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***The Role Of The Advisory Committee On
Northern Development In The Development
Of Policy And The Coordination Of Federal
Government Activities In Northern Canada***

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OF POLICY AND THE COORDINATION OF FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN CANADA**

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ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLICY AND THE COORDINATION OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN CANADA

Before the Second World War responsibilities and activities for Canada's North lay almost exclusively within the Department of Mines and Resources. During and immediately after the war, **defence** concerns became paramount and technological advances in transportation and communications brought the north closer to the rest of Canada. **Other** government departments developed interests in the north. To meet the increasingly obvious need to **coordinate** government activities and to establish consistent northern policies, the Cabinet established the **Advisory** Committee on Northern Development at a deputy minister level, chaired by the Deputy Minister of Resources and Development, the department then responsible for administration in the northern territories.

After a false start, the Committee and its Sub-committees met frequently and ensured that departments worked together in implementing agreed government policies that the Committee had itself often initiated. This highly productive period was followed by a decline when the Committee became less active. It does not ever appear to have been formally dissolved but many years have passed since it last met-

The effectiveness of the Committee depended mainly on the ability of the chairman to recognize the role it could play as conditions in the north **changed**, and to secure the interest and cooperation of its members. When decisions on major northern policies were made in the northern **department**, or at Cabinet level, without reference to the Committee, its **credibility** suffered.

The continuing need for coordination of government activities in the north is considered, and the arguments for **and** against reconstituting the Committee are discussed briefly.

RÉSUMÉ

Le rôle du Comité consultatif sur le développement nordique dans le développement de politiques et la coordination des activités du gouvernement fédéral dans le Nord Canadien.

Avant la **Seconde Guerre mondiale**, les responsabilités et les activités du Nord Canadien relevaient presque exclusivement du **ministère** des Mines et Ressources. **Durant la guerre**, et **immédiatement après**, les **préoccupations** en matière de **défense** ont pris une importance **capitale** et les **progrès technologiques** dans les domaines du transport et des **communications** ont fait du Nord **une réalité canadienne beaucoup plus concrète**. **C'est alors** que **d'autres ministères** se sentent **intéressés à cette région**. Le Cabinet **ressentait** de plus en plus **le besoin** de coordonner les **activités fédérales** dans le Nord et **d'établir** des **politiques uniformes** visant cette région. Il a donc **institué le Comité consultatif** de la mise en **valeur du Nord canadien**, qui **était formé** de sous-ministres. La **présidence était assurée** par le **sous-ministre** du **ministère** des Ressources et du **Développement économique**, alors responsable de l'administration dans les **territoires** du Nord.

Le Comité a connu des débuts difficiles. Par la suite, il se **réunissait régulièrement** avec ses **sous-comités** pour **s'assurer** que les **ministères** travaillaient ensemble à la mise *en oeuvre* des **politiques fédérales** qu'il avait souvent lancées lui-même. Cette période très fructueuse a été suivie **d'un ralentissement** du fait que **le Comité** avait commencé à jouer un rôle moins actif. Le Comité ne semble pas avoir été dissout officiellement, mais sa **dernière réunion** remonte à de nombreuses années.

L'efficacité du Comité tenait essentiellement à la **capacité** du président à reconnaître le rôle qu'il pouvait jouer dans le Nord à mesure que les *conditions* changeaient et à sa **capacité** de stimuler continuellement l'intérêt et la collaboration des membres. Lorsque le **Ministère** ou le **Cabinet** **prenait des décisions** concernant les **principales politiques** sur le Nord sans obtenir l'avis du Comité, la **crédibilité** de celui-ci en souffrait.

Dans le document, on **vérifie** s'il est encore **nécessaire** de **coordonner les activités** gouvernementales dans le Nord et on expose **brèvement** les arguments pour et **contre** la reconstitution du Comité.

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I am very grateful also to those with whom I have discussed drafts of some or all of this report for their comments, corrections, and additions. I have not listed their names because to do so might be taken to imply that they agreed with my views.

FOREWORD

It is both impractical and unnecessary to attempt to cover in detail all the activities of a committee and its sub-committees over a period of more **than** thirty years. I have attempted to select from the files what I believe will give an understanding of the nature of the issues and problems the Advisory Committee on Northern Development faced and how they were met, and of associated events that were significant at the time or which can be seen as significant in retrospect. My main sources have been the files held in the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and the Public Archives, supplemented by the Annual Reports on Government Activities in the North. My own often faulty memory has been checked against the memories of several others who were involved in the A. C.N.D.

Writing a biography of a committee is in some ways more difficult than writing a biography of an individual. The character of a committee changes with changes in its membership and especially when the chairman is replaced. A biographer finds it difficult to be objective if he has had a close relationship to his subject. I spent several years as secretary and coordinator of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development, and I am well aware that this report will reflect my personal views and prejudices. I cannot change them, but I should warn the reader.

As an archaeologist I have participated in salvage archaeology - excavations that are justified at least in part by the need to carry them out before it is too late. This report can be considered an essay in salvage history, to preserve in the public record one account of how policies were formulated during a crucial period in the development of the Canadian north.

This is not the only review that has been made of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development. In 1981 Dr. Gordon W. Smith wrote a detailed history of the Committee as part of a study of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. He generously allowed me to read this most **careful** professional account, which I found extremely useful. The body of his work is still a hand-written draft. His conclusions were however prepared in a finished form for limited distribution. With his permission I attach them as Appendix A. Dr. Smith has an unsurpassed knowledge of **the history** of the administration of the north and, as he was not personally involved in the Committee, he could view it in a more objective way than I.

NB: This report was written in 1989.

INTRODUCTION

In the years leading up to the Second World War Canada showed little interest in the northern parts of her dominion. **The Bureau of Northwest Territories and Yukon Affairs in the Department of Mines and Resources** handled almost all federal government responsibilities there, as well as territorial government responsibilities on behalf of the Northwest Territories Council and the Yukon Territorial Council.

The Northwest Territories Council was difficult to distinguish from the Department of Mines and Resources. Its Commissioner was the Deputy Minister of the **Department**, the Deputy Commissioner was the Director of the Bureau, through whom all business flowing from the councils was directed, and the majority of the members were Departmental officials, complemented by the Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. Administrative matters in the field were handled by the **R.C.M.** Police detachments established at the more important trading posts. The Yukon Territorial Council was an elected body, and an official **from** the Bureau was the appointed Controller, who headed a territorial civil **service** administering most provincial-type responsibilities.

Apart from the R.C.M. Police, the only government employees living in the Eastern Arctic on a year-round basis were a handful of Department of Transport radio operators at the radio navigation stations serving the sea route to Churchill, and a doctor at each of the small mission hospitals at **Chesterfield** and Pangnirtung. A government party was carried every summer on the Hudson's Bay Company's vessel "**Nascopie**", but she did not visit all the northern posts and stayed only a day or so at those on her itinerary. The situation was not very different in the Western Arctic and along the Mackenzie Valley. The Royal Canadian Corps of Signals operated radio stations at some settlements, and two or three federal agencies maintained small northern **offices**. The Labrador coast was part of Newfoundland, which was not yet within Canada. The population of northern **Québec** was almost entirely **Inuit**, whom the Supreme Court had ruled to be Indians in the context of the British North America Act, and hence a federal responsibility, administered by the Indian Affairs Branch of the Department of Mines and Resources. **The northern parts of the western provinces, like much of the Yukon Territory and the Mackenzie District, were populated** largely by Indians, again involving the Indian Affairs Branch.

There was some scientific interest in the north, with visits therein the summer months by scientists **from** the Geological Survey of **Canada**, the Dominion Observatories, the National Museum, the Hydrographic Survey, and the Geodetic Service. These agencies were also within the Department of Mines and Resources.

With such a low level of federal government activity in the north, and so much of that in a single department, there was no need for special measures to ensure inter-departmental coordination. The **R.C.M.** Police and the Department of External Affairs were represented on the Northwest Territories Council, and the normal relations between federal government departments could easily deal with most matters that might involve another department.

Occasionally some problem would arise that required more formal interdepartmental coordination. In 1925 for example the exploits of the United States explorers, D.B. MacMillan and Lieutenant-Commander R.E. Byrd, U.S. Navy, were causing concern, and the extensive research program of the Danish Fifth Thule Expedition in the Canadian Arctic had just been completed. So many questions regarding northern sovereignty were being referred to the Department of the Interior, which had preceded the Department of Mines and Resources as the department responsible for the north, that a Northern Advisory Board, largely at a deputy minister level, was established. It was directed to study and report on all matters relating to Canadian sovereignty and especially on Norwegian claims arising from Sverdrup's discoveries at the turn of the century. The Board played an important role in the resolution of Sverdrup's claims, which were satisfied by recompensing him for the expenses he had incurred through his expedition, but no other matters appear to have been referred to it. Again, early in 1933, when the reindeer drive from Nome to the Mackenzie Delta was being successfully completed, an Interdepartmental Reindeer Committee was formed at the request of the Northwest Territories Council to study reindeer problems. It continued to meet for some ten years.

At the beginning of the Second World War there was little economic development in the territories. Influences from the south had of course begun to penetrate into the north, especially in the Yukon, which had seen the Gold Rush come and go, and the Mackenzie Valley, where the discovery of oil at Norman Wells, followed by gold in the Yellowknife area and pitchblende on Great Bear Lake, had attracted mining interests and led to the rapid development of bush flying. In the rest of the north however one year was very like the one before, and the effects of the depression stifled commercial, political, and administrative initiative.

At first the Second World War had little effect in the territories, except to increase the lack of interest and activity there. Canadian attention was directed to Europe rather than the north, many gold mines were shut down because men and resources were required elsewhere, and the wartime importance of uranium was not yet recognized. The situation began to change after the Permanent Joint Board on Defence was established in August 1940. Early the following year work began on a series of airfields between Edmonton and Fairbanks.

In December 1941 the Japanese attacked the U.S. Fleet in Pearl Harbour, bringing the United States into the war. This led to the rapid initiation of many northern defence projects including the Alaska Highway, the expansion of the Northwest Staging Route, the Northeast Staging Route to Europe, and the Canol Project. They were on a scale far larger than anything the north had seen before and were carried out almost entirely by or through the U.S. Armed Forces. In many parts of the Canadian north, U.S. service personnel soon out-numbered the Canadian population. During the next year it became apparent that closer liaison was required between the U.S. services and local Canadian authorities, together with improved coordination of their needs and activities. In May 1943 the War Committee of the Cabinet appointed Major-General W.W. Foster as Special Commissioner for Defence Projects in Northwest Canada with headquarters in Edmonton and reporting directly to the Cabinet War Committee. He filled this office until April 1945, and it was discontinued in March 1946 when most of the activities of the U.S. Armed Forces in Canada had been transferred to Canadian control or discontinued.

Peace restored **interest** in the economic potential of the north, while commercial activities benefitted from the greatly improved infrastructure established for military needs, especially in **airfields**, roads, and transportation generally and in telecommunications. At the same time the decrease in military interest in the north proved to be short-lived owing to the development of **the cold war**. With the U.S.S.R. as a potential enemy, the availability of atomic bombs combined with long-range aircraft gave the north much greater strategic significance in the cold war **than it had had in the Second World War**, and the uranium production at Port Radium represented **an** important war-time resource. There was an immediate military need for northern meteorological data to improve forecasting, for air navigation aids, for training facilities, and for more accurate maps and other technical information.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT

The increased activity in the north, both civil and military, revealed the need for close coordination among civil departments and between civil and military activities. Dr. **H.L. Keenleyside**, who had been appointed Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources in 1947, reported that government departments, engaged in increasing their presence in the north, were competing against one another at several northern settlements for suitable building sites, for material, and for local labour. The Department of National **Defence** showed that the volume of freight to the Eastern Arctic was becoming too great to be carried in the H.B.C. vessel "**Nascopie**" on her annual voyage. In these and other ways the need for some central authority to plan and coordinate activities in the north was becoming apparent.

The **Defence** Research Board of the Department of National **Defence** made the first move, in 1947, by establishing an Arctic Research Advisory Committee on an inter-departmental basis with the Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources as Chairman. This proved an effective instrument for coordinating much of the northern scientific effort of government departments, and for indicating areas where the need for research was most pressing.

The work of the Arctic Research Advisory Committee was probably one factor in the Cabinet Secretariat's decision to review the relationships between those departments that were active in the north. This examination led to the preparation of a recommendation to the Cabinet to establish an Advisory Committee on Northern Development (A. C. N. D.), "to advise the government on questions of policy relating to civilian and military undertakings in northern Canada and to provide for the effective coordination of all government activities in the area". The Committee would be chaired by the Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources and the Secretary would be from the Privy Council Office. The memorandum, summarizing the need for the committee and suggesting its terms of reference and composition, was signed by the Ministers of National **Defence** and of Mines and Resources and was approved by the Cabinet on 19 January 1948. It is attached as Appendix B.

A False Start --1948-1949

The first meeting of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development was held on 2 February 1948 in the Privy Council Committee Room, Room 123, East Block. The venue underlined the interdepartmental character of the Committee, an **important** factor as the Chairman was also Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources and Commissioner of the Northwest Territories and it could have appeared to be an adjunct to his department. For many years the meetings continued to be held in the Privy Council Committee Room, except on one occasion when the Cabinet Council Chamber was used instead. The location of the Committee in the Privy Council Office in all probability helped to ensure continued high level attendance.

At the first meeting the Secretary to the Cabinet said the Cabinet Secretariat would act as a clearing house for information on the north, and many matters would probably be settled by telephone

between the **Committee** Secretary and members. The two issues that had been mainly responsible for the formation of the Committee - the coordination of transportation and construction in the north - were referred to specialist groups, which eventually evolved into permanent sub-committees on transportation and construction. The Committee then discussed a report written by the Chief of the **recently-organized** Geographical Bureau in the Department of Mines and Resources, under the title "U.S. Military Activities in Canada". It seems a surprising paper to have been circulated, presumably with the encouragement of the Chairman. In listing U.S. military activities it implies that for the most part they had been initiated or expanded without the approval and often without the knowledge of the Canadian government, and infers that the United States was consciously attempting to conduct operations in the Canadian north without informing the Canadian authorities. Several members objected to the tone of the report and noted inaccuracies in it, and the Committee agreed that comments and proposals for revising it would be sent to the Secretary.

