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
Roland **Bailey**
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NUP-2

FOOTPRINTS IN **NEW** SNOW

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UNTIL RELEASED BY THE

NUNAVUT IMPLEMENTATION COMMISSION



FOOTPRINTS IN NEW SNOW

We have been this way before. Once we were self-governing and self-sufficient. This past is like the hardened footprints we see in the hard snow during the early spring of each year.

As we travel towards Nunavut, which to us represents both the past and the future, we are guided by the hardened prints in the snow. But we also find that a new blanket of snow has covered our land. We leave our footprints in this new snow. Footprints, which the next generation will follow.

A Comprehensive Report from the Nunavut Implementation Commission to the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Government of the Northwest Territories and Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated Concerning the Establishment of the Nunavut Government

Letter of Transmittal from Chairman of the NIC to the Minister of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, the Government Leader of the Northwest Territories and the President of Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated	iii
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1. The report is built on a solid foundation of extensive public consultation in Nunavut and a confident sense of the preferences of the Nunavut public.
2. The report proceeds from full respect for the letter and spirit of the Nunavut Agreement, a land claims agreement within the meaning of the Canadian Constitution, while **institutionalizing** the “public government” qualities of Nunavut.
3. The report emphasizes the primacy of **recruiting** the Nunavut Government work force from Nunavut communities, avoiding a costly, disruptive and **alienating** reliance on a large influx of workers from outside Nunavut.
4. **The report advocates** a simpler, more streamlined approach to the design of the Nunavut Government than anticipated by earlier studies commissioned by the territorial and federal governments.

It is noteworthy in this regard, for example, that the report recommends the addition of some 555 full-time equivalent positions for the staffed up headquarters operations of the Nunavut Government (this number does not take into account **reductions** in headquarters positions in Yellowknife following division), compared to the **nearly** 1200 full-time equivalent positions suggested in the 1991 Coopers & Lybrand study. It is also noteworthy in this regard that the report recommends major reductions in boards and agencies in Nunavut, including the elimination of health boards and the merger of three regional boards of education into a single Nunavut board. Creating a smaller Nunavut Government **can** avoid many of the difficulties otherwise associated with extensive and **prolonged** “phasing in” of administrative **capacity**.

5. The report suggests that, on objective criteria, the capital of Nunavut be Cambridge Bay, Iqaluit or Rankin Inlet. The report respects the discretion of the federal Cabinet, under the **Nunavut Act**, to make the initial selection of capital.
6. Consistent with the design of a simpler, more streamlined territorial government, the report **suggests** that the **one-time capital** investment costs, the transitional costs, and the on-going operating costs associated with the Nunavut Government can be appreciably lower than indicated by earlier studies. The NIC believes that the cost estimates set out in the report, prepared with the assistance of Price Waterhouse Management Consultants, contemplate less onerous demands on public finances, by some considerable distance, than earlier studies.
7. The report takes a pragmatic view to the process of building up the administrative **capacity** of the Nunavut Government before and after 1999, and is supportive of the **devolution** of additional powers to all northern territorial governments. **This pragmatism is evident** in such things as the overall design of the Nunavut Government, the emphasis on education and **training**, the major role anticipated for an Interim Commissioner in the two years prior to division, and in the avoidance of overly complex inter-governmental arrangements for Nunavut.
8. The **report** gives due weight to the **socio-economic** opportunities that can be **generated** in many parts of Nunavut through an appropriately structured approach to the establishment of the Nunavut Government. **Maximization and** equitable geographic distribution of **socio-economic** opportunities have shaped many of the recommendations set out in report. This is most obvious in relation to decentralization of government operations, the design of government structures, government contracting and employment, and special education and training initiatives.

9. The report provides for further research and discussion concerning innovations to aspects of the **electoral** process in **Nunavut**, notably in relation to balanced representation of women and men in the **Nunavut** Legislative **Assembly** and to the selection and role of Government **Leaders**. At the same time, the report suggests that such research and discussion need not interfere with early decisions in relation to infrastructure and human resources.
10. The report takes into account the uncertainties surrounding the evolution of government in the Mackenzie Valley, and does not make the smooth operation of the **Nunavut** Government dependent on events there.
11. The report is a product of the **collegial** efforts of **Commissioners** and is presented as a **consensual** one.

Commissioners look forward to meeting with you, separately or collectively, at your earliest convenience to discuss the contents and follow-up to this report. The report, itself, contains some suggestions for follow-up steps. Needless to say, the MC will **also** make its staff members available to assist in a thorough understanding of this report being obtained at the officials level.


I would like to close this **letter** with a few additional comments.

First of all, the process leading to this report has **been** as rewarding as it has been challenging. The NIC **looks** forward to the next phase of its work with energy and enthusiasm.

Secondly, the preparation and submission of this **report** at this time would not have been possible without a genuine sense of inter-organizational common purpose and co-operation. A shared approach to work has, of **course**, long **characterized** the drive to **Nunavut**.

I look forward to hearing **from** you.

si.needly,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'John Amagoalik', written in a cursive style.

John Amagoalik,
Chairperson

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Glossary

The following terms are used in this report

“C&L I” means the report prepared by The Coopers & Lybrand Consulting Group in 1991 for the GNWT entitled “Financial Impact of Division”;

“C&L II” means the report prepared by The Coopers & Lybrand Consulting Group in 1992 for DIAND entitled “An Estimate of Costs - Creating and Operating the Government of Nunavut”;

“DIAND” means the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development;

“FIT” means a full-time equivalent position;

“GNWT” means the Government of the Northwest Territories;

“Inuit language” means the spoken and written forms of the language of the Inuit of Nunavut, including Inuktitut and Inuinnaqtun;

“NIC” means the Nunavut Implementation Commission;

“NTI” means Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated, the successor to “Tungavik” as referred to in the Nunavut Act;

“Nunavut Agreement” means the land claims agreement signed on May 25, 1993, entitled “Agreement Between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada”;

“Nunavut Agreement Implementation Contract” means the contract entitled “A Contract Relating to the Implementation of the Nunavut Final Agreement” entered into on May 25, 1993, by the Government of Canada, the GNWT and TFN;

“Nunavut Political Accord” means the agreement by that name entered into on October 30, 1992, by the Government of Canada, the GNWT and TFN;

“NWT” means the Northwest Territories; and

“TFN” means the Tunngavik Federation of Nunavut.

Nunavut: The Historical, Jurisdictional and Political Contexts

(a) The Historical Context

April 1, 1999 will be an exciting day in the history of Canada. On that day, the Nunavut Act will come fully into force, and the Nunavut Territory and Nunavut Government will come into existence. The internal boundaries of Canada will change for the first time since the entry of Newfoundland and Labrador into Canada in 1949. A new member of Confederation will be born in the Arctic. Equipping the people of Nunavut with a territorial government of their own will reinforce Canada's sense of being "true North, strong and free".

For many Canadians, "Nunavut" is as novel as it is intriguing. Yet, "Nunavut" is an old idea, as well as a contemporary one. "Nunavut" is a link to the past, as well as a claim to the future. "Nunavut" is an established reality, as well as an emerging one.

These contradictions result from "Nunavut" carrying a number of meanings.

In the language of the Inuit majority in the eastern and central portions of the existing Northwest Territories (NWT), "Nunavut" means "our land. Inuit are the aboriginal people of the Canadian Arctic and of other parts of the circumpolar Arctic (Greenland, Alaska, the eastern tip of Siberia). The ancestors of today's Inuit have lived in the Canadian Arctic for at least a millennium, and possibly a lot longer. In living "off the land", that is to say, in living off the rich mammal, fish and bird life of Arctic lands and seas, Inuit have developed and sustained a unique way of life. This way of life has adapted to the changes introduced into the North by

European peoples, but it has not been submerged by those changes. Viewed in the context of cultural originality and continuity, "Nunavut" is not a new concept at all. Rather, "Nunavut" is a term that has been part of the accepted vocabulary of uncounted generations of Inuit who have lived out their lives in their ancestral homeland.

In more recent times, "Nunavut" has come to take on new meanings. The political re-awakening of aboriginal peoples throughout Canada touched Inuit no less than others. Older Inuit, who had been born into a world largely free of control from outside, saw the need to channel cross-cultural forces into more constructive forms. Younger Inuit, who had acquired an in-depth knowledge of the law and politics of "the South" in church-administered residential schools, organized around the legal opportunities opened up by the Supreme Court of Canada in its 1973 decision in the *Calder Case*. "Land claims" organizations were formed, and "land claims" negotiations begun. For many Inuit, "Nunavut" became shorthand for the basket of political and proprietary demands brought to the land claims table by Inuit representatives, a basket that included a range of items extending from fee simple ownership of surface and mineral lands, to hunting, fishing and trapping rights, to joint Inuit / government management boards that could plan and regulate the use of Nunavut lands, waters and resources in a way that would emphasize public involvement and confidence.

Included in the basket of Inuit political and proprietary demands assembled by Inuit land claims organizations was an item that exceeded the bounds that had been set under the land claims policy of the Govern-

ment of Canada: the creation of a new territory, with its own territorial government, in the eastern and central portions of the NWT, to be called "Nunavut". From the outset, Inuit land claims organizations emphasized that the government of this new territory **should** be a "public" one, that is, a government which would be answerable to a legislative assembly elected by all **citizens meeting** residence and age qualifications and whose activities would be subject to Constitutional and statutory guarantees against **discrimination**. Despite such assurances, the federal **government** for **many** years resisted agreement to any formula which would link the conclusion of a **Nunavut** land claims agreement with a commitment to create a **Nunavut** Territory and Government through the division of the NWT.

Only in the period following the conclusion of a **comprehensive** land claims **agreement-in-principle** in April 1990, was a compromise found which was mutually acceptable to **Inuit** land claims **organizations** and the Government of Canada. Under this approach, the commitment to create the **Nunavut** Territory and Government was to be **recited** in the text of the Nunavut final land **claims** agreement, but the commitment was given life through the **detailed** provisions of stand-alone legislation. As a consequence, two pieces of legislation were proposed to Parliament in the summer of 1993, and **proceeded in lock-step through the various stages** Of **Parliamentary** scrutiny and approval: the **Nunavut** Land Claims Agreement Act, which ratified the **Nunavut** Agreement; and, the **Nunavut Act**, which creates a **Nunavut** Territory and Government and provides an institutional footing as to how laws will be made, executed, and interpreted.

For outside observers, who have learned about "Nunavut" through periodic announcements of good news—e. g., the success of various plebiscites, the **Inuit** ratification of the **Nunavut** Agreement, the signature ceremony in Iqaluit in May 1993, the enactment of **legislation**—it would be easy to overlook the many years of sustained research, negotiating and communications efforts culminating in the enactment of the **Nunavut** Land Claims Agreement Act and the **Nunavut Act**. Lives were invested, and risks were run. The briefest of **summaries** of the complex events that unfolded in the period leading up to the summer of 1993 is set out in Appendix A-2.

Finally, in placing "Nunavut" in historical context, it is important to acknowledge that the **meaning** of "Nunavut" is not and cannot be fixed. "Nunavut" is a means, not an end in itself.

The dynamic and evolutionary aspect of Nunavut will be obvious over the next few years. The period leading

up to 1999 will be **filled** with the events surrounding the design, **organizing** and setting up of the legislative, administrative and judicial **branches** of the new Nunavut Government

For its part, the Nunavut Implementation Commission (NIC) has been given a mandate to advise the Government of Canada, the Government of the Northwest Territories (GNWT), and Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated (NTI) on a variety of topics central to the smooth inauguration of the new **Nunavut** Government (for a precise description of the NIC's mandate, see Appendix A-3). The **NIC** is **conscious** of the great amount of work that will be involved in fulfilling its **mandate**. The **NIC** is equally conscious of the even greater amount of work that will be **associated** with the conversion of advice into action. Elected leaders and officials of the Government of Canada and the GNWT will be busy carrying out a long list of tasks in the period leading up to April 1, 1999, ranging from the development of Cabinet submissions, to the management of **large infrastructure** projects, to the **identification** and dividing up of territorial governments assets and liabilities, to the timely recruitment of new staff.

However **challenging** they maybe, the years leading up to **April 1, 1999**, are just a **beginning**. All those organizations and individuals taking part in the ambitious work of setting up the **Nunavut** Government **are** helping to begin something important, not to complete it. In the final analysis, the most compelling meanings of "Nunavut" will be the ones defined, and constantly **re-defined**, by the people of **Nunavut** over generations to come.

(b) The Jurisdictional Context

There are a number of jurisdictional aspects of the **Nunavut** Territory and Government that are worth noting.

The **Nunavut** Territory will be precisely that, a territory. Carving the **Nunavut** Territory out of the existing NWT will change **Canada** from a federation made up of 10 provinces and two territories to one made up of 10 provinces and three territories. Of the provinces and territories, **Nunavut** will be both the biggest and the **smallest**: the biggest in terms of its geographic size (approximately 20% of Canada); and, the **smallest** in terms of its population (although if the population of **Nunavut** is approaching 30,000 by 1999, there maybe more people living in **Nunavut** than Yukon).

A review of the provisions of the **Nunavut Act** suggests that Nunavut will be a territory similar to the others. The provisions of the **Nunavut Act**, although cast in more modern language and better reflecting the emergence of responsible government in the North (for example, the concentration of executive authority in the hands of a Cabinet responsible to the legislature), are not out of keeping with the provisions of the older Yukon Act and Northwest Territories Act. The **three** federal statutes dealing with the **organization** of northern territories share comparable text in relation to such things as the office of a federally appointed Commissioner, the law making powers of a territorial legislature, and the preservation of a federal power to disallow territorial legislation. None of the **three** statutes constituting territories establishes "a Crown in right of the **territory**". While allowing for the **transfer** of the beneficial use and enjoyment of certain lands to territorial governments, none of the three statutes provides for a general vesting of natural **resources** in a territory; the transfer of substantial authority over "Crown lands" requires the completion of collateral inter-governmental agreements, such as energy and minerals accords, and their implementing legislation.

Two other features of the Nunavut Act serve to reinforce the similarities between **Nunavut** and the two existing territories. The first feature is the "**grandfathering**" through of all the laws of the NWT into Nunavut. Under this approach, the statute books of the NWT and Nunavut will be virtually identical on April 1, 1999; substantive divergences will only arise as the legislatures of the two territories exercise their law making powers to different ends. The second feature is the **coming** fully into force of **all** the jurisdictional powers and duties of the **Nunavut** Legislature and Government on April 1, 1999. While the **Nunavut Act** neither requires nor prevents a **staged** build-up in the administrative capacity of the **Nunavut** Government in the post-1999 period, the **Nunavut Act** provides for the complete assumption of legislative and executive responsibilities by the **Nunavut** Legislature and **Government** on April 1, 1999. On that day, the Nunavut Legislature and **Government** will be as fully seized with the burdens and discretions of office as their sister institutions in Yukon and the Mackenzie Valley.

The jurisdictional **similarities** between **Nunavut** and other territories will no doubt colour both how the Government of **Nunavut** is perceived by the **Government** of Canada and how the Government of **Nunavut** perceives there to be concerns common to **all** northern territories. Such perceptions will have obvious implications in relation to such things as how the federal **government** organizes itself to assign front-line responsibility for managing relations with the **Nunavut** Government,

the policy rationale behind determining federal financial support for the operation of the Nunavut Government, and the role played by the Nunavut Government in inter-governmental processes invoking federal, **provincial** and territorial governments.

The **commonalities** characteristic of territories and their governments will be an important reference point in how **Nunavut** is governed. At the same time, it will also be important to remember a number of things that will distinguish **Nunavut** from other territories.

One of the matters commonly recited in the past to distinguish between provinces and territories has been the lack of Constitutional security for territories. With the transfer of the Hudson's Bay lands to Canada in the nineteenth century, the Parliament of Canada asserted unqualified law making control over much of the northern part of North America. This control was exercised to create the provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta. It was **exercised** to expand the provinces of Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec. It was **exercised** to create the Yukon Territory. By 1912, Parliament's authority had been **used so** as to reduce the Northwest Territories to the boundaries that will pertain until 1999, when the creation of **Nunavut** will once again shrink the area subject to the Northwest Territories Act (see the map attached as Appendix A-1).

While it might be suggested that political conventions, **co-incident** with the attainment of responsible government, have developed which would argue **against** any amendments being made to the Yukon Act or the Northwest Territories Act without the concurrence of the relevant territorial legislature, there are no legal obstacles to the amendment of those statutes by Parliament. This is not the case with **respect** to Nunavut.

Unlike Yukon and the Northwest Territories, the creation of the **Nunavut** Territory and Government[@] been brought about by almost two decades of effort by the aboriginal people of the **Nunavut** area. This effort, amply evidenced in the documentary history of the region, culminated in the inclusion of **Article 4** within the **Nunavut Agreement** (see Appendix A-4). The **Nunavut Agreement** is a "land claims agreement" for the purpose of section 35 of the **Constitution Act, 1982**, and its various provisions have Constitutional status and protection. While the precise legal consequences attending the wording of the commitment to create the Nunavut Territory and Government are open to interpretation, it would appear that Nunavut has a Constitutional dimension not shared with other territories.

In addition to the legal implications of **Nunavut's** Constitutional dimension, it is important to note the strong moral weight of the **Nunavut Political Accord** (see Appendix A-5). This Accord was entered into on

October 30, 1992 (shortly before the Inuit vote on the ratification of the Nunavut Agreement), by the Government of Canada, the GNWT and the Tungavik Federation of Nunavut (IT'N). The Accord, whose terms are in effect until July 1, 1999, contains **many important** assurances to the people of Nunavut and other parts of the existing NWT concerning how the new Nunavut Government will be accomplished and operate. Of primary importance in this regard are provisions of the Accord dealing with finances, particularly the following

"8.1 Prior to the coming into force and **effect** of the provisions of the **Nunavut Act** creating the **Nunavut Territory, Canada**, following consultation with other parties hereto, shall establish the financial arrangements for the Government of **Nunavut. Recognizing** the desirability of formula based **financing**, such financial **arrangements** maybe analogous to those which currently exist for the GNWT with such modifications as may be necessary.

..83 Prior to the coming into force and effect of the provisions of the **Nunavut Act** creating the **Nunavut Territory** a process shall be established by the parties to consult on the matters referred to in 8.1 and 8.2 herein and to clarify, as necessary, the financial **arrangements** referred to in **8.1** and **8.2**.

8.4 In establishing the financial **arrangements** referred to in 8.1, and following consultation with other **parties** hereto, Canada shall determine and fund reasonable incremental costs arising from the creation and operation of the Government of **Nunavut**.

8.5 The financial arrangement **referred** to in **8.1** and 8.2 shall support the need for financial stability for the territories and provide both territorial government the opportunity to continue to provide public services **for residents, recognizing** the existing scope and quality of such services."

Another important set of provisions in the Accord is that set dealing with training and human resource **planning**. The Accord recognizes the "central importance" of **training**, and stipulates that planning efforts should "consider all aspects of training activities including skills **surveys, pre-employment** education, skills **upgrading**, co-operative education and **on-the-job** training opportunities". The heavy emphasis placed on employment, **training**, and related education issues in the Nunavut Political Accord is consistent with a similar emphasis placed on such issues in the **Nunavut Agreement**. A

specific article of the Agreement (Article 23) is devoted to **Inuit** employment within government. The objective of that Article is stated to **be**:

"23.2.1 The objective of this Article is to increase **Inuit** participation in government employment in the **Nunavut Settlement Area** to a representative **level**. It is recognized that achievement of this objective will require initiatives by **Inuit** and by Government-

The article defines "a representative level" as "a level of **Inuit** employment within government reflecting the ratio of **Inuit** to the total population of the Nunavut settlement **Area**". The definition of "representative **level**" is stated to apply to "all occupational groupings and grade levels" within government employment in **Nunavut**.

Articles 4 and 23 of the Nunavut Agreement, **accompanied** by the **Nunavut Political Accord**, have profound consequences for how the Nunavut Government will operate, and on the planning process leading to its coming into operation. While Parliament and the **federal** government have traditionally had wide flexibility in how to legislate in relation to territories and to conduct **relations** with their governments, **Nunavut** will stand on a significantly different footing. The legal, political and moral commitments made to **Inuit** and other residents in **Nunavut**, especially in relation to government **finances** and employment, must serve as the **bedrock** on which all other undertakings **are** built.

There are two other jurisdictional aspects to **Nunavut** that should be noted.

The **first** is in relation to the offshore. The **Nunavut Territory** will encompass a greater expanse of offshore than any other province or territory in Canada. Under the terms of the **Nunavut Act** Nunavut will include all the marine areas that knit together the Canadian Arctic archipelago, as well as all the marine areas of Hudson Bay, **Ungava Bay** and Hudson Strait that are north of the sixtieth parallel north latitude. From the point of view of both effective management of marine areas, which **are** covered with ice for most of the year, as well as from the point of view of reinforcing Canadian sovereignty, **Nunavut's** extensive offshore jurisdiction is entirely sensible. One practical implication of this extensive offshore jurisdiction, however, is that the Nunavut Government must have adequate administrative capacity to **fulfil** its jurisdictional responsibilities in the offshore. It should be **noted** that administration of a **portion** of the **Nunavut** offshore is dealt with by the Nunavut Agreement, and may be affected in a significant way by offshore land claims negotiations now

taking place between northern Quebec **Inuit**, represented by Makivik Corporation, the Government of Canada and the GNWT.

The final jurisdictional aspect of **Nunavut** that should be noted is the lack of explicit reference to **Nunavut** in relevant parts of the Constitution Acts, 1867-1982 dealing with representation in the **Senate** and application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In terms of what is most desirable, there can be little dispute it is desirable that **Nunavut** be guaranteed a **Senate** seat in the same fashion as other territories; it is desirable that the Charter apply fully to the **Nunavut** Government; and, it is desirable that the appropriate Constitutional texts be amended so as to make what is desirable explicit. While it is difficult to imagine how any organized body of opinion in Canada would be opposed to such Constitutional amendments, experience has taught that the term "simple **Constitutional** amendment" is a contradiction in terms in Canada. Accordingly, while the matters of **Senate** representation and Charter coverage are ones which are not urgent, and can be dealt with further in the period leading up to 1999, it is important that they not be lost to sight.

(c) The Political Context

An assessment of the **political** context surrounding the setting up of the **Nunavut** Government might usefully begin with a couple of questions. Why is **Nunavut** so important to **Inuit**? Why should it be important to all Canadians?

Mary Simon, an NIC commissioner who has since gone on to become **Canada's** Arctic Ambassador, spoke to these questions in an address prepared for the convocation of Queen's University in October, 1994:

"...**Inuit** constitute some 80 to 85 per cent of the population of **Nunavut**, and an even higher percentage of those people who are committed to living there permanently. The impact of the outside world on **Inuit** in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries took away much of our self-reliance and some of our self-respect. We were colonized. Unlike aboriginal peoples in almost every other part of North **America**, however, we were not demographically overwhelmed. For obvious reasons of climate and ecology, the Arctic was not "homesteaded". While northern non-renewable resource development opportunities have attracted, and will continue to **attract**, the interest of outside investors, there is no combination of resource mega-projects on the horizon that

will reverse the numerical predominance of **Inuit** in the population of **Nunavut**. Indeed, given the dynamics of a young and growing **Inuit** population in the **North**, a key priority for the **Nunavut** Government will be **creating enough** economic activity in **Nunavut** to persuade **young, talented Inuit** to stay in the North.

The creation of the **Nunavut** Territory and Government will equip **Inuit** and other residents of **Nunavut** with a set of political institutions having two important characteristics: they will command a significant degree of legislative, **administrative**, and fiscal control over matters that affect the day to day existence of **Nunavut** households and communities; and, they will be answerable to the people of **Nunavut**. No one expects that the acquisition of these institutional controls will, in and of itself, solve the problems facing the people of **Nunavut**—and these problems are formidable, ranging from the setbacks to the traditional subsistence economy from the anti-fur lobby, to the debilitating levels of suicide and family violence, to the heavy dependence on intergovernmental financial transfers from Ottawa. But the creation of the **Nunavut** Territory and Government will represent an important and necessary first step in allowing **Inuit** and other residents to take control of their own lives and futures, to generate their own opportunities, calculate their own trade-offs, and make **their** own choices.

This process of regaining **control** is not confined to the **Nunavut** part of the Arctic. **Throughout** much of the **circumpolar** world, from the Greenland Home Rule Government, through the regional governments emerging in northern Quebec and the Beaufort Sea region, and to the North Slope Borough of **Alaska**, a network of sub-national, autonomous regional governments has begun to take shape. It is to be hoped that new and strengthened links among the peoples of the **circumpolar** North will help to replace the old Cold War tensions with a new era of international co-operation.

...the very scale of the **Nunavut** undertaking means it cannot be overlooked. **Nunavut** will constitute some 20 percent of the land mass of Canada. Its boundaries will extend over a larger marine area than the boundaries of any Canadian province. For the first time in Canadian **history**, with the partial exception of the **creation** of Manitoba in 1870, a member of the **federal-provincial-territorial** club is being admitted for

the precise purpose of supplying a specific aboriginal people with an enhanced opportunity for **self-determination**. This is ground breaking stuff. It is no **accident** that the news conference in 1991 that announced the breakthrough **commitments** to the creation of **Nunavut** as part of an overall settlement of **Inuit** land rights was covered in many **countries** by cable network news, and that **Nunavut** continues to be of interest to media from around the world."

Nunavut is of importance to the Inuit and other residents of **Nunavut**, and to Canadians outside **Nunavut** as well; its significance also travels far beyond Canada's boundaries.

Commitment to **Nunavut** is consistent with Canada's understanding of itself as an arctic **nation**, seeking to conduct its own affairs in the Arctic in recognition of its unique geographic, environmental, economic, and cultural **characteristics** and in **concert** with the policies of **other circumpolar nations**. Viewed from a **circumpolar** angle, **Nunavut** will, anchored in Canadian sovereignty, take **its** place among a group of **circumpolar governments in regions** such as Alaska, **Greenland**, Iceland, and parts of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia. Consistent with this **circumpolar** jurisdictional evolution **combining** domestic and international elements, the **creation of Nunavut will** give added incentive to create strong regional **governments** within **the Beaufort Sea and northern Quebec (Nunavik)** regions of arctic **Canada**.

Nunavut's international significance is not confined to the **circumpolar** arena. At a **time** when the global community is increasingly conscious of the legal rights and moral claims of aboriginal peoples throughout the world, Canada's **commitment** to **Nunavut** stands as concrete expression of its willingness to share a genuine degree of legislative and administrative power with aboriginal **citizens**. **Nunavut** stands for the preposition that, at least in some demographic circumstances, it is possible to supply additional practical **political** authority to aboriginal **peoples** without modifications needing to be made to the fundamental individual rights and freedoms of aboriginal and non-aboriginal residents alike. Canada's credibility in the eyes of the international public has been a great deal enhanced by the **commitment** to **Nunavut**. This credibility must be safeguarded and amplified by making **Nunavut** as successful in operation as it has been in conception.

In examining the political context that will pertain to the period leading up to the coming into existence of **Nunavut** in 1999, great weight needs to be given to the

economic circumstances of both the residents of **Nunavut** and of **Canada** in its entirety.

Ample evidence exists to underscore the point that a large proportion of the residents of **Nunavut** are **experiencing** economic distress. Statistical information cannot adequately relay hardships engendered by lack of employment, low income levels, poor **educational** achievement levels, and overcrowded housing **conditions**. Such statistics do, however, convey **some** sense of the magnitude of existing economic problems in the **Nunavut** area.

The **current** population of **Nunavut** is young and growing. Putting aside for a moment the range of impacts that may be associated with the creation of the **Nunavut Government**, there is good reason to fear that some of the economic problems already **starkly** apparent in **Nunavut** may become even more troubling in the future. (For an illustration of demographic and **socio-economic** conditions in **Nunavut**, see Appendix A-6.)

Given this situation, it is clear that a major priority in the design, implementation and financing of the **Nunavut Government** must **be** to **ameliorate** the regional **economic** problems that are now apparent and are tending to become worse.

The economic challenges **facing** the **Nunavut** area cannot be divorced from the economic challenges **facing** Canada. Whatever the prospects may be for economic **self-sufficiency** in **Nunavut** in the distinct future, the next several generations of **Nunavut** residents will continue to **rely** on fiscal transfers from the taxpayers of Canada in order to sustain an acceptable level of public services in **Nunavut**. As all Canadians know, **our** public finances are greatly **encumbered**, and our collective room for **budgetary manoeuvring drastically reduced**, by the size of **accumulated** federal **government** and **provincial government** debts, particularly that portion owed to **non-Canadians**, and the annual financing **costs** associated with **the** servicing of those debts.

A number of key facts are **self-evident**. The **Government** of Canada is in a tight **financial** squeeze. The Government of Canada will need to manage its financial affairs very carefully in the period leading up to the coming into operation of the **Nunavut Government**. The Government of Canada will need to continue to manage its affairs very carefully in the initial years of operation of the **Nunavut Government**.

The implications of these **facts** are **straightforward**. The **Nunavut Government** should be designed to **be** set up and to function in as efficient a way as possible. To

this end, maximum planning **effort** must be devoted to **ensuring** that the economic opportunities accompanying the creation of the Nunavut Government are converted into a heightened degree of economic self-reliance in **Nunavut**. Political **self-determination** and economic self-reliance are W. In this regard, appropriate **in-**vestments in education and training programs for **Nunavut**, with appropriate emphasis on the promotion of the Inuit language as a working **lanaguage**, will be **crucial**.



Developing this Report

(a) Getting Going

The draft legislation that became the **Nunavut Act** proceeded through the House of Commons and Senate in the early summer of 1993 and was given **Royal Assent** on June 10th of that year. That portion of the **Nunavut Act** establishing the **NIC** came into force in 1993, with the balance of the provisions of the legislation stated to come into force on April 1, 1999 (under section 79 of the **Nunavut Act**, it would be possible for an **order-in-council** to bring the **Nunavut Territory** into existence prior to April 1, 1999, but this is not expected to happen).

In discussions surrounding the development of the draft legislation in the early months of 1993, officials working with the Government of Canada, the **GNWT**, and **TFN** shared the assumption that appointments would be made to the **NIC** immediately upon the enactment of the **Nunavut Act**, thus allowing the **MC** to begin its work. This assumption was contradicted by events. Appointments to the **NIC** were delayed by the fast moving events that witnessed a change in the leadership of the governing party at the federal level, the holding of a federal election in September, 1993, and the coming into office of a new administration as a consequence of the election returns.

As a result, appointments to the **NIC** were not made until the closing days of 1993, and the first meeting of **NIC Commissioners** did not take place until January, 1994. The delay of approximately six months in the start-up of the **MC**, prompted commissioners, once appointed, to work with all possible dispatch in putting the in-house organizational needs of the **MC** in order and in deciding upon priorities for the completion of the first stage of its work. The organizational needs of the **NIC** were tackled promptly, with staff recruited, a main office

set up in **Iqaluit**, satellite operations situated in **Keewatin, Kitikmeot, Ottawa and Yellowknife**, and administrative procedures put in place. At the same time, Commissioners turned to the concrete jobs that they had been mandated to do.

(b) Public Consultation

In their initial deliberations, Commissioners placed great emphasis on the benefits to be gained in working in concert with all those organizations and individuals who share responsibility for the successful establishment of the **Nunavut Government**. This was clearly indicated in the first **communique** issued by the **NIC** after its meeting in Cambridge Bay in April, 1994. The importance of this aspect of the **NIC's** work was reflected in the early decision made by Commissioners to convene a large meeting in **Iqaluit** in June, 1994. This meeting, open to the public and the press, brought together **Nunavut** leaders from every region and community in **Nunavut**. Participants included ministers and other members of the **NWT Legislative Assembly**, the presidents of national and regional **Inuit** associations, and the chairpersons of regional **councils** and other such bodies. Special efforts were made to include elders, women and youth.

