finnmark regional and Norwegian parliamentary elections. Regional co-operation could be institutionalised, but at the least its opposite should not-be! That is, structures should not be designed so as to ensure conflict between peoples, or so great marginalisation of the one - e.g., through a reserve type model in Alaska - that conflict becomes inevitable. This whole question of ethnic relations and of relations among

jurisdictions is large and complex - ‘and it is worth more study and discussion.

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Having considered general possibilities for accommodating northern peoples and northern conservation through northern political structures, benefits which only senior governments ultimately can confer, there is the contribution of northern peoples themselves.

First of all, no ideas make any impression until they are advanced and fought for persistently by northern peoples themselves. The lethargy, prejudice or power-seeking of governments will never result in their volunteering very satisfactory solutions. These must be argued and negotiated by northern peoples and their advocates. The Nunavut case has shown the limitations of even a strong lobby effort. The versatility of practical experience which allows proffering of various options to break log-jams and maintain the political initiative and to recognise and seize opportunities is needed.

Too often, northern and remote peoples show skill in attracting attention to problems but not the capability to join the serious work of resolving the problems once governments are prepared to talk. This then leaves the northerner-s ' side in a take-it-or-leave-it position, taking up unsatisfactory and limited offers or leaving the talks and returning to an often long and unproductive confrontation. The required political organisation to carry a fight through to the ultimate taking of power in a new

political jurisdiction is also essential. The politics and organisation of influence and lobbying are not the same as the politics of power.[3] Northern peoples must assess whether they have such social resources or whether they must work to develop them. The development of regional, indigenous political movements which are like parties in the European style - with social and educational functions and continuing local organisation and activity - would be useful, while individuals would continue to participate in national parties where they could communicate regional native views.

Another crucial area for northerners is the availability of diverse skills and educated manpower. What is urgently needed is a group of resource persons and leaders who can help interpret within a society, who can provide opinion leadership and expertise and who can deal on behalf of northern peoples with new problems of negotiation, project and administrative management and executive skills. This is an area in which certain Alaskan groups like the North Slope Inupiat have shown tremendous foresight and where results have paid off handsomely. Closely related to this, and central to a second phase of political development - after the phase of winning control - is the need for institutions of learning with control by northerners. Facilities like the University of Tromsö and the Sami Institute in Norway are examples, as are other centres of excellence and technical-assistance like the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, which has assisted northern peoples such as Inuit in many tight corners. These are needed not only to provide expertise, but also to act as commentators and critics within northern society. In tough political struggles,

northern leaders sometimes forget that they no more than other persons have a monopoly on wisdom. In general, too, entire populations need to place the highest priority among themselves and for their children on educational and vocational upgrading. Again, the North Slope has shown the way.

Finally, institutions which are meant to solve problems and carry out work must be manageable within the north by northerners, be they producer co-ops, native development corporations or homeland government agencies. Of course, some outside expertise must be hired when it is not locally available, but management systems should be operable by northerners if they are to reflect northern needs and values. Sometimes when northerners take over they hire the guys from the bad old colonial régime, apparently to show them who's boss now. This can mean the perpetuation of the bad old systems and ideas, too. Another approach is to hire glitzy outside experts precisely because they are outside experts. This often leads to management forms and decisions which require continued outside involvement in pursuit of a very normal colonial mentality of wanting to appear sophisticated.

Canadian policies towards northern and remote and rural areas are moving the country from heartland/hinterland to city-land/wasteland. Free-market laissez-faire policies on the economy, unless regionally adjusted, will only exacerbate this. Canada's economic structure is so regionalised that no uniform policies are workable for long. The northern region clearly requires a native peoples' economic agency through which hunters, trappers and

fishermen, and others like arts and crafts producers, based in regional or tribal associations can protect and promote their production. A Crown agency would have certain advantages, a sort of Canadian Wheat Board for native harvesters, or both an independent native federation and a Crown agency. If the native production sector could organise to fight for its needs - in environmental regulation, fighting foreign bans on furs and sealskins, redefining marketing rules for game meat, and industry related matters - it would have better hopes of survival and of action against the major industrial projects promoted by governments. The dollar value, and especially replacement value, to native homes, plus the employment value of this northern sector may persuade government to act if the argument were made.

The other principal requirement for the northern productive economy must be investment and research. Although the federal government may put many millions of dollars in helping an already abundantly capitalised oil company drill one well in the arctic, any request for a matching amount to research improvements in production, employment and revenue from the renewable resource economy in the area occupying many times the number of persons is denied. It is precisely the lack of research into improvements in productivity and organisation of the renewable resource industries which has limited their possibilities. Governments which have regarded 'these activities as primitive have forced them to become primitive - by under-funding them and forcing them into ever weaker positions vis-à-vis the industrial economy. New modes of production, new kinds of products and processing and new organisational and management structures

for this productive economy are all required, and must all be manageable and managed at the local and regional level by the homeland peoples themselves.

"Giving the country back to the Indians" is not a bad idea, because the white man has vacated it. He has huddled in cities, sending out trucks and conveyors to bring ore and fuels in to his factories, leaving the earth and living environment in many areas without population and very surely without policies. An example is the third ocean, the Arctic, where policy fecklessness and the current federal blundering over the intrusion of an American military icebreaker are typical of the abandonment of the ocean to industrial ad hockery, whereas there is no end of political attention to Pacific and Atlantic ocean productivity, management and regional benefits.

Canada has had no rural policies for years except to cut back services, help residents leave for the city and concentrate population in more administratively convenient centres. Successive federal ministers of agriculture have pleaded quietly with their provincial counterparts and their farm clients to understand how hard it is to function in a national cabinet of city folk with city values extending and promoting the industrial state. Yet if it is hard for the mainstream earthy concerns of the white man to be heard in the policy councils of the country, it is a very great deal harder for the concerns of northern peoples to be heard. The white man's law and institutions wished away and refused to recognise the previous existence of native society and the native economy. Today, when federal, provincial and territorial governments have abandoned the renewable

resource economy in vast areas of the country, the need to maintain rural living standards, social order, a healthy environment and a productive expanse of the earth's surface in a starving world requires that the responsible permanent residents, the peoples of the northern aboriginal homelands, be returned the responsibility.

Notes

1. Prime Minister Trudeau used the postage stamp analogy in his opening remarks at the constitutional con· erence with aboriginal leaders and provincial premiers in March, 1984. He then went on to recommend the Nunavut mode' for aboriginal self-government.

2. I am indebted in my thinking here to the late Eben Hopson of Barrow, Alaska, founder of the North Slope Borough and the Inuit Circumpolar Conference.

3. For useful insights on this subject and on many others, such as the relative insignificance of community government experience in the development of Inuit politics, I am indebted to Lynn Jamieson-Clark.