Before the second meeting of the A. C.N.D., held on 1 June 1948, a slightly amended version of the report by the Chief of the Geographical Bureau was circulated with the paper the Secretary had been asked to prepare. The Secretary explained **that**, because so much of the original paper had been matters of opinion rather than fact, it had not been practical for him to revise **it**. He had instead listed the U.S. activities it covered, showing how, each had been authorized and indicating what further action might be required. The Chairman, presumably embarrassed by the shortcomings of the paper his department had prepared and he had **sponsored, distributed** a memorandum he had himself written which was much more temperate in tone than the Geographical Bureau's report. The Committee noted the reports, agreed that no **further** action should be taken on them, and directed the Secretariat to prepare a monthly report on U.S. activities and personnel for distribution to the members, the War Cabinet Committee, and the Canadian **Secretary** of the Permanent Joint Board on **Defence**. There were no other controversial issues **at the** meeting, which discussed the Joint Arctic Weather Station Program and received reports on the coordination of transportation and construction. The Chairman announced that an officer from the Department of Mines and Resources had been added to the Cabinet Secretariat and would be assistant secretary of the C o m m i t t e e .

- . The third meeting of the A. C.N.D. was held on 23 November 1948. After hearing reports on construction and transportation coordination, the operations and plans of the Joint Arctic Weather Stations, and plans for Canada to take over from the United States the weather stations that they still operated in the north-east, the Committee discussed the monthly report on U.S. personnel and activities in Canada. In furnishing the information required, the United States Air Force had stipulated that it be used only for military purposes and this contravened the principle that Canada had the right to decide on the distribution in Canada of information about Canada, whether or not it had been collected by U.S. agencies. The Committee agreed that this should be drawn to the attention of the Permanent Joint Board on **Defence (P.J.B.D.)**.

The subject was discussed again at the fourth meeting of the A. C.N.D. on 9 March 1949. The **P.J.B.D.** had avoided the issue by agreeing that each country could **construe** the meaning of the phrase "for military purposes only", without discussing the principle that the **distribution in Canada** of information on Canada, however it originated, was a matter for decision by Canadian authorities.

The Committee **agreed** that the matter should be again taken up with **the** United States, this time through diplomatic channels.

At this fourth meeting the Chairman introduced another contentious subject in a paper suggesting that, in the event of war, information on the arctic would be very **important** and that a Canadian Arctic Information **Centre**, with representation from National **Defence** as well as civil departments, the Hudson's Bay Company, and the Arctic Institute of North America, should be established, and be based on the Geographical Bureau in his department. He proposed the Committee should recommend this to the Cabinet Committee on **Defence**. The Chief of the General Staff and the Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff pointed out that the proposal ignored the existence of the Joint Intelligence Bureau which was already operating under very similar terms of reference which had been approved by Cabinet. After some discussion the Committee agreed that arrangements for coordination of Arctic information in time of war were already satisfactory. Other important matters considered at the meeting included the need for a second new ice-breaker and the provision of a helicopter for the new Eastern Arctic Patrol vessel (C.G.S. "C.D. Howe").

The fifth meeting of the A. C.N.D. was not held until 19 December 1949. It was concerned mainly with transportation issues including: the division of responsibility for control of remote **airfields** between the Department of Transport, the R. C.A.F., and other agencies; the role of commercial flying in the north; planning for taking over the north-eastern **airfields** from the United States; the itinerary for the "C.D. Howe", then under construction; and progress in building new ice-breakers.

This meeting completed what can be considered to be the frost phase of the A. C.N.D. In January 1950, as part of a government reorganization, the Department of Mines and Resources shed many of its responsibilities and was renamed the Department of Resources and Development. The Deputy Minister did not call another meeting of the Committee before he resigned in October 1950. The break in the continuity of the Committee provides a suitable point at which to review its accomplishments during this initial period.

The Deputy Minister had played an important role in the formation of the A. C.N.D. but, as Chairman, he had not used it to its full potential. From the minutes and other Committee papers it appears that he had attempted to use the Committee as a means of discrediting the activities of the Department of **National Defence** in the north and enhancing the role of his own department. He did not succeed, partly because the proposals he sponsored were, at least in some respects, unreasonable, and partly because the representatives of the Department of **National Defence** attending the meetings were better briefed than he. It was certainly not the way to handle a committee whose effectiveness required a basis of confidence and cooperation.

During this **first** phase the A. C.N.D. had however some solid achievements to its credit. Good progress had been made in coordinating the construction and shipping requirements of the government in the north. The long-term needs of transportation had been recognized and steps taken to meet them by supporting the construction of additional ice-breakers and by organizing the more effective operation of airfields. Canadian presence in the north had been strengthened.

Civilian and military departments had become more aware of one another's responsibilities and sensibilities, and of their need for mutual support and cooperation.

A New Start --1953

International tension increased in the early fifties as a result of the Korean War, and military activity in the Eastern Canadian Arctic expanded greatly, owing in **part** to the development of a major Strategic Air Command base at **Thule** in northern Greenland and in part to the introduction of early warning radar stations. There is no indication that the Secretariat had been able to prepare and circulate the regular reports on U.S. activities in Canada that the Committee had requested, and the new Deputy Minister of Resources and Development, Major-General **H.A. Young**, became aware of U.S. developments of which he had not been informed, and which in some cases, such as for instance the employment of **Inuit**, involved areas of his own special responsibility. On 11 October 1951, he wrote to the **Secretary** to the Cabinet expressing his concern, suggesting the A. C.N.D. be reassembled to review the general procedures for improving northern coordination, and asking his comments and guidance. He could presumably have called a meeting of the A. C.N.D. at any time but he was probably aware of the problems that had ensued when the subject of U.S. military activities had been discussed earlier in the Committee and, as a former regular army officer, he also understood the nature of defence requirements. He must have **wanted to be sure** of the support of the Secretary to the Cabinet before raising the issue again, and the reply he received did not encourage him to proceed.

On 31 December 1952 a letter, along much the same lines as that sent more than a year earlier by the Deputy Minister of Resources and Development to the Secretary to the Cabinet, was written by the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to his minister, who raised the matter in Cabinet on 22 January 1953. As a result the Cabinet directed that the A. C.N.D. should consider and **report** immediately, and periodically thereafter, on all phases of the development of the Canadian Arctic and on the means which might be employed to preserve or develop the political, scientific, or defence interests of Canada in that area. A few days later Cabinet revised the membership of the A. C. N.D.; the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, replaced the Chief of the - General Staff and the Chief of the Naval Staff, while the Chairman of the Defence **Research** Board, the Deputy Minister of Finance, the Commissioner of the R. C.M.P., and ~~the~~ Deputy Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys were added.

The sixth meeting of the now reconstituted A. C. N.D., held on 16 February 1953, discussed the report required by the Cabinet, and agreed to recommend to the Cabinet, through the Minister of Resources and Development, that that department assume sole responsibility for coordinating activities in the Yukon Territory and Northwest Territories with executive authority, and should prepare with the Secretariat for consideration at the next meeting the comprehensive report on activities in Northern Canada required by the Cabinet. The Committee also agreed that for their purposes Northern Canada included federal interests in Labrador and **Ungava**.

The seventh meeting of the A. C.N.D. was held on 16 March 1953 and proved to be very important. The Chairman informed the Committee that his Minister had made an interim report to Cabinet and had submitted the A. C.N.D.'s recommendation regarding vesting sole responsibility for coordinating northern activities in the Department of Resources and Development, together with a proposal that the President of the National Research Council be added to the Committee and that four sub-committees be established. These would deal with Transportation, chaired by the Deputy Minister of **Transport**; Construction, chaired by the Director of Building Research of the National Research Council; Administration, chaired by the Commissioner of the R. C. M.P.; and Research and Development, chaired by the Deputy Minister of Resources and Development. Cabinet had approved these recommendations. The Committee then discussed a draft **report** to the Cabinet on activities in northern Canada and agreed that any amendments would be sent promptly to the Secretary, that the report should be kept up-to-date, and that the Committee would meet at least monthly to report changes in departmental programs.

The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, described plans for establishing an experimental chain of three radar stations on the **Beaufort** Sea shore, two in Alaska and one in Canada. If successful they might lead to a chain of such stations across the north of the continent to provide warning of approaching aircraft.

The Committee then discussed the proposed sub-committees. The Transportation and Construction Sub-Committees were in effect successors, at a rather higher level, of the sub-committees that had been formed some years earlier and which had continued to meet while the A. C.N.D. itself had been dormant. During this time an administration sub-committee had been established but it had not been very active and was now superseded by the Sub-Committee on Administration. The Research and Development Sub-Committee would retain the terms of reference and membership of the Arctic Research Advisory Committee of the **Defence** Research Board, but with service representation at a higher level, and its scope would be broadened to cover all research and development programs in northern Canada. The establishment and terms of reference of a coordinating secretariat would be decided by a small sub-committee of the Deputy Minister of Resources and Development, the Secretary to the Cabinet, and the Deputy Minister of Finance. The Committee also approved in principle a central agency for collecting Arctic information?

The eighth meeting of the A. C.N.D., held on 13 April 1953, was concerned mainly with northern shipping, approving in principle that the Department of Transport would take over the supply of Resolute in 1954, agreeing that the research program of H. M.C.S. "Labrador" would be worked out by the Research and Development Sub-committee and her supply program by the Transportation Sub-committee, and discussing the provision of observers to accompany the U.S. supply mission to the Joint Arctic Weather Stations in 1953. The Committee also approved terms of reference for the Administration Sub-committee, adding a clause requiring it to consider U.S. activity in the Canadian north and to recommend measures which could **contribute** to maintenance of Canadian sovereignty in the area. As the Department of Transport was unable to take over the Padloping Island Radio Station from ~~the~~ U. S., the Department of National **Defence** agreed to see if it could operate the station until the Department of Transport could supply civilian staff.

At the ninth meeting on 11 May 1953 the need for the committee was clearly demonstrated when the R. C.A.F. was found to have virtually handed over the operation of the airfield at Frobisher Bay to the U. S.A.F. without consulting many departments whose interests and responsibilities were affected, including the **Department** of Resources and Development. It was **agreed that all Deputy** Ministers would be informed by letter of the positions of the A. C.N.D. and the Department of Resources and Development in northern Canada. **The committee** also **agreed** to recommend to the Cabinet that the Department of Mines and Technical Surveys procure a **survey** vessel in order to meet the economic and military needs for better hydrography in northern waters, and to ask External Affairs to recommend to the Cabinet Defence Committee **that** they approve the establishment of a U.S. Loran Station at Cape Christian. The Chairman reported that, on the recommendation of the special sub-committee, the writer of this report had been offered the position of Secretary and Coordinator to the Committee and that he had accepted.

The new **Secretary** attended the tenth meeting on 15 June 1953, though the official date of his appointment was 1 August. The Chairman said the Secretariat would also act as a planning group for the north, and an administrative officer had been added to assist the Secretary. The Privy Council Office would appoint a Joint Secretary. An Arctic Information Centre would also be established in the Department of Resources and Development, but in the Northern Administration and Lands Branch rather than the Secretariat. Cabinet had approved in principle the acquisition of a hydrographic survey vessel, and the Department of Mines and Technical **Surveys** had been authorized to prepare plans for the ship, which would be built at an appropriate time. Cabinet had also approved the Committee's recommendation that Canada undertake the resupply of the Joint Arctic Weather Stations and that the Department of **Transport** include in estimates an item for chartering a cargo vessel and a tanker for this purpose. The Committee also considered a proposal from the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey for a cooperative program with the government of petroleum exploration in the Canadian Arctic, and concluded that neither military nor economic requirements would justify such a **program** at that time.

The agenda for the eleventh meeting on 14 September 1953 established a pattern that proved satisfactory in practice and was followed for many years. After reviewing **the** minutes of **the** previous meeting, the Committee dealt with business arising out of earlier **meetings**. **New business** of which the Secretariat had been informed was next discussed. The Secretary **then** briefly mentioned northern events of general interest. These did not call for any action by the Committee, but they kept members aware of the many changes that were **occurring** throughout the north and gave them an opportunity to add events of which they had knowledge. This was followed by other business, when members could raise matters which had not been **specifically** included on the agenda.

At this meeting the Chairman drew attention to the problems facing the Eskimo people and the need for appropriate government policies. It was agreed to refer the matter to the Administration Sub-committee for suggestions. The Committee also agreed on the need for a review of the suitability of the **siting** of northern settlements.

Among the **many** issues discussed at the twelfth meeting on 19 October 1953 was the situation that was emerging at **Aklavik**. As this provides a good illustration of the way the Committee operated, it will be described in some detail.

Aklavik had become the administrative **centre** for the Mackenzie Delta, and five government departments had establishments there. There were both Roman Catholic and Anglican missions with churches, schools, and hospitals, and several trading companies. The shortcomings of the site of the town were becoming apparent as it grew. Land suitable for buildings was very limited and what there was was being eroded by the river, the whole town was subject to flooding, water supply and sewage disposal were very difficult because the site was in the middle of the delta, there was no source of gravel, and no area that could be developed into a year-round **airfield**. The Committee instructed the **Secretariat** to prepare a paper setting out the problem in detail. The Secretariat asked departments about their plans for **Aklavik** and it became evident that the new construction they contemplated would require a much **greater** area of suitable land than the present site could provide. The paper prepared by the Secretariat concluded that the only practical course was to identify a more suitable site and **to move all government** activities there. The Committee accepted this view and agreed that the Secretary should prepare a memorandum to Cabinet recommending that the Minister of **Resources** and Development be authorized to plan and carry out the **resiting** of **Aklavik** as soon as possible. This led in due course to the construction of the town that is now **Inuvik**.