One purpose of the **Iqaluit** meeting in June, 1994, was to gauge whether considerable **consensus** already existed in **Nunavut** concerning fundamental principles of how the **Nunavut Government** would be organized and operate. In order to assist in addressing this purpose, the **MC** developed a discussion paper in advance of the meeting and tabled the paper at the meeting (this paper, entitled "**Discussion Paper Concerning the Development of Principles to Govern the Design and Operation of the Nunavut Government**", is set out as Appendix A-7). Through a process of careful review of this discussion

paper, Commissioner emerged from the Iqaluit meeting confident that residents of Nunavut share, in large measure, a common set of expectations as to how the Nunavut Government should be put together and function.

The Iqaluit meeting in June, 1994, was an important one, allowing Commissioners to acquire a good sense of the broad state of public opinion in Nunavut before pursuing, in detail, various options for the administrative design of the Nunavut Government. Equally important has been the large number of smaller meetings that the NIC has conducted throughout Nunavut, and outside Nunavut, from the first days of its existence.

Important in this regard has been a series of periodic meetings involving Commissioners, members of the "Nunavut Caucus" of the NWT Legislative Assembly, and the elected leadership of NTL. The Member of Parliament for Nunatsiag and the President of Inuit Tapirisat of Canada have also taken part. These meetings have been useful in two respects. They have allowed a candid exchange of ideas about how the Nunavut Government should be put together, drawing on a wealth of different experiences and insights. They have also reinforced a sense of common purpose among various individuals who will play key roles in making sure the road to Nunavut is as smooth a one as is possible. The division of the NWT in two, involving a lead-up period that will culminate in the supersession of a single set of governing institutions with two autonomous sets, presents any number of opportunities for misunderstandings and conflicts as to power and legitimacy; it is no different thing that the process leading to Nunavut has, to date, been noticeably free of inter-organizational or inter-personal rivalry or rancour. This must be recognized as a major asset, well worth safeguarding and building upon.

Consultations in the North conducted by the NIC have taken other forms. Commissioners have had meetings with regional councils and regional Inuit organizations. They have visited schools. They have talked on the radio, and fielded questions on open-line radio. They have taken part in community by community visits in December, 1994, and January, 1995, typically involving community hall meetings and discussions with municipal councils and hunters and trappers organizations (a summary of the community visits is set out in Appendix A-9). An important public conference, bringing together delegates from all parts of Nunavut, was held in Iqaluit, February 21-22, 1995. The NIC has circulated printed materials about Nunavut in the form of newspaper supplements and community hand-outs.

The first map of the Nunavut Territory has been published and distributed. A regional communications field worker has been deployed on behalf of the NIC in each of the Baffin, Keewatin, and Kitikmeot regions.

Predictably, the NIC has been concentrating its consultation efforts in Nunavut. At the same time, efforts have been made to communicate the work of the NIC to southern Canadians and to interested parties outside Canada. Public enquiries have been fielded by the NIC's Ottawa office. Commissioners have spoken on several occasions to university audiences. A brochure has been published and made available outlining the role of NIC. With the completion of this report, commissioners hope to be in a position to devote more time to informing southern Canadians about the process that will lead to the new Nunavut Territory and Government in 1999. This report, in itself, will serve as a useful tool in appraising southern Canadians, including journalists and academics, about a number of the factors and options relevant to the organization of the Nunavut Government.

In addition to keeping southern Canadians up to date, the NIC is particularly conscious of the necessity of exchanging information and insights with other parts of the circumpolar world. In the coming year, Commissioners plan to engage in first hand discussions with senior members of the Greenland Home Rule Government and, if circumstances permit, Inuvialuit and Inupiat leaders. While this report has been developed with a broad awareness of political and administrative experience in other parts of the Arctic, information secured by the NIC through direct exchanges will be helpful in carrying out the NIC's future work.

Since its inception, staff members of the NIC have maintained close contacts with their opposite numbers with the Government of Canada, the NWT Legislative Assembly, the GNWT, NTL, and other organizations. These contacts have taken the form of bi-lateral meetings with senior federal and territorial government and NTL officials. They have also taken the form of on-going participation in a multi-organizational co-ordinating committee, and its various working groups, that have operated under the sponsorship of the NWT Legislative Assembly Special Joint Committee on Division, in succession to earlier, informally constituted contact groups linking the Government of Canada, the GNWT, and NTL. Such close relations at the officials level have proved productive to date and the NIC seeks to maintain and develop them further into the future.

(c). *The Timing of This Report*

By the late summer of 1994, Commissioners were in a position to assess the first six months of their consultation and research efforts. Their deliberations were summarized in a letter dated September 19, 1994, from the NIC to the individuals representing the parties that the NIC is mandated to advise, namely, the Minister of DIAND with respect to the Government of Canada, the Government Leader of the NWT with respect to the GNWT, and the President of NTI as the head of that organization. This letter included the following undertaking:

" . . . After considerable discussion and consultation, the Commission is of the view that implementation of the legislated commitment to establish the **Nunavut** Government by April 1, 1999, would be facilitated by ensuring that the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development is in a position to invite his Cabinet colleagues to consider **necessary** expenditure allocations and other authorizations in September, 1995. Our identification of September, 1995, reflects the following considerations

- the need to **secure** as much lead time as possible with respect to the introduction of training programs designed to ensure that as high a proportion as possible of the work force of the **Nunavut** Government is recruited from inside **Nunavut**;
- the need to secure as much lead time as possible with respect to the supply of **infrastructure** requirements of the **Nunavut** Government in an effective and efficient **manner**;
- the desirability of factoring the costs of establishing the **Nunavut** Government into federal financial planning proceeding from the M%-97 financial **year**;
- the desirability of avoiding overlap between Federal Cabinet consideration of the establishment of **Nunavut** and the sorting out of ministerial portfolios within the **territorial** government (after the territorial elections in October, 1995);
- the desirability of allowing an opportunity to return to the Federal Cabinet in a timely and considered fashion prior to April 1, 1999, to decide issues that cannot be readily decided in the near future, or to adjust decisions made

earlier in light of changes in **political** or economic circumstances; and

- generally, to supply the people of **Nunavut**, and of **Canada**, with as much certainty as is possible, as soon as possible, about the future shape of the **Nunavut Government**, thus allowing individuals, families, and businesses to plan for their own futures with **confidence** and **certainty**.

In order to accommodate the possibility of Cabinet deliberations in September, 1995, Commissioners have reached the conclusion that progress on the establishment of the **Nunavut** Government would best be assisted by the completion by the Commission of a comprehensive report by the end of **March**, 1995. By submitting a report at that **time...the** spring and summer of 1995 would be available for each of the three **parties** to assess fully the recommendations of the Commission, to engage in internal inter-departmental consultations, to pursue discussions with the Commission and with each other, and to gauge public opinion. The Commission **would** be in a position to consider a **supplementary** report in this same **time** period, if developments at the time suggested the wisdom of doing so."

Mindful of the amount of work foreseeable, the undertaking to **complete** a first comprehensive report by April, 1995, was not offered lightly. Commissioners believe, however, that subsequent events have **served** only to confirm the desirability of preparing this first comprehensive report within the time frame proposed, and are pleased that the NIC has been able to deliver this report as undertaken.

Challenges, Principles, and Organizing Conclusions

(a) Challenges

It is an unusual thing in any part of the world when a major political unit is peacefully divided in two and the people of each of the two halves have an opportunity to create a new government for themselves. These things do not happen often. They happen even less often in circumstances which allow enough time to plan how best to go about designing and setting up the new government. Nunavut is a rare example of such circumstances. The people of Nunavut are determined to take best advantage of that opportunity.

In the face of innumerable tasks, both grand and trivial, that will need to be done in the build-up to 1999, it will be easy to be pushed by events, rather than to guide them. This is most likely to happen if those involved in organizing Nunavut succumb to unrealistic expectations, be they unrealistically high or unrealistically low.

Too high expectations would involve a hope that every last detail associated with the creation of the Nunavut Government will be thought through in advance, that every piece of paper will be filed in the right place on April 1, 1999, every workstation occupied by a model employee, and every telephone answered on the first ring. This will not happen. Realistically, some aspects of the Nunavut government on April 1, 1999, will fall short of the plans. Some of the plans will reveal themselves as off the mark. It will be enough if such confusion as might exist will be limited in its scope, harmless in its consequences, and creative in its resolution.

Too low expectations would involve launching a Nunavut Government that has been so timidly, so tentatively planned, that April 1, 1999, precipitates precious

little change as to how government is conducted in Nunavut. Too low expectations might entail the Nunavut Government being supplied with only fractionally more administrative capacity than now exists in regional and community offices of the GNWT. Under this approach, the Nunavut Government would be less a functioning government than a receptacle for the transfer of small increments of additional authority, phased in over a timetable stretching indefinitely into the future.

Planning for the Nunavut Government must balance the appetite to consume with the capacity to digest. Striking such a balance will be most effectively pursued by developing a clear idea as to what are the key challenges, what are the best principles to build upon in facing those challenges, and what major conclusions must be made in applying those principles to those challenges. Above all, it is important to avoid becoming so immersed in the smaller points that the bigger ones slip away.

The Nunavut Government should be designed and set up so as to meet the following key challenges:

- the challenge of setting up the Nunavut Government on time, namely, April 1, 1999, with the first Nunavut Legislative Assembly elected into office shortly thereafter;
- the challenge of ensuring legal and administrative predictability, and of sustaining individual rights and freedoms;
- the challenge of having a government administration that is as representative of the people of Nunavut as its legislature, acknowledging that if this challenge is not realizable at the outset then it must be realizable, in measurable degrees, over time;

- the challenge of running an effective and efficient government in a high cost region facing major demographic pressures, offering a reasonable and reliable range and quality of government services to the Nunavut public;
- the challenge of promoting the cultural distinctiveness of Nunavut while building up social harmony among groups distinguishable by ethnicity, language, sex, religion, generation, region, community, family, and material well-being;
- the challenge of building up the strength and diversity of the Nunavut economy;
- the challenge of making best use of new and emerging communications technologies in organizing the public and private sectors of the Nunavut economy;
- the challenge of strengthening close, co-operative relations with neighbouring northern jurisdictions inside and outside Canada; and
- the challenge of confirming a reliable form and amount of financial support from the Government of Canada at a time of deep concern for the state of national finances.

(b) Principles

At its meeting in June, 1994, in Iqaluit, the NIC made public a discussion paper concerning the development of principles relevant to the design and operation of the Nunavut Government (see Appendix A-7). While the relevance of some of those principles has been modified by events, they remain pertinent. They can be summarized, very broadly, as follows.

Jurisdictional Setting of the Nunavut Government

The Nunavut Government will be a democratic, public and responsible government, with law making powers vested in a legislature elected by all residents and with executive authority answerable to elected legislators. The powers of the Nunavut Government will be similar to those of other northern territories. Nunavut will be governed in a way consistent with the Nunavut Agreement. NWT laws will be "grandfathered" through to Nunavut on April 1, 1999. English, French and the Inuit language will be official languages of Nunavut. Use of the Inuit language as a working language will be encouraged.

Nunavut Government Finances

Based on the Nunavut Political Accord, the financing of the creation and operation of the Nunavut Government should reflect the following

- funding by the Government of Canada of the reasonable incremental costs arising from the creation and operation of the Government of Nunavut, including infrastructure and training costs;
- the maintenance of financial stability;
- the maintenance of the scope and quality of territorial government programs and services; and
- the conclusion of an appropriate formula based financing agreement between the Nunavut Government and the Government of Canada, effective April 1, 1999.

Administrative Organization of the Nunavut Government

The administrative plan of the Nunavut Government should be as simple as possible, with an emphasis on ministerial responsibility. The scope and quality of territorial government programs and services should be maintained at least at pre-Nunavut levels, and should be delivered fairly and equitably throughout the various regions and communities of Nunavut. The Nunavut Government should be a decentralized government, with government functions and activities distributed across the regions and communities.

Local Hire

The success of Nunavut will be measured to no small extent against the degree to which Nunavut residents make up the bureaucracy of the Nunavut Government.

The Economy of Nunavut

The Nunavut economy will best be served by a Nunavut Government that delivers government services efficiently and effectively, that draws its work force primarily from Nunavut, and that operates in harmony with a diverse and robust private sector. All aspects of planning for the Nunavut Government should be guided by such considerations, including approaches taken to:

- the number, responsibilities and decentralization of departments and agencies;
- the recruitment, training and compensation of employees; and
- the use of the private sector to deliver services to the public, consistent with public preferences and mindful of the need to maximize recruitment of Nunavut residents.

(c) *Organizing conclusions*

Many people within and outside Nunavut would be able to support the principles contained in the discussion paper made public by the NIC at Iqaluit in June, 1994. At the same time, many people reviewing those principles would maintain that some of them are competing, if not actively contradictory. In seeking to apply principles to design options, there would likely be circumstances where one or more principles would have to be given greater emphasis over one or more competing principles.

A practical solution to the difficulty of deciding on design priorities, while avoiding the inflexibility of making a single design priority paramount, is to identify a small number of organizing conclusions. These organizing conclusions, fewer in number and more definitive in their implications than a longer list of competing principles, can be assembled to form a core of ideas that will allow more detailed design decisions to be made:

- the Nunavut Government must be designed and implemented so as to be democratically constituted, administratively competent, and culturally attuned;
- the Nunavut Government must be designed and implemented to promote the expansion and diversification of the Nunavut economy, both by way of aggregate economic sectors and by way of geographic distribution of economic activity;
- the Nunavut Government work force must reflect the people governed; education and training plans must build towards the objective set in the Nunavut Agreement of representative levels of Inuit employees (80-85%); in order to be credible, the Nunavut Government must begin its existence with a proportion of Inuit employees at least equivalent to the

proportion of Inuit in the current Nunavut public sector work force (approaching 50%);

- financing the Nunavut Government must balance the need of Nunavut residents for acceptable levels of material well-being and access to key government services, with the broader financial circumstances of the Government and people of Canada; Ottawa-Nunavut financial arrangements should promote Nunavut self-sufficiency;
- the most important political link for the people of Nunavut will be the link between the Government of Nunavut and the Government of Canada; relations with other jurisdictions, including relations with the remaining Northwest Territories, will be of lesser importance; and
- issues of timing and phasing associated with the design and implementation of the Nunavut Government must be decided according to the practical implications that flow from the application of other organizing conclusions.

Recommendations

Recommendation #3-1

The NIC recommends that the Nunavut Government be designed so as to reflect

1. the principles set out in the NIC's June, 1994, discussion paper, as modified by the recommendations set out in the various chapters of this report; and
2. the organizing conclusions set out in this chapter.

Nunavut Legislative Assembly

(a) Make-Up

Like other parliamentary bodies in Canada at the federal, provincial and territorial levels, the Nunavut Legislative Assembly will be the focal point of democratic life within its jurisdiction. The Legislature will make laws, modify laws, and repeal laws. The Legislature will approve or reject the expenditure of public funds for various purposes. The Assembly, as a whole, will determine which of its members have the collective confidence needed to carry out assigned executive responsibilities on behalf of the Nunavut Government, specifically, political responsibility for the management of various departments and agencies within the Nunavut Government.

How will the Nunavut Legislative Assembly be made up? How many members will it have, at least initially? What kind of electoral constituencies will be used to elect those members?

The Nunavut Act provides only a minimum of guidance in answering these questions. This is not exceptional. Canada is a country characterized by a history of Westminster style parliamentarianism; the rights and freedoms of the citizenry, and the legitimacy and power of representative institutions, are rooted in fundamental values and conventions, as well as in black letter Constitutional text.

The guidance that is offered by the Nunavut Act is concentrated in sections 13 and 14 of that statute

13. There is hereby established a Legislative Assembly of Nunavut, each member of which is elected to represent an electoral district in Nunavut.

14. (1) The Legislature may make laws prescribing the number of members of the Assembly and describing and naming the electoral districts in Nunavut.

(2) For the first Assembly, the Governor in Council shall, by order, prescribe the number of members of the Assembly and describe and name the electoral districts in Nunavut, but in no event shall the number of members of the first Assembly be less than ten."

These sections make it clear that the Legislature, being made up of the Commissioner and Legislative Assembly, will be able to control the future number and shape of electoral districts in Nunavut. The sections also make it clear that the number of members, and the descriptions and names of electoral districts, for the first Nunavut Legislative Assembly will be set by federal order-in-council (the number of members for the first Assembly must be at least 10).

Given the centrality of the Nunavut Legislative Assembly to the success of Nunavut, the NIC has devoted a considerable amount of effort to thinking about what the first Assembly should look like. This effort has expressed itself in a number of directions.

A continuing topic of consideration by the NIC has been the most appropriate size of the Assembly.

In its initial thinking, as evidenced in the relevant portions of the Iqaluit discussion paper of June, 1994 (Appendix A-7), the NIC focused on an Assembly of some 10 to 12 members, relying on the electoral boundaries currently in use for elections to the NWT Legislative Assembly. It was felt that an Assembly constituted along these lines would have two major advantages. Its modest size would keep costs down, and using existing electoral boundaries would reserve substantive debate concerning the long-term appropriateness of territorial electoral boundaries to the Nunavut Legislative Assembly.

Despite the advantages associated with a small Assembly put together in this fashion, Commissioners have come to believe that the disadvantages of such an approach outweigh its benefits. One disadvantage is that an Assembly of such limited numbers might not present a sufficiently wide cross-section of opinions and interests in the Nunavut public, and might not create a big enough pool from which to put together a suitable Executive Council (Cabinet). A second disadvantage is that the members of the Assembly chosen to exercise ministerial authority as part of the Executive Council might outnumber the members who are not chosen. This outnumbering, particularly in the absence of party politics, might severely impair the operation of a fundamental feature of responsible government in a parliamentary system, namely, that members of an Assembly charged with executive authority must be (1) accountable to the entire Assembly, and (2) subject to replacement by other members in the event that they lose the confidence of the Assembly.

The smallest functioning legislative assembly in Canada at the provincial and territorial levels is in Whitehorse and has 16 members. The NIC believes that it would be inadvisable to assume that an Assembly exercising provincial or territorial powers could operate effectively with any fewer than this number of members.

If the first Nunavut Legislative Assembly should have a minimum number of members to operate effectively, the NIC believes that there is also a logical upper limit to its size. The NWT Legislative Assembly currently has 24 members. Given the direct relationship between the size of an Assembly and the cost of running one, the NIC is unaware of any sound arguments that could justify an Assembly having more than 24 members.

Equally important to the size of the first Nunavut Legislative Assembly is the definition of its electoral districts. In its initial work, the NIC subscribed to the assumption that electoral districts for Nunavut would be of the "one electoral district, one member" kind familiar to most Canadians. As the NIC dug deeper into the topic, and particularly as the matter of male and female representation attracted its interest, the possibility emerged of constituting the Nunavut Legislative Assembly on the basis of two-member constituencies. Research by the NIC revealed that multiple member constituencies, far from being an unknown eccentricity, have been a common feature of parliamentary bodies in the United Kingdom and Canada and continue to be a common form of electoral representation in working democracies around the world. Additional research reinforced the impression that two-member electoral districts in Nunavut might be an effective way of realizing a number of objectives preserving existing electoral

boundaries; achieving a viable number of Assembly members; and, institutionalizing equal numbers of male and female members.

The NIC's research into two-member constituencies was summarized in the form of a document entitled "Two-Member Constituencies and Gender Equality: A "Made in Nunavut" Solution for an Effective and Representative Legislature" (Appendix A-8). The discussion paper was released on December 6, 1994, and received considerable attention in Nunavut and in southern Canada. Reaction to the paper has been mixed, with some organizations and individuals being enthusiastically in support of its analysis, and others vocally opposed. While Commissioners see enormous opportunity in the introduction of two-member constituencies guaranteeing equal numbers of male and female MLAs, it would be wrong to suggest any clear consensus now exists in Nunavut either in support of or in opposition to the idea. The issues raised in the NIC's discussion paper on the topic are important and abiding ones, and the Nunavut public should be offered further time to consider them.

In its public consultations with respect to the size and make-up of the Nunavut Legislative Assembly, interest has also been expressed in the possibility of direct election of the Government Leader of Nunavut.

Two advantages have been identified in support of the idea. The first flows from a perception that, in recent NWT experience, Government Leaders have lacked the kind of direct mandate from the people that might allow them to impose tighter discipline in the exercise of ministerial authority. The second follows from the assessment that, in the absence of party politics, voters cannot be confident during election campaigns about who may end up Government Leader.

Those who have expressed interest in the possibility of direct election of Government Leader have not indicated any details about how this approach might work in practice. There is an assumption that an elected Government Leader would sit as a member of the Assembly and be subject to all the same rules and privileges. One logical possibility following along those lines would be to constitute all of Nunavut as a single constituency with respect to the election of the Government Leader while dividing Nunavut into geographic sub-units for the election of all other members. This possibility would be a variation of sorts on the multi-member approach, in that each elector would be supplied with multiple ballots during territorial elections, one for the election of the Government Leader and one for each local MLA.

The direct election of the Nunavut Government Leader might strike many Canadians as a major departure from the conventions of parliamentary life that characterize Canadian federalism. What would happen if the elected Government Leader lost the confidence of the Assembly? Who, then, would be Government Leader? What if the elected Government Leader behaved in such a way as to warrant being "fired" by the Commissioner of Nunavut? Who could fill in for the Government Leader if he or she fell sick? Or if he or she died in office? Such questions would need to be thought through in order for the concept of an elected Government Leader to be viable.

The NIC sees many attractions in having an elected Government Leader but has not reached any conclusions as to the **practical feasibility** of the concept. In light of the public interest in the issue, and the minimal implications the issue has for the financing needs of the new Nunavut Government, the NIC believes that the issue should be reserved for further research and public consultation by the NIC.

Leaving open various possibilities as to the size and make-up of the Nunavut Legislative Assembly raises some obvious questions.

What size should the Assembly be assumed to be for the purpose of proceeding with calculations as to the anticipated cost of the Nunavut Government? One answer to this question is that costing calculations should proceed on the basis of the maximum number of members contemplated as possible in this report.

At what point, in advance of April 1, 1999, is it necessary for clarity to emerge on the size and make-up of the Assembly? One answer to this question would be the first half of 1997. This answer follows from several considerations.

The electoral districts of Nunavut need to be firmly set at least a year in advance of elections to the first Assembly, in order to allow potential candidates to assess their interest and chances. In the event that existing electoral boundaries were used along with a two-member constituency approach guaranteeing equal numbers of male and female MLAs, or some other variation of two-member constituencies were brought into play, then time might be needed to make enabling legislative changes. Alternatively, in the event that the two-member constituency approach were not to be followed, about a year would need to be set aside for an electoral boundaries commission to prepare recommendations for new electoral boundaries for Nunavut.

In light of the logical answers to these questions, it would be to the advantage of all concerned that the second major report contemplated by the NIC for the first half of 1996 set out recommendations as to the precise size and make-up of the Nunavut Legislative Assembly (see Chapter 13). Development of such recommendations would, of course, take fully into account emerging, potentially evolving, public opinion within Nunavut.

Recommendations

Recommendation #4-1

The NIC recommends that the first Nunavut Legislative Assembly have no fewer than 16 members and no more than 24 members.

Recommendation #4-2

The NIC recommends that calculations concerning the cost of the Nunavut Government for the purpose of the proposed review by the federal Cabinet, be based on the maximum number of members contemplated (24).

Recommendation #4-3

The NIC recommends that it should actively pursue, through a program of research and public consultation, issues associated with

1. the precise size of the first Nunavut Legislative Assembly;
2. two-member constituencies;
3. guarantees of male and female representation on the Assembly; and
4. the direct election of the Nunavut Government Leader.

Recommendation #4-4

The NIC recommends that the research and public consultation referred to in Recommendation #4-3 should result in the NIC making precise recommendations with respect to the matters listed in that recommendation in its next comprehensive report and, in any event, no later than June 30, 1996.

(b) *'First Election*

Section 15 of the **Nunavut Act** reads as follows:

"15. (1) Writs for the election of members of the Assembly shall be issued on the instructions of the Commissioner.

(2) Writs for the first election of members of the **Assembly** shall be issued within thirty days after the day on which section 3 comes into force."

Section 3 of the **Nunavut Act**, establishing the **Nunavut Territory**, is scheduled to come into force on April 1, 1999. Given this date, the time requirements set out in section 15 of the **Nunavut Act**, and those relevant provisions of NWT electoral laws that will be "grandfathered" through to **Nunavut**, it would appear that the earliest date for the first election of the **Nunavut Legislative Assembly** would be in the middle of May, 1999, allowing the earliest convening of the Assembly to occur in the middle of June, 1999. The latest date for the first convening of the Assembly would appear to be in early August, 1999.

In order to ensure a smooth transition to the establishment of the **Nunavut Government**, it will be necessary to appoint an Interim Commissioner considerably in advance of April 1, 1999, and to equip the Interim Commissioner with sufficient authority to make a number of binding commitments on behalf of the future **Nunavut Government** (see Chapter 12). Concern has been expressed that vesting executive authority of this kind in an appointed official, even on a temporary and transitional basis, may cause some anxiety about a lack of popular accountability. While this anxiety cannot be eliminated in its entirety, it can be considerably reduced by ensuring that elected representatives of the people of **Nunavut** are in office as soon as practicable after the coming into force of the **Nunavut Act**. Accordingly, it is preferable that the election of the first **Nunavut Legislative Assembly**, and the first convening of that Assembly, take place as soon as possible. Anxiety as to the absence of elected MLAs in the first few weeks of the existence of the **Nunavut Government** can be reduced by ensuring that the first Commissioner is instructed by the federal government to postpone, to the maximum extent possible, the making of important executive decisions until the formation of the first Executive Council.

The cost of organizing and conducting the election of the first **Nunavut Legislative Assembly** is likely to be incurred both before and after April 1, 1999, and may not figure in the broader funding arrangements secured between the Government of Canada on the one hand, and

the GNWT or Government of Nunavut on the other. As a result, it would be appropriate for the cost of organizing the election of the first **Nunavut Legislative Assembly** to be considered as a transitional cost to be met by the Government of Canada.

Recommendations

Recommendation #4-5

The **NIC** recommends that the writ for the election of the first **Nunavut Legislative Assembly** be issued at the earliest possible date following the coming into force of the **Nunavut Act** (April 1, 1999), the election be held on the earliest possible date (middle of May, 1999), and the Assembly be convened at the earliest possible date (middle of June, 1999).

Recommendation #6

The **NIC** recommends that the cost of organizing and conducting the election of the first **Nunavut Legislative Assembly** be identified as a transitional cost of the setting up of the **Nunavut Territory** and Government and be borne by the Government of Canada. The cost of an electoral boundaries commission to determine the electoral boundaries of the **Nunavut Legislative Assembly** prior to 1999 should, in the event that a commission is needed, also be considered a transitional cost and be borne by the Government of Canada.

(c) *Operation of the Assembly*

Like other legislative bodies in Canada, the **Nunavut Legislative Assembly** will have wide latitude to determine its own operations and procedures. This authority is made clear by section 21 of the **Nunavut Act**:

"21. The Assembly may make rules for its operations and procedures, except in relation to the classes of subjects referred to in paragraphs 23(1)(b) and (c)."

Those matters falling within paragraphs 23(1)(b) and (c) of the **Nunavut Act**, namely, the disqualification of persons from sitting or voting as members of the Assembly and the indemnity and expenses of members of the Assembly, may be dealt with only through legislation, not merely by rules of the Assembly.

In order to function, the members of the **Nunavut** Legislative Assembly will need to adopt, as a first order of **business**, a comprehensive set of rules to govern all future activities. These rules may, at least at the outset, resemble very closely the rules now employed by the NWT Legislative Assembly, with modifications based on such things as the number of members. Over time, it is possible that the rules of the **Nunavut** Legislative Assembly might evolve in quite a different direction from the rules of the NWT Legislative Assembly. This would likely be particularly noticeable in the event that members of the Assembly were to be **affiliated** with formally constituted political parties.

In the course of its research and consultation efforts, the NIC has noted considerable skepticism as to whether the NWT is entirely well served by the way in which NWT Legislative Assembly members are divided sharply into two groups: ministers who are assigned **responsibilities** for various departments and **agencies** and made answerable to the Assembly; and, "ordinary members" who are without ministerial responsibilities and who make up a kind of amorphous "loyal opposition" to the incumbent ministers. Those who are critical of the current system point to a number of problems that **appear** with greater and lesser regularity: a lack of common purpose and discipline among ministers; a fractious relationship between ministers and other members; and, an inability on the part of "ordinary members" to make effective contributions to the shaping of legislation and to the determination of budgetary and policy priorities.

The NIC has heard a number of suggestions that might ameliorate some of these problems. A frequent suggestion has been the direct election of a Government Leader (see previous section). Another suggestion has been the organization of formally constituted political parties to contest elections at the territorial level. A further, if less commonly heard suggestion, has been the elimination of the distinction between ministers and "ordinary members" through a committee system which would plug every member into one or more committee, each of which would be charged with overseeing the affairs of a particular **combination** of departments and agencies. This suggestion would result in the Assembly operating less along the lines of "government/ opposition" characteristic of most Westminster style parliamentary chambers, and more along the lines of how municipal councils operate in many parts of Canada.

A number of points should be made in relation to these and any similar suggestions that might be aimed at bringing about a more effectively operating Assembly in **Nunavut**.

The first point is that much of the life of the Assembly will depend on how the citizens of Nunavut choose to embrace or eschew **formally** constituted political parties and what kind of rules and conventions members of the Assembly deign to adopt. It would be inimical to the principle of freedom of association enjoyed by all Canadians to attempt to force a party system onto the political life of **Nunavut**. By the same token, it would be contrary to the **long-established** privileges of elected members of legislatures to **pre-suppose** an unchanging set of rules that would oblige members to inter-act in **prescribed** ways. Design of important aspects of the life of the Nunavut Legislative Assembly must, out of respect for democratic process and tradition, await the election of the first Assembly.

A second point to remember is that the NIC will have further opportunity in the period leading up to 1999 to investigate options for how the Nunavut Legislative Assembly might **function** more effectively, particularly with respect to the allocation of executive authority among members and the rendering of accountability for the discharge of such authority. While the work of the NIC in this regard cannot, by definition, bind the Nunavut Legislative Assembly, the research and analysis of the NIC could prove helpful in promoting public awareness and debate.

A third and final point is that some assumptions need to be made as to how executive responsibilities are likely to be allocated in the opening days of the **Nunavut** Government, and these assumptions should be embodied in draft legislation defining the roles of the members of the Executive Council of **Nunavut**. This draft legislation should be presented to the first **Nunavut** Legislative Assembly soon after its adoption of rules. In the absence of any consensus as to how the allocation of executive authority among members of the **Nunavut** Legislative Assembly might be handled differently from what is now the case with the NWT Legislative Assembly, the NIC must assume that the draft legislation would be similar to the legislation that now guides the **exercise** of executive authority within the GNWT.

A key official of the **Nunavut** Legislative Assembly will be the Clerk of the Assembly. In order to smooth the election and convening of the Assembly as soon as possible after April 1, 1999, the NIC recommends that the Clerk of the Assembly be recruited by the Interim Commissioner and begin work no later than six months prior to the first convening of the Assembly.

A necessity for the **Nunavut** Legislative Assembly will be a good Assembly Library, containing adequate

law and other reference materials. This Assembly Library should be under the control of the Clerk of the Assembly, reporting to the Speaker. Given the small size of the Nunavut Government, the need for economies of scale, and the desirability of keeping as much information acquired with government money as possible within reach of the public, it is recommended that the Assembly Library be charged with the mandate of supplying the information deposit and reference needs of the legislative, judicial, and administrative branches of the Nunavut Government (it may be advisable that, in light of its responsibilities, the Nunavut Department of Education maintain a subsidiary library).

judicial, and administrative branches of the Nunavut Government. Particular attention should be devoted to providing MLAs with adequate research support.

Recommendations

Recommendation #4-7

The NIC recommends that the Interim Commissioner recruit a Clerk of the Nunavut Legislative Assembly, and that the Clerk begin work no later than six months prior to the first sitting of the Assembly.

Recommendation #4-8

The NIC recommends that, under the supervision of the Interim Commissioner, the Clerk of the Nunavut Legislative Assembly prepare, for consideration by the Assembly at its first convening:

1. draft rules for operations and procedures of the Assembly; and
2. draft legislation concerning the allocation of executive authority among members of the Executive Council of Nunavut (cabinet).

Recommendation #4-9

The NIC recommends that, as part of its on-going work, the NIC identify options for how the Nunavut Legislative Assembly might operate as effectively as possible, particularly in relation to the allocation of executive authority among its members and the rendering of accountability for the exercise of such authority.

Recommendation #4-10

The NIC recommends that a Nunavut Legislative Assembly Library be established under the control of the Clerk of the Assembly, as reporting to the Speaker. It is further recommended that this Assembly Library be charged with the mandate of supplying the information deposit and reference needs of the legislative,

Organization and Design of the Nunavut Government

(a) Key Principles

As indicated in an earlier chapter, the NIC discussion paper at a meeting that took place in Iqaluit in June, 1994, entitled "Discussion Paper Concerning the Development of Principles to Govern the Design and Operation of the Nunavut Government" (Appendix A-7). This paper put forward principles touching upon a number of matters relevant to the establishment and operation of the Nunavut Government. Included in the paper were a number of principles relating to the organization and design of the Nunavut Government. Many of those principles remain pertinent in their entirety. Others require modification based on ideas brought forward during the public consultation and research activities of the NIC since the Iqaluit meeting.

Drawing on the Iqaluit discussion paper and the public consultation and research that have taken place since, the NIC believes that the following considerations are relevant to the organization and design of the Nunavut Government:

- the administrative structure of the Nunavut Government should be consistent with the responsibility and accountability of the Legislature and Executive Council (Cabinet);
- the administrative structure of the Nunavut Government should be as simple as possible, in keeping with the relatively small population of Nunavut;
- the scope and quality of territorial government programs and services should be maintained at least at pre-Nunavut levels;

- territorial government programs and services should be delivered fairly and equitably throughout the various regions and communities of Nunavut and, more specifically, should be of similar standards in communities of similar size in Nunavut;

- the interests of both the residents of Nunavut, and of Canadians as a whole, will best be served by a Nunavut Government that operates efficiently and effectively; efficiency and effectiveness can be pursued by designing the Nunavut Government so as

- to avoid duplication and overlap in the provision of government services

- to make best use of existing facilities, infrastructure and related services

- to emphasize the recruitment into the Nunavut Government of persons currently resident in Nunavut and to avoid a sudden influx of persons from outside Nunavut

- to encourage growth of the private sector by contracting out, to the extent appropriate, the supply of government programs, services and facilities, and

- to adopt sensible plans for building up the administrative capacity of the Nunavut Government at a manageable rate;

- it would be advantageous to merge various departmental functions of the existing GNWT into a smaller number of departments in the

Nunavut Government; it would be similarly advantageous to reduce the number of autonomous and semi-autonomous boards and agencies reporting to the Nunavut Government;

- the unity of **Nunavut** should be promoted by organizing departments of the **Nunavut Government** along functional lines;
- “central agency” type functions of the Nunavut Government should be concentrated in the capital of **Nunavut**;
- the **Nunavut Government** should be a **decentralized government** as far as practicable, with conscious efforts made to distribute government functions and activities across the regions and communities of Nunavut and **conscious** efforts made to delegate as much authority as possible to **Nunavut Government** officials working at the regional and community levels;
- the creation of the Nunavut Government should not be accompanied by the creation of any new law making bodies at the regional and local **levels**; the **Nunavut Legislative Assembly**, once elected, might wish to revisit this issue at a later date;
- the **Nunavut Government** should operate on the basis of the three administrative sub-units already familiar to the residents of **Nunavut**, namely, the **Baffin, Keewatin and Kitikmeot regions**; and
- to the extent **practicable**, the Nunavut Government should be **organized** so that the proportion of public sector employees working in each of the three regions is **equal** to the **proportion** of **Nunavut** residents living in each region.

(b) Key Design Elements for the Organizational Structure of the Nunavut Government

1. Community Government

The Commission believes that there should be only two levels of government in **Nunavut: community government** and territorial government.

The reality of **Nunavut** is that there is a total of 27 communities widely dispersed over a huge **geographic** area. Most of these communities are small, having populations of under 1,000 residents.

Communities retain their own distinctive characters based on culture, language and way of life, even though **inter-community** travel and other forms of communication have developed significantly over the past few decades. Many communities reflect the fact that many of their residents were born “on the land and then **re-located** to permanent communities.

The goals and priorities of each community vary **substantially**. Recognition of this reality has **reinforced** the Commission’s conviction that strong community government must be a fundamental part of the overall structure of government in **Nunavut**.

Community government is the level of government most visible to the residents being served. Through **community** governments, local residents have the **opportunity** to elect their leaders and hold them responsible for the effective and fair delivery of the programs and services that have been devolved to the community level.

Local decision-making and accountability **achieves** the following benefits

- it allows communities to set priorities for programs and Services **being** delivered by **community** governments;
- it allows communities to allocate available financial resources to high priority programs and **services**;
- it allows for effective co-ordination of **programs** and services delivered in **community**; and
- it **permits** better use of local staff involved in the delivery of programs and services.

Strong community governments provide an opportunity to increase both **community** and personal **self-reliance**. If programs and service are largely delivered by a distant territorial government, there is a tendency to become overly dependent on that territorial **government** to meet **all** needs and address **all** problems. This is not desirable. It will also become increasingly impracticable in the future, as the demands created by a rapidly growing population in **Nunavut** strain the limited **financial** resources available **from** a financially hard-pressed federal government.

The importance of community government in the North was recognized by the federal government in the 1960s, and by the GNWT after it was created at the end of that decade. Through commitment to the development of strong and effective government at the local level, significant progress has been achieved. All recognized communities in Nunavut have achieved hamlet status or higher. AU communities are now responsible for providing the normal range of municipal programs and services provided by municipalities in southern Canada.

In recent years, the GNWT has moved to a further stage of community devolution. It has provided a framework for communities to assume a broad range of responsibilities related to education, social services, economic development, health, justice, renewable resources and housing. Cape Dorset is one of the first communities in Nunavut to assume greater authority for some of these responsibilities, and several other communities have shown a desire in moving in this direction. Although it is expected that it will take several years for all Nunavut communities to have the ability and training necessary to assume such responsibilities, the Commission supports the goal of an enhanced role for community government.

Through an enhanced role for community government, local decision-making and accountability will be maximized. As well, the goal of distributing government employment as equitably as possible will be in large measure achieved. There is no better means of ensuring equity in employment sharing than through the creation of an expanded level of community government having a broad mandate for the delivery of programs and services.

Community government positions provide the best opportunity for Inuit residents to acquire necessary skills and experience and to fill a consistently high proportion of government jobs.

2. Decentralization

The NIC believes that the Nunavut Government should be highly decentralized, with programs and services delivered at the regional and community level to the fullest extent possible, while still ensuring effective and efficient government. Decision-making should be as close as possible to the people being served in order to promote the greatest accountability to the electorate.

Through a strong commitment to decentralization, the size of the headquarters staff in the capital of Nunavut can be kept to a minimum and the sharing of government employment opportunities with as many communities as reasonably possible can be achieved.

The Commission believes that decentralization should be pursued in a number of different ways:

- the location of some headquarters functions of the Government in communities throughout the regions;
- the location of various semi-autonomous boards, agencies, commissions and corporations in communities throughout the regions;
- the location of some territorial and regional facilities, both existing and as required in future years, in communities throughout the regions;
- the establishment of both regional government offices and regional auxiliary offices in each administrative region of Nunavut (Baffin, Keewatin and Kitikmeot);
- the further decentralization of some headquarters positions to regional and auxiliary regional offices;
- the stipulation that the community that is selected to be the capital should not continue to be a regional centre as well; regional offices currently located in that community should move out to other communities in that region;
- a commitment to confine the headquarters functions of the Government mainly to
 - legislation, policy and program development
 - long range planning
 - overall budget development and management
 - policy and program evaluation
 - allocation of resources among programs, services, regions, and communities
 - monitoring of policy, program and service implementation in the regions
 - management support to ministers, Cabinet, and the various committees of Cabinet, and
 - professional and technical support for regional staff;
- the delegation of a high level of program, financial and personnel authority and accountability to managers and officers at the regional and community levels;

- the delegation of a high level of program, financial and personnel authority and accountability to ministers, deputy ministers, and other senior headquarters staff; and
- the establishment of a Cabinet committee structure and a Legislative Assembly committee structure which is primarily focused on major legislative and policy and program matters, and not the day-to-day delivery of programs and services to communities and individual residents.

3. The Role of Boards and Agencies

It has been the practice of the GNWT to create a significant number of appointed boards and agencies to provide the delivery of some government programs and services and to provide advice and feedback to the Government. Over the years, there has been a proliferation of such boards and agencies. This has created the following problems:

- boards and agencies lack direct accountability in the same way as elected officials;
- the effectiveness of duly elected officials in the Legislative Assembly and Cabinet, and working at the community government level, has been reduced;
- the development and effective delivery of programs and services has become complicated and time consuming;
- boards and agencies detract from the priority attached to programs and services being delivered at the community level; and
- boards and agencies compete for funding that could be devoted to the delivery of programs and services.

The NIC is aware of these problems experienced by the present territorial government, and heard concerns about them expressed during recent community tours. Reflecting these problems and concerns, and consistent with the reasoning laid out in the report to the GNWT dated November, 1991, entitled "Strength at Two Levels" ("the Beatty Report"), the NIC believes that all special purpose boards, agencies, councils and similar bodies that are now operating in Nunavut that are funded, directly or indirectly by the GNWT, should be reviewed as to whether or not they are a necessary part of a smoothly functioning public administration in Nunavut. Only those bodies that perform important tasks with acceptable levels of efficiency should be preserved. A review of the role of such bodies in the

future government of Nunavut should be included in the next comprehensive report prepared by the MC.

Even prior to the completion of such a review, a couple of additional observations should be made.

In terms of budgets and numbers of personnel, regional education and health boards eclipse in importance by far other special purpose bodies. Accordingly, the future of regional education and health boards requires special consideration.

In the case of education, regional boards in Nunavut emerged and evolved as structures which could provide a degree of regional input while ensuring that Yellowknife retained overall control of education across the NWT. Many dedicated community delegates--selected by individual community education councils--put in a great deal of hard work to ensure that the school systems in the three regions developed policies and programs which better reflected the needs of the communities. That being said, the regional boards--like any other management structure--have also developed their own momentums and agendas.

The history of the health boards is somewhat different. Inuit organizations insisted on a regional management structure before agreeing to the devolution of responsibility for health services in the Baffin. The Baffin Regional Health Board was established as a quite autonomous body, while the health boards in the Keewatin and the Kitikmeot are more integrated into structures of the GNWT.

As was the case with education boards, many dedicated community delegates--nominated by the communities but appointed by the Minister--put in a great deal of hard work to ensure the health systems in the three regions developed policies and programs which better reflected the needs of the communities.

The key point is that education and health boards were established essentially in response to the early physical, social and political distance of GNWT headquarters from Nunavut, and the manner in which they developed over the years was very much a function of pre-Nunavut political realities. The key question, then, is the degree to which the political realities of Nunavut alter, and perhaps displace, the rationale for the existence and operation of the boards as they are today.

Nunavut will be a more homogeneous society than the existing NWT. There will be a higher number of members in the Nunavut Legislative Assembly to represent the people of Nunavut than there are representatives from Nunavut in the current NWT Legislative Assembly in Yellowknife. Given the desire of the people

of Nunavut for an effective and accountable legislature, given the risks inherent with the start-up of a new government, and given the tight fiscal circumstances likely to prevail among governments in Canada throughout the 1990s, any proposals to maintain extra management structures in Nunavut must be founded on solid reasoning. Sustaining the status quo is not, in itself, a convincing reason.

Based on the above considerations, one sensible way of organizing the management structures for education and health issues in Nunavut would entail the following:

- a Department of Education led by a Minister and Deputy Minister;
- a 10 to 12 person Nunavut Board of Education, with members elected directly (on the basis of Nunavut Legislative Assembly electoral constituencies);
- regional administrative structures in relation to education similar to those of other departments, led by regional superintendents;
- a Department of Health and Social Services, led by a Minister and Deputy Minister;
- no regional or Nunavut-wide health boards, but regional administrative structures in relation to health similar to those of other departments led by regional superintendents; and
- existing staff of regional education and health boards having satisfactory job performance evaluations would be offered comparable positions elsewhere in the Nunavut public sector, preferably in the education and health fields.

This approach would have the following advantages:

- by shrinking the number of education boards from three to one, and by eliminating all three health boards, it would minimize overlap and duplication and reduce overhead, allowing a greater proportion of spending dollars to be concentrated on programs and services;
- it would maximize direct political control and accountability during the critical early years of the Nunavut Government;
- it would emphasize the common features of education and health policy issues affecting Nunavut as a whole, while allowing regional variations at the delivery level;

- it would preserve the long-standing tradition in Canada that parents and other electors have a direct say in the running of schools; and
- it would allow an opportunity to strengthen the Nunavut Social Development Council as a consultative body on social and cultural issues, as contemplated by Article 32 of the Nunavut Agreement.

A final observation should be made specifically concerning the place of existing regional councils in Nunavut.

Currently, regional councils, periodically bringing together the mayors within a region, exist in Kitikmeot and Keewatin. A Baffin Regional Council existed for a number of years but was recently wound up. Like many organizations, regional councils have had their ups and downs. Sometimes they have served as an effective regional sounding board and voice on issues, particularly in helping to secure and administer particular types of services—such as legal aid—that otherwise might not be available to citizens of the region.

At other times they have been less effective, generating lots of talk but little action. The NIC takes the view that the mayors, local councillors and citizens of each region should examine the utility of maintaining regional councils having the kinds of advocacy and advisory functions that they now perform. An alternative to regional councils that some regions might wish to consider would involve regular regional leaders meetings that would bring together, not just mayors, but a variety of individuals having positions of authority in regional politics, business and social affairs. It should be noted that the Nunavut Government could easily be designed to accommodate differing regional preferences in regard to regional councils, leaders meetings, and other methods of reliable regional opinion gathering.

4. Number and Make-up of Nunavut Government Departments

In reviewing the departmental structure for the new Government, the NIC has taken into consideration:

- the population and number of communities to be served;
- the need for close co-ordination and co-operation among Nunavut Government departments and agencies;

- the need to eliminate duplication and overlap among departments and agencies and to sustain levels of service using fewer **positions** and associated financial **resources**;
- the need to **re-organize** departments in a **manner** which would support and simplify the transfer of programs and services to **community governments** in the future;
- the need to **respect** the unique culture, **language and history** of the **aboriginal residents** of **Nunavut** and
- the need to ensure full recognition of the new institutions of public government established through the **Nunavut Agreement** (e.g. the **Nunavut Wildlife Management Board**), and to promote close Co-ordination **between** the structures, programs and **services** of the **Nunavut Government** and the structures, programs and services flowing from the **Nunavut Agreement**.

The recommended departments and their primary **purpose** areas follows.

Executive and Intergovernmental Affairs

- to provide **co-ordination** for support **services** to Cabinet and Cabinet **committees**
- to co-ordinate inter-governmental relations with the federal government, provincial **governments** and **circumpolar countries** and regions
- to **co-ordinate** relations with aboriginal organizations

Finance and Administration

- to **co-ordinate financial** planning and **management** for the Government
- to **co-ordinate** financial and administrative support for the Government, allowing operating departments to achieve the broad program and **service objectives** of the Government

Human Resources

- to co-ordinate the development and **implementation** of human **resource policies** to achieve a **competent** and productive public service
- to **co-ordinate** achieving a public **service representative** of the Nunavut population

Justice and Regulatory Affairs

- to manage the legal and **regulatory affairs** of the government and provide public **services**

- to provide a justice system relevant to the **lifestyle, customs and culture** of Nunavut

Community Government Housing and Transportation

- to promote the continued growth of strong community government in **Nunavut**

Culture, Language, Elders and Youth

- to bring **Inuit** language and culture into the everyday lives and work of the residents of **Nunavut**
- to recognize and promote the importance of elders and youth

Education

- to focus on the fundamental importance of education and training to the future of Nunavut
- to provide a strong link between education and training and employment
- to provide for the integration of employment, training and social assistance support for the unemployed

Health and Social Services

- to promote the health and well-being of community residents

Public Works and Government Services

- to **co-ordinate** the design, construction and maintenance of public infrastructure in **Nunavut**
- to promote instruction and maintenance in a manner which **maximizes** employment, training and **business** opportunities in Nunavut

Sustainable **Development**

- to promote and maximize economic opportunities in a way that is sensitive to the environment and resources in Nunavut
- to ensure the close **co-ordination** of renewable and non-renewable resource development, tourism and parks, and small business development

Summary and Conclusions

The recommended organizational structure for Nunavut **reflects** commitment to:

- only two levels of government in **Nunavut**: community and territorial;

- **devolution** of further authority and **responsibility** in the fields of education, renewable **resources**, economic development, social services, health, justice and social housing to **community** governments;
- **decentralized** delivery of territorial programs and services to the community and regional levels;
- consolidation of existing departments of the GNWT;
- reduction in the number of **appointed boards** and **agencies** associated with the delivery of territorial government programs and **services**; and
- **sharing** government generated **employment** as equitably as possible among communities while **ensuring** effective and **efficient** government.

Details of the suggested organization of the Nunavut Government are set out in **Appendix A-10**.

5. Comparison with Previous Studies on the Organization of a Nunavut Government

In 1991, the GNWT **commissioned** The Coopers and Lybrand Consulting Group to carry out a study of the

financial impact of division (C&L I). The key **assumptions** for this study were:

- the existing services delivered by the GNWT **were** to be **duplicated**;
- the same level of decentralization that existed at that time was to be **maintained**;
- the impact of land claims agreements was not to be included;
- no sharing of programs, **services** or facilities was to be assumed;
- there was to be no reduction or enhancement of **service** levels; and
- the existing departmental structures were to be **maintained**.

In 1992, DIAND **used** *the same* consultants to conduct a second study of the estimated costs of creating and operating the **Nunavut** Government (C&L II). In this study, the assumption was made that the transition to the new government would **be phased** over the period 1999 to **2008**. The existing **territorial** government departmental structure was assumed to remain in place.

The organizational structure recommended by the NIC in this **report** reflects significant changes **from C&L I** and **C&L II**. These changes are set out in Tables 1 and 2.

Table 1: Government Departments

The recommended number of departments, has been reduced as follows

Coopers & Lybrand I and II (1991/1992)

- Executive
- NWT Housing Corporation
- Finance
- Culture
- Personnel
- Justice
- Safety and Public Services
- Government Services
- Public Works
- Transportation
- Renewable Resources
- Municipal & Community Affairs
- Health
- Social Services
- Energy, Mines & Petroleum Resources
- Economic Development & Tourism
- Education

Total: 17 departments (plus Legislative Assembly)

MC (1995)

- Executive & Inter-governmental Affairs
- Finance and Administration
- Human Resources
- Justice & Regulatory Affairs
- Community Government, Housing and Transportation
- Culture, Language, Elders & Youth
- Education
- Health and Social Services
- Public Works and Government Services
- Sustainable Development

Total: 10 departments (plus Legislative Assembly)

Table 2: Headquarters Personnel

The Commission has designed and costed a "headquarters" consisting of 555 full-time equivalent positions (FTEs), of which 553 would be located in Nunavut and two would be located in Ottawa. Previously studies have modeled considerably larger headquarters

	Headquarters FTEs
•Coopers & Lybrand I (1991)	1,180
•Coopers & Lybrand II (1992)	930
•N-It (1995)	555

The headquarters modeled by the Commission is 53% smaller than the headquarters modeled in C&L I, and 40% smaller than the headquarters modeled in C&L II.

2. The number of headquarter positions required to be located in the capital has also been reduced:

	Headquarters FTEs required to be located in the capital
• Coopers & Lybrand I (1991)	1,180
• Coopers & Lybrand II (1992)	930
•NIC (1995)	379

3. Total territorial government staff in the capital expressed as a percentage of total non-federal public sector employment (including community governments and housing associations) in Nunavut has been reduced as follows:

	Territorial government staff in the capital as % of total non-federal public sector employment in Nunavut
•GNWT (1991)	approx. 40%
•NIC (1995)	
- Cambridge Bay as capital	11.5%
- Iqaluit as capital	21.5%
Rankin Inlet as capital	13.4%

4. In addition to the 555 positions in the headquarters, the Commission's model adds 72 positions at the regional level (four positions in six of the departments, in each of the three regions) to perform work decentralized from the headquarters level to the regional level. The Commission's model also subtracts 27 positions at the regional level (nine positions in each of the three regions) to reflect departmental consolidation.

The net increase in positions in the Commission's design model is therefore:

New headquarters positions	555
Positions decentralized from headquarter to the regions	+ 72
Positions consolidated at the regional level	- 27
Net increase in positions	<u>600</u>

The NIC believes that the above comparisons reveal strong and clear commitment by the Commission to design a consolidated, streamlined and highly decentralized Nunavut Government featuring a maximum level of resources committed to regional and community delivery of programs and services.

6. "Regionalized" Models

The NIC has prepared three design models for the organization of the Nunavut Government based on the possibility of the Nunavut capital being situated in Cambridge Bay, Rankin Inlet or Iqaluit. These models are described in Appendices A-11 to A-13 and their cost implications set out in Appendices A-18 to A-20.

As the NIC is proposing major decentralization of government programs, especially at the level of the regional offices, it is important to view the models and the costing associated with each, as "regionalized" models. For example, the Cambridge Bay as capital model means that most, but not all, headquarters positions would be in Cambridge Bay. The Kitikmeot regional office functions of the government, now located in Cambridge Bay, would be decentralized to other communities in the region. The costs associated with this model are not only the costs of adding headquarters positions and infrastructure to Cambridge Bay's existing capacity, but also include the costs of decentralizing regional functions to other communities in the region. With the Rankin Inlet model, Keewatin regional functions are decentralized from Rankin Inlet to other communities in the Keewatin and, for the Iqaluit model, Baffin regional functions are decentralized from Iqaluit to other communities in Baffin. It should be noted that the concept of the capital of Nunavut not also serving as a centre for regional territorial government offices has greater implications for Iqaluit than elsewhere, due to the existing heavy concentration of Baffin regional jobs in Iqaluit.

In Kitikmeot, infrastructure costs are higher in communities outside Cambridge Bay than Cambridge Bay itself. This is also true with respect to Baffin communities outside Iqaluit. The Keewatin region does not show the same pattern.

Recommendations

Recommendation #S-1

The NIC recommends that the Nunavut Government be designed and established in conformity with the key principles, key design elements and organizational structure outlined in this section and elaborated in the following appendices:

Appendix A-10: Organization and Design of the Nunavut Government and HQs Positions;

Appendix A-n: Design of the Nunavut Government Cambridge Bay as Capital;

Appendix A-12: Design of the Nunavut Government Iqaluit as Capital;

Appendix A-13: Design of the Nunavut Government Rankin Inlet as Capital; and

Appendix A-14: Comparison of the Distribution and Demographic Impacts of the Three Decentralized Design Models.

Recommendation #S-2

The NIC recommends that political responsibilities within Nunavut be concentrated at the territorial and community levels, with no new law making bodies introduced at the regional level.

Recommendation #S-3

The NIC recommends that all special purpose boards, agencies, councils and similar bodies that are now operating in Nunavut that are funded, directly or indirectly by the GNWT, should be reviewed as to whether or not they are a necessary part of a smoothly functioning public administration in Nunavut. Only those bodies performing important tasks with acceptable levels of efficiency should be preserved.

Recommendation #S-4

The NIC recommends that, because of their size and significance, the future of regional education and health boards not await the general review of special purpose bodies referred to above. In relation to education, the NIC recommends that the three existing regional boards be merged and re-defined as a single Nunavut Board of Education. With respect to health, the NIC recommends the abolition of regional health boards and the provision of health care programs through a Nunavut Department of Health and Social Services.

Recommendation #S-5

The NIC recommends that, following on the efforts of Cape Dorset and other communities to secure greater control of programs and services at the local level, it is appropriate to support the continued devolution of additional responsibilities to community governments. Devolution to community governments should not be carried so far as to impair the coherence of the Nunavut Government or to introduce unacceptable diseconomies of scale.

(c) Implications for New Institutions of Public Government Set Up Under the Nunavut Agreement

The Nunavut Agreement creates three major categories of commitments to the Inuit of Nunavut: (1) rights of an essentially proprietary nature, such as fee simple title to certain lands, rights to hunt, fish and trap, and financial entitlements; (2) the commitment, set out in Article 4 of the Agreement, to create the Nunavut Territory and Government and (3) obligations with respect to the establishment and operation of a number of new institutions of public government to ensure sound and accountable decision-making with respect to the conservation and use of the lands, waters and other resources of Nunavut, independently of whatever proprietary rights (Gown, Inuit, or otherwise) may be vested in them. The first category of commitments made to Inuit—proprietary rights—will be of fundamental importance in shaping the economic and social development of Nunavut, but has only limited direct significance for the design of public government institutions in Nunavut. The commitment to create the Nunavut Territory and Government contained in the Nunavut Agreement is obviously of central significance to the work of NIC; the entire contents of this report proceed from this commitment. It is the third category of commitments made under the Nunavut Agreement, the commitments made in relation to new institutions of public government, that needs to be addressed more specifically.

The various articles of the Nunavut Agreement envisage the establishment of five new institutions of public government, namely:

- the Nunavut Wildlife Management Board (NWMB);
- the Nunavut Impact Review Board (NIRB);
- the Nunavut Planning Commission (NPC);
- the Nunavut Water Board (NWB); and
- the Surface Rights Tribunal.

These institutions have many things in common, such as their memberships being 50% nominated by Inuit organizations and 50% by government (the Surface Rights Tribunal is an exception on this point). They can also be distinguished from one another in terms of such things as their mandates, their security of funding, and when they come into existence.

Common to all these institutions is their being firmly anchored within the Nunavut Agreement, a land claims agreement within the meaning of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. As such, the obligations incumbent upon the Government of Canada and, to a lesser extent, the GNWT, to establish these institutions are Constitu-

tionally protected imperative. While only the NWMB is up and running at the date of this report, Article 10 of the Nunavut Agreement makes it clear that all these institutions must be established well before the coming into existence of Nunavut on April 1, 1999. Given these facts, a logical conclusion follows: the Nunavut Government (and, for that matter, relevant parts of the Government of Canada) must be designed so as to accommodate the roles mapped out in considerable detail in the Nunavut Agreement for the five new institutions of public government. The apparent confusion on the point in some quarters warrants it being re-stated in the clearest of terms: the legal primacy of the Nunavut Agreement means the design of the Nunavut Government must accommodate the five institutions of public government established under the Nunavut Agreement, not the other way around.

The requirement to accommodate the establishment of the five new institutions of public government cannot be expressed merely in terms of recognizing the existence of the institutions. While the Nunavut Agreement provides the Parliament of Canada with some discretion concerning the consolidation and reallocation of functions among the institutions, this discretion is subject to a number of major qualifications that serve to guarantee the collective authority and autonomy of the institutions. Perhaps even more significantly, the Nunavut Agreement Implementation Contract ("A Contract Relating to the Implementation of the Nunavut Fii Agreement") sets out legally enforceable commitments as to minimum levels of funding to be provided to these institutions by the Crown for their first ten years of operations. These levels of funding are, in turn, required by the provisions of the Nunavut Agreement to be periodically renegotiated in good faith. Both respect for lawful obligations and the need to make good use of public moneys combine to produce the following challenge: the Nunavut Government must not only be designed (and relevant parts of the Government of Canada re-designed) to accommodate the existence of the new public government institutions created under the Nunavut Agreement; government structures in Nunavut should also be designed to allow these new institutions to carry out their appointed roles making effective use of their designated resources.

The institutions of public government created under the Nunavut Agreement, rather than being resented, constrained, or duplicated, should be given room "to breathe" within the overall public administration of Nunavut. If this logic were apparent during the negotiation of the Nunavut Agreement, it is even more apparent in the fiscal climate of the 1990s. In light of the permanence and profile of the institutions created through the Nunavut Agreement, a practical question emerges

with respect to the design of the overall public administration of Nunavut: would the sound public administration of Nunavut be promoted by supplying these institutions with additional functions to those set out in the Nunavut Agreement?

In looking at this question, it is important to remember an important feature of these institutions.

The Surface Rights Tribunal will provide binding decisions concerning disputes over terms of access to lands that are subject to multi-party rights and over levels of compensation resulting from certain categories of intrusions onto lands. In many ways, the Surface Rights Tribunal can be expected to operate like an arbitration board.

The Tribunal is an exception, however. All the other institutions of public government created as a result of the Nunavut Agreement will act in quite a different way. Their primary function will be the supply of policy advice to responsible ministers at both the federal and territorial levels on broad topics of public administration affecting Inuit and other members of the public alike, topics such as the management of wildlife, the use of water, the development and application of land use plans, and the review of the environmental and socio-economic impacts of major development proposals. Decisions of these institutions will not, as is the case with the Surface Rights Tribunal, take the form of binding awards that are enforceable against parties in the same fashion as court judgements and orders. Rather, decisions of these other institutions will (apart from the certificate and licence issuing activities of NIRB and NWB) take the form of "advice" tendered to responsible government ministers.

Various provisions of the Nunavut Agreement will make it difficult, legally and politically, to reject the "advice" offered by these institutions and, in that sense, the advisory functions of these institutions will very much resemble decision-making ones. Nevertheless, the provisions of the Nunavut Agreement dealing with these institutions clearly anticipate that the expertise vested in new institutions tendering their advice to ministers will, at least in modest measure, be shadowed in the form of resident expertise within relevant departments of the federal and territorial governments. The Nunavut Agreement contemplates that sound decision-making in the areas of wildlife management, water management, land use planning, and environmental assessment will be promoted by institutionalizing multiple sources of expertise on tough matters of public policy making. Under the Nunavut Agreement, relevant min-

isters will (1) receive advice on issues from autonomous boards, (2) have this advice vetted by departmental staff, and (3) make informed decisions that are justifiable within the objective tests set out under the Agreement.

From this analysis, it is apparent that a certain amount of what could be described as "duplication" has been consciously built into the Nunavut Agreement in relation to these institutions. This duplication could be reduced by re-casting these institutions as decision-making bodies in a more fundamental and complete sense. Removing the possibility of ministerial "second guessing" would reduce the need for in-house expertise within departments to offer ministers objective assessments of conclusions reached by the institutions. At the same time, this possibility would make elected ministers less actively engaged in the substantive striking of decisions concerning important issues of public policy. Clearly, trade-offs exist. From its perspective, the NIC believes that a major redefinition of the relationship between the institutions of public governments created by the Nunavut Agreement and relevant government ministers would necessarily entail a fundamental departure from the assumptions and principles that animate the Nunavut Agreement. Accordingly, in the absence of a clear signal to re-negotiate the Nunavut Agreement to that end, delivered jointly by the Government and NTI, the NIC believes that it would be inadvisable to proceed with designing the Nunavut Government based on expectations of a re-defined institutional/ministerial relationship.