The role of the Committee in the decisions regarding the establishment of **Inuvik** was crucial. No single agency would have agreed to move from **Aklavik** on its own, and no single department would have been likely to secure Treasury Board approval "to a move without at least considerable delay. By acting together and in cooperation with Treasury Board, the Committee found a solution that was much more effective and far less costly than would have been the case if departments had proceeded separately, each with its own plans.

At the twelfth meeting the Chairman said he had been appointed Deputy Minister of Public Works and that his successor in Resources and Development and as Chairman of the Committee would be Mr. R. Gordon Robertson, then Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet. This can be seen **as** bringing to a close the second phase of the Committee, during which it had been **re-established** on a secure base.

On taking over as Deputy Minister of Resources and Development, General Young had at **first** done little to revive the Advisory Committee on Northern Development, possibly because he wanted to be sure of his ground before making a move. It was only in January 1953 that he could feel confident of substantial support. He then acted with speed and decision. By October of that year he had held seven meetings, reconstituted the committee and its sub-committees, and established a **permanent** secretariat. There had been no shortage of business for the Committee. A number of important issues had been resolved and recommendations made to the Cabinet when necessary. He had made the Committee an effective instrument and he had used it efficiently.

As Chairman he had many advantages. Having been a regular officer he was fully aware of military requirements, and having been Quartermaster General of the Canadian Army and President of Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation he had had considerable administrative experience. Possibly of most importance was that he had himself lived in the arctic, had retained an interest in the north, and could speak with confidence and first-hand knowledge of conditions there. He believed in the concept of the A. C. N.D., and the Secretariat could be sure of his full support. For instance, he appointed an outstanding departmental administrative officer, C.J. Marshall, to assist the Secretary. Mr. Marshall subsequently transferred to the Department of External Affairs and was Canadian Ambassador to Pakistan at the time of his death.

Productive Years -- November 1953-1963

1953, 1954

The future of the Joint Arctic Weather Stations was discussed at the thirteenth meeting on 23 November 1953. The Department of Transport was very reluctant to take over sole responsibility for these stations, referring to the increased expense and the difficulty in recruiting staff for northern work. Most other members considered that Canada should not have to rely on the United States for what was essentially a civil operation. The Committee agreed to recommend to Cabinet that Canada take over the complete operation of the stations as soon as time and resources permitted. It also agreed that the Deputy Minister of Public Works would chair the Construction Sub-committee.

At the fourteenth meeting of 21 December 1953 the Chairman referred to a bill that had just been passed by Parliament. The Department of Resources and Development had been renamed the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources and had been given wider powers in the north. Coordination of government activities there, which sprang from a recommendation of the Committee, had been specifically included. The Committee discussed responsibility for administering and maintaining the Northwest Highway System and agreed to recommend to Cabinet that the Department of Public Works take over this responsibility from the Canadian Army within four years.

At the fifteenth and sixteenth meetings on 18 January 1954 and 15 February 1954 respectively, a problem regarding the Haines Cut-off road, which had been discussed at earlier meetings, was resolved. The U.S. was building an oil pipe-line along the road and had asked for it to be kept open during the winter months. Canada had been reluctant to concur, partly because this was contrary to what had been agreed at the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, and partly because it would cause a precedent and lead to pressure to keep it open in future years, an expense not justified by the volume of traffic. Instead it was proposed to keep the road open at both ends to allow access to two pumping stations that were under construction, but leaving a closed section in the middle. At a meeting called to discuss the problem the U.S. said it was unwilling to pay the cost and it was decided not to open the road.

The main **subject covered** at the seventeenth meeting on 22 March 1954 was the provision of health services in the northern territories. Some health facilities were being provided by the departments of Northern Affairs and National Resources, National Health and Welfare, and National **Defence** as well as by both territorial governments and the Yellowknife Hospital Board, and such private agencies as the missions and mining companies. After considerable discussion the Committee agreed to recommend to the Cabinet that they approve in principle a single agency, Northern Health Services, covering both territories.

At the eighteenth meeting on 26 April 1954 the Report on Government Activities in the North, prepared by the Secretariat for submission to the Cabinet, was considered. It was a comprehensive report listing for each agency its responsibilities, long-term plans, review of operations during the previous year, and plans for the current year. The format was followed in later reports which were prepared by the Secretariat early each calendar year. The reports were classified as they included secret material, but this was omitted in unclassified versions which were distributed more widely to show the broad scope of Canadian Government activities in the north. They are still frequently used for reference by historians and others **interested** in northern development.

The Secretariat had also been asked to prepare a list of northern settlements, summarizing in each case the factors governing the suitability of the site, and this report was distributed at the nineteenth meeting on 31 May 1954. The Secretariat was asked to add population figures and the revised listing was issued at a later meeting. Among other subjects discussed were the plans of the Geological Survey to accelerate investigations in the Arctic Archipelago, particularly with regard to its petroleum potential, and a policy guidance paper for the release of public information on the north, prepared by a sub-committee on public information that had been established at the previous meeting.

At the twentieth meeting on 12 October 1954, the Committee was briefed by a representative of the Joint Intelligence Bureau on activities in the Soviet north. The **commissioning** of H.M.C.S. "Labrador", the naval ice-breaker whose construction had been recommended by the Committee, and her voyage through the Northwest Passage were reported, as well as a proposal for a very major engineering project involving the diversion of the Yukon River over the Coastal Range to produce power for **aluminium** smelting in the Alaska Panhandle. Plans **for** the construction of a bridge over the Yukon at Whitehorse to allow the town to expand on the other side of the river were also mentioned.

The Committee had been kept informed of Operation Corrode through periodic reports. It was the code name for three experimental radar stations along the Beaufort Sea coast. At the **twenty-first** meeting on 8 November 1954, and for many subsequent meetings, the Distant Early Warning Line, which followed on **Corrode**, became a regular item on the agenda. Through the Committee, departments were advised by the Chairman Chiefs of Staff of the plans, construction, and operation of the D.E. W. Line, and were able to make known their views. This exchange of information, leading to greater understanding at a high level of needs and capabilities, was certainly the main reason that such an enormous project was accomplished with little controversy and very few avoidable incidents.

Much of the **twenty-second** meeting on 13 December 1954 was taken up with a discussion about the transportation needs of the **D.E.W. Line**. The Transportation Sub-committee and the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources preferred a line through Prince of Wales Strait and Lancaster Sound but a Canada/U.S. **Military Study Group** had recommended a line roughly along the latitude of the continental mainland, largely owing to **insufficient hydrographic** information along the more northern route, which would also require more ice-breakers and strengthened shipping than were available.

During the period November 1953 to December 1954 the pace of change in the north was quickening, bringing important issues before the A. C.N.D. Fortunately General Young had handed it over to his successor in good shape and Mr. Robertson did not have to spend time in reorganizing it. The need to relocate **Aklavik**, the establishment of a northern health **service**, and the effect of constructing radar stations were only some of the many problems that had to be discussed and resolved, with more restricted matters being handled through the Sub-committees. Even when no decisions were required the sharing of information within the Committee often prevented problems from arising.

It was also a time when the Northern Administration and Lands Branch of the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources was beginning to expand very rapidly both in the numbers of its staff and the size of its budget. One result was a growing tendency for matters to be decided within the department rather than inter-departmentally through the Committee. For instance, the expansion of Whitehorse was decided in the department, approved by Cabinet, and then reported to the Committee. If the matter had arisen some months earlier it would probably have been referred to the Committee and it would have been recommended to Cabinet with the Committee's support. The increase in the department's resources enabled and encouraged it to act unilaterally.

1955

Seven meetings were held during 1955 (24 January, 7 March, 12 April, 16 May, 20 June, 25 October, 28 November). Construction of radar warning lines was the main activity in the north during the year. The Department of National Defence had established a D.E.-W. Line Coordinating Committee, of which the Secretary of the A. C.N.D. was a member. The Chairman Chiefs of Staff reported on the progress of construction on both the **D.E.W. Line** and the Mid-Canada Line at the meetings. The Mid-Canada Line, though most of it lay in the Committee's geographical area of **interest**, did not have as **great** interdepartmental implications as the **D.E.W. Line** because it was a rather smaller **undertaking**, was farther south, and was carried out completely by Canada. It was largely through the A. C.N.D. that the interests of all departments were considered in drawing up the **D.E.W. Line** agreement with the United States, and that Canadian transportation and industry were able to participate. The transportation needs of the **D.E.W. Line** entailed a major sea-lift in the Western Arctic carried out by a U.S. Navy Task Force, to which the Secretary was appointed as the Canadian Government representative.

Another continuing activity was the **resiting** of **Aklavik**. A special sub-committee dealt with minor issues, while more important or contentious matters were brought before the Committee by the Deputy Minister of Public Works, as Chairman of the Construction Sub-committee. A U.S. Loran Station at Cape Christian, a winter road between Circle in Alaska and Shingle Point on the Canadian Arctic coast, a **Shoran survey** of **Baffin** Island, and proposed air navigation systems in northern Canada were among the U.S. activities or requests considered by the Committee, **ensuring** that Canadian interests were covered.

Following the establishment of Northern Health Services, the Deputy Minister of National Health was added to the Committee. This appears to have been done by a resolution of the Committee without reference to the Cabinet. As the Secretariat was within the office of the **Deputy** Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources, the Associate Secretary in the Privy Council **Office** had progressively had less to do with its operation. When he was transferred out of the PCO, the Secretary to the Cabinet and the Deputy Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources agreed that it was unnecessary to replace him. In practice this made no difference. However, the retention of a link with the Cabinet Secretariat had been a safeguard against the Committee appearing to be an instrument of the Department rather than of the government as a whole.

At the time when the Department of Resources and Development was renamed Northern Affairs and National Resources it had been given one new responsibility - that of fostering, through research and technology, knowledge of the Canadian north and of how to assist northern development. Approval was obtained for the establishment of a small group in the department - the Northern Research Coordination **Centre** - and it was placed **under** the direction of the Secretary of the A. C.N.D. As a result a part of his time had to be spent in the administration of this **centre**. Certain other duties that were not related to the operation of the Committee, such as representing the northern territories on the Canadian Board on Geographical Names and organization of **vice-regal** visits to the north, were also added to his responsibilities, further diluting the Secretariat's work for the A. C.N.D.

1956

The Committee held nine meetings in 1956 (9 **January**, 6 February, 12 March, 16 April, 23 May, 25 June, 15 October, 12 November,

17 December). During the year, construction of the **D.E.W.** Line was virtually completed, but the Line remained a major topic, with discussion focusing on employment of Canadians and the role that Canada should play in supplying and maintaining the line.

A number of related issues were also covered, such as procedures for the use of the **D.E.W.** Line **airstrips** by civil carriers. One episode illustrates the sort of problem that might have become a major public relations embarrassment in Canada. Having been contracted by the U.S. to deliver supplies to certain **D.E.W.** Line stations, Alaska Freight Lines had bulldozed a winter road for a massive tractor train through part of the Yukon, without seeking permission from any Canadian authority. They intended to establish a number of such trails in the western Canadian Arctic.

When this became known through the A. C. N.D., the president of the company was called to Ottawa and the company's operations were stopped, being **allowed** to resume **only** after their plans had been revised.

The Committee discussed on several occasions 'the desirability of the Department of Transport taking over the operation of **certain** key **airfields** from the **RCAF** or, in the case of those on the DEW Line, from U.S. authorities, and determined a priority on which this should be done. Among other matters considered during the year **were** the extension of the program of vertical air photography to cover the whole of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, the development of scheduled air services in the north, the disposal of some of the **old** war-time **Canol** pipe-lines, and the agency to be responsible for town planning at certain northern settlements. The Committee recommended that a study be made of the Whitehorse escarpment where drainage problems associated with the **airfield** together with cutting of trees were making the slope unstable, and landslides had already caused property damage in the town below.

1957

Six meetings of the Committee were held in 1957 (21 January, 4 March, 6 May, 17 June, 16 October, 2 December). The most important new military development was a request by the U. S.A.F. to establish four **air-refuelling** bases for Strategic Air Command in Canada, at Namao, Cold Lake, Churchill, and **Frobisher**. Each would **require** a very long runway for very heavy aircraft, fuel storage, and accommodation for three or four hundred men. Five more bases were planned and surveys indicated that Coral **Harbour**, Knob Lake, the Pas, **Winisk**, and Esker Lake might be suitable. Plans for these additional five airfields were later **cancelled**. The Committee agreed that reports on the progress of the four bases would be made at each meeting until construction was completed.

During the year, both the icebreaker HMCS "Labrador" and the Northwest Territories and Yukon Signals System were transferred **from** the Department of National Defence to the Department of Transport, in the one case without the A. C.N.D. being consulted, and in the other while the technical aspects of the transfer were being examined by the departments concerned at **the** request of the A. C.N.D. The Committee agreed that the Chairman should discuss these decisions with the Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources, pointing out that they had been made without consulting the A. C.N.D., which was therefore prevented from **fulfilling** its advisory responsibility, and that as a **result** some of the implications of the transfers might not have been considered. It also appeared that departments had been making plans for developments' at Frobisher independently rather than through the Committee, and the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources had therefore convened an interdepartmental committee to coordinate their activities. The **Committee** had earlier recommended that the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources be responsible for planning the general development of those northern settlements which **were** expected to expand and **that** the Department of Public Works be responsible for providing and managing all federal housing at **Aklavik (Inuvik)**, Fort Smith, Churchill, and Yellowknife, as was already the case at **Kitimat** and Whitehorse.

The Committee was taking increased interest in events in the Soviet North and asked that a paper on recent developments there, prepared for them by the Joint Intelligence Bureau, be brought up-to-date each year.

1958

Five meetings were held in 1958 (27 January, 3 March, 20 May, 20 October, 24 November). A major concern was the improvement of northern telecommunications, and the A. C.N.D. established a Northern Communications Sub-committee, chaired by the Department of Transport. Ballistic missiles were becoming a threat, making the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (B. M.E.W.S.) a continental defence requirement. Canada was not as greatly involved as it was with the D.E.W. Line because only three radar stations were required - at Clear in Alaska, at Thule in Greenland, and near Whitby in England. The effectiveness of these stations however rested on very reliable rearward communications, with two independent high efficiency systems from each station. Those from the Greenland and Alaskan stations passed through northern Canada and included a submarine cable from Thule to Cape Dyer and from there to the south, and a land line along the Mackenzie Valley. Regular reports were made to the Committee on these projects.