Respecting the assumptions and principles that animate the Nunavut Agreement means that the Nunavut Government cannot be designed in such a way as to deprive Nunavut Government ministers from access to in-house departmental expertise in public policy areas that fall within the purview of the various Agreement-created institutions (an exception to this point can be made in relation to the Surface Rights Tribunal, but the lack of multi-year funding for the Tribunal and its minimal personnel needs make this exception inconsequential). The organizational plan for the Nunavut Government set out in the preceding section of this chapter takes this factor into account.

Notwithstanding the preceding analysis, there would appear to be a number of "grey areas" in relation to the functions of the Agreement-created institutions that might allow for a number of cost efficiencies to be realized in the operation of (1) the Nunavut Government, (2) relevant parts of the federal government, and (3) the institutions themselves. The most promising candidates for further investigation along these lines would appear to be the following.

- **Wildlife Research.** Under the Nunavut Agreement the NWMB is competent to perform functions in relation to wildlife research but is not assigned an exclusive role. Given the economic and social importance of wildlife in Nunavut, it would make sense to concentrate all government sponsored wildlife research efforts, including federal government research efforts, in the NWMB, and to guarantee the wide availability of research results.
- Monitoring and enforcement of decisions/orders/certificates of Agreement-seated institutions and of other governmental decisions made in relation to the use of lands, waters and resources, including wildlife. It will be difficult for each institution to ensure that its decisions/orders/certificates are being respected without major overlap and duplication of effort. A comprehensive and focused approach is needed.
- Simplicity/predictability of environmental assessment procedures. The Nunavut Agreement allows for two different bodies to review major development projects in Nunavut, NIRB and the Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office. Since the conclusion of the Nunavut Agreement, new federal legislation has redefined responsibilities and rules with respect to the Government of Canada's environmental responsibilities. Some advantages might be gained by allowing NIRB to review all development projects in Nunavut.
- Administrative support for the Agreement-created institutions. Thought should be given as to how, on an arms-length contractual basis, the Nunavut Government might be able to supply administrative support services to the institutions in a cost efficient way, while respecting their individual autonomy.

While not all these matters would necessarily imply amendments to the text of the Nunavut Agreement, they all touch on how the institutions created by the Agreement would function on a day-today basis. Equally importantly, they all raise questions concerning the additional financial resources that would be made available to the Agreement-created institutions in the event that they were to take on new functions. Because of this, the NIC believes that NTI should be fully involved in any investigations along these lines. The NIC also believes that financial dimensions should be frankly acknowledged and discussed as an essential part of any such investigations.

On a final point, the geographic location of the main offices of the five new institutions of public government should be determined in a way that fits within broader

assumptions as to the organization of government in Nunavut. At the moment, no decisions have been made by the parties to the Nunavut Agreement with respect to the permanent location of the main offices of the new institutions, although the NWMB has an interim headquarter in Iqaluit. From the perspective of the NIC, the preferred approach to the location of these institutions would be one which is guided primarily by two factors (1) the need for the institutions to be reasonably proximate to the headquarters of the various territorial government departments that deal with related issues; and, (2) the desirability of distributing job opportunities across various regions and communities. The NIC urges the parties to the Nunavut Agreement, in consultation, where they have already been established, with the institutions themselves, to apply these factors in making decisions about the permanent location of the headquarters of these institutions. The NIC further urges that, in order to facilitate broader planning efforts and to identify possibilities for maximizing cost efficiencies, decisions about the location of the permanent headquarters of these institutions should be made as soon as possible.

Recommendations

Recommendation #5-6

The NIC recommends that investigations reconducted into the possibility of the Nunavut Government, the Government of Canada, and the new institutions of public government created by the Nunavut Agreement achieving cost efficiencies in relation to:

1. wildlife research;
2. monitoring and enforcement of decisions/orders/certificates of government institutions and departments in relation to the use of lands, waters and resources, including wildlife;
3. simplicity/predictability of environmental assessment procedures; and
4. administrative support for the new institutions of public government.

Recommendation #S-7

The NIC recommends that NTI be fully involved in any investigations into the issues referred to in Recommendation #5-6 and that the complete financial dimensions of the issues be frankly acknowledged and discussed.

Recommendation #5-8

The NIC urges the parties to the **Nunavut Agreement**, in **consultation**, where they have already been established, with the institutions themselves, to decide on the permanent location of the headquarters of the new institutions of public government based on the following **factors**: (1) the need for the institutions to be reasonably proximate to the headquarters of the various **territorial** government department that deal with related issues; and (2) the desirability of distributing job opportunities **across** various regions and communities. The NIC further urges **that**, in order to facilitate broader planning efforts and to identify possibilities for **maximizing** cost efficiencies, decisions as to location be made as soon as possible.

(d) Government of Canada Personnel Requirements

Since the commitment to create the **Nunavut** Government was first made in land **claims** negotiations in late 1989, focus has been concentrated on the design and costs of the **Nunavut** Government, and the impacts that the creation of **Nunavut** may have on the size and shape of territorial government in the Mackenzie Valley. In **comparison**, relatively little attention has been paid to questions surrounding how the Government of Canada might organize its operations in the North in the wind-up to and aftermath of division. By way of illustration, the March 22, 1991, report on the **financial** impact of division prepared by The **Coopers & Lybrand** Consulting Group for the **GNWT** contained the following **qualifier**:

"Federal government **costs**, which would be impacted by Division, are beyond the scope of this study, but have to be dealt within the future. **As** such, the total **costs** of Division for the federal government have not been included in the **financial** analysis that is provided in this **report**." (Volume 1, page 9)

Focus on the organizational needs and financial dimensions of the territorial level of government, and the lack of explicit reference to federal government programs and services, is evident in the mandate of the NIC as set out in section 58 of the **Nunavut** Act. Section 58 obliges the NIC to offer its advice on "the administrative design of the **Nunavut** Government" and "the timetable for the assumption by the Government of **Nunavut** of responsibilities for the delivery of **services**"; there is no **comparable** obligation recited in relation to reviewing or re-thinking the federal government presence in the **Nunavut** area.

Notwithstanding its lack of an expressly stated mandate in relation to the impact of division on **federal** government activities in the **Nunavut** area, the NIC believes that it is **necessary** to address two aspects of the issue (1) the first iteration impact on the demand for federal programs and **services**, and on the number of federal government personnel **needed** to administer **those** programs and services, resulting from an **expanded territorial** government **public sector in Nunavut**; and (2) the desirability of the federal government organizing itself in **Nunavut** in a way that stands up to the test of fairness, particularly when examined against how the federal government goes about its business in the Yukon Territory and in the Mackenzie Valley.

With respect to the first iteration impact on the demand for **federal** programs and services flowing from the creation of **Nunavut**, there is an obvious incentive to make some kind of quantifiable assumption about how a significant expansion of territorial government in **Nunavut** will affect population sensitive parts of the federal public sector in **Nunavut** (this could include everything from postal workers, to RCMP constables, to employment counselors). A **reasonable** assumption of this kind will supply a more complete picture of how the demographics of **Nunavut** are likely to shift in the post-1999 world and, in turn, this picture **will** permit a more realistic and cost **efficient** approach to be taken to the development of infrastructure in **Nunavut**.

A couple of practical problems attend the striking of a reliable assumption of this kind. First of all, there is a chicken-and-egg relationship between territorial and federal public sector work **forces**: a bigger **Nunavut** government work force may engender a bigger federal work force in **Nunavut**, which may engender a bigger **Nunavut** work force, etc. The NIC's approach to this problem has been to confine its analysis to first iteration impacts. A second problem which looms larger in light of the most recent federal government budget, is the possibility of dramatic changes in (1) the range of programs and **services** offered by the federal government, and (2) the numbers of personnel **assumed** to be required to provide relevant services to populations of given sizes.

These problems, among others, make the choice of a **reasonably reliable** ratio between the numbers of new territorial government public sector workers and federal ones a difficult and, to a considerable extent, an arbitrary one. In the extensive work that has been done by DIAND Technical **Services** for the federal Department of Public Works and Government Services, **reliance** has been placed on an assumption that every 10 new workers

in the territorial government level public sector work force will result in the need for one more federal employee. The NIC has no compelling reason to reject this assumption in favour of an alternate one.

It is important that the Government of Canada organize itself concerning the delivery of federal government programs and services in the Nunavut area so as to meet expectations as to fair treatment of the Nunavut area in comparison with other parts of Canada, notably other territories. This objective would be promoted by the federal government adopting the following principles:

- in the absence of a compelling reason based on cost efficiency, all those federal government programs and services that are conventionally administered in each province and territory by federal offices situated within each province and territory should be administered from federal offices situated in Nunavut;
- where cost efficiencies justify certain federal programs and services being administered in a number of provincial/territorial jurisdictions from a single regional centre, a fair share of those centres should be situated in Nunavut (in the case of programs and services being offered from a single centre to two or three territories, fairness should be defined as equality in numbers of personnel);
- where a discrete set of federal policy and administrative activities relate to a particular place or task in Nunavut (for example, a specific national park), those activities should be conducted from offices situated in Nunavut;
- federal offices in Nunavut should be staffed and administered according to measurements of cost effectiveness and efficiency that take into account the unique features of Nunavut society and economy; and
- initial application of these principles should be guided by considerations of phasing and timing set out in the following section of this chapter.

Recommendations

Recommendation #5-9

The NIC recommends that, based on a ratio of new Government of Canada employees to new Nunavut Government employees of 1:10 and on the number of new Nunavut Government employees contemplated

in the previous section, the Government of Canada plan for the addition of 60 full-time equivalent positions (FTEs) to its work force in Nunavut.

Recommendation #5-10

The Government of Canada should adhere to the principles set out in this section in determining and establishing its administrative capacity in Nunavut.

(e) Phasing

The issue of phasing the build-up of the administrative capacity of the Nunavut Government was given considerable and careful attention by the Government of Canada, the GNWT and TFN in the period prior to the finalization of the Nunavut Agreement. The Nunavut Political Accord, concluded on October 30, 1992, devotes a number of sections to this topic. Part 7 of the Accord, entitled "Administrative Capacity of the Nunavut Government", states as follows

"7.1 The arrangements made regarding the administrative design of the first Nunavut Government shall provide the Nunavut Government with the administrative capacity to:

- (i) establish and maintain a Legislative Assembly and Executive Council;
- (ii) manage the financial affairs of Nunavut;
- (iii) secure independent legal advice for the Government;
- (iv) undertake personnel recruitment, administration and training for and of government employees;
- (v) maintain certain aspects of public works and government services...;
- (vi) support municipal affairs; and
- (vii) provide adult education programming as part of a comprehensive human resource development plan.

7.2 It is anticipated that other areas of administrative responsibility at present administered by the GNWT which are not part of the core administrative capacity of the Nunavut Government, referred to in 7.1, shall be discharged through intergovernmental agreements or contracts with appropriate governments, public institutions or non-governmental bodies."

Part 7 of the Nunavut Political Accord clearly reflects the **common** assumption of the parties to the Accord that the administrative capacity of the **Nunavut** Government would be **built** up on a graduated basis. No doubt, this common assumption reflected a number of concerns on the part of the parties to the Accord, particularly in relation to two matters (1) the problems of building up the administrative capacity of the **Nunavut** Government at such a rapid rate as to **require** unacceptable levels of reliance on employees recruited from outside Nunavut; and, (2) the cost deferrals to be realized through pursuing a slower approach.

The emphasis placed on phasing in the **Nunavut** Political Accord was also characteristic of the costing assessment of the **Nunavut** Government prepared by The Coopers & Lybrand Consulting Group for DIAND in 1992 (C&L II). Unlike the report prepared by the same company earlier for the **GNWT** (C&L I), C&L II assumed three major phases to the build-up of administrative capacity by the **Nunavut** Government. On April 1, 1999, the **Nunavut** Government would begin life with a "core" administrative capacity consisting of a legislative assembly, an executive council, a department of justice/inter-governmental affairs, and a department of finance/human resources. By 2004, the new government would have fully functioning departments of education, culture, capital works, and northern development. Establishment of remaining departments of health and social services would be completed by 2008.

It should be noted that the emphasis on phasing in both the **Nunavut** Political Accord and **C&L II** reflected a widespread concern in various quarters in **Nunavut** about trying to do too much, too fast, in a postdivision **Nunavut**. At the first **Nunavut** Leaders Conference, held in **Iqaluit** in January, 1992, delegates urged that the start up date for the **Nunavut** Government be pushed back from 1997 to 1999 and that the administrative capacity of the new government be built up during its first 10 years of operation.

Since beginning its work, a number of key elected leaders and officials in the North have expressed the view that a 10 year phasing-in of administrative capacity on the part of the **Nunavut** Government would be too slow. It has been suggested that assumptions motivating the approach taken to phasing in the **Nunavut** Political Accord and **C&L II** have lost their force, and that extensive phasing would cause more problems than it would solve. Four main arguments have been identified as supporting this view.

The most important argument against the need for extensive phasing turns on a reduction in the kinds of numbers associated with the staffing of the headquarters

component of the new **Nunavut** Government. **C&L II** anticipated a need to create 930 new positions to staff the **Nunavut** Government headquarters; this report anticipates a fully staffed headquarters requiring 555 FTEs. This sharp decline in the magnitude of the task being undertaken makes it plausible to have the entire headquarters operations of the new government up and running soon after the coming into existence of **Nunavut**. Put simply, a smaller government poses little risk of overwhelming **Nunavut**. This minimization of impact will be taken even further through the kind of decentralization efforts that are front and centre in this report.

A second argument against extensive phasing involves training, and breaks down into two sub-arguments. The first sub-argument follows from the previous point: the shrinking personnel needs of a **Nunavut** Government headquarters makes it easier to secure an acceptable level of hiring of Inuit and other **Nunavut** residents from the time of start-up. The second sub-argument is that training cannot take place effectively in the absence of practical tasks; according to this reasoning, the successful training of Inuit and other **Nunavut** residents to take on the work of running government can only be hampered by postponing the creation of the full range of **Nunavut** Government headquarters and offices.

A third argument against extensive phasing is the unpredictability of interest in the Mackenzie Valley in such an idea in the years surrounding 1999. Indeed, this argument based on the unpredictability of interest in the Mackenzie Valley goes even farther. Given the questions hanging over the constitutional redefinition of the Mackenzie Valley in the postdivision world, it maybe that territorial government there is entirely unclear as to its own institutional future, let alone its institutional links with the **Nunavut** Government. As extensive phasing for the **Nunavut** Government has always presupposed a set of reliable, cost efficient inter-governmental agreements with the **GNWT** or its successor, it can be argued that reliance on extensive phasing would make the successful inauguration and early operation of **Nunavut** entirely dependent on political forces which are outside the control of the people of **Nunavut** at best, and subject to considerable volatility at worst.

A fourth and final argument against extensive phasing is financial in nature. The argument contests that significant, perhaps even any, cost savings could be realized through extensive phasing. In the event that the **Nunavut** Government is not equipped in its early days with headquarters administrative capacity in relation to virtually all its programs and services, then it will necessarily need to contract for the supply of those things through inter-governmental agreement or some other form of contractual undertaking. Even assuming that a

willing party is prepared to offer the supply of all or some of such things, it would be hazardous to assume that it would offer those things for less cost to the Nunavut Government than the cost from an in-house source. This hazard only increases if the all-in rest-including negotiation and administration costs-of obtaining the supply of those things from outside is calculated.

For the NIC, choices in relation to phasing should not be approached on the basis of some pre-fixed thinking which contravenes both logic and analysis. Defining an appropriate approach to phasing must be driven by practical assessments of costs, benefits and risks. In defining an appropriate approach, the following factors should be taken into account:

- the maintenance of acceptable levels of delivery of public sector goods and services to the people of Nunavut;
- the ability of the GNWT to re-organize itself prior to division in such a way as to facilitate the early assumption by the Nunavut Government of in-house administrative capacity with respect to virtually the full range of its responsibilities;
- the ease with which certain discrete administrative functions within the political responsibility of the Nunavut Government can be treated as severable and stand-alone;
- the extent to which discrete functions within the political responsibility of the Nunavut Government can be staffed by Inuit and other residents of Nunavut;
- the extent to which it is practicable to rely on inter-governmental agreements and contracts to supply certain public sector goods and services on behalf of the Nunavut Government;
- the need to avoid the Nunavut Government relying on the federal government to supply goods and services in Nunavut that have been previously devolved to the GNWT for delivery; and
- the costs, both direct and indirect, associated with having certain public sector goods and services supplied through inter-governmental agreements or contracts, and the alternate costs of not having them so supplied.

These factors can be applied in a number ways with respect to phasing. The Commission takes the view that the following approach to phasing would be both workable and sensible.

First of all, the issue of phasing should not be seen as one that becomes relevant only after April 1, 1999. A preferable approach would be one which emphasizes continuity in events happening before and after April 1, 1999. The following "phases" in the build up of the administrative capacity of Nunavut need to be initiated and fulfilled in the four years leading up to the formal establishment of Nunavut.

- There is a need for the GNWT to complete a comprehensive plan to re-organize the existing GNWT in preparation for division (the NIC notes and supports the initiative taken by GNWT Minister John Todd to this end with respect to his areas of ministerial responsibility). The re-organization plan should, to the extent possible, calculate the degree to which positions within the GNWT can be dedicated, in advance of division, entirely or in quantifiable part to activities within the Nunavut area. The plan should identify those positions that should be redefined or created within the existing GNWT to assist in the creation of Nunavut (for example, the plan should examine the need to create an assistant deputy minister position to oversee preparing human resources for the Nunavut Government, as recommended at a meeting of leaders and other individuals with responsibilities for education and training that took place in Gjoa Haven earlier this year). The plan should identify appropriate recruitment and training strategies needed for its implementation. The plan should be completed, at least in preliminary form, and the various measures contemplated in the plan costed out, in time to feed into the suggested federal Cabinet consideration of Nunavut issues in the fall of 1995. "
- The role of the Interim Commissioner for Nunavut is an important one in considering the matter of phasing. In the event that the Interim Commissioner is appointed in the first part of 1997, as advised in Chapter 12 of this report, the Interim Commissioner will be in a key position with regard to several dimensions of phasing, including (1) the offering of employment security to a number of individuals who may be willing to step into senior "Nunavut-oriented" GNWT jobs as described in a GNWT re-organization plan; (2) the entering into with the GNWT of agreements governing the operation of any public sector organizations that are "shared" by the two jurisdictions for at least an initial period following April 1, 1999; and, (3) the entering into of any legal agreements that

- might be required to adapt to circumstances at variance from assumptions as to phasing that were built into a **federal Cabinet review** of fall, 1995 (for example, a drastic shortfall in **successful training** results in relation to the **management** of certain types of **government** programs and **services** might persuade the Interim **Commissioner** to seek inter-governmental **agreements** guaranteeing the supply of such management services from outside **Nunavut** for a period following April 1, 1999).

- The Government of Canada, the **GNWT** and **NTI** will need to assess and discuss the conclusions set out in this section with respect to the administrative **capacity requirements** of the Nunavut Government as of April 1, 1999. Insofar as **discussions** of this kind lead to **consensus** on a different set of conclusions, those conclusions should be built into the planning assumptions presented to the federal Cabinet; as **suggested** for the fall of 1995.

The **matters** described above, taking place over the next four years, will affect how planning with respect to phasing is agreed upon, revised, and implemented. The question remains what conclusions has the **NIC** formed with respect to the level of administrative capacity to target for the **Nunavut** Government at the time of its coming into existence?

The **NIC** has concluded that planning for the start-up administrative capacity of the **Nunavut** Government should proceed on the basis of the Nunavut Government being equipped with **fully** functioning headquarters operations in relation to virtually **all** departments and **agencies**. The reasons for arriving at this conclusion are as follows.

- It is desirable for both political and economic **factors** that the **Nunavut Government** achieve as much self-sufficiency by way of administrative capacity as is practicable as soon as is practicable. Nunavut is a project in **self-determination**, and **self-determination** in a contemporary societal context has a bureaucratic dimension as well as a political control dimension.
- The scaled down size of the **Nunavut** Government put forward in this report in **comparison** with the model put forward in C&L II makes supplying the Nunavut Government with full administrative capacity at the date of its inauguration **free** from unacceptable risks of a logistical nature or in relation to potential **socio-economic** impacts.

- As set out in Chapter 6 of this report, it is possible to achieve acceptable levels of **Inuit** and **Nunavut** hiring in equipping the **Nunavut** Government with **full** administrative capacity at start-up. There is no compelling reason to believe that a **10 year phase-in** of administrative capacity, as examined in C&L II, **will** generate appreciably better training results.
- The lack of certainty as to the constitutional future of the Mackenzie Valley makes it extremely problematic, particularly in 1995, to **pre-suppose** a willingness on the part of the **GNWT** or its successor to enter into any set of extensive inter-governmental agreements with the **Nunavut** Government regarding the supply of administrative services, let alone a set of agreements that would be advantageous to **Nunavut**. The practical **difficulties** of **negotiating**, applying and enforcing such agreements should also not be underestimated.
- Finally, there is no clear evidence that an **assessment** of all cost implications, even if such an acceptably comprehensive assessment could be assembled, would indicate that a 10 year phasing-in of administrative **capacity** on the part of the **Nunavut Government** would realize significant cost **efficiencies** over a more ambitious timetable. While intuition might suggest some areas for savings (**learning as you go**, pushing through a slower flow of **trainees**), intuition also suggests diseconomies (smaller but more numerous building projects, paper burden associated with complex **inter-governmental** agreements).

A number of additional points **need** to be made with respect to the **NIC's** conclusions as to the initial administrative **capacity** of the **Nunavut Government**.

The first point is that a **number** of territorial level public sector **organizations** that perform highly specialized and **technical tasks** on a quasi-autonomous basis might be left to carry out those tasks on a "shared" arrangement between the **Nunavut** Government and the **GNWT** or its **successor**, at least for some indefinite period following **definition**. A "shared" arrangement could entail a number of restructuring options, but any such "sharing" should involve equal political **control** exercised by the **Nunavut** Government and the **GNWT** or its successor. Both the **NWT Workers' Compensation Board** and the **NWT Power Corporation** would lend themselves to being treated in this fashion. The Government of **Canada**, the **GNWT** and **NTI** might wish to see other organizations treated as candidates for shared control.

A second point relates to continued devolution of federal responsibilities to the GNWT in the period leading up to April 1, 1999. A number of jurisdictional candidates for devolution of this kind exist, most importantly the devolution of beneficial use and control over oil, gas and other minerals situated on Crown lands. The NIC has a number of views with respect to devolution: (1) there is no need, from first principles, for devolution to be impeded by the scheduled creation of Nunavut; (2) any jurisdiction devolved to the GNWT should adhere to the benefit of Nunavut on at least as favorable terms, and devolution agreements should say so; and, (3) devolution should not detract from the Government of Canada's responsibilities concerning the costs of establishing and operating the Nunavut Government. The Nunavut Government should be equipped with adequate administrative capacity at start-up in relation to those jurisdictional matters that may be devolved to the GNWT over the next four years. The NIC would be willing to participate in on-going devolution discussions to an extent commensurate with its expertise and that would be acceptable to the current parties to those discussions.

A final point relates to the identification of those areas of administrative capacity that would best lend themselves to being phased in after April 1, 1999, in the event that the federal Cabinet, informed by discussions involving the GNWT and NTI, were to determine that a major element of phasing were necessary. While the NIC does not favour such a course, the following areas of administrative capacity might not be as crucial as others for the Nunavut Government to acquire at the outset: (1) certain aspects of regulatory affairs; (2) certain aspects of public works and government services; (3) certain aspects of transportation; and (4) administration of Crown lands (assuming further devolution occurs in this area). The NIC would be happy to participate in any discussions, involving the Government of Canada, the GNWT and NTI, that take place in response to this report, that focus on a detailed review of organizational candidates for post-division phasing-in of the administrative capacity of the Nunavut Government.

Recommendations

Recommendation #5-11

The NIC recommends that the issue of "phasing" the build-up in the administrative capacity of the Nunavut Government be recognized as an issue touching on current events, not just events occurring on and after April 1, 1999.

Recommendation #5-12

The NIC recommends that the GNWT complete a comprehensive plan to re-organize itself in preparation for division. The re-organization plan should, to the extent possible, calculate the degree to which positions within the GNWT can be dedicated, entirely or in quantifiable part, to activities within the Nunavut area. The plan should identify those positions that should be re-defined or created within the existing GNWT to assist in the creation of Nunavut; for example, the plan should examine the need to create an assistant deputy minister in relation to preparing human resources for the Nunavut Government. The plan should identify appropriate recruitment and training strategies needed for its implementation. The plan should be completed, at least in preliminary form, and the various implementation measures contemplated in the plan costed out, in time to feed into the federal Cabinet consideration of Nunavut issues that is recommended by NIC for the fall of 1995.

Recommendation #5-13

The NIC recommends that the Interim Commissioner for Nunavut be recognized to play a key role with regards to a number of aspects of phasing, including (1) the offering of employment security to a number of individuals who may be willing to step into senior "Nunavut oriented" GNWT jobs as described in a GNWT re-organization plan, (2) the entering into on behalf of the Nunavut Government with the GNWT of agreements governing the operation of any public sector organizations that are "shared" by the two jurisdictions for at least an initial period following April 1, 1999, and (3) the entering into of any legal agreements that might be required to adapt to circumstances at variance from assumptions as to phasing that were built into a suggested federal Cabinet review for the fall of 1995.

Recommendation #5-14

The NIC recommends that, for the reasons rested in this section, planning for the start-up administrative capacity of the Nunavut Government should proceed on the basis of the Nunavut Government being equipped with fully functioning headquarters in relation to all departments and agencies. Exceptions should be made in the case of the NWT Workers' Compensation Board and the NWT Power Corporation, which should continue, for the indefinite future, to operate as "shared" organizations under the joint political control of the Nunavut Government and the GNWT or its successor. Other suitable candidates for

“sharing” may, in the opinion of the Government of **Canada**, the GNWT and NTL, also exist and warrant additional review by the **NIC**.

Recommendation #5-15

With respect to the continued **devolution** of **federal** government responsibilities to the GNWT in the period up to April 1, 1999, the **NIC** recommends that (1) such **devolution** not be impeded by division, (2) any jurisdiction devolved to the **GNWT** adhere to the benefit of **Nunavut** on at least as favorable terms, (3) **devolution** not detract from federal government funding obligations in relation to the setting up and running of **Nunavut**, and (4) the **Nunavut** Government be equipped with adequate administrative **capacity** at start-up to take on responsibility for newly devolved jurisdictions.

Recommendation #5-16

The **NIC** recommends **that**, in the event that the federal Cabinet, informed by discussions involving the GNWT and **NTL**, were to **determine** that a major element of phasing of administrative capacity after 1999 were necessary, the following areas be considered for phasing-in at a later date: (1) certain aspects of regulatory affairs; (2) certain aspects of public works and government services; (3) **certain** aspects of transportation and, (4) administration of Crown lands (assuming further **devolution** occurs in this area).

(f) Other Items

In the course of its work to date, the **NIC** has formulated a number of opinions about aspects of the organization and operation of the **Nunavut** Government that, while not of **sufficient** importance to warrant extensive discussion, are **worth** consideration. Such opinions are put forward in the form of the following **recommendations**.

Recommendations

Recommendation #5-17

The **NIC** recommends that the **Nunavut** Government be designed to **permit**, and in many circumstances promote, part-time and seasonal employment and **job-sharing**.

Recommendation #5-18

The **NIC** recommends that training programs leading to and following the establishment of the **Nunavut**

Government be designed to discourage an excessive intensity of competition among government departments and agencies for promising individuals that may result in disrupted and incomplete pursuit of training activities.

Recommendation #5-19

The **NIC** recommends that the physical design of new **Nunavut** Government offices emphasize accessibility by the public and service to the **public**.

Recommendation #5-20

The **NIC** recommends that the physical design of new **Nunavut** Government offices emphasize requirements for in-house training by government departments and agencies and for close collaboration with educational and training facilities operated outside **government**.

Recommendation #5-21

The **NIC** recommends that the physical design of new **Nunavut** Government offices emphasize the needs of children and parents of **children**, including the need for government employees to have access to child-care facilities and services.

Government Employment in Nunavut

(a) Existing Government Employees

Note: In this chapter, and throughout this report, "government employment" and "public sector employment" have essentially the same meaning as "government employment" in Article 23 of the Nunavut Agreement, and include Nunavut-based employment involving:

- "": positions in the federal Public Service for which Treasury Board is the employer, and
- positions in the territorial Public Service for which the Commissioner is the employer (including positions in the NWT Housing Corporation), and positions for which the employer is a community government or housing association.

In thinking through the establishment of the Nunavut Government, it is easy to concentrate attention on the enormous number of things that will need to be done in order to ensure that the headquarters functions of various ministries and agencies will be up and running in April, 1999. Building up headquarters capacity will be a key challenge in the year leading to 1999. At the same time, it will be important to keep two other things closely in mind.

First of all, a large majority of the positions in the Nunavut public sector will be regional and community level positions, not headquarters positions. This is true today with respect to the public sector work force within the NWT; the Nunavut Government is being designed to place an even higher proportion of the public sector work force at the regional and community levels. Based on the design for the Nunavut Government set out

in Chapter 5, it can be expected that the overwhelming majority of non-federal public sector jobs in Nunavut will be at the regional and community levels. In percentage terms, only 14.5% of the non-federal public sector positions are proposed to be assigned to headquarters functions, and almost one-third of those positions could be located outside the capital.

Secondly, apart from a small percentage of jobs that are vacant at any time due to the inevitable delays that accompany people leaving and taking up jobs, the existing regional and community level work force of the future Nunavut Government is largely already in place. Current incumbents of GNWT funded positions at the regional and local levels—teachers, nurses, truck drivers, wildlife officers, and so forth—have two qualifications that make them a valuable part of the overall planning process: (1) a track record of "hands on" experience in meeting the job demands associated with their current positions; and, (2) a demonstrated ability to "fit in" to the circumstances, both physical and social, that make living in Nunavut different from living in other parts of Canada.

The high proportion of the Nunavut public sector work force that will be assigned to the regional and community levels, along with the large number of experienced individuals who now hold down positions in this regional and local employee pool, has a number of implications.

One implication is that it will be important to avoid overstating the magnitude of the task of establishing ministry and agency headquarters capacity in Nunavut. The job at hand between now and 1999 does not involve starting from scratch. It does not involve conjuring up an entire government, top to bottom, from out of the ether. Rather, the job at hand involves introducing an

efficiently organized headquarters level onto a solid body of regional and local administration that already exists in Nunavut. Viewed from this angle, the work to be done can be more readily seen in manageable and optimistic terms.

Another implication is that there is every incentive to make use of the work experience that is already assembled at the regional and local levels in staffing the Nunavut Government. The opening up of new headquarters positions should allow a significant number of existing regional and local public sector employees to "move up the ladder", applying expertise garnered at the regional and local levels to policy issues common to all of Nunavut. The approach of drawing on the existing pool of public sector workers could be taken too far; the creation of Nunavut should not be seen as the occasion for current employees, however well performing, to secure effortless promotions. With due regard to the merit principle, however, it will still be possible to give the senior ranks of the Nunavut Government headquarters "a familiar face" to the people of Nunavut.

A final implication flows from the advisability of making best use of individuals now working in regional and community level offices of the territorial and municipal governments. It will be highly desirable to retain within Nunavut those employees who are experienced in their work and comfortable with their circumstances, but may be tempted to leave. This is most obviously relevant with respect to those individuals who have moved to Nunavut from other parts of Canada and who might return there. But this point will also have increasing relevance with respect to those young, educated residents of Nunavut who, notwithstanding strong family and cultural roots in Nunavut, have job skills and personal attributes that provide considerable mobility.

A corollary to the desirability of retaining existing public sector employees in Nunavut with demonstrated competence is the desirability of motivating existing public sector workers in the Nunavut area to contribute enthusiastically and imaginatively to the building up of the Nunavut Government in the period leading to April, 1999. The successful start-up of the Nunavut Government will turn as much, if not more, on the willingness of regional and community level workers now in place to help bring about change smoothly as it will on the organizational charts and logistical calculations that form the "Big Picture".

How can the prospect of Nunavut become a source of excitement and optimism for the individuals who are now the day-in, day-out providers of essential public services in Nunavut? How can fears of displacement be addressed?

The following recommendations stem from the above observations and concerns.

Recommendations

Recommendation #6-1

The NIC recommends that previous work experience in Nunavut be given significant weighting in the recruitment of individuals to all new public sector positions associated with the creation of the Nunavut Government

Recommendation #6-2

The NIC recommends that a minimum of 50% of the initially recruited senior managers within the Nunavut Government have previous work experience in Nunavut.

Recommendation #6-3

The NIC recommends that the Government of Canada, the GNWT and NIT indicate, as soon as possible, support for the general proposition that every individual employed in a public sector position dealing with the Nunavut area prior to the coming into existence of the Nunavut Government, who has a satisfactory performance evaluation be offered an opportunity to retain that position or to secure a comparable one in the Nunavut public sector.

Recommendation #6-4

The NIC recommends that, subject to the research and consultation process referred to in Recommendation #6-5, the general proposition referred to in Recommendation #6-3 be incorporated in more precise form into the provisions of one or more collective agreements involving the Interim Commissioner for Nunavut, the federal Treasury Board, other public sector employer organizations and the representatives for collective bargaining purposes of public sector employees.

Recommendation #6-5

The NIC recommends that the Government of Canada, the GNWT, the representatives for collective bargaining purposes of current public sector employees, and the NIC devote collective attention as soon as possible to investigating and discussing issues surrounding employer/employee relations in the transition around the Nunavut Government coming into existence.

(b) New Government Employment in Nunavut: What's Desirable

This section focuses on the composition of the Nunavut public sector, particularly with respect to the proportion of Inuit employees in the public sector.

With respect to the proportion of Inuit employees in the Nunavut public sector, there can be no doubt about the objective that must be pursued. Article 23 of the Nunavut Agreement, entitled "Inuit Employment within Government", states:

"23.2.1 The objective of this Article is to increase Inuit participation in government employment in the Nunavut Settlement Area to a representative level...."

"Representative level" is defined in the definitions section of the Article to mean:

"... a level of Inuit employment within Government reflecting the ratio of Inuit to the total population in the Nunavut Settlement Area; this definition will apply within all occupational groupings and grade levels."

The Nunavut Agreement does not set a fixed target date for the attainment of the objective of a representative level of Inuit employment within the public sector in Nunavut. It does, however, set a timetable for the completion of steps aimed at ensuring progress in the timely realization of that objective.

Section 23.3.1 of the Nunavut Agreement states

"23.3.1 Within six months of the date of ratification of the Agreement and as a basis for the development of initiatives contemplated in this Article, the Government shall, with the participation of the NITC (Nunavut Implementation Training Committee), undertake a detailed analysis of the labour force of the Nunavut Settlement Area to determine the availability, interest and level of preparedness of Inuit for government employment. The data shall be maintained and updated on an on-going basis."

This obligation required completion of the initial analysis by January 9, 1994. It should be noted that there is a requirement to keep this analysis up to date.

Section 23.4.1 of the Nunavut Agreement states:

"23.4.1 Within three years of the date of ratification of the Agreement, each government organization

shall prepare an Inuit employment plan to increase and maintain the employment of Inuit at a representative level."

The definitions section of Article 23 defines "government organization" as "a department or similar body within Government in the Nunavut Settlement Area" (the definition also extends to municipal corporations). Section 23.42 provides a lengthy list of what must be included within an "hit employment plan" for each government organization. A key feature of each plan, as described in sub-section (b) of that section, is that it involve a:

"...phased approach, with reasonable short and medium term goals, in the form of numerical targets and timetables for employment of qualified Inuit in all levels and occupational groupings where under-representation has been identified; such goals to take into account the number of Inuit who are qualified or who would likely become qualified, projected operational requirement, and projected attrition rates."

Each government organization has until July 9, 1996, to complete its first Inuit employment plan.

A third series of milestones contemplated in Article 23 is set out in Part 7 of that Article, which is entitled "Review, Monitoring and Compliance". These milestones are described in section 23.7.1:

"23.7.1 On the fifth anniversary of the date of ratification of the Agreement and at five-year intervals thereafter, or at such other dates as may be agreed upon by the Implementation Panel, the Panel shall arrange for an independent review of the Inuit employment plans and other measures under this Article. The Implementation Panel shall identify and recommend measures to correct any deficiencies in the implementation of this Article...."

The first independent review is required to be completed by July 9, 1998.

Examination of the steps set out in the Nunavut Agreement for achievement of satisfactory progress towards the fulfillment of the objective of Article 23 results in the following

- the obligation with respect to the preparation of Inuit employment plans by July, 1996, will bind government organizations within the GNWT; how should such plans deal with the employment of increasing numbers of Inuit by the Nunavut Government in the period following its establishment?

- “the reference to “**Commissioner**” in the definition of “government employment” probably extends to an Interim Commissioner for **Nunavut** on his or her appointment; would an Interim Commissioner for **Nunavut** be positioned to follow up, immediately upon taking office, on **Inuit** employment plan obligations entered into by government organizations within the **GNWT**?
- what is entailed in the requirement for each **Inuit** employment plan to follow a “**phased approach**, with reasonable short and **medium term goals**” for the employment of **qualified Inuit**?; what is “short **term**”? “medium term”?; what are “reasonable” goals?
- while the Implementation Panel, made up of federal government, **GNWT** and **NTI** nominees, **will** have the ability to **carry out** a review of the **results** of this Article of the Nunavut Agreement in 1998 and at intends thereafter, how will **work** be **co-ordinated** across various government organizations in the period before that?
- Article 23 devotes attention to apprenticeships, internships, **in-service** education assignments, upgrading programs, and the like; what, however, does this Article imply with respect to the problems **associated** with equipping **Inuit** with basic literacy and other school-leaving skills?

The Nunavut Agreement contains more **commitments** with respect to public sector employment than any other comprehensive land claims agreement. Given the inter-connections between the Nunavut Agreement and the creation of the **Nunavut** Government, the importance attached by **Inuit** during land claims negotiations to new public sector **employment** opportunities is not surprising. Nor is it surprising that the emphasis placed on public **sector** employment of **Inuit** in the Nunavut Agreement is mirrored elsewhere in the **Agreement**. Article 37, which deals with implementation issues, commits the Government of **Canada** to contribute \$13,000,000 towards an Implementation Training Trust. This **Trust**, to be administer by the **Nunavut Implementation Training Committee**, is aimed at preparing **Inuit** to take up the personnel requirements **associated** with implementation of the Nunavut Agreement. These jobs will be created primarily within the new institutions of public government contemplated by the Agreement and within various **Inuit** organizations administering **Inuit** rights and benefits under the Agreement.

Acknowledgement of the desirability of more **representative levels of Inuit employment** in the Nunavut work force is not **confined** to the **Nunavut Agreement**. The Nunavut Political Accord (Appendix A-5), entered into by the Government of Canada, the **GNWT** and **NTI**'s predecessor, places considerable emphasis on **training** and human resource planning. Sections 9.1 and 9.2 of the Accord state:

“9.1 The parties recognize the central importance of training in enabling **Nunavut residents** to **access** jobs resulting from division of the Northwest Territories, and that investing in people is of greater value than investing in **infrastructure**.”

9.2 Training plans shall be incorporated into all **planning**, design and implementation activities of the **NIC** as reflected in (its).. general mandate..”

Section 9.1 recites a clear priority to be given to training and **human** resource issues over building up the physical plant of the Nunavut Government. **This priority** should be kept clearly in mind in the event that limitations on **financial resources** prevent the **Nunavut** Government being **established** in the best of all possible ways.

In identifying what objectives are desired to be **obtained** with **respect** to employment within **Nunavut**, the **Nunavut Agreement** and Nunavut Political Accord are defining points of reference. In the case of the Nunavut Agreement, the legal force and Constitutional status of the Agreement compel this conclusion; in the **case** of the Nunavut Political Accord, the political and moral force of the document is similarly persuasive. It should not be thought, however, that **objectives** need be **limited** to those matters that have been determined to be of the highest importance.

For example, given the significant attached to issues of equality between men and women in Nunavut, it is important that training and human resource planning for Nunavut encourage **full participation** by men and women in new employment opportunities. Similarly, there is no need to confine the objective of **representative levels of Inuit employment** to the public sector in **Nunavut**. While only the public sector will **be** governed by the explicit requirements of the **Nunavut** Agreement, there is no sensible reason to **confine** training and human resource efforts to the **staffing** of government **jobs**. On the contrary, it is both inevitable and desirable that individuals move from the public sector to the private sector and vice versa. A public sector structured dramatically different from the private sector would generate perceptions of privilege, discrimination, or worse.

Without limiting the stand-alone obligations imposed by the Nunavut Agreement to create on-the-job solutions to many of the difficulties that inhibit the retention and promotion of Inuit employees, a lack of basic entry level skills on the part of many Inuit is a problem common to public sector and private sector employers. A common problem begs a co-ordinated search for a solution.

Recommendations

Recommendation #6-6

The NIC recommends that planning with respect to the organization and design of the new **Nunavut Government** on the one hand, and with respect to government employment in **Nunavut** on the other, must be seen as bound together. Issues relating to the size and composition of the **Nunavut** public sector cannot be dealt with in isolation from each other.

Recommendation #7

The NIC recommends that **all planning with respect to government** employment in **Nunavut** be built upon the Constitutionally protected commitments with respect to **Inuit** participation in government employment set out in Article 23 of the **Nunavut Agreement**.

Recommendation #6-8

The NIC recommends that all planning with respect to government employment in **Nunavut** proceed from an understanding that implementation of the **Nunavut Agreement**, and honouring the expectations of the people of **Nunavut**, require that the new **Nunavut Government**, at its inception, be at least as representative of the **Inuit** share of the **Nunavut** population as is the public sector in **Nunavut** today (approaching 50% of government employees in **Nunavut** are **Inuit**). Accordingly, NIC recommends that all planning proceed from an understanding that, at a minimum, **Nunavut** government employment as of **April, 1999**, be 50% **Inuit** by way of (1) overall composition% and (2) occupation of senior management positions.

Recommendation #6-9

The NIC recommends that the **Inuit** employment plans to be completed initially by all government organizations by July 9, 1996, ensure consistent progress, in five year increments, towards the goal of representative levels of **Inuit employment**. Such plans should provide

for the attainment of representative levels as soon as possible and, in any event, not later than 2021 (i.e. 25 years-a generation-after the completion of the first **Inuit employment** plans).

Recommendation #6-10

The NIC recommends that, in order to facilitate human resource planning and assessment, the **Government of Canada**, the **GNWT** and **NTI** (or its designate) maintain a common data base of all **Nunavut** based positions, including job descriptions, qualifications and training paths.

Recommendation #6-n

The NIC recommends that government organizations within the **GNWT** prepare **Inuit** employment plans that extend beyond the coming into existence of the **Nunavut** Government in April, 1999. Such plans should factor in emerging political consensus as to the administrative organization and design of the **Nunavut** Government after April, 1999. **GNWT** responsibility for the pursuit of such **Inuit employment** plans would terminate on the coming into existence of the **Nunavut Government**.

Recommendation #6-12

The NIC recommends that, given the primacy and urgency of training and human resource planning issues, and mindful of difficulties of inter-organizational coordination, the following steps be taken as soon as possible to promote more effective results (where such steps have already been taken, they should be kept up):

1. the **GNWT** should designate a single individual to co-ordinate training and human resource issues in relation to **Nunavut** on behalf of territorial government and municipal government organizations; this individual should be situated in the Division Secretariat;
2. the Government of Canada should designate a single individual to co-ordinate training and human resource issues in relation to **Nunavut** on behalf of federal government organizations;
3. **NTI** should designate a single individual to represent the interests of **Inuit** organizations with respect to training and human resource issues;
4. upon appointment of an Interim Commissioner for **Nunavut**, the Interim Commissioner should designate an individual to represent the Government of **Nunavut** with respect to training and human resource issues; and

5. these designated individuals, along with the training and human resource development **co-ordinator** of the **NIC**, **should** meet on a regular basis to develop a shared approach to training and human resource initiatives and to advise their respective principals on the best use of the combined financial resources available; other participants should be invited to take part as needed.

Recommendation #6-13

The **NIC** recommends that **planning** for new employment opportunities in **Nunavut** encourage the full **participation** of both men and women.

Recommendation #6-14

The **NIC** recommends that **planning** for new employment opportunities in **Nunavut** take into account the private as well as **the public** sector and accommodate the mobility of workers between sectors.

(c) An Education and Training Program for the Nunavut Government Work Force

The education and training dimensions of the project to establish the **Nunavut** Government will significantly affect the levels of in-migration to **Nunavut**, the operating rests of the **Nunavut** Government, and the attenuation or exacerbation of economic and social disparities in **Nunavut**. In **attempting** to think through what kind of concrete measures should be taken in **pursuit** of the government employment objectives sketched out in the previous sections of this chapter, it is important to keep two points in mind.

The first point is that a successful approach to human resource challenges associated with the creation of the **Nunavut** Government should not **be** determined in a vacuum. Education and training responsibilities, **facilities**, programs and budgets now exist in **Nunavut**. Governmental **experience** has been built up, institutions are functioning at the community and **Nunavut** levels, and **people**—in the form of educators, graduates, and a current crop of students—can be attached to statistics.

The education and training efforts **associated** with the creation of the **Nunavut** must build on those things already in place. College level, secondary school, primary **school** and adult education programs and budgets should focus on the new public sector and private sector professional and vocational opportunities

that will be opened up. All levels of government should think through the kinds of education and training initiatives that should be inaugurated in order to prepare existing employees, and to recruit new ones, for the post-division public sector in **Nunavut**. In some cases this will mean making better use of **financial** resources already available to the public sector. In other cases, it will be necessary to create and fund new education and training efforts aimed at **Nunavut**. In particular, and as described in Recommendation #5-12, the **GNWT** will have to carry out a **major** undertaking to **re-organize itself**, and **re-orient** its work force, for division. This **re-organization** at the territorial government level, which will be mirrored in a less substantial way at the federal and municipal levels, will entail significant costs. These costs should be identified as soon as possible and factored into the transitional costs of creating the **Nunavut** Government.

A second point to note in relation to education and training is that the **successful** creation of the **Nunavut** Government would benefit from a judiciously chosen set of new initiatives which go beyond existing programs. Such initiatives are particularly needed in ensuring that as many of **today's** youth as possible are motivated and assisted to acquire the kinds of general and specific academic and technical skills needed to take up the job opportunities of tomorrow. To this end, the **NIC** has put together, in collaboration with other parties committed to **meeting** the education and training needs of **Nunavut**, a set of new initiatives in the form of "An Education and Training Program for the **Nunavut** Government Work Force" (see Appendix A-15). The **NIC** supports the financing of this program as a transitional cost associated with the **creation** of **Nunavut**.

Recommendations

Recommendation #6-15

The NIC recommends that, the Government of **Canada**, the **GNWT** and **NTI** **endorse** "An Education and Training Program for the **Nunavut** Government Work Force", referred to in **this** section and set out in its entirety in Appendix A-15.

Infrastructure and New Communications Technologies

(a) Infrastructure

L. Requirements

Chapter 5 of this report outlines the approach taken by the NIC to the structures, locations and personnel requirements of the Nunavut Government. Details of this approach, with variations resulting from different choices of capital, are set out in a number of appendices to this report (see Appendices A-10 to A-13). Another Appendix (A-14) provides information about the demographic impacts of different choices of capital.

In calculating the cost implications of the recommended approach to organizing the Nunavut Government, the NIC has developed a number of key assumptions relevant to infrastructure (average household size, mix of housing units needed, etc.). In assembling these assumptions, the NIC has been assisted by federal and territorial government officials with pertinent expertise, as well as by Price Waterhouse Management Consultants. All these assumptions, and the cost implications flowing from these assumptions, are set out in appendices (A-16 and A-17) that support Chapter 11 of this report.

2. Delivery

The construction of infrastructure to accommodate the Nunavut Government will be a major project. While the size of the project will give it Canada-wide importance, its impact will be most significantly felt in Nunavut. In planning for the initial construction, and subsequent maintenance, of the capital works necessary to accommodate the Nunavut Government, three fundamental objectives must be kept clearly in mind.

The first objective is to secure facilities and services for the Nunavut Government that will meet its immediate and reasonably foreseeable needs of the Nunavut Government. This means ensuring that facilities and services are designed to meet the purposes required, that they are of a quality that meets arctic circumstances, and that they can be readily expanded to cope with predictable increases in the demands for certain types of government services due to demographic changes in Nunavut.

A second objective is that facilities be supplied and maintained in a cost effective manner. This objective should be an important aspect of public sector planning at any time; Canada's current fiscal difficulties can only make this objective even more compelling in the years leading to the establishment and early operation of the Nunavut Government. Cost effectiveness does not, of course, necessarily entail using lowest cost options. This is particularly true when, as is the case with Nunavut, facilities are being delivered against a backdrop of (1) potential phasing-in of additional government capacity, and (2) a population that is growing rapidly independently of the project at hand. In order to promote the securing of an acceptable measure of cost effectiveness, it is necessary to define an appropriate planning horizon for the determination of facility and service needs and costs.

A third fundamental objective associated with the construction and maintenance of facilities should be the promotion of greater economic self-sufficiency in Nunavut. This can be assisted in a number of ways. Adopting strategies for the construction and maintenance of facilities that emphasize public sector/private sector partnerships can help build up the private sector in Nunavut, thereby contributing to a more diversified and resilient Nunavut economy. Such strategies, if struc-

tered properly, can also have the beneficial effect of reducing the initial federal government capital expenditures needed to get the Nunavut Government Up and running. Equally important to emphasizing public sector/private sector partnerships will be encouraging Inuit controlled and other businesses in Nunavut of various kinds—development corporations, co-operatives, private companies, individual proprietorships—to play a strong role in the construction and maintenance of Nunavut Government facilities.

In order to promote public sector/private sector partnerships, the NIC believes that the construction and maintenance of Nunavut Government facilities should, as a general proposition, be secured through leasehold arrangements with private sector suppliers. Such leasehold arrangements could typically be expected to last for 20 year terms with respect to the supply of new facilities and 10 year terms with respect to existing ones.

In encouraging the forging of public sector/private sector partnerships for the furnishing of facilities to the Nunavut Government, it is important to remember some exceptions and qualifications.

There will be a number of special purpose facilities required by the Nunavut Government—for example, health care facilities, schools, and the Legislative Assembly building—for which conventional leasehold arrangements would not likely be suitable. In addition, the leasing of facilities by the Nunavut Government of facilities constructed and owned by the private sector should not be confused with the transfer of ownership to the private sector of facilities in Nunavut that are now owned by the public sector.

The existing stock of GNWT staff housing is particularly noteworthy in this regard. It may well be that the future legislators of Nunavut may at some date embrace a set of comprehensive housing policies that will result in the orderly and fair transfer of staff housing units to the private sector. At the moment and for the foreseeable future, however, it is unlikely that the piecemeal sale of the existing GNWT staff housing stock in Nunavut can do anything except complicate the eventual emergence of a healthy private sector to the housing market, and reinforce public perceptions of social cleavages and inequities. The creation of the Nunavut Government will, no doubt, generate its own substantial pressures on the housing market in Nunavut, especially in relation to the community chosen as capital. It would be inadvisable to continue to sell GNWT staff housing units in the Nunavut area until a comprehensive housing policy for Nunavut has been developed which takes fully into account the housing implications of the creation of the Nunavut Government.

Equally important to the promotion of public sector /private sector partnerships is stimulating the growth of the Nunavut business sector, and the Inuit component of the Nunavut business sector in particular.

Promotion of Inuit controlled businesses in Nunavut was the motivation behind the inclusion of Article 24 of the Nunavut Agreement. Article 24 states the following general objective:

“24.21 The Government of Canada and the Territorial Government shall provide reasonable support and assistance to Inuit firms in accordance with this Article to enable them to compete for government contracts.”

“Inuit firms” are defined as including a limited company with at least 51% of the company’s voting shares beneficially owned by Inuit, a Co-operative controlled by Inuit, and an Inuk sole proprietorship or partnership.

In support of the general objective set out in Article 24, the Article contains specific commitments in relation to various aspects of the government contracting process, including procurement policies, bid invitation, bid solicitation, and bid criteria. By way of illustration, the following section describes the obligations of the Government of Canada with respect to the bid criteria associated with federal contracts in the Nunavut Settlement Area:

“24.6.2 Whenever practicable, and consistent with sound procurement management, and subject to Canada’s international obligations, all of the following criteria, or as many as may be appropriate with respect to any particular contract, shall be included in the bid criteria established by the Government of Canada for the awarding of government contracts in the Nunavut Settlement Area:

- (a) the existence of head offices, administrative offices or other facilities in the Nunavut Settlement Area;
- (b) the employment of Inuit labour, engagement of Inuit professional services or use of suppliers that are Inuit or Inuit firms in carrying out the contracts; or
- (c) the undertaking of commitments, under the contract, with respect to on-the-job training or skills development of Inuit.”

In examining Article 24 of the Nunavut Agreement, including Part 8 dealing with Evaluation and Monitoring and Part 9 dealing with Implementation, a couple of

things are relevant to the design and awarding of **government** contracts associated with the construction and maintenance of infrastructure for the **Nunavut Government**.

The **first** thing to note is that the commitments set out in Article 24 need to be fulfilled through the adoption of detailed policies by the appropriate contracts administration branches of the federal and territorial governments. These **policies** must be **developed** in collaboration with NTI, and discussions have already **occurred** between NTI and the federal Treasury Board, and between NTI and the territorial Department of Public Works and Services, on how best to bring relevant **government** policies and practices into line with the **Nunavut Agreement**. One possibility that has been **raised** by NTI in discussions with the federal government would involve taking advantage of the **regulation-making** power granted to the **Governor in Council** under the **Nunavut Land Claims Agreement Act** Other **mechanisms** might prove equally satisfactory.

A second aspect of **Article 24** worth emphasizing is its overall focus on the promotion of **economic** opportunities for **Inuit** firms in Nunavut and, to a lesser extent, the promotion of economic **activity in Nunavut** as a whole. With respect to the obligations of the **Government** of Canada under the Article, there is no indication that such obligations can be discharged by giving favorable treatment to all firms situated in the NWT or all firms situated in a **specific** community in the NWT.

Article 24 takes a somewhat **different** focus with respect to **GNWT** obligations

"24.9.2 The Territorial **Government** will **carry** out the terms of this Article through the application of Territorial Government preferential contracting policies, procedures and approaches **intended** to maximize local, regional and **northern** employment and business opportunities."

This section lacks **explicit reference** to policies, **procedures** and approaches tailored to **Inuit** firms and to the Nunavut area. This lack of **explicit reference** to **Inuit** firms and to the Nunavut **area reflects** a GNWT approach to stimulating the private **sector** that gives **preference** in awarding **government** contracts (1) to NWT businesses over businesses based outside the NWT, and (2) where a **contract** is in relation to a particular community, to local businesses over other **businesses**. Thus, the current GNWT Business Incentive Policy (**BIP**) provides that bids by northern (NWT) businesses for **territorial** government contracts will be adjusted favorably by 15% of the value of their northern (NWT) content and that bids by local businesses will be adjusted a further 5% for local content. The obvious advantages **associated**

with being classified as a "northern business" and a "local business" has forced the GNWT to become vigilant in distinguishing between businesses that meet the various criteria, on a **bona fide** basis, and those that are merely "storefront" operations that **are** setup for the **purpose of qualifying** for bid preference. Applying the policy to sub-contractors has posed **special** challenges.

Regardless of **existing** GNWT policies, it should be emphasized that the project to construct and maintain the infrastructure **needed** to accommodate the **Nunavut Government** has to satisfy the **Inuit-centred** and **Nunavut-centred** obligations of the Government of Canada under Article 24. This follows for two reasons.

First of all, the **Government** of Canada accepts responsibility for the provision of new infrastructure associated with the establishment of the Nunavut Government. This acceptance of responsibility was stated in the following way in a letter from DIAND Minister Irwin to the NIC dated **December 19, 1994**:

"As you are **aware**, the federal government is responsible for incremental facilities linked to the establishment of the Government of **Nunavut**, as well as any new federal requirements, and ensuring that this **is** done in a cost-effective manner. The federal Cabinet has designated the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (**DIAND**) as **infrastructure** Project Leader with the Department of Public Works and Government Services (**PWGS**) to act as Project Leader and Strategic **Investment Adviser**".

Federal responsibility for the provision of infrastructure is **accompanied** by federal responsibility for bearing the **costs** entailed with the supply of needed infrastructure.

A second reason for emphasizing the **requirement** for compliance with the **Inuit-centred** and **Nunavut-centred** obligations under Article 24 is the definition of "government contract" under section 24.1.1. Under that section, "government contract" is defined to mean

"... a **contract**, other than a contract for **government** employment as defined in Article 23, between the Government and a party other than Government or any other government for **procurement** of goods or services-"

The NIC understands that the GNWT has indicated a willingness to the federal government to take on a role of "managing" the project of constructing and maintaining the infrastructure. Given the definition of "government contract" **contained** in Article 24, and its inclusion of inter-governmental contracts, it would appear that the Government of **Canada** could not be relieved of its Inuit-

centred and Nunavut-centred obligations under Article 24, even in the event the federal government were prepared to enter into an umbrella "sub-contracting" of project management to the GNWT (the consent of NTI to any such inter-governmental arrangement would, no doubt, qualify this result). Accordingly, it is unlikely that the Government of Canada could rely entirely on the application of existing GNWT business incentive and related policies, which are northern-centred and locality-centred, rather than focused on Inuit and Nunavut, to discharge federal commitments under the Nunavut Agreement.

There is considerable work that needs to be accomplished to ensure that the on-going contract design and administration work of the federal and territorial governments in relation to the Nunavut area meet the requirements of the Nunavut Agreement. In order to secure reliable results, federal government and GNWT contracting policies, procedures and approaches will need to be re-visited in detail. This will be a major task. Given the finite lead time available to begin infrastructure work connected to the coming into operation of the Nunavut Government in April, 1999, the NIC believes that the appropriate approach by government to contracting the supply of Nunavut Government infrastructure should not await the refinement of policies and measures to implement, on a long-term and on-going basis, the letter and spirit of Article 24 of the Nunavut Agreement. Rather, the NIC take the view that, for the purpose of government contracting procedures, the provision of new infrastructure to support the Nunavut Government should be considered as a discrete, stand-alone matter. This approach has four major advantages

- . it would assist in timely decision-making with respect to contracting for Nunavut Government infrastructure;
- without holding up Nunavut Government infrastructure work, it would allow the practical experience gained from contracting such work to feed into the development of longer-term, on-going government contracting measures to be adopted at the federal and territorial levels to implement fully the letter and spirit of Article 24 of the Nunavut Agreement;
- . it would allow for greater accuracy in identifying incremental costs bound up in the creation of Nunavut; and
- it would allow for greater clarity in distinguishing between the incremental capital investments made to accommodate the creation of the Nunavut Government and the on-going capital expenditure program activities of the GNWT.

To date, communications with the Government of Canada have indicated that, notwithstanding the request of the GNWT to act as project manager, administration of the contracting process for Nunavut Government infrastructure will be handled by "the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND) as Infrastructure Project Leader with the Department of Public Works and Government Services (PWGS) to act as Project Manager and Strategic Investment Adviser". This position is consistent with both the Government of Canada's statutory responsibilities in relation to Nunavut and its financial commitments under the Nunavut Political Accord. This position however, discounts a couple of practical reasons why it might be advantageous to "sub-contract" the supply of Nunavut Government infrastructure to the GNWT.

The most significant advantage relates to the practical experience and expertise that has been built up in the GNWT, in both headquarters and regional offices, concerning the cost efficient design and delivery of capital projects in a part of the country that defies off-the-shelf importation of engineering, architectural and building skills that might be adequate elsewhere. Sub-contracting the management of the Nunavut Government infrastructure to the GNWT would be the most logical way to tap into GNWT-based experience and expertise.

A second incentive to sub-contract to the GNWT involves minimizing problems of inter-governmental coordination. Building up the infrastructure needed to operate the Nunavut Government will inevitably involve connections with existing infrastructure-water, sewage, roads, schools, etc.-that falls within the direct or indirect responsibility of the GNWT. Sub-contracting the management of all infrastructure work associated with the creation of the Nunavut Government to the GNWT could avoid a number of potential administrative complexity: and delays that might flow from a divided effort.

It should be remembered that sub-contracting the supply of Nunavut Government infrastructure to the GNWT would necessarily be subject to various terms and conditions, and the precise form that any inter-governmental agreement on the subject might take would be of considerable significance. Given the indications from NTI and other Inuit organizations that the GNWT's current BIP falls short of providing adequate stimulus to Inuit controlled and other Nunavut businesses, coupled with the Government of Canada's own obligations under Article 24 of the Nunavut Agreement, any sub-contracting to the GNWT should be subject to terms and conditions accommodating the reasonable proposals of NTI and other Inuit organizations involved in economic development issues.

In light of the desirability of clarifying government contract issues prior to a federal Cabinet reference, the NIC believes that the Government of Canada, the GNWT and NTI should make intensive efforts to reach agreement, by June 30, 1995, on appropriate arrangements governing Nunavut Government infrastructure contracting. While not pre-supposing the outcome of any negotiations, it would be appropriate for such arrangements to balance the routing of management of the infrastructure project through the GNWT with special measures in favour of the residents of Nunavut. These could take the form of such things as (1) the use of Nunavut regional offices of the GNWT, (2) the replacement of the existing "northern business preference" component of the GNWT, BIP, with an appropriately defined "Nunavut business preference", and (3) the use of an on-going policy advisory committee made up of Nunavut residents to build public input and confidence in Nunavut. The NIC would be prepared to assist in intensive efforts along these lines if invited by the parties.

Recommendations

Recommendation #7-1

The NIC recommends that infrastructure be built in Nunavut adequate to meet the overall infrastructure needs associated with the organization of the Nunavut Government along the lines set out in Appendix A-10, and consistent with the infrastructure and cost assumptions set out in Appendices A-16 and A-17.

Recommendation #7-2

The NIC recommends that planning and implementation of the Nunavut Government proceed on the basis that, as a general proposition, new Nunavut Government facilities should be constructed and maintained through leasehold arrangements with private sector suppliers.

Recommendation #7-3

The NIC recommends that the GNWT discontinue the sale of GNWT staff housing in the Nunavut area until a comprehensive housing policy has been developed which takes fully into account the housing implications of the creation of the Nunavut Government.

Recommendation #7-4

The NIC recommends that, in relation to the broad, on-going process of government contracting, the

Government of Canada and the GNWT each continue comprehensive discussions with NTI for the purpose of ensuring that day-to-day contracting policies, procedures and approaches for the construction and maintenance of government facilities meet fully the letter and spirit of Article 24 of the Nunavut Agreement.

Recommendation #7-5

The NIC recommends that, notwithstanding the process referred to in Recommendation #7-4, the provision of new infrastructure to support the Nunavut Government should, for the purposes of government contracting, be considered as a discrete, stand-alone matter, and subject to a specially defined set of arrangements. Such arrangements should maximize the economic stimulus provided to Nunavut while, at a minimum, meeting all the Inuit-centred and Nunavut-centred aspects of Article 24 of the Nunavut Agreement.