The Committee had expressed concern that Canada was not involved in scientific work in the Polar Basin though both the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. had had scientific stations on the floating sea-ice there for many years. This inactivity might prejudice Canadian rights there and encourage other nations to fill the gap. The Secretary was instructed to draw up a plan for some suitable Canadian scientific activity in the area. He proposed that, rather than establish permanent stations on the ice of the Arctic Ocean as the U.S. and U.S.S.R. had done, Canada should undertake an investigation of the polar continental shelf and the waters above it, using aircraft based in turn on Alert, Mould Bay, and other Canadian weather stations. In this way the Canadian scientific effort would be concentrated on the area of most concern to Canada and where there might be exploitable resources. As the Department of Mines and Technical Surveys was then responsible for hydrography and oceanography, it was recommended that the department should be responsible for this activity. After approval by the A. C.N.D. the proposal was submitted to the Cabinet by the Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources with the concurrence of the Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys. This was the origin of the Polar Continental Shelf Project.

A potential problem that came to light through the Committee was the result of the freedom allowed by the U. S.A.F. to agencies working for them. The Rand Corporation, employed under contract by the U.S.A.F., had arranged for McGill University to undertake a topographical study of northern Canada required for defence purposes. This ran counter to the principle that information on Canada required by the U.S. for defence purposes should be requested on a government-to-government basis, and should not be arranged by U.S. services without consultation with Canadian authorities. The matter was brought to the attention of the U.S. Government.

1959

The Committee remained very active in 1959, when seven meetings were held (12 January, 23 February, 20 April, 1 June, 6 July, 9 November, 14 December). A discussion in the Committee on the use of D.O.T. ships for research purposes had revealed a need for better coordination of government scientific activities in the north. When the A. C.N.D. had been reorganized in 1952, the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources had been made responsible for coordinating federal government activities in the north, and the Deputy Minister had been appointed Chairman of the Research and Development Sub-committee of the A. C.N.D. The administrative responsibilities of the department had however over-shadowed its scientific responsibilities and the Sub-committee had been inactive. The Polar Continental Shelf Project had in fact sprung from an initiative of the A. C.N.D. itself, rather than its sub-committee. With the increasing importance of research in the north, the Committee asked the Secretary to prepare a paper on the coordination of research in the north with the object of **re-activating** the Research and Development Sub-committee. The paper he prepared summarized research activities in the north and proposed wider research responsibilities for the sub-committee, with a change of name to avoid any implication that social and economic development was included. The Committee approved the paper, and appointed Dr. Van Steenburgh, the senior scientist in the Department of Mines and Technical Surveys, as Chairman of the Scientific Research Sub-committee.

While there was never any question of the legal sovereignty of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago itself, the Committee was concerned that the Canadian position on sovereignty of arctic waters had never been defined. The views of all departments on the advantages and disadvantages of asserting sovereignty over the Polar Basin north of Canada and of the waters of the channels between the islands were obtained, and a paper was prepared concluding that there would be no **significant** advantages and many disadvantages in asserting a claim overwaters in the arctic Basin outside the Archipelago, but there could be real advantages if sovereignty could be asserted over the waters within the archipelago. The paper was circulated to the ministers on the Cabinet Committee on Territorial Waters.

During the year oil companies began to show interest in the petroleum possibilities of **the Arctic** Archipelago, and the Committee discussed what facilities would be needed **to** assist their work.

1960

Only two meetings were held in 1960 (15 March, 5 December). This was partly because many of the major **defence** projects **were** nearing completion and no new ones had been initiated during the year. Another reason was the absence from Ottawa for much of the year of the Secretary, who was attending National Defence College in Kingston. Oil companies took out exploration permits of about 40 million acres in the Queen Elizabeth Islands, and many oil exploration parties were in the field, one of which discovered the **lead/zinc** deposit which **became the Arvik mine** on Little Cornwallis Island.

The A. C.N.D., **anticipating** the probable expansion of Resolute to meet commercial needs, and aware of the shortcomings of its location, had directed the Secretariat to compare Resolute with Radstock Bay, the most promising alternative. Radstock Bay was found to have a longer open water season, a more protected and deeper **harbour** with easier approaches, and more suitable **terrain** for an airfield, but there was no information on which to assess flying weather. The Committee agreed to request the Department of Transport to **undertake** a meteorological **programme** at Radstock Bay as a matter of urgency.

On the recommendation of the Scientific Research Sub-committee, the Committee agreed that a research station should be established at Inuvik and administered by the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources.

Plans for the long-term development of Frobisher Bay were reported to the Committee.

1961

Four meetings were held in 1961 (6 February, 24 April, 12 June, 18 December). There was less military activity during the year, with no new defence projects in northern Canada, the closing of some Pinetree radar stations along the Labrador coast and at Resolution Island and Frobisher Bay in **Baffin** Island, and Canadian civilian organizations taking a greater part in the operation and maintenance of the D.E.W. Line. On the other hand, commercial interest was increasing, especially in the petroleum possibilities in the Queen Elizabeth Islands, where the **first** well in the arctic was drilled near Winter **Harbour** in Melville Island. Substantial changes *were* made in the Canada Oil and Gas Lands Regulations in order to encourage petroleum exploration in the north.

The Department of Transport decided that five years of meteorological observations would be necessary at Radstock Bay in order to assess flying conditions there. As the immediate needs of National Defence and the Department of Transport could be met at Resolute Bay, Treasury Board would not approve the cost of the observing program. The A. C.N.D. agreed, with some reluctance, that development of facilities at Resolute Bay could continue. The conflation of Resolute as the focus of activities in the Queen Elizabeth Islands represents a failure on the part of the A. C.N.D. The Joint Arctic Weather Station program was originally intended to be based at Winter **Harbour** in Melville Island, but the supply ships had been stopped by ice, and were unloaded instead in Resolute Bay. It was a poor harbour, and Radstock Bay appeared to have many advantages. As Resolute expanded it would become progressively more difficult to relocate the facilities established there. Had the A. C.N.D. taken a **firmer** attitude, Treasury Board and the Department of Transport would have found it difficult not to agree to collecting the data needed on which a well-informed decision could be reached.

The Department of External Affairs asked for the Committee's views on whether Canada should accede to the Antarctic Treaty. After the Scientific Research Sub-committee had examined the matter, the A. C.N.D. replied that, from a scientific point of view, there would be no disadvantages and possibly considerable advantages in acceding to the treaty.

On the advice of the Scientific Research Sub-committee, the A.C.N.D. agreed that northern research should be encouraged by providing research grants to northern institutes and expeditions. Representatives of the Scientific Research Sub-committee with scientists from outside the government would recommend grants to the Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources, and the program should be administered by his department.. This was the origin of the Northern Scientific Training Program.

1962

- Only one meeting was held in 1962 (10 December). It was a time of severe financial **restraint** in the government. As a result there were no new initiatives and a low level of activity in the north. The hole drilled to 12,500 feet on Melville Island proved to be dry, the **airfields** at Snag and Aishihik in the Yukon were closed, and the mine at Rankin Inlet was shut down as no new deposits of ore could be found. Few policy issues were raised, but the Committee was kept informed of such matters as the progress of construction of the Pine Point Railway and the new interest shown by the Quebec government in the administration of northern Quebec.

In 1963 Mr. Gordon Robertson was appointed Secretary to the Cabinet and Clerk of the Privy Council, Mr. E.A. Côté replacing him as Deputy Minister and Chairman of the A. C.N.D. He did not become Commissioner of the Northwest Territories, an office to which a different departmental official was appointed.

Many changes had occurred in the north during the ten years that Mr. Robertson had been Chairman. His appointment had coincided with a period of **increasing** military activity, with the construction of the D.E.W. Line as the largest of many major defence undertakings. After some years **defence** involvement in the north began to decline but, with considerable government encouragement, mining and **oil** companies had begun to show interest in the mineral possibilities of the north. The A. C.N.D. could not have had a more competent and courteous Chairman, or one that could have guided their discussions more adroitly in the directions he wanted. Members recognized that he needed and appreciated their suggestions and advice and **were not being** asked simply to **rubberstamp** what had already been decided within his department. **The Committee** suffered another great loss with the retirement of General Young as Deputy Minister of Public Works, who had remained an active and **supportive** member.

During this period radical changes had also taken place in the administration of the north. The presence of the **Department** of Northern Affairs and National Resources had been minimal in 1953, with only a **handful** of employees living in the Mackenzie **District**, and none in the Eastern Arctic. By 1963 every settlement of any size had a federal school, a settlement manager, administrator, or northern **service** officer, and often one or more technicians. The **Inuit** were encouraged to move from their small hunting camps scattered along the coasts into these settlements, where they could take advantage of the new government services but could not hunt and trap as profitably. The role of the Department had changed **from** that of absentee landlord to that of conducting a **well-**developed and increasingly-entrenched colonial administration.

The winds of **change** were blowing strongly in the north. The Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources was responsible for tempering their effect on the native people. The Department was **itself** however also the cradle of the winds, to an extent it probably failed to recognize. The settlements were strange to the greatly increased numbers of both native people and southerners who were brought together there. Some settlements saw power struggles between the southerners, with the H.B.C. manager trying to retain his historic dominance in the economic life, the missions and the R.C.M. Police resentful of a new and powerful authority, and the representative of the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources assuming that his position made him the ranking federal official. These matters were not considered by the A. C. N.D., the Northern Administration Branch of the Department preferring to handle them on an individual basis rather than through the Administration Sub-committee, which became inactive. This resulted in different practices among the departments working in the north, including different northern allowances and accommodation standards, and different conditions for the employment of Inuit.

Decline -1963-1967

1963

The Committee met twice in 1963 (23 September, 18 December). Accelerated oil exploration in the Queen Elizabeth Islands was expected, and the commercial companies involved would require facilities, especially at Resolute airfield which was operated by the R. C.A.F. The scale of services needed and the responsibility for supplying them were examined by the A. C. N. D., following which the Cabinet agreed that responsibility for operating the **airfield** should be transferred from the Department of National Defence to the Department of Transport. The involvement of the Department of National Defence in the north was further reduced by the Committee's agreement to recommend to Cabinet that responsibility for the Northwest Highway System be transferred from that department to the Department of Public Works.

The Committee also considered the future of Frobisher Bay. Owing to the rapid development of long-range commercial aircraft, plans for its use as a refueling base for scheduled **trans-Atlantic** flights had been **cancelled**, exploration had failed to discover any significant mineral resources in the general area, there was no economic base, and the Strategic Air Command's air refueling activities had been terminated. There was no longer the same pressure for development; and some of the educational and medical **services** required for the Eastern Arctic could be provided at less cost at Churchill in accommodation no longer required by the Canadian Army.

Evidence of radioactive fall-out in the arctic was discussed at the Scientific Research Sub-committee. Arrangements were made to collect caribou meat from the north for analysis and for whole body radiation counts of some of the Inuit who were visiting Ottawa.

The division of the Northwest Territories, which had been proposed by the Northwest Territories Council, was being examined by the Mines, Forests and Waters Committee of the House of

Commons. The A. C.N.D. was informed that there was no probability that division could place on the originally planned date of 1 April 1964.

1964- The Chairman did not call a meeting during the year.

1965

Two meetings were held during the year (20 February, 12 April). The February meeting was concerned largely with reviewing routine reports as so long had passed since the previous meeting, and discussing how the north could be presented in Canadian government exhibits during Expo 67. For the April meeting the Chairman had written to members asking if they could be present in person to discuss a proposal for a Commission of Enquiry on the government of the Northwest Territories. A draft memorandum to Cabinet was circulated proposing the establishment of a commission to make recommendations concerning the future government of the Northwest Territories, with a suggested membership and tentative terms of reference. After a discussion which resulted in several amendments, the Committee approved the memorandum and the preparation of a comprehensive statement of government policy on northern administration and developments. The Committee also agreed that the Arctic Bibliography of the Arctic Institute of North America should be supported in part by annual grants, that the potential of ground effect machines in the north should be examined, and that "moonlighting" by federal public servants in the north should be handled departmentally rather than be governed by an interdepartmental policy.

1966

Two meetings were again held in 1966 (19 May, 12 December). More than a year had passed since the last meeting when the May meeting was held and many of the papers distributed by the Secretariat dated back to the previous year. The Chairman said he hoped to hold meetings more frequently. This meeting had apparently been called to resolve two problems. The Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources was again considering the development of Frobisher as a regional headquarters and education centre, and was planning to re-allocate accommodation there in a way that did not meet the requirements of some departments, and there was some disagreement between the Department of Northern Affairs and the Department of Transport on the standard of water and sewer services to be provided in northern settlements. Neither problem would have arisen if an effective Administration Sub-committee had been able to resolve them and to recommend agreed solutions to the A. C.N.D.

By the December meeting, the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, to which the Indian Affairs Branch had been transferred, had been again reorganized and renamed the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. For very many years parts of the department had been in different buildings in Ottawa, but it was now housed in a single building, Centennial Tower. The Chairman decided to hold the meeting in the department conference room

in Centennial Tower against the advice of the Secretary who considered the meetings should continue to be held in the Privy Council Offices as it was an interdepartmental committee. Holding the meetings in the department would make the Committee appear to be an adjunct to the department. At the meeting the A. C.N.D. approved, with minor amendments, measures proposed by a working group chaired by the Secretary, to control expeditions in the Polar Basin but based in Canada. The Committee also approved a paper prepared by the Secretariat recommending that federal departments and crown agencies adopt an objective of filling 75% of their northern positions with northern residents by 1977, and also provide training of northern residents for these positions.