Recommendation #7-6

The NIC recommends that the Government of Canada, the GNWT and NTI make intensive efforts in the three month period April 1, 1995, to June 30, 1995, to reach agreement on appropriate arrangements for government contracting in relation to Nunavut Government infrastructure consistent with Article 24 of the Nunavut Agreement. The NIC recommends that:

1. such arrangements should route through the GNWT, by way of an appropriate agreement, the tendering, awarding and management of the construction and leasing of federally-funded infrastructure for the Nunavut Government;
2. such tendering, awarding and management be done through Nunavut-based offices of the GNWT, and not through a Yellowknife office;
3. the tendering, awarding and management of the contracts be subject to a modified form of the GNWT's current Business Incentive Policy (BIP);
4. modifications to the GNWT's BIP in its application to the federally-funded Nunavut infrastructure entail the replacement of "northern business preference", with a similar or comparable "Nunavut business preference"; that "Nunavut business preference" be applied only to those firms based in Nunavut, and that no "northern business preference" be applied to northern businesses not based in Nunavut; the replacement of "northern business preference" with "Nunavut business preference" would not effect the local business preference aspect of the existing BIP; and

5. a **policy** advisory committee be formed, made up of **Nunavut** residents, to advise on the process for tender, **award**, management and monitoring of such contracts.

(b) New Communications Technologies

There are a number of reasons why the **Nunavut Government**, and those helping to organize its **first operations**, should be vitally interested in the matter of new communications technologies.

On a broad level, the **opportunities** for **economic** development and prosperity within **Nunavut** will be a direct function of access to **information** and services, coupled with the ability to reach global markets. It is critical that implementation plans for **Nunavut** take this into account and that communications infrastructure be in place to ensure that the people and government of **Nunavut** have access to the tools and information needed for growth.

Implementation plans will require innovation and alliances. Innovation regarding the deployment of technologies and **processes** will enable the business of the **Nunavut Government** and **Nunavut** residents to be conducted **efficiently**. Alliances among the federal government, **territorial** government, and the private sector will ensure fair access at affordable prices to information and telecommunications services. Establishment of **Nunavut** requires that a basic telecommunications pathway be established early, and that it be intrinsically linked to the needs of the people and **Government** of **Nunavut**.

On a more specific level, a modern **telecommunications** infrastructure is required to support a fundamental tenet of the design and establishment of a **decentralized Nunavut Government**: to **maximize** the **number** of jobs distributed throughout the communities and regions.

The geographic distribution of **government** departments poses significant organizational challenges that can only be met through the effective use of modern-day telecommunications technologies. Considerable distances separate communities from each other, and will separate regional **centres** from the capital. Physical distances, along with frequently adverse weather conditions, contribute to irregular and erratic transportation **services** that affect the **efficiency** of **government** operations. **Government** officials who are unable to attend **important** meetings, or who are "weathered in" en route, can add significantly to the **travel** budgets of **government**

departments, **to say nothing** of the costs of lost work time. To continue to move bodies around the communities **will** not help productivity.

Cultural attachment to home communities and high travel **costs**, combine to deprive residents of smaller communities in **Nunavut** of access to services and facilities that residents of regional **centres** in **Nunavut** enjoy, and that most other Canadians take for granted. Increasing pressure is being placed on government to deliver more and **improved** educational, health and other programs and **services** in smaller communities. Unfortunately, the costs of delivering enhanced programs and services to smaller communities in a conventional **manner**—the construction of well equipped modem facilities and the deployment of highly trained personnel—are increasingly difficult, if not prohibitive. New telecommunications technologies offer **considerable** hope of finding **economically** viable solutions to bridge the gap **between** the demand for **government** services and the special costs associated with operating in geographically isolated locations.

Both global and **Nunavut-specific** government telecommunications/ information needs can only be **accomplished** effectively and efficiently through the use of modern-day communications technologies. Pathways of the past were forged by dogsled and snowmobile. The pathways of the present are **travelled** by air. The pathways of the future will be **travelled** electronically. The resources of the future are information and the people who use it. **Nunavut** must be **W** to the "Information Highway".

Information Highway

The Nunavut Government cannot afford to be a hitchhiker on the **Information Highway**, but must actively **participate** in its construction and the guidance of its traffic.

The Information Highway has been characterized as a "network of networks", that allows for a **two-way** communications and information exchange of any kind, including full motion video, from anyone to anyone else, anytime, anywhere. At a physical level the **Information Highway** is a "network of networks" with standards and protocols that enable dispersed and different computers to exchange data. A technological definition of the **Information Highway** is too narrow a focus, however, and misses key policy objectives outlined in the January, 1994, federal Speech from the Throne: creation of **jobs** through innovation and investment in Canada; reinforcement of Canadian sovereignty and cultural identity; and, provision of universal access at reasonable cost.

For the Government of Nunavut, the challenge will be to ensure that, through adequate access to the Information Highway, Nunavut will be able to gain access to the opportunities and services available to other Canadians.

In a recent pronouncement, federal Finance Minister Paul Martin outlined the federal government's commitment to the "Information Highway" in all regions of the country

"The Information Highway promises to reduce the disadvantages of distance and remote locations in Canada. This has profound implications for the economic prospects of less advantaged regions and smaller communities throughout the nation. The development of an effective information highway promises to revolutionize the electronic delivery of government and other services, as well as to deliver "distance education" to every corner of the country."
(*"Jobs and Growth"*, October, 1994, page 63)

Federal Industry Minister John Manley has also identified the different needs of the various regions of the country:

"The government believes strong regional economies are the building blocks of Canada. To be effective, economic policy must recognize the differences between regions. Regionally based program delivery will build on past success to help firms meet competition in the international marketplace, improving competitive capacity and productivity in all regions. The goals and initiatives presented in this paper apply regionally as they do nationally."
(*"Building a More Innovative Economy"*, November, 1994, page 17)

The definition of the Information Highway is evolving into "a community of communities". Just as community may be defined as a people living in one area, or a group of people with similar interests, the Information Highway may be defined as a system that brings together the collective strengths of Canadians by enabling quick and efficient access to information and to each other. All Canadians, regardless of location or economic status, have incentive to use the Information Highway in order to participate in the growth and prosperity of Canada.

The "Internet"

It is estimated that 30-40% of Canadians now own home computers. This number is expected to increase to 70-80% within the next five years. Many of the new systems

are equipped with modems for connection to external networks, and new purchases are commonly equipped for multimedia applications like CD-ROM video, audio, and graphics. Many households are now connected to local "information on-ramps" such as bulletin boards and Free-Net, and to wider networks such as Internet, SchoolNet, CompuServe, etc. The Internet consists of some 20,000 registered networks, over 3 million host computers, and in excess of 20 million users worldwide. It transports text, images, audio clips, and video through the network, and its number of users is expected to grow to 100 million by the year 2000. The use of these types of networks assists in breaking down communications barriers and uniting local, regional and international communities of interest.

Importance to Nunavut

While computers and networks should not be seen as a panacea for the social and economic challenges that confront Nunavut, tackling such challenges will require these fundamental tools. The ability of Nunavut to market products and services in this new information-based economy will be dependent on suitable infrastructure to access and distribute information and on the skill sets of citizens to operate effectively in the new economy. Infrastructure, productivity, and competitiveness must be closely linked in any growth agenda for the marketplace of the 1990s.

Communications technologies will be crucial to the private sector in Nunavut. The private sector will need to organize itself to communicate within and outside the costly world of arctic Canada, especially insofar as it has to compete directly with southern-based interests that operate primarily in lower cost environments. Access to information and the need for instantaneous telecommunications will be crucial to winning contracts, delivering cost efficient services, and running organizations effectively.

Breakthroughs in communications technologies in recent years have changed dramatically the way public sector and private sector business is conducted. In an era of instant global communications, access to information, and confidences to its speedy and reliable transmission, are critical. Contemporary innovations now in use in the South include: access to libraries and centrally located files through the use of computer mod-entire collections contained on CD ROMs; instant exchange of information via computer modem and FAX machine; interactive business meetings, educational programs and medical diagnosis conducted via audio/visual conferencing; electronic transaction of finances; electronic

filing and payment of taxes: debit card shopping in stores, and home shopping via cable and satellite television; and, access to the Internet communications network via home computers.

Changing Views

Over the **next 5-10** years we will **dramatically change** the way we view communications technologies. We **are evolving** from the stage of viewing **computers** and communications networks in technological terms to considering them as simply part of the landscape. With time, computers and video conferencing **units** will become appliances that simply exist as **part** of an **infrastructure** that enables work and home to be run **successfully**. In building a community, planners would never design without access to electric power; the communities of the future **will not** be built without access to information **services**.

Planning for the new technologies is a challenging field. At the time that the NIC commissioners **were** appointed, a mere 15 months ago, how many of us could have predicted that the World Wide Web, a relatively recent phenomenon on the Internet, would almost explode in popularity and **commercial** appeal by the time that this, the NIC's first comprehensive **report**, goes to print? As an **ever-increasing** amount of **research** is dedicated to the **development** of user-friendly **tools** for the Information **Highway**—such as the World Wide **Web**—access to **ample bandwidth** becomes **increasingly critical**. The very developments which make the **Internet** a useful tool **assume** a high level of infrastructure, and without that basic infrastructure many of these developments will remain out of reach to the residents, businesses and governments of **Nunavut**.

Regulatory Environment

Of critical concern to a Nunavut Government are **access** and affordability. The key to ensuring access to affordable **services** is to keep **Nunavut** on the agendas of both the **Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC)** and the "Advisory Council on the Information **Highway**". Cable companies will be attempting to move into telephony and telephone **companies** will **try** to access cable/broadcasting markets, all of which fall under the regulatory responsibilities of the CRTC.

The Telecommunications Act regulates all **telecommunications** carriers in Canada and sets out their operational **framework**. In a recent regulatory review, the CRTC said:

"...any changes to regulation must be **conductive** to the following objectives:

-universal accessibility to basic telephone service at affordable prices;

...**encouragement** of the development and widespread availability of **new technology and innovative services** to respond to the needs of business and residence customers."

(Telecom Decision CRTC 94-19)

As interactive and transactional **services** become increasingly available, access to these and other information services may also come to be considered essential by many subscribers. Promoting the use of Canadian **facilities** and making **telecommunications** affordable in all regions of Canada are intrinsically linked.

While the Telecommunications Act **performs** an essential **role** in the maintenance of Canada's sovereignty, the **CRTC's telecommunications** policy sets out the **social** and economic agenda

"...1) to facilitate the orderly development throughout Canada of a **telecommunications** system that serves to safeguard, enrich and strengthen the social and economic fabric of **Canada** and its regions;

2) to render reliable and affordable telecommunications **services** of high quality accessible to Canadians in both urban and rural areas in all regions of **Canada**;

...7) to respond to the economic and **social requirements** of users of telecommunications **services**..."

(Telecom Decision CRTC 94-19)

The current means of financing services is changing. The CRTC is moving towards a cost-based competitive **model** for services. This **will** mean that competition and market forms will begin to dictate pricing in the rates for local and long distance services. Costing methods of subsidizing local rates with long distance revenues, and remote and rural areas by large volume calling areas, will gradually **be phased out**. **Although this will have** implications for **Nunavut**, the CRTC has recognized that NorthwestTel should be considered differently because of its high cost **operating** area. The **Telecommunications** Act also provides that a "... Canadian carrier may provide telecommunications services at no charge or at a reduced rate . . . with the approval of the Commission to any charitable organization or disadvantaged person or other person." Such flexibility must be **preserved** in the case of **Nunavut**.

Service Needs

The principles contained in the MC June, 1994, discussion paper (Appendix A-7) regarding the provision and maintenance of services on an equitable basis throughout Nunavut argue for Nunavut residents having a right to the same basic services as other Canadian citizens concerning access to the Information Highway. The Nunavut infrastructure must support a range of services, from basic access to the Internet for electronic mail distribution, to multi-point video conferencing between government centres and residents. The optimal use of new telecommunications technologies could lead to significant cost savings of an operational nature, particularly in the context of a geographically dispersed public sector. In addition, the maintenance of the cultural identity of Inuit will require the development of systems tools and data bases in the Inuit language.

The travel needs of government employees for purposes of information gathering and exchange could be reduced. The travel needs of residents to obtain educational, health and other government programs and services could be cut back. Use of audio/visual technologies, in particular, could eliminate many forms of government subsidized travel. Centralized libraries and government accounts could be accessed from outlying communities and regional centres. High school and post-secondary education programs could be delivered to communities electronically. Long distance medical diagnoses and treatment could be made with the aid of audio/visual and computer technologies. Universally designed telecommunications systems and services would ensure the participation of all people, including those with disabilities, enabling government and industry to reflect the diversity of the population. Reliable telecommunications technologies and technical expertise developed in the crucible of the harsh arctic environment could prove to be a successful Nunavut export. (There is a precedent to this possibility in the form of the housing construction and maintenance know-how employed in various parts of the NWT that has figured in the use of Canadian contractors to build new villages in Siberia.)

The nature and level of service will determine the infrastructure required. For instance, data service such as E-Mail, internet access, remote database and distance education could be provided with a TV receiver (9.6Kb/s-19.2Kb/s). Enhanced data service for file transfer, low end graphics/video, desktop video conferencing and the World Wide Web could be provided with a TV Receiver (56Kb/s-384Kb/s) as well. Full video conferencing and the delivery of education, justice and health services, and the use of interactive databases, CD

ROM libraries, video file servers, graphics, and broadband interactive services contemplated for the Information Highway, would require multimedia service (1.544Mb/s plus).

Financial Options

The biggest barrier to providing acceptable levels of service in Nunavut is the cost of supplying the service and resolving the question of who pays. With indirect subsidies disappearing, a new conceptual approach is required. Rather than viewing the provision of Information Highway services as a subsidy, the cost of providing such services might be better viewed as an investment with returns measured in better access to markets (access by telephone companies to cable or broadcasting markets, and cable company access to telephone markets). Ultimately, access to these services should be seen as a standard part of the social fabric. Provision of such services should be a condition of broadcasting licence approval. (Broadcasters provide close captioned services for the deaf, Cancom provides uplink and radio services to aboriginal programmers, cable companies provide community channels, and programmers commit to levels of Canadian content.)

Some funding options include

- . direct investment by Information Highway carriers in the infrastructure and on-going expenses of servicing remote areas;
- . direct contribution by government to the service provider that provides services to remote areas; and
- . licence fees charged to Information Highway carriers to ensure access to remote areas.

Government must use its powers to ensure access to services by remote communities and other special communities of interest. The move to a cost-based competitive pricing model puts at risk the ideals of universality and reasonable rates. If northern telephone services had not been subsidized in the past there would either be no phone services today, or services would be unaffordable for most users. It is worth noting that the level of service in the North has not kept pace with other areas of Canada even when cross-subsidies have been in place; this gap could grow even faster with the new technologies and services that are currently being launched. The price of entrance into the electronic market place will be higher the longer the basic infrastructure remains absent, and the social and economic penalties of an inability to participate, will be that much greater.

Nunavut Today

The face of the Arctic is rapidly **changing**, and in no area more so than in the field of electronic communications. A significant level of **computer/electronic** literacy has already been attained. With proper forethought, **planning**, and tools, this level of electronic literacy can be expanded and **deepened** and corresponding **economic** and other benefits realized. Making intelligent choices from among new telecommunications **technologies**, and matching those choices with a **skilfully** prepared work force, will be major challenges of the Nunavut Government.

Despite their **physical** distance from the more heavily **populated** parts of Canada, Nunavut residents are already plugged into the rest of Canada and the global scene via television and other electronic means of communications. While they are **limited** in their access due to outdated **telecommunications** systems, awareness of the benefits of modern means of communications, and practical personal experience with computers and various forms of electronic amusement, are **producing** a society that is becoming increasingly **sophisticated electronically**. Many **residents** now possess their own satellite television dishes. Home videos are a popular form of entertainment. Most children are **intimately** familiar with electronic forms of **entertainment** and many have been educated over the past **decade** in the use of computer technology. Computers are a common feature in many homes as well as in schools and the work place. In some communities, small computer sales and services companies have been established. The **Inuit Broadcasting Corporation**, based in **Iqaluit**, has been in **operation** for more than a decade and has proven itself to be both technologically competent and artistically imaginative in the production and transmission of films, television and **phone-in** shows. Some of the smaller communities now produce their own television shows and transmit them locally **via** cable. Arctic Cooperatives Ltd. has wired nine **Nunavut** communities for cable television and has plans for wiring more by the end of 1995. Cable service, coupled with the placement of satellite ground stations in each community, might function to serve the telecommunications needs of both **government** and the private sector. Government departments are currently linked via fax /modem and E-mail, and the GNWT is working on an "**Informatics Strategy**" to **streamline** and consolidate the processing of **information**.

Initial training in the use of technologies at the local level will be required. Skills upgrading can be done through **programs transmitted over the system**, and maintaining the system might be handled in the com-

munities in the same manner that other community maintenance needs are looked after. A Nunavut Government might provide needed **technical services**, or communities **could** hire their own experts to provide technological **services** to **local governments** and businesses.

Direction

Financing and building the infrastructure initially, and maintaining and operating it thereafter, is something that might benefit from the establishment of an organization **dedicated** solely to that task. An **unco-ordinated** government **effort on a department by department** basis, or government reliance on the collaborative efforts of a collection of independent private sector bodies, is not **likely** to provide the kind of integrated **telecommunications systems** needed. Similarly, private sector needs may not be well served by relying on government to develop telecommunications systems that also serve private interests. Government and the private sector have different but similar telecommunications needs, and a single collaborative government/industry effort might insure that the needs of both sectors can be met. **Along** with private financial support should come private sector **participation** in planning and **management** ensuring that both governmental and non-governmental telecommunications needs are served.

One possibility would involve the establishment of a separate corporation (**Nunavut Systems Corporation**) with 50% of its shares held by the Government of Nunavut and 50% by the private sector. Initial financing costs would be covered by subscribing shareholders and access to the system **could** be sold to the public on a user-pay basis in order to meet operational and maintenance costs. **Potential** investors and users **might** include the **Inuit Broadcasting Corporation**, **TVNC**, **CBC**, **Arctic Cooperatives Ltd.**, **NorthwestTel**, the **Department of National Defence** and other federal departments delivering **programs** and services in **Nunavut**, the **RCMP**, education and health bodies, hunters and trappers organizations, boards and institutions setup under the Nunavut Agreement, **NTI** and regional **Inuit** associations, local businesses, **community governments**, etc.

Recommendations

Recommendation #7-7

The NIC recommends that officials of the federal **government**, the **GNWT**, **community governments**, **NTI**, **regional Inuit** associations, the **Inuit Broadcasting**

Corporation and selected private sector **organizations** participate with **NIC** in a working group which **will**:

1. review the current state of public and private sector communications systems capabilities, **including** technologies, facilities, and human resources;
2. identify public and private sector communications needs, and potential users and investors;
3. determine public and private **sector communication** infrastructure needs and training requirements;
4. develop a **corporate** model and a financing plan for a **Nunavut-wide** communications network to serve the public sector, the private sector, **and** individuals; and
5. prepare a comprehensive telecommunications strategy for **Nunavut** which will define what should be considered "basic services", assess options for delivering such services and other **services**, and consider who might be the partners that can provide the infrastructure.

Recommendation #7-8

The **NIC recommends that**, once **appointed, the Interim Commissioner** should devote attention to the communications needs of **Nunavut**, particularly issues associated with the financing of infrastructure **installation**, operation and training.

The Socio-Economic Benefits of Nunavut

The social and economic circumstances of Nunavut communities today are not healthy.

Social problems in Nunavut are inextricably bound up in the economic realities of life in the Arctic. A lack of non-governmental employment opportunities, combined with a cash-starved land-based economy, has resulted in many people with employable skills sitting at home dependent on social assistance. A chronic shortage of wage labour—and a set of social programs that often encourage or require inactivity rather than stimulating productive activity—are at the root of problems such as high drop-out rates, elevated levels of chronic diseases, substance abuse, spousal assault and other types of violence, crime, and suicide. These problems have predictable costs to the person, the family and the community as a whole, and can be portrayed starkly in financial as well as human terms.

In the winter of 1994 the GNWT Bureau of Statistics' LabOur Force Survey estimated that real unemployment—a rate of unemployment which takes into account people who have "given up" looking for work because no work is available in their community—in Nunavut stood at just under 30%. More than 35% of the population live in communities with 40% or higher real unemployment. More than 95% of the unemployed persons in Nunavut were aboriginal.

During the fiscal year 1993, social assistance payments in Nunavut totalled \$18.6 million, a 50% increase over the amount spent just four years earlier. Social assistance spending increased by 73% in the Baffin region, 37% in the Keewatin region and just under 10% in the Kitikmeot region during that period. Almost all social assistance payments in Nunavut were made to aboriginal people.

The GNWT is a significant employer of Nunavut residents, directly or indirectly funding over 3,200 positions, more than 45% of which are filled by Inuit.

The GNWT receives about 80% of its revenues through federal transfers, and about 75% of its current revenues are derived from the western (non-Nunavut) part of the NWT. If the current situation prevails, Nunavut will be dependent upon federal transfers for about 95% of its revenues.

The conclusion of the Nunavut Agreement had three favorable socio-economic impacts on Nunavut: it created additional investor confidence; it supplied Inuit—some 80 to 85% of the population of Nunavut—with a tangible package of economic benefits and opportunities; and, through Article 4 of the Nunavut Agreement, it brought about the necessary commitments to establish the Nunavut Territory and Government. Each of these impacts warrants further discussion.

Years of uncertainty surrounding issues of aboriginal title prior to the signing of the Nunavut Agreement convinced the Crown of the need for negotiations with Inuit, but did little to encourage private sector investment. Every land use and water licence was open to legal dispute. With the completion of the Nunavut Agreement in 1993, issues between the Crown and Inuit concerning wildlife harvesting, the ownership of lands and resources, economic benefits from mining and other projects, and the rules surrounding development, were defined in the form of concrete rights, commitments and undertakings. Nunavut became "open for business".

The Nunavut Agreement makes many economic ventures attractive for Inuit. The Agreement casts its economic net widely to capture economic opportunities

dealing with wildlife harvesting, land and resource ownership, sharing of resource royalties, tourism and parks, employment in the private and public sectors, and access to government contracts with business. Some \$1.14 billion in capital transfers (over 15 years) will provide Inuit investment organizations and businesses with monies to participate in a range of business undertakings.

The economic gains defined through the Agreement can be reinforced and extended through complementary economic and social policies on the part of the Nunavut Government.

A case in point is wildlife harvesting. The Nunavut Agreement recognizes Inuit rights to harvest wildlife for many purposes—consumption by the family or community, inter-settlement trade, sports and naturalist operations, and other commercial ventures. A study several years ago by the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee estimated that \$55 million worth of country food was being harvested annually in the NWT, a significant number in economic terms, let alone in terms of social and cultural value. A joint multi-year, \$30 million NWT and GNWT harvester support program, agreed to alongside the negotiation of the Nunavut Agreement, is now under way and will improve access to country food in the Nunavut part of the NWT. An increase in the consumption of country food is expected to improve diet and overall health, thereby reducing dependence on social assistance and a number of health care costs. A Nunavut Government, with a sharper focus on the centrality of wildlife harvesting to the well-being of the residents of Nunavut, will have every incentive—and perhaps considerable pressure from Inuit organizations operating under the Nunavut Agreement—to introduce, amplify and fine-tune imaginative economic and social programs geared towards the wildlife economy and Nunavut's other special economic and societal circumstances.

The Nunavut Agreement can be expected to contribute positively to both the size of the Nunavut tourism industry and the extent of its control by Nunavut residents. The Nunavut Agreement defines Inuit rights of first refusal to sport and naturalist lodges. It also requires the negotiation of Inuit Impact and Benefit Agreements (IIBAs), supplying Inuit with economic opportunities in association with the opening up of new parks and conservation areas. As obliged under the Nunavut Agreement, Parks Canada plans to establish at least three National Parks in various natural terrestrial and marine regions in Nunavut. These plans, and similar ones by other national and international conservation agencies, will help to attract visitors. Increased tourism and business travel, and infrastructure improvements (hotels, airstrips, hunting lodges etc.), whether

initiated by the public or private sector, can be expected to be mutually reinforcing better facilities will mean more travelers coming to Nunavut, which will result in better facilities, and so on.

At present, there are only two operating mines and one oil producing field in Nunavut, but high levels of mineral exploration are being experienced in the Keewatin and Kitikmeot regions, and proven natural gas reserves in the Sverdrup Basin are considerable. Under the Nunavut Agreement, Inuit are entitled to receive a 50% share of the first \$2 million of resource revenues collected by government, and 5% of the remainder. Resource revenue sharing of this kind will encourage Inuit to become active supporters of, and active participants in, resource development projects.

Through the Nunavut Agreement, Inuit have ownership to the surface estate of 134,000 square miles (18.5% of traditionally used lands in Nunavut). With respect to 14,000 square miles, concentrated in areas with the most promising mineralization, Inuit also have ownership to the underlying sub-surface estate. These property rights equip Inuit with significant opportunities for involvement in all aspects of resource development in Nunavut, as well as protecting Inuit interests with respect to lands that have high biological productivity and special cultural significance. The Inuit land ownership elements of the Nunavut Agreement, combined with the requirement for conclusions of IIBAs in relation to all resource development projects affecting Inuit-owned lands or involving hydro development, should have a stimulative effect on the Nunavut economy.

The Nunavut Agreement anticipates Inuit employment opportunities in the public sector and fair access by Inuit to contracts awarded by government to business. As a target for public sector employment, the Nunavut Agreement looks to a ratio of Inuit employees commensurate with the Inuit presence in the total population of Nunavut. The government contracting provisions of the Agreement apply to both the federal and territorial governments, requiring them to pursue policies to assist Inuit controlled businesses to compete effectively for a share of government procurement contracts. Fulfilment of the objectives of the public sector employment and government contracting provisions of the Nunavut Agreement will increase the employment of local people in Nunavut, build businesses committed to operating in Nunavut, and keep dollars circulating in Nunavut. With major infrastructure outlays for a new Nunavut Government scheduled to startup in the near future, it is important that the Nunavut economy draw the biggest long-term impacts as possible from these investments (see Chapter 7), and obtain these impacts as soon as possible. Creating new Inuit and non-Inuit employment

and business opportunities now, and building up an improved infrastructure in the near future, will best position the Nunavut economy for post-division challenges and possibilities.

A divided NWT will provide the Nunavut Government with opportunities to develop economic policies and programs to deal solely with the Nunavut region, unencumbered by the different geographic and socio-economic realities of the Mackenzie Valley. Legislation, policies, and programs that are made and applied in Nunavut, for Nunavut, by Nunavut law makers, will better reflect the priorities of the people of Nunavut (division may well benefit the people of the Mackenzie Valley in a similar way). This advantage of the creation of the Nunavut Government will be of greatest long-term significance; indeed, it was the prospect of such an advantage, bound up in the immeasurable boost to societal self-image and self-confidence that comes from "running your own show", that in large measure motivated and propelled the 20 year drive to secure Nunavut as a discrete territory and jurisdiction.

Specific features of an appropriately designed Nunavut Government can help to tackle some of the long-standing economic and social problems of Nunavut.

Decentralization of government can bring public sector jobs to depressed communities. New jobs in communities have tangible economic benefits, and sometimes offer a psychological boost to community spirit that far exceeds direct dollar impacts. Greater economic activity resulting from infrastructure development can provide additional spin-off gains for communities. Leasing arrangements for government facilities with the private sector can provide secondary business and employment opportunities. Contracting with the private sector for the supply of such services as housing maintenance and warehousing can reduce government costs and open the door to local business development. (In the context of Nunavut, it is important to remember that the private sector often takes a different face than in communities in other parts of Canada; for example, community co-operatives and hunters and trappers organizations often play an important role in the community economy.) Decentralization can also minimize potential adverse socio-economic impacts on specific communities that might otherwise experience too rapid an expansion in size and too mapr a shift in demographic make-up.

Turning to the role of specific departments in the Nunavut Government, this report anticipates a key place for a Department of Sustainable Development (see Chapter 5). This department will combine responsibilities for wildlife harvesting and management, tourism develop

ment, land and water management, non-renewable resource development, and related economic matters. Combining these matters in one department will, apart from realizing efficiencies in operations, better reflect the inter-connectedness of economic and environmental topics in Nunavut.

The integration of wildlife management into a more broadly defined economic and environmental mandate of the Department of Sustainable Development is a significant step. Treating the renewable resource economy as a vital sector of the Nunavut economy, and treating wildlife harvesting as a legitimate form of productive labour, will reflect the realities of life in Nunavut. To view wildlife harvesting as a vestigial part of the economy is to condemn it to death. To recognize it as an important component of the Nunavut economy, supported by an appropriate net of economic and social policies, will deliver tangible and widely distributed pay-offs. A comprehensive harvester income support program, already being introduced on a limited basis due to the tenacity of NTI (and its predecessor) and the sympathy of some GNWT leaders and officials, can bring a host of favorable impacts, ranging from reduced social assistance spending to lower health care and administration of justice costs.

Suicide, crime, substance abuse, and other manifestations of societal distress, can only be partially remedied through improved employment prospects and other economic conditions. Strong family and community ties, expressed through shared language and well established and defended cultural traditions, are the cement of well functioning and productive societies. Too often, Inuit cultural needs have been compromised or sacrificed for reasons of ignorance, convenience, or false economy.

The Nunavut Agreement includes provisions aimed specifically at Inuit social and cultural needs. In the area of language, for example, the Inuit language is made a working language of the new institutions of public government set up under the Agreement. The IIBA provisions of the Agreement require developers to negotiate with Inuit concerning use of the Inuit language at work sites, Inuit Preferences with respect to work rotations (for example, to accommodate seasonal wildlife harvesting patterns), and other matters of social and cultural significance. The archaeology and ethnography provisions of the Nunavut Agreement recognize the importance of Inuit participation in the development of legislation and policies in these areas, as well as the need for training Inuit to pursue careers in relevant occupational fields. An Inuit Heritage Trust, controlled by Inuit, has been established to ensure an appropriate role for Inuit in the management of the archaeological

and historical record of Nunavut, and to promote the retention and exhibition of material culture in Nunavut. The development of museums, and the preservation of archaeological sites and other past and contemporary expressions of Inuit culture, can play a key part in maintaining and articulating the cultural distinctiveness of Nunavut; efforts of this kind can also help draw research scientists and tourists to Nunavut and generate positive economic returns.

A Nunavut Social Development Council has been established under the Nunavut Agreement to advise government on all aspects of social and cultural issues in Nunavut. The Agreement anticipates that the Council will be a key centre, at arms length to government, for research in relation to such matters, and will table its reports in the Nunavut Legislative Assembly and the House of Commons

The Department of Culture, Language, Elders and Youth described in Chapter 5 of this report has been designed to complement the institutional features of the Nunavut Agreement. The department will help promote the Inuit language in the work place. It will urge that the special needs and insights of youth and elders be built into every stage of public decision-making in Nunavut. It will work collaboratively with organizations such as the Inuit Heritage Trust and the Nunavut Social Development Council to ensure that the work of these organizations is given appropriate encouragement and fair hearing.

The role of the Department of Culture, Language, Elders and Youth can be expected to be varied and dynamic; at the same time it must be remembered that the true test of public decision-making in Nunavut in relation to social and cultural issues will not be with respect to those matters that are specifically tagged as such. Rather, the social and cultural well-being of Nunavut will be most significantly determined by the broad legislative and budgetary priorities set by the Nunavut Government. This centrality of budgetary considerations will be particularly true over a period in Canada's history when public finances form difficult and far-reaching choices to be made by elected leaders.

Recommendations

Recommendation #S-1

The NIC recommends that the implementation of the Nunavut Agreement, and the design and establishment of the Nunavut Government be recognized as a unique, two-fold opportunity to bring about substantial and enduring improvements in the socio-

economic circumstances and prospects for Nunavut. The NIC further recommends that the design and establishment of the Nunavut Government be carried out so as to buttress and build upon the possibilities for enhanced socio-economic well-being set out in the Nunavut Agreement.