1967

Two meetings were held (6 February, 18 December). The first was well attended, and discussed the coordination of federal government activities in the Yukon Territory. The Commissioner of the Yukon was present at the meeting. In the Commissioner's letter of appointment from the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, the Minister had said he was to be responsible for coordinating federal government activities in the Yukon, and he proposed establishing an interdepartmental advisory committee, which he would chair, in Whitehorse. Federal departments were concerned that this might confuse their reporting lines, and weaken their control of their own field staff. The Committee agreed that when the Commissioner's committee, which would deal essentially with local issues, did not agree on any point, it would be referred to the Chairman of the A. C. N. D., who would discuss it with the appropriate Deputy Minister and if necessary refer it to the A. C.N.D.

In contrast to the previous meeting, the December meeting was very poorly attended. For the first time no regular members were present, apart from the Chairman; all either sent representatives, or ignored the notice of the meeting. Relations between Eskimos and federal employees in the north were discussed, and whether departments should adopt some agreed code of behaviour for their employees. The Committee approved a paper asking only that departments investigate instances where their employees appeared to have harmed Eskimos and take appropriate action.

The Secretary had been appointed Scientific Adviser to the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, and the Chairman announced that Mr. L. A.C.O. Hunt would replace him as Secretary. By the next meeting the Committee would have a new Chairman as well as a new Secretary because during the summer Mr. Côté was appointed Deputy Solicitor General, and Mr. J.A. MacDonald replaced him as Deputy Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Chairman of the A. C.N.D.

The A. C.N.D. had declined markedly in the years since Mr. Robertson had been Chairman. Few meetings had been held and they had been called sporadically, destroying the continuity of the Committee. The link with the Privy Council Office had all but vanished. Deputy Ministers rarely attended, sending officials at progressively lower levels, or not being represented at all. The Committee was apparently losing its credibility in the eyes of the other departments. With the move of the meetings to Centennial Tower, the number of officials in attendance from the

Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development increased! forming nearly half of all present at some meetings. In addition the agenda progressively tended to reflect the concerns of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. Much of this was inevitable as defence activities had declined greatly and commercial interest had failed to develop to any great extent. Consequently the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, as the administrative authority, the largest employer, and the biggest spender, had come to dominate the north. Towards the end of this period the office of the Commissioner of the Northwest Territories moved from Ottawa to Yellowknife, taking with it much of the administration of the Mackenzie and Keewatin Districts, but with the control and administration of natural resources, other than wildlife, remaining in Ottawa.

Side-Tracked --1968-1969

1968

Two meetings were held during the year (16 June, 14 December). No important issues were raised at the June meeting. The Construction Sub-committee was discontinued as much of its work could in future be carried out by the Edmonton office of the Department of Public Works, to which the responsibility for most northern construction had been decentralized. A temporary sub-committee studying the potential of ground effect machines in the north, chaired by the Secretary, was also discontinued. It had completed field trials at Fort Churchill, and its work could now be carried out by an interdepartmental committee on air cushion vehicles that the Department of Transport had recently organized to study their use on a nation-wide basis.

A report was made on the activities of Panarctic Oils Limited. A large number of companies held permits to explore for oil in the Canadian Arctic, attracted by the generous terms under which the permits were issued. Many of these companies were unable or unwilling to finance the high cost of drilling in the north. Panarctic Oils was a consolidation of their interests, formed with the active encouragement of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, to drill exploratory wells in what were geologically the most favorable places. It was financed largely by government equity participation. Mention was made at the meeting of a promising discovery of oil in Alaska at Prudhoe Bay not far from the Canadian border.

The Secretariat of the A. C.N.D. had always been part of the office of the Deputy Minister of what was now the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, with the Secretary reporting directly to him as Chairman. Departmental responsibilities in the north were organized in such a way that they formed part of a single directorate or program, which had always resented the existence of another channel on northern matters to the Deputy Minister. Several attempts had been made to absorb the Secretariat within the Northern Program but the Secretary had always resisted them successfully, on the grounds that an interdepartmental committee should not be considered or seen as an integral part of the department. The new Secretary however agreed to it becoming a part of the Northern Program, reporting to an Assistant Deputy Minister.

By the time of the December meeting, the importance of **Prudhoe** Bay was widely known, and means of moving oil from there to markets in the south were being considered. Canada would be involved if tankers through the Northwest Passage were used, or if the Mackenzie Valley were to be a route for a pipe-line. Rather than using the A. C.N.D. for the formulation of the Canadian government position on such matters, a special committee was established to report directly to the Cabinet. It included the Deputy Ministers of Energy, Mines, and Resources, and of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, and the Chairman of the National Energy Board. The implications of the Prudhoe Bay discovery were however discussed at some length by the A. C.N.D. With the resulting acceleration of oil exploration in the Canadian Arctic, **D.E.W. Line** airfields were increasingly being expected to provide fuel, accommodation, and other services to non-military aircraft and their passengers. The Department of National **Defence** asked the A. C.N.D. to consider what measures should be taken to meet this civil need, but at the Chairman's suggestion the Committee agreed only that the Department of National **Defence** should discuss the matter with the Canadian Transport Commission.

1969-January 1970

A single meeting was held in 1969 (26 June). The Department of National **Defence** again raised the problem of providing fuel and other services for non-military purposes at **D.E.W. Line** stations. Demands were far exceeding what could be provided by the contractor who operated the stations on behalf of the **U.S.A.F.** Although under no obligation to do so, the stations had provided these services, but the volume of traffic had grown to the extent that this was no longer possible. Many of the aircraft involved were under charter to federal government departments, and the Canadian Transport Commission had exacerbated the situation by approving regular air services that used **D.E.W. Line** airfields and sometimes terminated there. At **Tuktoyaktuk** the volume of traffic was becoming too great for untrained personnel to handle with safety. The Committee recommended that the problem be studied by an "ad hoc" committee, but there is no indication that this was done. The Department of National **Defence** would have been justified in thinking that the A. C.N.D. could have taken some more positive action.

Before this meeting the Chairman had written to the members of the Committee proposing the establishment of a Coordinating Sub-committee but there is no reference to this in the minutes.

At the next meeting (9 January, 1970) the Chairman announced that he was being replaced as Deputy Minister of Indian Affairs and National Resources and Chairman of the A. C.N.D. by Mr. **H.B. Robinson**. Most of the meeting was devoted to the presentation and discussion of a long document "A Strategy for Northern Development" prepared by the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development.

The A. C.N.D. had not been effective while Mr. MacDonald had been Chairman. It was a time when the dichotomy of the department, responsible on one hand for the native people, and on the other hand for northern economic development, was becoming apparent. The reception given by the Indians to the White Paper on their future had not encouraged the Deputy Minister, but the

Prudhoe Bay discovery had led him to believe that the north was on the threshold of rapid economic development based on minerals, especially petroleum. He had little idea of the role of the A. C.N.D. and how it should function, and he appears to have been in favour of the establishment of quite different machinery for recommending how northern oil should be transported. After making the Secretariat of the A. C.N.D. a part of the Northern Economic Development Branch, he established a coordinating sub-committee of the A. C.N.D., chaired by the Assistant Deputy Minister responsible for the Northern Program, who was also much more responsive to the needs of development than to those of the native people. Its functions were never clear. It was obviously redundant if the A. C.N.D. itself were carrying out its responsibilities effectively. Alternatively there was no need for the A. C.N.D. if the Coordinating Committee could, at a lower level, achieve the objectives of the A. C.N.D. It became increasingly evident that it could not.

Failure To Respond --1970-1971

1970 (February-December)

After the January meeting, six more meetings were held in 1970 (11 May, 25 May, 23 June, 31 July, 21 October, 26 November). It appears that no minutes were distributed for the first meeting in May, which was mainly concerned with the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, then being considered by Parliament. It was agreed that a working group should be established to draft the regulations required under the act. Foreign reaction to the legislation and the need for an international conference to discuss the safety of navigation and pollution in the Arctic were considered. The Committee also discussed the Coordinating Sub-committee, members expressing very different views on its function and how it might operate. The second meeting in May discussed at great length the position Canada should take on arctic pollution in negotiations with the United States.

At the next meeting the Chairman reported that the Cabinet Committee on Science Policy and Technology had asked the A. C.N.D. to prepare a paper on "National Objectives for Northern Canada". The Committee then commented on a draft paper prepared in the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. The Cabinet Committee had also decided that an international conference should be held in Canada on problems of the arctic environment. At this meeting the Chairman introduced the Commissioner of the Northwest Territories as a new member of the Committee. Presumably the Commissioner of the Yukon had also become a member, though he was not present. It is difficult to understand the rationale behind these appointments of territorial officials to a federal government committee, of which the Deputy Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development was a member and would represent their interests. It contributed still more towards the domination of the Committee by the Department.

The Committee was informed at the July meeting that the proposed international meeting on safety of navigation and control of pollution in arctic waters had been postponed. Draft Arctic Waters

Pollution **Prevention** Regulations were tabled and approved, with minor refinements, for forwarding to the Department of Justice for final **review** before promulgation.

At the October meeting it became apparent that negotiations with the U.S. about **an arctic treaty**, which would have been discussed at the proposed Arctic Conference, **were not** proceeding smoothly. It **was also** reported that Cabinet **was** considering holding in Canada a scientific conference on arctic problems.

The November meeting was largely a replay of the previous meeting, with little progress on either the arctic treaty or the **arctic scientific** conference. The Coordinating Sub-committee reported that it had dealt with a number of matters, but gave no details about them.

1971

Three meetings were held during the year (22 April, 6 May, 7 October). The first was a presentation by Mr. Richard Rohmer proposing the establishment of a Mid-Canada Council, which had superseded his earlier proposal of a Mid-Canada Corridor. The Council would create and coordinate policies and plans for the orderly development of the boreal forested area north of the highly populated **region** of the country **within** 200 miles of the U.S. border. The Chairman said departments would wish to consider the proposal and whether the A. C.N.D. was the proper mechanism to develop the government's response.

The **Committee was** informed at the May meeting of the **Ministry** of Transport's proposal to establish **an Arctic Transportation Administration** and discussed its relationship to the Transportation Sub-committee. The proposal **was to** be submitted to the **Minister** of Indian Affairs and Northern Development for his concurrence, but the Committee did not make any recommendation to him.

While plans for the proposed arctic scientific conference in Canada appeared to be stalled, an international conference on transportation and other issues in the Arctic Ocean was being held at **Ditchley** in England. The Committee discussed the **views** that Canadian **representatives** at the conference might put forward.

Before the next meeting the Cabinet had approved a "Policy for Northern Development 1971-81", produced in answer to a Cabinet directive "to develop a strategy which recognizes that the needs of the native people in the North are more important than resource development and that the maintenance of ecological balance is essential". This was in sharp contrast to the philosophy that had been followed in administering the north in the recent past, when **exploration** of non-renewable resources was uppermost. The **policy** established **social** improvement as the highest priority, followed by protection of the environment, development of renewable resources, and development of non-renewable resources, in that order.

This important document was considered by the Coordinating Sub-committee but the only part to have been referred to the A. C.N.D. itself was a statement that the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Northern Development, should introduce improved arrangements for joint planning and coordination of all policies and programs including joint consideration of their financial implications. To this the Coordinating Sub-committee attached a proposal that a steering group of A. C.N.D. should be formed to refer subjects to sub-committees, that the Secretariat should be enlarged, and that departments should identify and report the expenditures they made towards northern objectives. These proposals were discussed at the October 7 meeting of the A. C. N.D., and accepted in part, subject to any further comments that might be received, and it was agreed that a paper would be prepared giving proposals for the re-organization of the A. C.N.D. for consideration at its next meeting. This appears however to have been the last meeting of the A. C.N.D.

The annual report "Government Activities in the North" continued to be published for many years. The section on the A. C.N.D. in the 1971 report records the three meetings held by the Committee that year but later reports make no mention of any meetings of the A. C.N.D. The only record of any activity is in the 1972 report where the Science and Technology Sub-committee is said to have organized a seminar on northern science at Mont Gabriel, and to have held discussions with scientists from the USSR on cooperation in northern research. The various committees and sub-committees continued to be listed with their terms of reference, and new working groups and committees are sometimes reported to have been formed in the reports up to that for 1980/81. After that all reference to the A. C.N.D. is dropped, and the report itself was discontinued after 1983/84. It can be concluded that, even though some sub-committees met, nothing of significance emerged, or it would have been mentioned in the annual reports, and that the A. C.N.D. itself did not function after 1971.

It is difficult to assess this terminal phase of the A. C.N.D. The Chairman had inherited an organization that was no longer effective. The Secretariat had moved from the Chairman's direct control, and the establishment of a Coordinating Sub-committee, or Coordinating Committee as it was usually called, which appears to have usurped the functions of the A. C.N.D. itself, made him more often a spectator when he should have been an actor. The Cabinet directive to introduce improved managements for joint planning and coordination of northern policies and programs provided an opportunity for the Committee to become once more the 'main instrument for formulating northern policy, but it was missed. Far from increasing the effectiveness of the A. C. N.D., the measures taken by the Department destroyed it.

THE COORDINATING AND GENERAL COMMITTEES

Towards the end of the useful life of the A. C. N.D., a new sub-committee was formed. It was originally named the Executive Coordinating Committee, but this was changed to the Coordinating Committee, or sometimes Sub-committee. Later its name was changed again to the General Committee. The uncertainty about its name was matched by uncertainty about its purpose and direction. The original object was that it should take the weight off the A. C.N.D. itself, by resolving matters at a lower level, though the A. C.N.D. could not have been described as being overburdened at the time. The proposed **terms** of reference for the new committee gave rise to considerable discussion at the committee **itself**, and many **important** matters, such as **its** relationship to the other sub-committees remained unresolved. The **obfuscatory minutes** may well reflect the nature of the committee's discussions on **its** purpose and how **it** should operate. A particularly unfortunate result of the committee's establishment was that northern **policies** were no longer considered at the deputy **minister** level except in the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, and **sometimes** not even there.

It is unnecessary to examine in detail the work of the committee as it appears to have had little effect on government policies, and in any event the files are incomplete, lacking the minutes of several of the later meetings. As least twenty-nine meetings were held: six in 1970; four in 1971 and 1972; five in 1973; four in 1974 and 1975; and two in 1976. The Chairman was at first the Assistant Deputy Minister for the Northern Development Program in the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, but he was replaced by the Assistant Deputy Minister for Corporate Affairs of the same department in 1973. The meetings were characterized by bulky agendas and very large attendance, usually between thirty and forty comparatively junior **officials**. With so many taking part in the discussions, few **firm** decisions could be reached. It seems also that the practice of the A. C.N.D. Secretariat, which had become a part of the Northern Economic Development Branch of the Northern Program, was to copy any material on the north and forward it to **all** the members of the Coordinating Committee for formal discussion. It was a far cry from the original "intention of the Secretary to the Cabinet that many matters would be settled by telephone between the Committee Secretary and members of the A. C.N.D. A further weakness in the A. C.N.D. Secretariat was failure to follow-up matters raised in the Committee to **see** if any action was agreed and, if so, to ensure that it was taken.

One subject that occupied much of the time of the Committee, and must have resulted in countless hours of work throughout the government, was the preparation of an annual northern expenditure plan **it** had **itself** proposed. It gave details each year of all expenditures on the north planned by federal government departments for the next year according to **which** of several loosely defined national northern objectives they were **intended** to be directed towards. An **internal** committee **review** admits that it was not being used by departments, Treasury Board, or the Cabinet **in** taking decisions on resource application and had therefore **limited** value. Nevertheless **it** continued to be produced **in** much the same form until 1982, when the Annual Northern Expenditure Plan for 1983/84 was **published** together with the Report on Government Activities **in** the North for 1982/83 but no longer under the auspices of the A. C.N.D. The Annual Report on Government **Activities**

was discontinued in 1984. A much shorter Annual Northern Expenditure Plan is still published by the Department.

The protracted sessions and inconclusive discussions resulting from **over-large** attendance at this and other sub-committees was discussed by the **Deputy Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development** at a meeting with sub-committee **chairmen** in January 1976, which was more than four years after the last meeting of the A. C.N.D. It was **agreed that smaller attendances** of more senior officials were required and that the A. C.N.D. itself, now **called the Policy Committee**, would meet regularly to deal with items referred to it by the sub-committees and to review and direct their work. The files do not however contain minutes of any subsequent meetings of the General Committee, nor could I find any record of the Policy Committee ever having met.

There can be little doubt that the Coordinating/General Committee was ill-conceived. The main object of the A. C.N.D. was to coordinate federal government policy in the north. This was not a responsibility it could properly delegate. Many matters were, however, referred to the Coordinating Committee that could have been handled more effectively and more expeditiously by a responsible Secretariat; others of a technical nature could have been dealt with by the departments concerned through normal interdepartmental channels.

A more serious objection is that, instead of acting as a filter *to* protect the members of the A. C.N.D. from matters of little significance, it could block important issues from reaching them. For instance, "Northern Canada in the 70's", Mr. **Chrétien's** statement on 28 March 1972 to the Standing Committee on Indian Affairs and Northern Development on Government policy in the north, affirms that the needs of the native people in the North' are more important than resource development, and that the maintenance of ecological balance is essential. This represented a very important change in government thinking but neither it nor the Cabinet's deliberations that preceded it appear to have been brought to the attention of the A. C.N.D. itself. It is also remarkable that matters affecting the native people **were** seldom raised except in the context of employment of northern residents, and that, despite the large attendance at meetings, the Department of the Secretary of State was not represented. It could have been concluded from the minutes that the practices of the Northern Development Program and the policies of its Minister were pointing in - different directions.

The Construction Sub-Committee

After visiting the Mackenzie District in the summer of 1947 as a member of the **Northwest Territories Council**, Dr. **Keenleyside** had remarked on the confusion in certain settlements, where departments were competing against one another for local **labour**, suitable building sites, and transportation of building supplies. He established a sub-committee on the coordination of federal construction in the north at the **first** meeting of the A.C.N.D., and it continued to meet even during the period when the A. C.N.D. itself was dormant. The membership was not however sufficiently senior to consider matters of general policy.

As part of the **re-structuring** of the A. C.N.D. by General Young, a Construction Sub-committee was established. The Director of the Building Research Division of the National Research Council was to be chairman, but when General Young became Deputy Minister of Public Works, he withdrew in his **favour** so that the chairman could be from an operating department.

General Young brought the same effectiveness to the Sub-committee that he had to the A. C.N.D. itself. All departments active **in** the north were asked each fall to send details of the **northern** construction projects they proposed for the next year to the Secretary. They were then **re-grouped** by settlements. If a disproportionate amount of construction was planned for any settlement, adjustments were made. At each settlement a single department, usually that **with** the largest program there, was made responsible for **supervising** all federal construction at that settlement that year. In this way construction was **limited** to what a settlement could handle effectively, and local competition between departments was avoided. At the end of the construction season progress was reported and the **situation** at each settlement was reviewed.

The Construction Sub-committee played a valuable role also in assessing the need for housing in the north, in the allocation between departments of federal housing, in the provision and standardization of electricity generating capacity, in the identification of problems for research, and in planning the development of roads in the northern territories. It became in effect a forum for the consideration of the special problems faced by government engineers in the north.

The need for the Sub-committee continued for many years but it became progressively less important after the Department of Public Works decentralized its operations, with northern matters being **handled** by the Edmonton office, which then became in a better position to coordinate most northern construction. Another factor was the increase in **activities** and capabilities of the agencies responsible for **construction**, roads, and administration in the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and in the territorial governments.

The Transportation Sub-Committee

A sub-committee on transportation was established along with a sub-committee on the **coordination** of construction, at the first meeting of the A. C.N.D. It was chaired by the R. C.A.F. Air Member for Technical Services, and had been very active at **first**. It settled many current working difficulties but the members had not been sufficiently senior to determine general policy. In the restructuring of the A. C.N.D. under General Young, a Transportation Sub-committee was established with the Deputy Minister of Transport as chairman.

Because of the long distances in the north, transportation is unusually important. After the Second World War the small volume of commercial freight along the Mackenzie River and the Arctic coast and in the **Eastern** Arctic was dwarfed by large but probably not recurring defence requirements, and the Sub-committee was faced with a number of important issues in both sea and air supply. One was the provision of shipping and ice-breaking capacity so that Canada would no longer have to rely on the United States for the supply of the Joint Arctic Weather Stations and other

installations in northern Canada. Another was the need for better **hydrographic** information and other aids to navigation. In order to handle the substantial and increasing amounts of fuel **required** in the north for heating, generating electricity, mechanical transport, and aviation, arrangements had to be made for special shipping and for **oil** storage tanks at northern settlements.

A corresponding situation existed in air transportation. In most of the north there were no scheduled air services. Bush aircraft could be **chartered** at **only** a handful of northern settlements, none of which were in the Eastern Arctic. Much of the **infrastructure** had been built by the United States during the Second World War and there were questions of responsibility for the operation of airfields both between Canada and the United States, and between the Department of Transport and the Department of National **Defence**.

After a number of major policy decisions had been reached by the Sub-committee and approved by the A. C. N.D., such matters as receiving departmental transportation requirements each year and chartering the necessary shipping became routine Department of Transport procedure. New problems however continued to arise as, for instance, in providing for the transportation needs of the **D.E.W.** Line in both the construction and operating phases and ensuring that Canadian companies received, and were able to provide, a suitable share of the resulting business.

The Transportation Sub-committee continued to exist, though meeting less frequently, throughout the life of the A. C. N.D. The need for coordination at the A. C. N.D. level decreased however owing to the transfer of H. M. C. S. "Labrador" to the Department of Transport, the establishment of first the Canadian Coast Guard, and later the Arctic Transportation Authority within the Department of Transport, together with the transfer of the more **important** northern airfields to the same department, and the great expansion of commercial aviation in the north.

The Administration Sub-Committee

The Administration Sub-committee was the least successful of the four sub-committees established when the A. C. N.D. was **re-structured** in 1953. A sub-committee on general administration had been - formed in 1952 under the chairmanship of the Director of the Northern Administration **and Lands** Branch of the Department of Resources and Development to deal with **current** problems that did not merit the attention of the A. C. N.D. itself, but only one meeting had been held. The new Administration Sub-committee was chaired by the Commissioner of the **R.C.M** Police, who was also a member of the Northwest Territories Council, and had a more senior membership. Its terms of reference authorized it to study and recommend improvements to the government administrative machinery in the north, to examine government employment practices in the north and specifically the employment of native people, to propose government policies with regard to the Eskimo people, and to consider reports on U.S. activities in the Canadian north and recommend measures which would contribute to the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty in the area.

The Sub-committee was at **first** very busy, dealing with such diverse issues as the appointment of members of the **R.C.M.** Police and certain officials as Canadian customs and immigration officers

at many northern settlements as a legal demonstration of Canadian sovereignty, the procurement and **distribution** of foreign publications on the north, and the need for a defined government policy in accordance with which contacts between **Inuit** and non-Eskimos could be controlled. **This** level of activity however declined rapidly. One reason was certainly a **rapid** expansion in the size and capabilities of the staff of the Department of Northern Affairs and **National Resources** in both Ottawa and the north. The Northern Administration Branch of the Department saw itself as the administrative authority and tended to act unilaterally without consulting others or, if another department were unavoidably involved, with that department alone. It did not refer issues to the A. C.N.D. One result was that such matters as northern allowances were discussed by the Department with the Treasury Board staff officer in whose province the Department fell. Other departments followed the same practice with their Treasury Board staff officers, and a number of different scales evolved, - a certain source of discussion and discontent among federal employees in northern settlements.

The Northern Administration Branch also considered matters affecting the **Inuit** people to be its exclusive responsibility and did not encourage discussion of **Inuit** affairs or the evolution of native policies through the A. C.N.D. With so little placed before it, the Administration Sub-committee did not survive after Commissioner Nicholson resigned from the **R.C.M. Police**.

The Research and Development Sub-Committee

When the A. C.N.D. was established there was little need for a scientific sub-committee because most scientific work in the north was reviewed regularly by the **Defence** Research Board's Arctic Research Advisory Committee of which Dr. **Keenleyside** was already chairman. In the restructuring of the A. C.N.D. under General Young a Research and Development Sub-committee was one of the four permanent sub-committees. It was to be chaired by the **Deputy** Minister of Resources and Development and would take over many of the responsibilities of the Arctic Research Advisory Committee, but with service representation at a higher level. The **Defence** Research Board Committee then limited its interests to military-related research, but the Research and Development Sub-committee did not assume the responsibilities assigned to it. It was probably a mistake for the Chairman of the A. C.N.D. also to chair one of its sub-committees, and for the chairman of a committee that was essentially **scientific** to come from a department that was becoming much more concerned with administration than with science, particularly after the Geological Survey and several other scientific agencies had been moved out of the department.

In 1958 the need for greater scientific involvement in the north led to the A. C.N.D. itself taking the initiative in establishing a major continuing **scientific** undertaking in the north - the Polar Continental Shelf Project - and this was certainly one of the reasons that the A. C.N.D. requested the Secretary to prepare a paper on the coordination of northern science, with a view to re-activating the Research and Development Sub-committee. The Secretary's paper reviewed federal government research in the north, reported that the coordination of northern science was adequately covered in the existing terms of reference of the Sub-committee, recommended the membership should include the Fisheries Research Board, and suggested the Sub-committee be renamed the

Scientific Research Sub-committee to exclude social and economic development. The A. C.N.D. accepted the paper and appointed as chairman Dr. W.E. van Steenburgh, who soon after became Deputy Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys.

The Scientific Research Sub-committee met, though somewhat sporadically, from that time on and appears in fact to have been the last element of the A. C.N.D. to remain active. Many scientific issues were processed through the Sub-committee and its advice was frequently sought, even on such matters as when hunting might be resumed in the Fort Smith area following an outbreak of anthrax, and the measures to be taken to determine the extent to which the Inuit were being affected by strontium 90 fall-out from atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons. Other subjects it considered included the attitude to be adopted to foreign scientific parties planning to work in the Canadian north, the need to continue the requirement for Scientists and Explorers Licenses to cover research in the Northwest Territories, and scientific cooperation in the north with other countries, especially the United States and later the U.S.S.R. The degree of support to be given to various projects proposed by the Arctic Institute of North America became a perennial topic.

Some of the measures initiated by or through the Sub-committee had a far reaching influence on Canadian northern research. On a recommendation of the Sub-committee the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources instituted a program of grants to Canadian universities and expeditions to encourage young scientists to work in the north. This has been continued in the Northern Scientific Training Program which has supported so many of the northern scientists and other professionals now working for the federal and territorial governments, Canadian universities, and native organizations. The lack of scientific facilities in the north led the Sub-committee to propose that the government build the Inuvik Research Laboratory to support government, university, and other scientists working in the Lower Mackenzie Valley. Some years later the Sub-committee, which had changed its name to the Sub-committee on Science and Technology, concluded that Igloolik would be the most suitable site, for a corresponding facility in the Eastern Arctic and its recommendation was followed by the construction of the Igloolik Research Laboratory.

As government and other programs in the north expanded, the Sub-committee became concerned that their scientific requirements were not being fully met and concluded that there should be a better understanding of northern science in relation to the needs of the north. Accordingly a seminar of scientists with northern experience was held at Mont Gabriel in the fall of 1972 to review the current state of northern research, to discuss the needs of the north, and to indicate how research might be pointed in directions that would be of most benefit to the government's national northern objectives. This resulted in the formulation of northern scientific guidelines.

Following the Mont Gabriel seminar, the Sub-committee became involved in attempting, with only limited success, to arrange cooperation in northern science with the U.S.S.R. It also reviewed scientific facilities in the north, determined government needs and prepared detailed plans for laboratories in the Yukon, at Yellowknife, and in the Arctic Archipelago, but failed to persuade the government to make provision for them. The Sub-committee remained active as late as the end of 1977.