Recommendation #8-2

The NIC recommends that, as set out in Chapter 5 of this report, the Nunavut Government be designed and established in such a manner so as to ensure the distribution of the employment and economic benefits as fairly as possible throughout the regions and communities of Nunavut.

Recommendation #8-3

The NIC recommends that, as described in Chapter 6 of this report, the Nunavut Government be designed and staffed in a way consistent with the objectives and obligations of the Inuit employment within government provisions of the Nunavut Agreement (Article 23).

Recommendation #8-4

The NIC recommends that, as described in Chapter 7 of this report, new infrastructure for the Nunavut Government be provided through a maximum level of leasing with the private sector and through an appropriate approach to the awarding of government infrastructure contracts.

Recommendation #8-5

The NIC recommends that, as soon as practicable after the suggested review of Nunavut issues by the federal Cabinet in the fall of 1995, and the emergence of a clearer picture on the design and financing of the Nunavut Government, the Government of Canada, the GNWT and NTL, with the assistance of the NIC, organize a Nunavut-wide conference devoted to the "Building the Economy of Nunavut."

Recommendation #8-6

The NIC recommends that, as soon as practicable after the suggested review of Nunavut issues by the federal Cabinet in the fall of 1995, and the emergence of a clearer picture on the design and financing of the Nunavut Government, the Government of Canada, the GNWT and NTL, with the planning assistance of the NIC, organize a Nunavut-wide conference devoted to "Developing Social and Cultural Well-Being in Nunavut." The conference should address social and cultural issues that have been touched upon in a num-

ber of public discussions sponsored by the NIC in the past, and include:

1. ways in which the use of the Inuit language can be promoted as a working language in the Nunavut Government;
2. issues involved in the standardization of oral and written forms of the Inuit language with respect to the operations of the Nunavut Government; and
3. the use of traditional knowledge, especially the integration of traditional knowledge into Nunavut Government operations.

Recommendation #8-7

The NIC recommends that the architecture and interior design of new office buildings and other facilities for the Nunavut Government be supportive of the cultural identity and history of Nunavut. A fixed percentage of the value of all building contracts should be devoted to the acquisition and display of works by Nunavut artists.

Choosing a Capital

(a) Balancing Regional Interests

For obvious reasons, the choice of a capital for Nunavut has attracted enormous interest in Nunavut and elsewhere. In Nunavut, there have been three important perceptions about the issue that have coloured the interest of various communities in being candidates for selections as capital.

First of all, there has been a perception of prestige associated with any particular community becoming capital. Many people believe that the community chosen as capital will be uniquely positioned to influence the course of public life in Nunavut for generations. Proximity to elected leaders and senior officials is seen as making it much easier for the residents of the capital to "do business" with their government.

A second important perception has been the expectation of substantial economic benefits attached to being capital. This expectation goes to direct benefits in the form of new public sector employment. This expectation also goes to indirect benefits in the form of the private sector activities—ranging from printing services, to taxi rides, to restaurant meals—that will be sustained through a higher number of government workers.

A third perception, not as sanguine and perhaps not as widely felt as the first two, is a concern that being chosen capital might be "too much of a good thing" for some communities. The positive economic impacts that will flow to a community chosen as capital will be easy to measure. Such impacts will be measured in such things as increased employment levels, significant infrastructure expenditures, and higher retail sales figures. What may be more difficult to measure maybe some of the difficulties that arise when a community experiences

a great deal of change in a compressed period of time. These difficulties may appear in the guise of such things as price inflation, a housing shortage, a loss of community identity, an erosion of community solidarity, and a worry that the community is being "taken over" by newcomers. It is concern about difficulties of this kind that has, no doubt, resulted in smaller communities in Nunavut refraining from participating actively in the competition for capital.

In considering the choice of capital, the NIC has been conscious of these perceptions surrounding the issue, and has a number of related concerns. One concern is that the Nunavut Government, particularly its legislative branch, should not be identified so closely with the capital as to make it a stranger elsewhere. A second concern is that the capital issue not become a "windfall or wipeout" matter, where the community that is ultimately chosen as capital is seen as receiving a huge "windfall" boosting its fortunes, and every community not chosen is seen as having been "wiped out" of the political and economic benefits associated with the creation of the new territory and government. A final concern is that the residents of any community chosen as capital be spared from an overwhelming and debilitating amount of growth. It is important for both the residents of any community chosen as capital, and for all the residents of Nunavut, that the capital of Nunavut maintain the feel of a Nunavut community, having its own distinctive character but sharing many qualities in common with the other communities of Nunavut.

The NIC is of the view that these concerns must be dealt with by adopting a number of specific measures relating to the location of Nunavut Legislative Assembly sessions, the decentralization of Nunavut Government operations, and the limitation of public sector growth in any particular community.

Recommendations

Recommendation #9-1

The NIC recommends that, prior to or contemporaneous with the choice of a capital for **Nunavut**, commitments be made that each of the **Nunavut** regions be provided with appropriate facilities (including interpretation **equipment**, adequate computer hook-ups for Assembly staff, **space** for the public and journalists), allowing the **Nunavut** Legislative **Assembly** to sit in a designated location in each region on a regular basis.

Recommendation #9-2

The NIC recommends **that**, prior to or contemporaneous with the choice of a capital for **Nunavut**, commitments be made that the **Nunavut** Government be a decentralized one to the extent practicable, with **conscious** efforts made to distribute government functions and activities across the various regions and communities of **Nunavut**.

(b) The Basis of Selection

The choice of a capital for **Nunavut** must be based on objective **factors**. Early on in its work, the **NIC** turned its efforts to attempting to identify such factors. At **its** meeting in Cambridge Bay in April, 1994, the Commission issued a communique suggesting that the following factors **are** relevant to the selection of a **community** as **capital**:

- existing infrastructure, services and amenities;
- potential for additional **infrastructure**, services and amenities;
- existing and potential transportation links within Nunavut and outside **Nunavut**;
- cost of living in the **community**;
- position/accessibility within the **overall circumpolar** region;
- attitude of the population of the community, **taking** into account its social, cultural and economic priorities;
- the extent of regional **support**; and
- climate.

These factors were also identified in the **discussion** paper prepared for the large public meeting convened by **NIC** at **Iqaluit** in June, 1994 (Appendix A-7).

However useful this list of **factors** may be, a difficult question arises as to what communities might match up best with the factors **listed**.

Early on in the **NIC's** work, the communities of Cambridge Bay, **Iqaluit** and Rankin Inlet (listed **alphabetically**) expressed to the **Commission** their interest in becoming capital. In each case, this expression of interest was accompanied by clear indications of regional support. Since that time, elected **representatives** from each of **these** communities have campaigned to promote the choice of their particular **community** as capital.

Since December of 1994, a further three communities have indicated to the **NIC** their interest in being considered as location for capital: Baker Lake, Gjoa Haven, and **Igloolik**. In the case of **Igloolik**, the interest in **being** considered capital has **focused** on the possibility of **Igloolik** being the home of the **Nunavut** Legislative Assembly and a limited range of executive functions.

The **NIC** congratulates the leaders and **citizens** of all six communities that have come forward on the question of the location of a capital for **Nunavut**. In each case, significant efforts, and in some cases very substantial **efforts**, have been **invested** in, first of all, securing support within the community to pin the contest and, afterwards, "selling" **others** on the **attractions** of various communities. The Commission believes that the level of interest and commitment demonstrated by communities in the selection of capital speaks very highly of the **sense** of confidence and optimism that is found among the **people** of **Nunavut** in the **process** of gearing up for the new territory and government.

The issue of selection of a capital for **Nunavut** has been one of the most challenging ones facing the **NIC**. Discussions in the Commission have, like the broader public debate, been occasionally spirited but always friendly and constructive. In an ideal world, it would be **wonderful** if every **community** in **Nunavut** could be "capital" for some specific purpose, but the organizational **logic** associated with running a **modern** government does not **realistically** permit that possibility. After considerable analysis and thought, and with particular attention to the factors of regional support and **financial** costs, the **NIC** believes that three communities best measure up to all the factors listed. They are Cambridge Bay, **Iqaluit** and **Rankin Inlet**.

Recommendations

Recommendation #9-3

The NIC recommends that the selection of a capital for Nunavut be based on the following factors:

1. existing **infrastructure**, services and amenities;
2. potential for additional infrastructure, services and amenities;
3. existing and potential transportation **links within** Nunavut and outside **Nunavut**;
4. cost of living in the community;
5. **position/accessibility** within the overall **circum-polar region**;
6. attitude of the population of the community, taking into account its social, cultural and economic priorities;
7. the extent of regional **support**; and
8. climate.

Recommendation #9-4

The NIC recommends that the selection of a capital for Nunavut be limited to Cambridge Bay, **Iqaluit**, and Rankin **Inlet**.

(c) Making a Decision

In the first section of this chapter, the NIC set out its recommendations as to what fundamental **commitments** should be made with respect to the overall design and operation of the **Nunavut Government** in advance of or **contemporaneous** with any **determination** being made with **respect** to the choice of a capital. In the second section of this chapter, the NIC indicated what factors should be **taken** into account in arriving at a decision for the choice of capital, and applied those factors to narrow the list of best candidates for capital to three communities.

It should be noted that, in providing such thoughts concerning the choice of capital, the NIC has gone beyond the narrow confines of its mandate. **This** mandate, set out in 58 of the **Nunavut Act**, indicates that the NIC should advise on "... the **process** for determining the location of the seat of government for **Nunavut**".

With respect to the process for choosing a capital, the Commission believes that this is a decision that must be made by the federal Cabinet. There are two reasons why the NIC comes to this conclusion.

The first reason turns on the wording of the **Nunavut Act**, and the intentions of Parliament revealed in that statute. Section 4 of the Act states as follows:

"4. The seat of government of Nunavut shall initially be such place in Nunavut as the Governor in Council may designate, but the Legislature for Nunavut may thereafter designate another place as the seat of government".

The **Nunavut Act** requires that the **choice** of capital should be made formally by the Governor in Council. There is nothing in the statute **indicating** that the formal designation by the **Governor in Council** should be rooted in a substantive **recommendation** coming from another source. If Parliament had preferred that a recommendation as to preferred location be **forthcoming** from a **Nunavut-based** source, the Act could have easily been worded to **reflect** that preference. For example, the NIC might have been given a mandate to that end. It is revealing that the Act does not make reference to an "interim seat of government" in the same fashion as allowance is made for an "Interim Commissioned". While the **Nunavut Legislative Assembly** may move the **capital** at a later date, the **Nunavut Act** indicates that the upfront choice will **be** made in **no uncertain** or **time-limited** terms by the federal Cabinet.

The second reason that the Commission believes that the federal Cabinet should make a decision as to the choice of capital turns on an appreciation of how such decisions have been made in the past. In **1867**, the location of a capital for Canada was fixed in Imperial legislation. This was not due to a lack of interest about the matter in Canada or a lack of respect for responsible government. Rather, this approach reflected a **recognition** of the difficulties for any society, particularly one redesigning itself within new political institutions and boundaries, to come to easy **consensus** on the location of a capital, and a **recognition** of the responsibilities of a senior **level** of government in such circumstances. Such considerations, **no** doubt, animated the **Government of Canada** in its choice of a capital for the Northwest Territories when the territorial government was "moved North" in the 1960s. The same considerations are also relevant for **Nunavut**.

Two further things should be noted.

There would be no useful purpose served in carrying out a plebiscite in **Nunavut** on the issue of which com-

munity should be chosen as capital. Enough is known about the state of public opinion in Nunavut to predict that such an exercise, both in its conduct and its results, would **reveal** what is hardly **surprising**; that different regions and communities have decidedly different **preferences**. The people of Nunavut must begin their new political life with a sense of common **purpose** and inter-regional and inter-community goodwill. Little good could be served by a plebiscite, and some considerable and lasting injury could result.

The decision about a capital for **Nunavut** should be made sooner rather than later. This **will** allow more detailed planning to take **place** with respect both to infrastructure and human **resource development**. It will also allow the private sector to make intelligent choices about investments and other business related matters.

Recommendations

Recommendation #9-5

The **NIC recommends that the federal Cabinet**, exercising its statutory **discretion**, choose the **capital of Nunavut at the first opportunity it has to consider Nunavut issues as a package**.

Recommendation #9-6

The **NIC recommends that** no plebiscite be conducted in **Nunavut** on the question of the choice of a **capital for Nunavut**.

Inter-jurisdictional Relations

(a) Federal/Nunavut Relations

The most important political link for the people of Nunavut will be the link between the Government of Nunavut and the Government of Canada. Relations with other jurisdictions, including relations with the remaining NWT will be of secondary importance.

Several factors contribute to this result.

The most obvious factor is the status of the Nunavut Territory within Canada. Putting aside for a moment the Constitutional significance of the commitment to create the Nunavut Territory and Nunavut Government set out in Article 4 of the Nunavut Agreement (this matter is addressed in a later chapter of this report), the legislative, administrative, and judicial institutions of Nunavut will flow from the exercise of the powers of the Parliament and Government of Canada. The Nunavut Act is an Act of the Parliament of Canada. The Nunavut Territory and Government are not referenced in the various Constitution Acts enacted in relation to Canada from 1867 to 1982. Unlike the case with provincial legislatures, the law making powers of the Nunavut Legislative Assembly will not be ones that can be claimed on the strength of the founding division of powers that constituted Canada as a federal state. Rather, the law making powers of the Nunavut Legislative Assembly will be those specifically enumerated in the Nunavut Act or through some other federal statute. While the three northern territories will enjoy comparable levels of legislative authority, there is nothing in Constitutional "first principles" that would pre-determine that the three territories must evolve in lock-step towards enhanced levels of jurisdiction or to provincial status. Indeed, acquisition of provincial status by a territory is an area, like the application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, where

Parliament's authority is now impaired; and the post-1982 Constitutional arrangements, the conversion of a territory into a province would require a substantial degree of approval on the part of existing provinces.

The legal status of Nunavut as a territory will underscore the primacy of its inter-jurisdictional connection to the federal Parliament and government. The significance of Nunavut's legal status in emphasizing relations with the federal government will also be reinforced by the special relationship that binds the Crown, as represented by the Government of Canada, to the Inuit majority of the Nunavut population. This relationship is part of the larger relationship between the Crown and aboriginal peoples that has been described by the Supreme Court of Canada in fiduciary terms. The relationship expressed itself in the negotiations that led to the Nunavut Agreement. Its importance is evidenced by the breadth and depth of the terms of that Agreement.

Independently of the creation of the Nunavut Territory and Government, the Inuit of Nunavut can be expected to seek to maintain a direct and meaningful relationship with the federal Crown. In a paper entitled "Implementation of the Inherent Right to Self Government in Nunavut", dated October, 1994, NITI took the following view concerning any attempt on the part of the Government to "wind up" or "off load its responsibilities to Inuit:

"The establishment of self-government arrangements with Inuit (and other aboriginal peoples) and the subsequent dismantling of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development does not relieve the federal government of its fiduciary obligations and responsibilities to Inuit. There is a continuing need for the federal government to maintain political and administra-

tive structures for the purpose of maintaining **Inuit/Canada** relations and for carrying out specific program responsibilities for **Inuit**.

At the same time these structures need to be **re-organized** to more appropriately address the unique needs of **Inuit** and reflect the distinctiveness of **Inuit** people in Canada. To this end, **Inuit** have been calling for the establishment of **Inuit-specific** programs, policies and legislation." (p. 14)

Self-determination and self-government are important concepts in the structuring of more satisfactory relationships between aboriginal and non-aboriginal Canadians. In assessing statements and comments made by federal government, GNWT and NTI leaders and officials since the coming into force of the **Nunavut Agreement**, it is apparent that there are subtly, but significantly, divergent understandings of the relationship between the **Nunavut Government** and the rights of the **Inuit** of Nunavut to self-determination and self-government.

From the perspective of the federal and territorial governments, there is a tendency to emphasize three matters relevant to the relationship

- the Nunavut Government will reorganized as a "public government" with **all citizens** meeting age and residency requirement entitled to stand for elected territorial offices and to vote in those elections;
- the Nunavut Territory and Government are being established in response to the initiative of **Inuit** organizations who have consistently emphasized its central importance to the **political** future of the **Inuit** of **Nunavut**; and
- establishing and operating the Nunavut Government **will** involve **major** new financial commitments on behalf of the taxpayers of Canada, and in an era of tight public finances access to the public purse must be **reserved** to matters of the highest priority.

Emphasis on these points leads to a strong **preference** on the part of many federal and territorial government leaders and **officials** that issues of aboriginal **self-determination** and self-government take a "**back seat**", of indefinite duration, to the practical challenges associated with a successful start-up and build-up of the **Nunavut Government**.

Organizations representing the **Inuit** of Nunavut have tended to emphasize a different approach. In its October, 1994, paper on self-government, NTI underlined its view that the **Inuit** of **Nunavut** have an inherent right to self-government that is recognized both by the Constitution of Canada and by international human rights law and that was not compromised by the surrender of certain proprietary rights to the **Crown** in the **Nunavut Agreement**. NTI has argued that the right to self-government on the part of the **Inuit** of **Nunavut** will be **coloured**, but not eclipsed, by the setting up and operation of the **Nunavut Territory and Government**:

"While the general framework for **Inuit self-government** in **Nunavut** has been determined . . . it is presumptuous to assume that self-government will inevitably ensue. Its ultimate success requires a high level of commitment by **all** parties to the **Nunavut** project as well as attention to the details which **will** ensure the realization of the right of **Inuit** self-government in **Nunavut**. Such details include adequate financing of the **Nunavut** government as well as the process leading to its establishment commitment to education and **training** of **Inuit**, **devolution** of control over non-renewable resources to **Nunavut**, protection of **Inuit** language and cultural institutions and traditions, furtherance of the **principles and objectives** of the **Nunavut Land Claims Agreement**, and constitutional protection for the powers and **functions** of the **Nunavut Government** as described in the **Nunavut Political Accord** and in any subsequent agreements relating to implementation of the inherent right of **self-government** in **Nunavut**." (pp. 1-2)

These arguments, combined with other aspects of the paper prepared by NTI, emphasize that **organizations** representing **Inuit** do not view the work towards the setting up of the **Nunavut Territory and Government** as the "last word on the rights of the **Inuit** of **Nunavut** to **self-determination** and self-government.

The federal government, GNWT and NTI may differ as to the most appropriate way to describe the relationship between the **Nunavut Territory and Government** on the one hand, and the nature, scope and implications of the rights of the **Inuit** of **Nunavut** to **self-determination** and self-government on the other. Common ground is most evident in the shared realization that the practical advantages associated with an enhanced measure of political control by the **Inuit** of **Nunavut** will best be accomplished through making the **Nunavut Territory and Government** a success. This point can also be put in the negative the practical problems associated with the disentanglement of the concepts of public

government and Inuit self-government in Nunavut will be most troublesome in the event that the Nunavut Territory and Government fall short.

The success of the Nunavut Territory and Government will be a function of how the various mapr issues touched upon in this report are dealt with. One factor that may be of some long-term relevance to the degree of success attained in relation to Nunavut will be the ability of the Government of Canada to handle two competing but equally valid needs. There will be a need to respect, in a fundamental and enduring way, the differences between Nunavut asa form of public government and the rights of the Inuit of Nunavut to self-determination and self-government. There will be a similar need to conduct federal relations with the Government of Nunavut and Nunavut Inuit organizations in a collegial way so as to make the successful establishment and operation of the Nunavut Government, and the successful on-going implementation of the Nunavut Agreement, shared undertakings and priorities.

The above analysis leads to the following recommendations.

Recommendations

Recommendation #10-1

The NIC recommends that the Government of Nunavut be organized so as to give due weight to the importance of the relationship between the Government of Nunavut and the Government of Canada. In practical terms, the importance of this relationship would suggest that (1) political responsibility for the conduct of relations with the Government of Canada be assigned to the Government Leader of Nunavut, and (2) the Government of Nunavut maintain a small liaison office in Ottawa, comparable to the ones currently maintained by the GNWT and the Government of Yukon.

Recommendation #10-2

The NIC recommends that the Government of Canada maintain a specific policy-making and administrative focus for the co-ordination of federal relations with the Government of Nunavut, and that any changes to the mandate and structure of DIAND respect that need.

Recommendation #10-3

The NIC recommends that the Government of Nunavut participate in federal/provincial/territorial and provincial/territorial inter-governmental activities on the same footing as other territorial governments, and that the Nunavut Government be supplied with the policy-making and administrative capacity to participate effectively. Political responsibility for inter-governmental activities should be vested in the Government Leader of Nunavut, to be discharged with Nunavut ministers having responsibilities over relevant subject matters.

Recommendation #10-4

The NIC recommends that, within their respective mandates, the Government of Canada, the GNWT and NTI acknowledge the centrality of the following principles:

1. the reference to the Nunavut Territory and Government in Article 4 of the Nunavut Agreement is of fundamental importance;
2. in the context of Nunavut, the concepts of “public government” and “aboriginal self-government” are distinguishable;
3. it is to the practical advantage of the Inuit of Nunavut, other residents of Nunavut, and all Canadians, that the Nunavut Government fulfil the expectations on which it is based;
4. while the Nunavut Agreement, and the creation of the Nunavut Territory and Government, do not supplant the rights of the Inuit of Nunavut to self-determination and self-government (or the mobility rights of all Canadians), the ability of the Nunavut Government to serve the practical political aspirations of the Inuit of Nunavut will be enhanced by Inuit remaining a majority of the residents of Nunavut into the future; and
5. notwithstanding any initiatives that may be taken to dismantle DIAND, the Government of Canada should maintain political and administrative structures designed to promote Inuit/Canada relations and for carrying out specific program responsibilities for Inuit.

Recommendation #10-5

The NIC recommends that the Government of Canada, the GNWT and NTI conduct discussions as to whether

the principles referred to in Recommendation #10-4 might form part of a formal written accord or agreement. These discussions might take into account the forthcoming final report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, which is likely to offer analysis of the relationship between public government and aboriginal self-government throughout Canada.

The status of the Nunavut Territory, and its connection to the aboriginal and land claims agreement rights of the Inuit of Nunavut, will be a crucial determinant of the nature, form and significance of the relationship between the Nunavut Government and the Government of Canada. Another factor of fundamental importance to that relationship will be the inclusion of Nunavut within the Government of Canada's overall policy approach to all of Canada's northern territories.

In April, 1999, Canada will have three northern territories, not two. The three northern territories will have much in common, not just in terms of their political institutions but in terms of such things as their small but growing populations, their resource extraction/public sector weighted economies, their remoteness from the big cities of southern Canada, and their fiscal dependence. The three northern territories will also show marked differences, in terms of such things as their environments and ecologies, their languages and cultures, their extent of urbanization, the educational achievements of their populations, and their costs of living.

In a two territory world, it has perhaps been tempting for the federal government to regard its overall policy approach towards the northern territories as the sum total of the policies that have made up the Ottawa/Whitehorse and Ottawa /Yellowknife relationships. With the creation of a third territory, there may be greater need for the federal government to be more generic about the broad purposes, objectives and factors that will be relevant to its relations with all territorial governments. Broad purposes, objectives and factors, clearly conceived and publicly stated, may be particularly relevant with respect to how the federal government will justify its allocation of financial resources among the northern governments. At a time when the state of Canada's national finances are under considerable and on-going strain, it can be expected that there will be growing scrutiny from the North as to how other territorial governments are faring and a growing demand that the federal government treat territorial governments with a defensible level of "even handedness" based on objective criteria.

The issue of how the federal government will rationalize the division of financial support among competing territorial governments will be especially important for

the Nunavut Government. In comparison with the Yukon Territory and Mackenzie Valley, the Nunavut Government will face the most difficult challenges with regard to generating economic activity and delivering acceptable levels of public services. Without removing the need for the federal government and the GNWT to take maximum advantage of the preparatory period leading up to April, 1999, it may very well be the case that the Nunavut Government comes into existence facing the following:

- the highest unemployment and underemployment rates among the three territories;
- the lowest literacy rates among the three territories;
- the youngest and fastest growing population among the three territories;
- the highest cost of living, including the cost of supplying public services, among the three territories; and
- the most under-developed public infrastructure among the three territories.

In the fundamental economic and social policy reviews that are pre-occupying Canada at all levels of governmental jurisdiction, it is increasingly apparent that the intelligent application of public moneys must be targeted at those with genuine needs and be capable of securing definable results. Budgets should not be structured merely on the strength of carrying on with historically established patterns or of rewarding those who can speak the loudest.

In the North, Nunavut will be the new kid on the block. As such, it may be tempting in some quarters to see Nunavut at the margin of how the North has been governed to date, and to see the financial requirements connected with the operation of the Nunavut Government as tangential to established patterns of federal financial assistance to the North. Subscribing to this approach would be neither fair nor defensible. The division of federal financial assistance among the three northern territories should be based on the needs of their populations for essential public sector goods and services, not on shoe-horning the financial requirements of a new Nunavut Government as much as possible into a predetermined status quo.

The federal Cabinet's review of Nunavut will devote considerable attention to the one-time and on-going costs associated with the new Nunavut government. In making calculations as to what level of federal financial

support should be adequate for Nunavut Government purposes, clear consideration will need to be given to the "offsetting" cost savings that can be realized through reductions in the size of the territorial public service that will be needed to administer the remainder of the Northwest Territories in the post-1999 period.

The drive to create Nunavut was not motivated by a desire to provoke a thorough examination of the effectiveness and efficiency of the existing GNWT. At the same time, the creation of a new territorial government at a time of strain in public finances may precipitate the Government of Canada taking a close look at how government can be organized in the North to ensure best value for the financial resources available.

The residents of Nunavut have accepted careful federal scrutiny of territorial finances as a necessary condition of getting their own government. In examining the kinds of financial resources available for Nunavut, it is equally appropriate that other residents of the North, particularly those living in the Mackenzie Valley, also look in the mirror. It would be hard to justify, except perhaps on a transitional basis, how a Nunavut Government could be expected to operate effectively on a far leaner public service than would be the case in the post-division Mackenzie Valley.

The creation of Nunavut must be recognized as having a redistributive effect on the location of public sector employment in the North, shifting headquarters jobs from the Mackenzie Valley to Nunavut. The issue of offsetting cost savings to be realized in the Mackenzie Valley as a consequence of this redistribution will likely have direct impact on the kinds of financial resources made available to the Nunavut Government. While the Government of Canada will maintain its ultimate responsibility for the appropriate use of moneys voted by Parliament, the issue of offsetting cost savings in the remaining NWT is as much a legitimate concern of the residents of Nunavut as the opinions of Mackenzie Valley residents are with respect to the possibilities of shared program design and delivery after 1999.

Recommendations

Recommendation #10-6

The NIC recommends that the Government of Canada develop policies that ensure fairness in the allocation of federal financial resources among the three northern territories in the post-1999 world. Fairness of this kind can best be promoted by equipping territorial govern-

ments with financial resources adequate to supply essential public sector goods and services of comparable scope and quality throughout the North. Emphasis should be placed on the needs of the populations of the three territories and the "real" cost of supplying public sector goods and services, not on artificial formulas based on historical levels of funding or on precise per capita equality of revenue support expressed in cost-unadjusted dollars.

Recommendation #10-7

The NIC recommends that the matter of "offsetting" savings associated with the operation of a post-division GNWT (or its successor) be given equally close examination by the federal Cabinet as calculations of the costs of running the new Nunavut Government.

(b) The Mackenzie Valley

1. up to 1999

At least until the appointment of an Interim commissioner for Nunavut, relations between Nunavut and the remaining Northwest Territories will not be shaped by formal, legally enforceable agreements. The absence of an official with authority to make binding commitments in the name of Nunavut will mean that informal understandings in relation to the future policies and work of the Nunavut Government reached between individuals and groups representing Mackenzie Valley and Nunavut constituencies—be they members of the NWT Legislative Assembly, aboriginal organizations, or professional associations—will not be definitive.

This is not to say, of course, that such informal understandings will not be useful, perhaps crucial. The smooth course of events leading up to April, 1999, will very much depend on the continuation of good lines of communications being maintained, at both leaders and staff levels, by people working in Nunavut, Yellowknife and Ottawa. At the same time, it would be misleading at best, and financially compromising at worst, for the GNWT to enter into any inter-governmental or contractual commitments before April, 1999, that fail to take adequately into account the impending emergence of the Nunavut Territory and Government.

An Interim Commissioner for Nunavut, once appointed, will be able to make binding commitments on behalf of the new Nunavut Government. The interim Commissioner will have this power in relation to the recruitment of new employees and the establishment of

administrative systems and processes. The Interim Commissioner will also have this power in relation to (1) inter-governmental agreements with respect to the carrying out of programs previously carried out by the GNWT, subject to the ability of the Nunavut Government to terminate any agreement on one year's notice, and (2) funding agreements concluded with the Government of Canada, subject to the ability of the Nunavut Government to terminate the agreement on two years' notice.

The extent to which the Interim Commissioner uses this power to conclude agreements with the GNWT for the carrying out of programs on behalf of the Nunavut Government will turn on the strategy adopted with respect to phasing the build-up in the capacity of the Nunavut Government. While this issue is dealt with in a substantive manner in Chapter 5 of this report, it is worth noting two additional points in relation to the structuring of any inter-governmental agreement concluded between the Interim Commissioner for Nunavut and the GNWT. The first point is that any inter-governmental agreements made by the Interim Commissioner with the GNWT (or any other jurisdiction) should be clearly defined as such. It will be important to distinguish between what is intended to be binding on the new Nunavut Government and matters of routine correspondence and conversation intended to help work through the array of detail likely to be involved in the transition process. The second point is that the number and complexity of transitional agreements struck between the Interim Commissioner and the GNWT will in all probability oblige the Office of the Interim Commissioner to maintain an office in Yellowknife.

2. After 1999

In the first years following the establishment of the Nunavut Government, there may be a significant risk of inter-governmental agreements concluded with the GNWT. The situation may warrant the maintenance of a small office in Yellowknife on the part of the Nunavut Government.

Over time, the extent to which the Nunavut Government and the GNWT continue to be bound by agreements relating to program design and delivery will depend on whether such agreements are in the mutual interests of the two governments. It would be counter-productive to seek to perpetuate a range of inter-governmental agreements between the two governments that overstate their shared interests. While the Government of Canada might have certain preferences, motivated by financial considerations, as to how the two territorial governments might co-operate in some

areas for an indefinite duration, it would not be appropriate for the Government of Canada to take any measure that would oblige the Nunavut Government to obtain certain program design or delivery functions only through inter-governmental agreement with the GNWT. Such a stance on the part of the federal government would effectively confine the Government of Nunavut to relying on "sole source bidding" over important subject areas. This would be incompatible with the autonomous stature of the Government of Nunavut and its ability to manage its own affairs.

Recommendations

Recommendation #10-8

The NIC recommends that, in the period leading up to April, 1999, the GNWT include provisions within any new or extended inter-governmental agreement or contract indicating that the agreement or contract will not be binding on the Nunavut Government without the subsequent signature of an official specifically authorized to act in the name of the Nunavut Government.

Recommendation #10-9

The NIC recommends that the Interim Commissioner be equipped with resources to maintain an office in Yellowknife.

Recommendation #10-10

The NIC recommends that the Nunavut Government consider maintaining an office in Yellowknife in the period following April, 1999.

Recommendation #10-11

The NIC recommends that the long-term relationship between the Nunavut Government and the GNWT be based on mutual best interests and that the Government of Canada not take any measure that would oblige the Nunavut Government to obtain certain program design or delivery functions only through inter-governmental agreement with the GNWT.

(c) Other Jurisdictions

1. In Canada

In achieving the status of a territory within Canada, Nunavut becomes one of the "senior governments" in Canada (federal /provincial /territorial), and a member of the most prestigious domestic inter-jurisdictional

club. This will be a **major** advantage to the people of Nunavut, allowing Nunavut concerns to be introduced into discussions that define the inter-governmental concerns and priorities of all Canadians. As recommended earlier in this chapter, the Nunavut Government, within its resources, should seek to play an active role in federal /provincial /territorial discussions and provincial / territorial discussions.