The effectiveness of the Sub-committee depended very largely on **its** chairman. It was not enough simply to pass on the recommendations of the Sub-committee; the chairman had to be an advocate for them. At least **in** theory he had access to the A. C.N.D. and **its** chairman. After the Secretariat **was** moved to the Northern Economic Development Branch, he alone had this access. The more approved route through the Coordinating or General Committee rarely led anywhere.

Other Sub-Committees and Working Groups

A number of other sub-committees and working groups were formed from time to time to consider special topics. At first they were few. When problems arose that could not be settled immediately, the A. C.N.D. usually instructed the Secretary to explore the matter further, either directly or by calling a meeting of those most concerned, and to recommend an agreed solution. The decision to relocate Aklavik however brought a number of comparatively minor recurring matters, and a special sub-committee was formed to supervise the undertaking until the construction of Inuvik was complete. A Public Information Sub-committee was also set up but, once policy matters were settled, was not recalled. More enduring was the Sub-committee on Communications which was of particular **value** when the rearward telecommunications for the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System were being planned and their coordination with civilian systems was under discussion.

It was not however until late **in** the history of the A. C.N.D. that the number of sub-committees and working groups began to expand rapidly. According to the Annual Report on Government Activities in the North for 1970, the Transportation, Science and Technology, and Communications Sub-committees were **re-activated** and a number of working groups established. Two years later three more sub-committees are reported to have been formed. an Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee in Yellowknife, presumably to provide local coordination of federal activities in the Northwest Territories, like the Yukon committee in Whitehorse; a Sub-committee on the Employment of Native Northerners; and an Environmental Committee on the Mackenzie Valley Highway, A diagram of the A. C.N.D. structure at the end of 1972 is attached as Appendix C. It is however dated more than a year after the last recorded meeting of the A. C.N.D.

In the fiscal year 1973/74 a Federal-Territorial Economic Planning Committee was **added** and the A. C.N.D. is said to have included under its jurisdiction the Interdepartmental Committee on Northern Roads. The next year saw three more A.C.N.D. committees; the Advisory Committee on Canadian Content in Oil and Gas Operations on Canada Lands; a Federal-Territorial Regional Planning committee; and a Mackenzie Delta Development Committee. The same year the term Sub-committee was dropped.

From this time on there was little change. The Annual Reports on Government Activities in the North continued to list all the committees. In that for 1975/76 the A. C.N.D. was described as "a structure of specialist committees with **sectoral** responsibilities". The next year it is stated that "A.C.N.D. provides through a committee structure the mechanism for interdepartmental planning and coordination of federal policies and programs pertaining to the Canadian north". Many readers will recognize the language. In the absence of any record of achievements, **from** the way in which

each report was **almost** a copy of the previous year's, and nom the failure of the A. C.N.D. or its Policy **Committee** to meet, it must be assumed that the A. C.N.D. **itself** no longer **existed**. Some of the Committees no doubt survived, but their decisions could not be endorsed by and **receive** the , powerful support of the A. C.N.D. **The A. C.N.D. structure, without a head, had become a maze, .** and was of no use to them.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

After a somewhat shaky start in 1948, the A. C.N.D. was from 1953 to 1963 an active and very influential body. All important northern policy was processed through it and often originated in its proceedings or those of its sub-committees. After 1963 its influence declined rapidly and it lost much of its credibility in government circles. There were many reasons for its initial success and subsequent decline.

It was essential for the Chairman to have the confidence and respect of the members, many of whom not only participated in the decisions reached by the Committee, but were also responsible for implementing them in their own departments. The A. C.N.D. had been very fortunate in its chairmen during its successful years.

The authority of any deputy minister is limited to his own department. The A. C.N.D. had however been created by the Privy Council Office and the Chairman of the A. C.N.D. had therefore a rather wider mandate than he had as Deputy Minister of Resources and Development. It was important to retain this link to the Cabinet Secretariat. By agreeing with the suggestion of the Secretary to the Cabinet that a joint Secretariat was no longer necessary, by moving the meetings from the Privy Council Office to his own department, and by making appointments to the Committee and its Secretariat without consulting the Privy Council Office, the Chairman of the A. C.N.D. was weakening his own authority.

When the A. C.N.D. had been established, the Department of Resources and Development was one of several departments that were active in the north and had in fact fewer staff there than some. It expanded very rapidly and soon became much the largest department in the north. No longer did it depend on the help and cooperation of others in order to carry out many of its responsibilities in administering the north. Increasingly, northern policies were decided in the Department without consulting others. To many it appeared that the Northern Program of the Department recognized only one solution to any problem in the north, and that was the one they had already devised. The Department also became less concerned with interdepartmental coordination as it controlled directly so many northern activities.

During its decline the A. C.N.D. held fewer meetings, with fewer deputy ministers attending. It lost much of its influence and its recommendations progressively carried less weight. It appears never to have been formally dissolved, but the last recorded meeting of the Committee itself was in 1971. A number of sub-committees and other groups it had formed survived for some years but, without the A. C.N.D. to endorse their decisions, they could have little influence on policy and were concerned mainly with administrative matters.

This leads to the question of whether there is still a role that the A. C.N.D. or some body with similar terms of reference could usefully fill. Does the government still require advice on policy in northern Canada, and is there still a need for coordination of government activities there?

In some areas ^{the} need for coordination of federal activities has certainly decreased. The part played for instance by the Department of National Health and Welfare in the north is no longer so direct now that the delivery of health services is provided by the territorial governments. The same is true for local government, education, and many other services. The decentralization of some departments, with the establishment of their own offices in the territories, allows coordination at a more local level, further reducing the part that Ottawa should play. On the other hand policies in one territory should be consonant with those in the other territory, and bringing them in line is a responsibility that Ottawa must assume, - a task that will become greater when Nunavut is established.

Many federal responsibilities in the north have changed little and will still require inter-departmental coordination. In particular the Indian and Inuit people remain a federal responsibility. This was an area in which the A. C.N.D. did little, partly because the Department built up a large northern administrative staff, greatly increased after it was joined by the Indian Affairs Branch, who were dealing directly with the native people. Now other departments, in particular the Secretary of State and Justice, have legitimate interests in native affairs.

In December 1986 the federal government itself, in reply to the report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Canada's International Relations, recognized the importance of developing a coherent set of policies for the Arctic. It must have also recognized the need for advice on what those policies should be.

The Honorable Gordon Robertson, who was Chairman of the A. C.N.D. during its most successful years, writing in 1986 as Chairman of a Working Group of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, referred to the government's statement in the following words,

“Departments of the federal government that would be involved include Indian Affairs and Northern Development; External Affairs; National Defence; Environment Fisheries and Oceans; Energy, Mines and Resources; Health and Welfare; Communications; the R. C. M.P.; and Public Works. The information that is relevant for policy and the measures for its implementation in an area as special in character as the Arctic should be co-ordinated if ministers are to be in a position to take decisions, either in their own area of responsibility or for the government generally, that will be coherent and effective in result. It appears, however, that developments in recent years have been and continue to be in the reverse direction, with a weakening and loss of mechanisms to ensure a comprehensive information base for northern policy and for its implementation. The Working Group strongly urges that immediate attention be given to establishing effective interdepartmental co-ordination without which a coherent total policy for the Arctic will not be possible.” (The North and Canada's International Relations - Ottawa, March, 1986.)

Government **concerns** in the Arctic have of course changed greatly since the **time** when the A. C.N.D. was established. **Defence** activities, though still important, are no longer **pre-eminent**. Sensitive new issues have emerged concerning for instance the arctic environment, aboriginal rights and native claims, exploitation of renewable and non-renewable resources, and pan-Eskimo identity. Many of them are inter-related, and policy development will require careful inter-departmental consultation.

There are certainly compelling arguments for the **re-establishment** of machinery to develop northern policy and to provide inter-departmental co-ordination. **This** existed **in** the A. C. N. D., but **it** has not been used for many years. The A. C.N.D. could be revived, but continuity has been lost and a new start under a new Cabinet directive would probably be preferable. It would underline the government's concern, provide impetus, and ensure the full co-operation of all government agencies.

This report indicates the following guidelines to the form the advisory and **co-ordinating** agency could take.

1. An interdepartmental committee can be effective.
2. It should be established under a Cabinet directive.
3. The terms of reference of the A. C.N.D. were adequate.
4. The Committee should be affiliated in some way with the Privy Council **Office**.
5. The Chairman should be the Deputy Minister of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development.
6. Membership must be at the Deputy Minister level and should include the **Secretary** to the Cabinet and the Deputy Minister of Finance.
7. **The** chairman of any continuing sub-committee should be a Deputy Minister. .” .
8. The structure of the Committee should be simple and straight forward.
9. A permanent Secretariat **is** necessary with a senior official as Secretary.
10. The Secretariat must be part of the Chairman's office, with the Secretary reporting directly to him.
11. The **Committee** must have continuity - there should be no long gaps between meetings, **and** there should be a minimum of three a year.

12. The Committee must be concerned with development of **policy** and inter-departmental co-ordination, avoiding so far as possible becoming involved **in** administrative matters.

APPENDIXES

Appendix A

Dr. Gordon W. Smith's Conclusion to His Study on the A. C.N.D.

Concluding Remarks*

My study of the A. C.N.D., which I conclude with this brief section, must give the impression of an organization that suffered repeated ups and downs during its existence, and had, on the whole, a decidedly checkered career. This was in fact largely true, but all the same an important qualification of the statement is necessary. During its heyday, which actually lasted for a significant number of years, the A. C.N.D. was a stable and active organization, with much concrete achievement to its credit. It would hardly be exaggerating to say that it was the unit in government which had the most fundamental role in, and the most direct responsibility for, policy and development in the North. Also, with respect to the basic theme of sovereignty which underlies this work, the A. C.N.D. assumed, or was charged with, a large share of the responsibility for maintaining surveillance over all matters relating to this important subject. The period of its final decline and demise has not been dealt with in detail in the main body of this work, and therefore comment on it is similarly brief in this conclusion.

During the approximately 25 years under consideration (roughly 1947-1972), the A. C.N.D. went through several fairly distinct phases, as follows.

1. (1947- 1949). Initial phase; organization in atmosphere of considerable enthusiasm and optimism.
2. (1949-1953). First period of decline.
3. (1953 -c.1963). First **reconstitution** and revival, followed by period of greatest utility and prestige.
4. (c.1963-1969). Second period of decline, gradually increasing stagnation and lessening utility.
5. (1969-c.1972). Second attempt at reconstitution and revival.
6. (c.1972-). Renewed decline, accompanied by increasing confusion and **frustration**, and virtual disappearance of the parent committee as a functioning body.

In concept and as created, the A.C.N.D. was a very senior body, with a very senior role to fill. It functioned thus during its best years, i.e., from 1953 to approximately the mid-1960's. It had a direct line to Cabinet through its chairman and the minister of his department; it was consulted extensively by Cabinet about practically anything and everything respecting northern **Canada**; and it maintained an all-inclusive and all-pervading view of the North, its

* The text of this appendix was written a few years ago, (in or about 1980), as a brief concluding section for a detailed study on the A. C.N.D. I have agreed to its inclusion as an appendix in Graham Rowley's work on the same subject, having first made a few minor but necessary changes. Consequently it is presented here as a slightly revised and edited version of the original.

problems, and issues relating thereto. Its competence and prestige were such that as a general rule its recommendations and advice were accepted as authoritative and became official government policy. What then accounts for its failure to survive? A few comments are offered here, although, as stated above, the fact that this essay does not deal extensively with events beyond about 1972 puts the accelerated decline afterwards somewhat outside its scope.

It seems evident that one factor of importance in the A. C. N.D.'s role throughout, and in its decline, was the influence of Cabinet, and particularly of those ministers most directly concerned. During the early years of the A. C.N.D. these ministers generally took a greater interest in it than did those who came upon the scene later on. Prominent among the early ministers who exerted an active and dynamic influence were Robert Winters, Jean **Lesage**, and Alvin Hamilton.

What has just been said of the ministers applies in probably even greater measure to the deputy ministers. During the year of achievement it was the deputy ministers of the key department, i.e., Mines and Resources and its successors, who more than any others made the A. C.N.D. go. The main figures here were **H.L. Keenleyside** (at least for a time), **H.A. Young**, and **R.G. Robertson**. The same interest and leadership were not so evident among their successors.

The same is also true of the secretaries. The early **secretaries** - **Bean**, **Chipman**, **Newsome**, **Beveridge**, and particularly **Rowley** - looked after minutes, documents, and other A. C.N.D. materials with competence and meticulous care. It is distasteful to have to record that under **L. A.C.O. Hunt** the work of the Secretariat took a nosedive, but a look through these documents would suffice to convince anyone that this was **true**.¹

No doubt there were many reasons for the decline of the **A. C. N.D.**, but one other seems to stand out. Ironically enough, it is to be associated with the attempt to revive the **A. C.N.D.** in 1969 and afterwards, an attempt which was, as **events turned out**, considerably less successful than the revival of 1953. On the earlier occasion **Maj. Gen. Young** had put his finger on the great need in the revival then taking place, when he wrote, with regard specifically to the **subcommittees**:-

The weakness of the foregoing committees centres chiefly on the fact that the members are too junior to consider and establish policies . . . as many of the difficulties in

¹ This remark has been criticized by a former employee of **D.I.A.N.D.**, who was involved in the work of the **A. C.N.D. Secretariat**, on grounds that the real decline took place after **L. A.C.O. Hunt**'s term as secretary had ended, and that during his term the fault lay not with him but with his superiors, whose directions he had to carry out. It can be readily admitted, I think, that both of these points have a measure of validity, in their own context. But my comment was about the work of the Secretariat itself, on secretarial matters, during **L.A.C.O. Hunt**'s own term. In this sense, it seems to me, the comment stands as originally made.

general coordination relate to matters of policy, it is felt that the chairmen should be members of the main committee and the members of the sub-committees senior officials.²

This meant, obviously, that the parent committee would have to be correspondingly senior in status, above the sub-committees.

As conceived in 1947, and particularly as revived in 1953, the A. C.N.D. was an organization with real "clout," composed of deputy ministers and their equivalents, responsible through the chairman directly to Cabinet, and with the sub-committees, also composed of senior officials, clearly and directly responsible to the parent committee. This basic structure was sound in concept and in fact; and therefore the A. C.N.D. had a chance to work, or, if it turned out to be less than fully satisfactory in some respects, the fault was not attributable to deficiencies in organization.

The flaw in the attempted revival of 1969 and afterwards was that it was handled at a level too junior to assure success. Initiative did not come from top level; there was from the start much doubt and disagreement about structure, objectives, etc.; the organization took on a less senior aspect; and, regardless of intentions, it lost both its cohesiveness and its authority. The interjection of an ill-defined and suspected body such as the Coordinating (Sub) Committee more or less between the other subcommittees and the parent committee, leaving all of them uncertain of their status and function, was, as events developed, a major miscalculation and a major disaster. It fostered resentment, suspicion, and declining cooperation on the part of the other subcommittees, and also on the part of departments other than I. A.N.D. The virtual disappearance of the parent committee as a functioning body heightened the difficulties. The members of the Coordinating (Sub) Committee were not of sufficiently senior status to give this body the "clout" that Maj.Gen. Young had considered so necessary, and, not surprisingly, it was unable genuinely to take the place of the parent committee.

Actually the Coordinating (Sub) Committee was probably a basic error in concept anyway. The job of coordination was one of the two principal responsibilities assigned to the parent committee itself; and for the senior committee to pass this responsibility on to, or let it be assumed by, a junior body, while at the same time virtually ceasing its own-activity, could hardly lead to other than unsatisfactory results. This is not to say that a well-defined and well-organized coordinating sub-committee, functioning in cooperation with the other sub-committees and like them clearly responsible to a parent committee which continued to discharge its own responsibilities, might not have worked. However this was not the case, certainly not in fact, whether or not it was in design.

Evidently those who undertook the reorganization in 1969-1970 were under the impression that they were injecting life into an organization which had been essentially a failure; and no doubt they were sincere in their belief. Their attitude towards the organization they had come to rescue is apparent in the caustic remarks about its past performance which dot the pages of the A. C.N.D. records at this time. For example, Secretary L. A.C.O. Hunt wrote on

²A. C.N.D. Dec. ND-37, Art. 3. Memo by Young for A. C.N.D. (March 9, 1953). This document and other government documents cited here have been declassified.

September 28, 1971, "The achievements of the A. C.N.D. in matters of co-ordination have fallen short of the original hope when the Committee was first established." He attributed this to, among other things, "the absence of clearly defined national objectives for northern development and the absence of other clearly defined national objectives."³ To correct matters, obviously, the revitalized A. C.N.D. would be taking on quite a load. One feels obliged to observe that there was nothing new about attempts to define such objectives; this has been an ever-continuing, or ever-recurring, and also a never-fully-rewarded, search.

A comment on the A. C.N.D. at the first meeting of the Co-ordinating (Sub) Committee by A.D. Hunt (Chairman) is recorded in the minutes as follows,

That the Committee had provided an effective forum of discussion over the years on many matters of major concern was indisputable, but in other ways it had fallen short in its mandate... the idea of the Co-ordinating Committee, already approved by the members of the main Advisory Committee on Northern Development, seems to be the best means of achieving the objectives set by the Government for northern development.⁴

Disparagement of the old structure and its performance is as evident here as is optimism about the proposed restructured setup. However, as the documents of both this committee and the parent committee show, these feelings were not fully shared by some of the other members; and their distrust and, in some respects, disapproval of the new body come through loud and clear. For example, at the same meeting, Mr. G. Taylor of the Department of Finance remarked that a committee with terms of reference such as those suggested "would render the main committee of the A. C.N.D. redundant."⁵ The draft minutes of the 76th meeting of the A. C.N.D. on May 11, 1970, record that Dr. R.J. Uffen of the Privy Council Office "mentioned the possibility of the A. C.N.D. not meeting often enough could give the Co-ordinating Sub-committee of the A. C.N.D. over a period of time too much authority on policy matters." Lt. Gen. M.R. Dare, D. N.D., "said that too much authority had been delegated to the Sub-committee for the level of the Sub-committee."⁶ Such doubts and reservations turned out to be perceptive, and prophetic.

A cautious judgment would appear to be that during its best years, at least, the A. C.N.D. filled a real need, perhaps imperfectly, but still with credit. Unfortunately its utility was "not maintained. Inevitably the question arises:- Has the decline of the A. C.N.D. in recent years been attributable only to faulty handling, negligence, and disinclination to make use of it, or has there also been a gradual disappearance of any real need for it? This is the nub of the problem. If the former alone, the logical answer would appear to be another reconstitution, undertaken at top level and with the requisite determination to make it purposeful and lasting. If the latter also

³ A. C.N.D. Dec. ND-512 (Sept. 28, 1971).

⁴ Minutes of Co-ordinating (Sub) Committee meeting No. 1 (Jan. 19, 1970), I.

⁵ Ibid., p.4.

⁶ Draft minutes A.C.N.D. meeting No. 76 (May 11, 1970).

applies, then **perhaps** the end of its existence as a useful body has been inevitable, and it should be dispensed with.

Looking at the basic factors in the situation, it does not appear that a strong, active advisory body on northern policy and development, and northern affairs generally, is any less feasible for the present and foreseeable future than it was in 1948, or 1953, or at any time since. It is necessary to underline, however, that any major reconstitution and revival would have to come from the topmost level of government. It is this sort of interest and sponsorship that has been lacking in recent years. This has been unfortunate, since quite likely the only initiative necessary at any time would have been a firm requirement from the most senior authority that a reactivated A. C.N.D. go to work on important northern problems, and try to provide needed information, recommendations, and solutions. A clear directive of this kind from Cabinet could have restored the A. C.N.D. to life literally **overnight**; and this has continued to be true. One thing is practically certain - permitting the A. C.N.D. to die, or decreeing it out of existence, would create a vacuum such that before very long some enthusiastic bureaucrats, or politicians, or both, would be beating the drums for the urgent creation of just such a body, quite likely without any great awareness of the record of its predecessor. It is inevitable that from time to time any such organization will go through periods of lesser as well as of greater activity; and there is much to be said for **maintaining** continuity, even though there are such lows as well as highs.

If there were to be a reactivation of the A. C.N.D., or creation of something similar to it, it would be essential to give it an appropriately broad mandate for its responsibilities and activities, and to see that this is properly reflected in its title. Actually the original terms of reference for the A. C.N.D. were very **comprehensive**, and they did reflect the main concerns of the time. They were as follows:- "TO advise the government on questions of policy relating to civilian and military undertakings in northern Canada and to provide for the effective co-ordination of all government activities in that area." Unfortunately the broad implications of these carefully phrased terms of reference were not adequately reflected in the less suitable title "The Advisory Committee on Northern Development," which was more restrictive, and seemed to suggest that the Committee's field of action was limited specifically and only to northern development. Certainly the economic development of the North has been a major preoccupation since World War II, but there have been a good many others, e.g. northern defence, the aboriginal **peoples**, political and constitutional problems, protection of the environment, relations with other arctic states, questions relating to arctic sovereignty, transport and shipping in arctic waters, and so on. Any or **all** of these, including northern development, may undergo periods of ebb and flow; and to tie the advisory committee's responsibilities to one only would mean that if this one is in a temporary situation of reduced concern and lower profile, then the committee's **raison d'être** is correspondingly lessened. **There** would soon be criticism that the committee had failed in its task or outlived its usefulness, and therefore its existence should be terminated. The interests, concerns, and needs of the North change and fluctuate with the evolving times; the one constant is that the North itself is always present, vast, awe-inspiring, and remote - a part of Canada which, although little known, is deeply and permanently embedded in the Canadian consciousness, and continually presents its never-ending and varying array of problems, worries, and opportunities, both new and old.

A properly conceived advisory committee should be authorized to come to grips with important problems of any kind in the North, as they arise and develop. In fact this was the approach taken by the A. C.N.D. during its best years; and the extent to which it gave its attention to the great variety of issues coming before it, using its appropriately generous terms of reference, rather than feeling bound by its more **restrictive title**, is a measure of its success. It seems to me, therefore, that an appropriate title, to match the broad terms of reference that would be necessary for a reconstituted advisory committee, would be something like, "The Advisory Committee on Northern Canadian and **Circumpolar Affairs**."⁷

These concluding remarks have been written with some hesitation, because I have had no direct association with the A. C.N.D. throughout its existence, and have had to put together this chapter essentially from study of the available documents and records, as well as from consultation with numerous individuals who have been closer to the scene than I have. However, I have to say that I have found near-unanimity among those consulted on the principal points I have made here.

Gordon W. Smith

⁷For purposes of comparison, see comments on the A. C.N.D. in **Franklyn Griffiths, A Northern Foreign Policy**, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Wellesley Papers 7/1979, p.76 ff.

Appendix B :

MEMORANDUM TO ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT .

Terms of Reference

1. Attached is copy of memorandum to Cabinet from the Ministers of National Defence and Mines and Resources, proposing the formation of the. Advisor-y Committee on Northern Development. This memorandum sets out the purposes for which the Committee is being formed, its terms of reference and composition.

2. Cabinet on January 19th approved these proposals. At that time, during discussions on facilities required and available for transportation, Mr. Howe observed that **Trans-Canada Airlines** might be of assistance in providing air transport. It was understood that the matter of providing increased Canadian participation in air transport through the facilities available to **Trans-Canada Airlines** would be examined by Mr. **Claxton** and Mr. Howe.

W.W. Bean
Group Captain, RCAF
Secretary.

28th January, 1948

MEMORANDUM TO CABINET:

Northern Development Policy

1. The Cabinet **and** the Cabinet **Defence** Committee have from time to time in the past two years approved various projects in northern Canada. Some of these have been undertaken in co-operation with the United States as part of the continental **defence** scheme. Others are part of the government's normal programme for development of northern **Canada**; these, too, usually have some importance from a defence standpoint. The programme includes such measures as the establishment and operation of weather stations, low frequency Loran stations, air photography for mapping purposes, and Arctic research, including the operation of ionospheric experimental stations.
2. Responsibility for the initiation and administration of civil developments in the north falls primarily - under government direction - on the Northwest Territories Council. The Department of Government chiefly concerned is the Department of Mines and Resources. Other civilian departments, however, also have direct interests, particularly the Department of Transport in respect of the weather station programme, and the Department of Health and Welfare. In many civilian undertakings in the area, the Department of National Defence also has some interest.
3. Responsibility for **defence** projects in the north, on the other hand, falls primarily on the Department of National Defence. Many of these projects, however, have important civilian implications and involve some responsibility on the part of one or more civilian government departments.
4. There is, therefore, a need for close **and** continuous interdepartmental coordination to ensure that all responsibilities are discharged effectively and in accordance with overall government policy. Moreover, it is in the national interest to ensure that **problems of administration** - particularly those involving United States participation in **joint** undertakings - are known to and dealt with by all the departments directly affected.
5. As an example of the kind of problem that is a recurring phenomenon in northern administration, reference is invited to a recent report from the Interdepartmental **Meteorological** Committee, which deals with the present status of the weather station **programme**. The United States are still operating eight weather stations in northeast **Canada** and the Canadian Arctic. The present programme as approved by the Cabinet calls for the assumption of full operating responsibility by the Department of Transport over a three-year period (1947-50). It is expected that two stations will be taken over next year, but it is undoubtedly desirable to accelerate the process. This problem was, in fact, discussed at the August 12th meeting of Cabinet **Defence** Committee, when it was decided that the attention of the Department of Transport be directed to the importance attached by the government, on grounds of policy, to the introduction of Canadian personnel to all stations on **Canadian** territory as soon as might be practical.

6. In conjunction with the establishment of Arctic weather stations, the United States have constructed air strips for supply purposes. Some of these are of a rudimentary character, but it has recently been learned that the United States Air Force has plans for the extension of at least one of these to a length greater than that required for weather station purposes. At present there is no adequate provision for Canadian control of these air strips except that exercised indirectly through the operational control of the related weather stations being vested in a Canadian meteorological official. Again, as has been previously reported, the United States is still operating three aerodromes in Canada - at Mingan, Fort Chimo and Frobisher Bay. Although an R.C.A.F. officer is stationed at each of these aerodromes, no plans have yet been made for their operation by Canada.

7. There are other factors in the overall problem, including transportation, communications, general administration and development, etc. For instance, the United States is at present providing all transportation, both air and sea, for these new Arctic projects. This tends, in practice, to give them a good deal of control over the operations.

8. The tendency has been for new Arctic projects to be considered separately. No provision has been made for any comprehensive review which would inter-relate all Arctic activities, presenting for the government a composite picture of the Canadian position in the Arctic and joint advice from the responsible departments on the general policies to be adopted.

9. It appears, therefore, that some joint advisory and co-ordinating body, representative of the departments primarily interested, should be formed for this purpose. The Northwest Territories Council, in spite of the breadth of its local and general responsibilities, is not adequately informed nor is it vested with the powers which would be required to undertake this task. A new committee composed of senior officials of the interested government departments appears to be the best solution. The membership of such a committee should include a member of the Northwest Territories Council.

10. It is accordingly recommended that an "Advisory Committee on Northern development" be established with the following terms of reference and composition: "

(a) Terms of Reference

To advise the government on questions of policy relating to civilian and military undertakings in northern Canada and to provide for the effective co-ordination of all government activities in that area.

(b) Composition

The Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources (Chairman)
The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
The Deputy Minister of Transport
The Secretary to the Cabinet

The Chairman, Canadian Section, Permanent Joint Board on **Defence**
The Chief of the General Staff
The Chief of the Air Staff


The Deputy Minister of Health and Welfare, the Deputy Minister of Public Works, the Chief of the Naval Staff, the Chairman, **Defence** Research Board, and the Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted **Police**, **would** be invited to attend when items of direct interest to them were being discussed, other officials would **attend** when appropriate. The Secretary would be provided from the **Privy** Council Office.

Minister of National **Defence**

Minister of Mines and Resources

16th January, 1948.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NORTH
COMMITTEE STRU



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