Given its Inuit majority, and its arctic setting, the Nunavut Government can also be expected to take an interest in the activities of other established and emerging public governments in the North with a **majority** of Inuit residents. Mindful of the sensitivities that might sometimes attend contacts between the Nunavut Government and subordinate jurisdictions operating within the boundaries of adjacent provinces and territories, the Nunavut Government should seek to pursue common interests with regional governments in the Beaufort Sea, Nunavik, and Labrador.

2. The *Circumpolar World*

For a number of years, the GNWT has **played** an active and constructive role with respect to **circumpolar** affairs. This role has complemented, rather than detracted from, the coherence of Canada's overall foreign policy in the Arctic. The Nunavut Government will have every incentive to build on the work of the GNWT in this regard. Co-operation with Greenland and other parts of the **circumpolar** world should be fostered in as many areas as possible, particularly linguistic and other cultural ties, economic development, and **environmental protection**. The Nunavut Government should establish and maintain a policy-making and administrative capacity with regard to circumpolar affairs within the Department of Executive and Inter-governmental Affairs. This office would help the Nunavut Government to pursue fruitful **circumpolar** relations while respecting the Government of Canada's lead responsibilities regarding the conduct of international relations. The Nunavut Government can be expected to work closely with the federal Department of Foreign Affairs, DIAND, and Canada's Arctic Ambassador.

Recommendations

Recommendation #10-12

The NIC recommends that the **Nunavut** Government play an active role in the development of relations in the circumpolar world, consistent with the **Government** of Canada's lead responsibilities for the conduct

of international relations. The **Nunavut** Government should establish and maintain a policy-making and administrative capacity with regard to **circumpolar** affairs within the Department of Executive and **Inter-governmental Affairs**.

Financial Matters

(a) The Costs of Creating and Running the Nunavut Government

With the assistance of Price Waterhouse Management Consultants, the NIC has estimated the costs of creating and running the Nunavut Government. Assumptions and calculations in this regard are set out in detail in Appendices A-16 to A-20.

Table 3 summarizes calculations of operating and capital costs associated with the decentralization models based on three alternative choices for capital: Cambridge Bay, Iqaluit and Rankin Inlet.

Assumptions and calculations as to costs are "best estimates". The following points should be kept in mind in relation to infrastructure costs:

- the federal government is responsible for the cost of new infrastructure associated with the establishment of the Nunavut Government consistent with the principles and commitments in the Nunavut Agreement and Political Accord (this includes required infrastructure, whether owned or leased by the Nunavut Government, and associated funding for the operation and maintenance of these facilities); and

Table 3: Cost Differences among Decentralization Models (all figures are in thousands of dollars (000s)).

Decentralization Models	Cambridge Bay as Capital	Iqaluit as Capital	Rankin Inlet as Capital
Operating Costs			
Settlement Allowance	3,771	3,712	3,671
Vacation Travel Allowance	2,430	2,661	2,312
O&M Price Differential	8,916	7,913	7,581
Non-location Dependant	62,948	62,948	62,948
Total Operating Costs	78,065	77,234	76,712
% difference from Iqaluit	1.1%	0.0%	-0.7%
Capital Costs			
Equipment and Furniture	18,920	17,844	17,846
Facilities	176,151	167,510	173,051
Base Infrastructure	18,240	24,356	22,393
Total Capital Costs	213,311	209,710	213,290
% difference from Iqaluit	1.7%	0.0%	1.7%

- the federal government is responsible for the incremental capital costs associated with the early expansion or early replacement of the existing territorial government infrastructure resulting from the establishment of the Nunavut Government (this includes associated funding for the operation and **maintenance** of the expanded portions of the facilities).

Recommendations

Recommendation #n-1

The **NIC** recommends that funding provided to create and run the **Nunavut Government** be sufficient to meet the assumptions and calculations set out in the following appendices:

Appendix A-16 Government of **Nunavut** Financial Model Overview and Comparison with Previous Studies;

Appendix **A-17: Government of Nunavut** Financial Model Design and Design Assumptions;

Appendix A-18 Cost Implications: Cambridge Bay as **Capital**;

Appendix A-19: Cost Implications: **Iqaluit** as **Capital**; and

Appendix A-20: Cost Implications: Rankin Inlet as Capital.

(b) The Ways of Financing Nunavut

In examining questions of how the **Nunavut** Government will be financed, and related issues involving how the **Nunavut Government** will administer the **financial** resources available to it, there are two **important** reference **points**: the **Nunavut** Act and the **Nunavut** Political Accord.

The **Nunavut** Act contains a number of law naking provisions dealing with the financing and financial administration of the **Nunavut** Government. **Section 39** establishes a **Nunavut** Consolidated Revenue Fund. **Sections 42 to 48** provide for the creation of territorial accounts and the auditing of those accounts Paragraph 23(l)(j) gives the **Nunavut** Legislature the power to make laws in relation to “direct taxation within **Nunavut** in order to raise revenue for territorial, municipal or local purposes”. Paragraph 23(l)(u) gives the **Nunavut** Legis-

lature the power to make laws in relation to “the expenditure of money for territorial purposes”. Section 27 of the **Nunavut** Act **sets** out specific powers of the Legislature, and qualifications on those powers, with respect to borrowing and lending

“27. (1) The Legislature may make laws

- for the borrowing of money by the Commissioner on behalf of **Nunavut** for territorial, municipal or local purposes;
- for the lending of money by the Commissioner to any person in **Nunavut**; and
- for the investing by the Commissioner of surplus money standing to the credit of the **Nunavut** Consolidated Revenue Fund.

(2) No money may be borrowed under a law made pursuant to paragraph (l)(a) without the approval of the Governor in Council.

(3) The repayment of money borrowed under a law made pursuant to paragraph (l)(a), and the payment of interest on the money, is a charge on and payable out of the **Nunavut** Consolidated Revenue Fund.”

The **Nunavut** Act does not contain similarly detailed provisions concerning the exercise of executive power over the use of moneys in the hands of the **Nunavut** Government **Subject** to laws adopted by the **Nunavut** Legislature, the use of executive powers in relation to the expenditure of money falls within the gift of executive powers granted the Commissioner and Executive Council (Cabinet) under sections 5 to 11. These powers are sufficient to enter into funding agreements with the Government of Canada. A point of qualification is introduced by section 41 of the **Nunavut** Act with respect to the expenditure of moneys obtained by the **Nunavut** Government from the Government of Canada

“41. When a sum of money is granted to Her Majesty in Right of Canada by Parliament to defray expenses for a specified public service in **Nunavut**, the power of appropriation by the Legislature over that sum is subject to the specified purpose for which it is granted.”

In addition to the general grant of executive powers to the Commissioner and Executive Council of **Nunavut**, the **Nunavut** Act supplies more **circumscribed** powers to an Interim Commissioner in advance of 1999. These powers include (paragraph 73(l)(b)), the power to enter, with the approval of the Governor in Council, binding agreements “with the Government of Canada or the

Northwest Territories for funding in respect of Nunavut". Subsection 73(4) stipulates that any agreement of this kind "terminates two years after the coming into force of section 3, unless the agreement provides for an earlier termination". Accordingly, a funding agreement with the Government of Canada **or the GNWT** entered into by an Interim Commissioner for Nunavut could not have any binding force after March 31, 2001.

Part 8 of the Nunavut Political Accord also contains provisions relevant to the financing and financial administration of Nunavut:

"8.1 Prior to the coming into force and effect of the provisions of the **Nunavut Act** creating the **Nunavut Territory**, **Canada**, following consultation with the other parties hereto, shall establish the financial **arrangements for** the Government of **Nunavut**. Recognizing the desirability of formula based **financing**, such financial **arrangements** may be analogous to those which **currently exist** for the **GNWT** with such modifications as may be necessary.

8.3 Prior to the coming into force and effect of the provisions of the **Nunavut Act** creating the **Nunavut Territory** a process shall be established by the parties to consult on **the** matters referred to in 8.1 and **8.2 herein** and to **clarify, as** necessary the financial **arrangements** referred to in **8.1** and **8.2**.

8.4 In establishing the financial arrangement referred to in **8.1**, and following consultation with the other parties hereto, Canada shall **determine** and fund reasonable incremental costs arising from the **creation** and **operation** of the Government of **Nunavut**.

8.5 The financial **arrangements referred** to in 8.1 and **8.2** shall support the need for financial stability for the territories and provide both **territorial** governments the opportunity to continue to provide public services for **residents**, recognizing the existing scope and quality of such **services**.

8.6 The GNWT will continue to provide an equitable **allocation** of its **capital**, maintenance, and operating expenditures in the **Nunavut** area and the western part of the Northwest Territories until the coming into force and effect of provisions of the **Nunavut Act** creating the **Nunavut Territory**."

These provisions within the Nunavut Political Accord provide important assurances as to practical objectives that must be served in striking an acceptable level of federal financial support for residents of Nunavut.

A practical choice emerges from the inter-play of the provisions of the **Nunavut Act** and the **Nunavut Political Accord**.

While it is clear that a binding funding agreement cannot be concluded on behalf of the **Nunavut Government** with the Government of Canada until the appointment of an Interim Commissioner, there might be seen to be considerable attraction to mobilizing the office of Interim Commissioner to introduce as much financial predictability as possible, as soon as possible, to the affairs of the **Nunavut Government**. This attraction is heightened if it assumed that the difficulties that **exist** in Canada's public finances are likely to subsist. Given what is **recommended** in Chapter 12 of this report concerning the timing of the appointment of an Interim **Commissioner**, such considerations could rationalize the following approach:

- the Interim Commissioner would conclude a multi-year funding agreement with the Government of Canada on **behalf** of the **Nunavut Government** that would come into effect shortly after April 1, 1997 and would run until March 31, 2001;
- the funding **agreement** would deal primarily with the funding of preparatory work (**both infrastructure** related and human resource **related**) to the **creation** of the **Nunavut Government** until April 1, 1999, and the forecast costs of **operating** the **Nunavut Government** for the two years following April, 1999; and
- the **funding agreement** would feature a formula **based on** a stipulated level of funding support with readily quantifiable forms of arithmetic adjustment (for example, population changes), but would largely be impervious to adaptation to changing policy priorities or understandings.

This approach would create a maximum of predictability about funding for the Nunavut Government. It could also be fairly said that this approach would create a maximum of inflexibility. Another major **defect** of this approach would be the heavy reliance on an **unelected** Interim commissioner in making enormously important financial commitments on behalf of the people of **Nunavut**. While this defect could be mitigated by ensuring that the Interim Commissioner acted in consultation with popularly accountable representatives (see Chapter 12), considerable anxiety on this score would be difficult to overcome.

A contrary approach that would offer as much flexibility of **results** as possible, while supplying little

predictability, might involve an Interim Commissioner concluding a funding agreement along the following lines:

- the Interim Commissioner would conclude a funding agreement with the Government of Canada on behalf of the Nunavut Government shortly before April 1, 1999;
- the agreement would provide funding for the initial operations of the Nunavut Government, and hence would not address preparatory costs leading to the Nunavut Government; the agreement would have a term of quite limited duration, running from April 1, 1999 to April 1, 2001 (or perhaps even shorter, although too short a period would eliminate the logic of having any initial degree of financial predictability at all); and
- the agreement would readily contemplate being re-visited in the event of unforeseen changes in the fiscal, economic or social policy environment.

Each of these competing approaches has its own virtues and drawbacks, and is not subject to simple "right or wrong" analysis. The Commission believes that preparations put in place with respect to the financing and financial administration of the Nunavut Government should be a sensible balancing of the need for adequate levels of both predictability and flexibility.

Recommendations

Recommendation #n-2

The NIC recommends that all matters involving how the Nunavut Government will initially be financed, and how its financial resources will initially be administered, be governed by full respect for the provisions of the Nunavut Political Accord as well as the Nunavut Act.

Recommendation #n-3

The NIC recommends that formula funding arrangements entered into by the GNWT not purport to deal with costs associated with the setting up of the Nunavut Government or with the costs of running the Nunavut Government after April 1, 1999. Costs incurred by the GNWT prior to April 1, 1999, and, associated with the setting up of the Nunavut

Government should be reimbursed by the Government of Canada through a special purpose agreement (a Preparations for Nunavut Agreement") separate and apart from the formula funding agreement between the GNWT and the Government of Canada. A Preparations for Nunavut Agreement should have a term that expires 60 days after the appointment of an Interim Commissioner for Nunavut. At that point, the Agreement should be replaced with a tri-partite agreement signed by the Interim Commissioner on behalf of the Nunavut Government, as well as by appropriate signatories of the federal government and GNWT.

Recommendation #11-4

The NIC recommends that the Interim Commissioner oversee, on behalf of the Nunavut Government, the negotiation of an initial funding agreement with the Government of Canada governing the costs of operating the Nunavut Government in the first year of its operations. The agreement should be concluded, if at all possible, six months in advance of the coming into operation of the Nunavut Government. In addition to respecting the provisions of the Nunavut Political Accord, the agreement should take into account those factors relevant to satisfactory long-term federal/Nunavut relations set out in Chapter 10 of this report. The agreement should contain language acknowledging that its assumptions and calculations have been negotiated in the absence of (1) a Nunavut Legislative Assembly and Executive Council, and (2) a demonstrated history of the cost of operating a Nunavut Government, and further acknowledging that the absence of these things may warrant substantial re-visiting of its assumptions and principles.

(c) Dividing Assets and Liabilities

It is impossible to approach the issue of dividing up assets and liabilities between the Nunavut Government and the GNWT without an element of apprehension. This is the case for two reasons.

First of all, contemporary governments are complicated things, owning and managing virtually the entire spectrum of different types of property and vulnerable to virtually the entire spectrum of different types of claims against them. On the asset side of the balance sheet, the GNWT owns some things on a fairly simple footing, such as buildings and motor vehicles. It owns other things of a more complex nature, such as entitlements to payments under contracts or intellectual

property in the form of trademarks and copyright. Similarly, on the liability side of the balance sheet, the GNWT has some rather straightforward obligations in the form of such things as current wages owed to employees. It **may** also be subject to some much more difficult to quantify claims, and even some things—such as exposure to lawsuits associated with environmental problems—that might only come to the surface at a distant point in the future. Contributing to the **complexity** of any investigation of governmental assets and liabilities is the element of time. Governments are constantly acquiring and disposing of things, and things themselves are constantly appreciating and depreciating in value. Thus, the conceptual problems of measuring the assets and liabilities of the existing NWT are compounded by the problems of establishing an appropriate point in time at which to make measurements.

There is a second reason for approaching the division of assets and liabilities with some trepidation. In dividing up anything among different parties, whatever the circumstances prompting the exercise and however well motivated the parties, there is always an opportunity for things to become competitive to the point of acrimony.

The process for dividing up the assets and liabilities of the current GNWT will be made easier, if not easy, by establishing as clear, and as widely accepted, an idea as possible as to what the **process** is intended to accomplish and, equally importantly, what it is not intended to achieve.

The overall objective in any process to divide up the assets and liabilities of the current GNWT should be to secure fair and equitable results for both the people of Nunavut, as they will be represented after April 1, 1999, by the Nunavut Government, and the people of the Mackenzie Valley, as they will be represented after April 1, 1999, by a modified version of the existing GNWT (or by a government of a different name). Such an objective, stated simply, is unlikely to be controversial. More controversial, of course, will be what, in very tangible terms, can be said to be “fair and equitable” in the situation.

Determination of what is **sufficiently** fair and equitable in the context of the division of the **assets** and liabilities of the current GNWT must **ultimately** be **reserved** for full fledged negotiations on that **point**. There are, however, four things that might usefully be kept in mind in the structuring and conduct of a negotiating process.

An essential requirement for achieving what is fair and equitable involves equality in the status of the parties concluding a comprehensive division of assets and

liabilities. The **parties** should be **seized** of comparable levels of authority. This means, as a practical consequence, that a binding agreement on the division of assets and **liabilities** should be entered into only after an Interim Commissioner for Nunavut has been appointed with a capacity to speak in Nunavut's name. This reality has been foreseen by Parliament in the inclusion of paragraph 73(1)(c) of the **Nunavut Act**, which explicitly mandates an Interim Commissioner to enter into such an agreement with the GNWT.

A second aspect of achieving what is fair and equitable involves defining a workable target for results. In this regard, it is important to remember what an **agreement** on division of assets and liabilities cannot accomplish. It cannot “undo” history, in the sense of making up for perceptions held by many **people** in the existing NWT that previous territorial budgets, particularly on the capital projects side, have unduly favoured certain regions or communities. Similarly, an agreement of this kind cannot hope to provide either the residents of Nunavut or the Mackenzie Valley with a sufficiently high level of capital assets to “capitalize” economic self-reliance; the **financial** positions of both the Nunavut Government and the post-1999 GNWT will be overwhelmingly **determined** by the revenue streams made available from the Government of Canada through hi-lateral formula funding agreements. Accordingly, there can only be illusory incentive, at best, in developing **overly** complex approaches to the division of assets and liabilities (for example, an effort to capture the “**historic**” levels of expenditures on asset-creating activities in different parts of the NWT). Such **ap**proaches **could** easily stymie negotiations and could obscure **necessary** distinctions between issues of current assets and liabilities and issues of future income needs and flows. The most rational approach to the division of assets and liabilities **will** be one which allows for the classification of assets and liabilities according to the simplest tests available (for example, geographic locations) and which allows the people of Nunavut and of the Mackenzie Valley to concentrate on the kinds of federal **financial** assistance needed in the years ahead to **support** acceptable levels of public sector programs and **services**.

Thirdly, achieving fair and equitable results will be assisted by identifying some general **principles** to guide negotiations. On preliminary examination, the following suggest themselves to the Commission:

- division of assets and liabilities should be tied to geography as much as practicable; all those assets and liabilities connected in their entirety to the Nunavut or Mackenzie Valley should be presumed to accrue to the relevant territorial

- government in the absence of a compelling reason to the contrary; beneficial use and enjoyment of Commissioner's lands in Nunavut are deemed to be acquired by the new Nunavut Government by section 49 of the Nunavut Act, and the same logic should be presumptively applied to other physical assets such as buildings, furniture, motor vehicles, utilities, etc.;
- the presumption flowing from geographic location should extend to physical assets that are facilities for the use of residents coming to them from all parts of the existing NWT; logically, the Nunavut Government would not end up with some ownership interest in the Stanton Hospital in Yellowknife (federal financial support for the Nunavut Government would need to take into account access by Nunavut residents to out-of-jurisdiction health care facilities such as Stanton);
 - the substantive benefits and burdens associated with legal instruments (such as leases) and liabilities connected to specific physical assets should usually follow the ownership of the asset;
 - physical assets which are held in a single location to facilitate their circulation and consumption in a variety of regions and communities in the NWT (for example, goods warehoused in Yellowknife) should be fairly and equitably divided between the two governments (fairness and equitableness might suggest division based on population size, but also taking into account the cost differences of operating in Nunavut and the Mackenzie Valley);
 - where physical assets are divided between the two governments, every effort should be made to avoid the unnecessary movement of goods; adjustments can be readily expressed through monetary means;
 - the GNWT should avoid entering into contractual commitments (including inter-governmental agreements) between now and April 1, 1999, that would complicate the fair and equitable division of assets or would result in the incursion of unnecessary liabilities (for example, the GNWT should probably wish to avoid making severance payments to anyone who is now employed by the GNWT in the Nunavut area who becomes an employee of the Nunavut Government);
 - most financial assets and liabilities of the current GNWT that are not tied to specific physical assets should be fairly and equitably split between the two new governments (as suggested earlier, an appropriate formula might be based on population size, adjusted for the cost differences of offering programs and services in Nunavut and the Mackenzie Valley);
 - intellectual property and any physical assets situated outside the NWT should be divided equally between the two territories (this could lead to interesting negotiations "we'll take the polar bear motor vehicle licence plates, while you can have the copyright in territorial publications"); and
 - an arbitration process and procedures should be adopted to sort out problems that elude working out by negotiators, and time should be allotted to resolve such issues prior to April 1, 1999.
- Finally, achieving fair and equitable results requires eliminating any sense on the part of residents of Nunavut or the Mackenzie Valley that territorial budget-setting and expenditure activities in the run-up to 1999 are geographically tilted for political reasons. Accordingly, full respect should be afforded to the relevant commitment in the Nunavut Political Accord on this point:
- "8.6 The GNWT will continue to provided an equitable allocation of its capital, maintenance, and operating expenditures in the Nunavut area and the western part of the Northwest Territories until the coming into force and effect of the provisions of the Nunavut Act creating the Nunavut Territory."

Recommendations

Recommendation #n-5

The NIC recommends that the division of assets and liabilities between the Nunavut Government and the GNWT be resolved through the conclusion of a comprehensive inter-governmental agreement, prior to April 1, 1999, sorting out the ownership of all classes of assets and liabilities now owned or controlled by the GNWT at the date of the agreement and all liabilities, established or contingent incumbent on the GNWT at the date of the agreement. Specific exceptions to the complete division of assets and liabilities might be

made in relation to those assets and liabilities that are tied to institutions that continue, after April 1, 1999, to ~out functions on behalf of both the residents of **Nunavut** and the Mackenzie Valley (for example, a workers' compensation board and an electric power corporation).

Recommendation #n-6

The **NIC** recommends that the **GNWT** continue its work of assembling and maintaining an inventory of various classes of **GNWT** assets and liabilities. The **GNWT**, **NTI**, the Government of Canada and the **NIC** should continue to consult among themselves as to the practical measures that might be adopted in order to resolve the fair and equitable division of assets and liabilities, but the conclusion of a comprehensive inter-governmental agreement should only follow the appointment of an Interim Commissioner for **Nunavut**.

Recommendation #n-7

The **NIC** recommends that **the** principles set out in this chapter be employed to guide the **negotiation** of a comprehensive inter-governmental agreement on the fair and equitable division of assets and liabilities between the Nunavut Government and the **GNWT**.

Recommendation #n-8

The **NIC recommends** that negotiations towards **a comprehensive** inter-governmental agreement on the fair and equitable division of assets and liabilities commence **sufficiently** soon after the appointment of an Interim Commissioner for Nunavut to allow recourse to a binding arbitration process to clear up, prior to April 1, 1999, any outstanding disagreements about appropriate results.

Legal and Procedural Matters

(a) An Interim Commissioner

Part IV of the Nunavut Act, entitled "Transitional Provisions", contains the following sections:

"Interim Commissioner of Nunavut"

71. (1) The Governor in Council may establish the office of Interim Commissioner of Nunavut and may appoint a person to hold that office during pleasure until the appointment of the first Commissioner of Nunavut.

(2) The Interim Commissioner shall act in accordance with any written directions given to the Interim Commissioner by the Minister.

(3) Directions respecting the exercise of the powers conferred by section 72 or 75 shall be published in such manner as the Minister may determine.

72. (1) The Interim Commissioner may

(a) recruit for employment by the Government of Nunavut such persons as the Interim Commissioner considers necessary for the operations of that Government on its establishment

(b) prescribe the duties of the persons referred to in paragraph (a) and the conditions of their employment consistent with the conditions of employment established by the Government of the Northwest Territories for its employees;

(c) establish systems and processes for the Government of Nunavut, including the organization and administration of territorial courts; and

(d) carry out such other functions as the Governor in Council may, by order, assign to the Interim Commissioner for the purposes of facilitating the as-

sumption by the Government of Nunavut of any of its powers, duties or functions.

(2) Agreements entered into pursuant to paragraph (1)(a) are binding on the Government of Nunavut.

(3) The Government of Nunavut may alter, revoke or replace any system or process established pursuant to paragraph (1)(c).

73. (1) The Interim Commissioner may, with the approval of the Governor in Council, enter into agreements

(a) with the Government of Canada, the Northwest Territories or any province or with any other body for the carrying out on behalf of Nunavut of programs previously carried out by the Government of the Northwest Territories;

(b) with the Government of Canada or the Northwest Territories for funding in respect of Nunavut; and

(c) with the Government of the Northwest Territories for the division of its assets and liabilities between Nunavut and the Northwest Territories.

(2) Subject to subsections (3) and (4), agreements entered into pursuant to this section are binding on the Government of Nunavut.

(3) The Government of Nunavut may, by giving notice in writing, terminate an agreement entered into pursuant to paragraph (1)(a) at the end of the fiscal year following that in which the notice is given

(4) An agreement entered into pursuant to paragraph (1)(b) terminates two years after the coming into force of section 3, unless the agreement provides for an earlier termination."

Some confusion has arisen among people in Nunavut about the purpose and import of these provisions. Accordingly, it is worth noting a few points with respect to them.

The Nunavut Political Accord stipulates that representatives of TFN and the GNWT would be consulted in the development of the draft Nunavut Act. Full consultation did take place. In the course of consultation, a common concern arose as to the practical difficulties associated with the "overnight" (March 31, 1999 / April 1, 1999) substitution in the Nunavut area of the executive authority of the Commissioner of the Northwest Territories with the executive authority of the first Commissioner of Nunavut. How could anyone make any legally binding commitments, be it an offer of employment, a lease of office space, or the purchase of equipment, on behalf of the new Nunavut Government prior to April 1, 1999? How could the senior managers be contractually "lined up" in advance of the new Nunavut Government coming into existence? What collective agreement would apply to the first employees of the Nunavut Government?

A couple of theoretical options existed to deal with these telling questions. One approach would have been to develop legislative language allowing the Commissioner of an "undivided" NWT to enter into commitments prior to April 1, 1999, binding on the new Nunavut Government after that date. This approach was rejected in the belief that it would be too difficult to invite a single individual to take on the job of holding ultimate executive authority over both an "undivided" NWT and an emerging Nunavut Territory, particularly given the expectation that executive authority would need to be exercised to "sign off" such potentially contentious things as an agreement to divide assets and liabilities between Nunavut and the rest of the NWT.

The more attractive option, and the one included within the Nunavut Act, allowed for the possibility of an "Interim Commissioner of Nunavut" to be appointed, sometime in advance of April 1, 1999, to enter into legally binding obligations of an essentially transitional nature on behalf of the not yet formally instituted Nunavut Government. In order to reduce fears of too much power being concentrated in the hands of an unelected appointee, some limitations on the authority of an Interim Commissioner were placed in the legislation. These limitations provide the Interim commissioner with executive authority over fewer topics than is formally the case with the current Commissioner of the NWT and, more importantly, they limit the length of time that an inter-governmental agreement signed by the Interim Commissioner, including a funding agreement with the Government of Canada, can bind the new Nunavut Government.

Notwithstanding the limitation on the powers of an Interim Commissioner placed in the Nunavut Act, a concern has been expressed by a number of leaders in Nunavut that the office of an Interim Commissioner, whatever its practical advantages, might result in slippage back to a period in the history of the North when powerful appointed Commissioners exercised enormous real as well as titular authority. The Nunavut Act, unlike the Northwest Territories Act, effectively eliminates the possibility of a Commissioner being instructed by the federal government to act in accordance with confidential instructions by requiring all directions from the Minister of DIAND to the Interim Commissioner to be published (this requirement will also pertain to all subsequent Commissioners of Nunavut). Despite this assurance, there is lingering apprehension of a strong willed Interim commissioner taking office who would detach himself or herself from the established conventions of responsible government and exercise authority solely on the basis of individual intuition and judgment.

The NIC believes that practical considerations make the appointment of an Interim Commissioner in advance of April 1, 1999 desirable, if not unavoidable. At the same time, the NIC believes that the concerns that have been expressed as to ensuring an adequate degree of public confidence and accountability are genuine and can be accommodated by doing two things: appointing an Interim Commissioner at a point in the process leading to April 1, 1999, that is timely but not premature; and, instructing an Interim Commissioner in such away as to reinforce the obligation of the Interim Commissioner to be adequately informed as to the preferences of the Nunavut public. The Interim commissioner must be based in Nunavut and have adequate staff.

The NIC has developed recommendation: along these lines.

Recommendations

Recommendation #12-1

The NIC recommends that the Governor in Council use the discretion set out in Part IV of the Nunavut Act to appoint an Interim Commissioner of Nunavut prior to April 1, 1999.

Recommendation #12-2

The NIC recommends that the selection of an Interim Commissioner be made in consultation with the GNWT, NTI and the NIC.

Recommendation #12-3

The **NIC** recommends that an Interim Commissioner of **Nunavut** take office on or about April 1, 1997.

Recommendation #12-4

The **NIC** *recommends* that the written directions given to an Interim Commissioner be developed in consultation with the **GNWT**, **NTI**, and the **NIC**.

Recommendation #12-5

The **NIC** recommends that an Interim Commissioner exercise powers in consultation with a member of the "Nunavut Caucus" of the NWT Legislative Assembly nominated by members of the Caucus, with the President of **NTI**, and with the Chairperson of the **NIC**.

Recommendation #12-6

The **NIC** recommends that the Office of the Interim Commissioner be located in the community chosen as capital of **Nunavut**. The Commissioner should have an adequate budget and staff, and the Office of the Commissioner should have a staff presence in **Yellowknife** and **Ottawa**. Further work should be undertaken by the **NIC**, resulting in recommendations at an early date, concerning the relationship between the Office of the Interim Commissioner and the MC in the period following the appointment of the Interim Commissioner.

(b) Legislative Revisions

The **Nunavut Act** "grandfathers" forward into the **Nunavut Territory** those laws of the NWT in operation immediately prior to the coming into existence of the Territory. This is done through section 29 of the **Act**:

"29. Subject to this **Act**, the laws in force in the Northwest Territories on the coming into force of this section continue to be in force in **Nunavut**, in so far as they are not thereafter repealed, amended or rendered inoperable in respect of **Nunavut**."

This section overcomes any problems in the form of a 'legal vacuum' that might otherwise exist in **Nunavut** in the period between the coming into existence of **Nunavut** on April 1, 1999, and the first opportunity for the **Nunavut Legislative Assembly** to convene for the purpose of considering territorial legislation.

Notwithstanding this overall solution to issues of legal continuity and clarity, a number of secondary issues have been identified in relation to ensuring that the statute books of **Nunavut** are as complete, comprehensible and workable as possible in the opening days of the **Nunavut Territory's** existence.

One such issue is the inappropriateness, on pragmatic grounds, of some existing NWT legislation applying to **Nunavut**. An obvious example of such legislation would be legislation dealing exclusively with a geographic location outside **Nunavut**, for example, legislation dealing with the City of **Yellowknife**. With respect to other legislation, most provisions would be of relevance to **Nunavut**, but others would not. An example of this would be provisions within a law of general application making reference to "Indian bands" and "Indian reserves".

Another issue involves official languages. At present, the NWT has eight official languages. The official status of these languages, and the rights associated with their use, are set out in a combination of Constitutional texts, federal legislation, and territorial legislation. The legislative history of official languages in the NWT has also been the subject of federal-territorial negotiation and agreement. It can be anticipated that the **Nunavut Legislative Assembly** and Government will attach considerable importance to two aspects of official languages matters: ensuring that all the legislation of **Nunavut** is available in well developed Inuit language versions; and, confining official language status in **Nunavut** to English, French and the Inuit language, thereby eliminating the need for the **Nunavut Legislative Assembly** and Government to conduct business in the Dene languages used in the Mackenzie Valley portions of the existing NWT, but not in **Nunavut**.

A third issue associated with the topic of legislative revisionism is the need to ensure that the statutes and regulations pertaining to **Nunavut** are in full compatibility with the provisions of the **Nunavut Agreement**. For example, Article 5 of the **Nunavut Agreement** establishes an entire new regime of wildlife rights and wildlife management in the **Nunavut** area. For the sake of legislative clarity, existing federal and territorial laws relevant to the **Nunavut** area should be thoroughly reviewed and, to the extent necessary, amendments developed to bring such laws into line with the **Nunavut Agreement**. **NTI** should, of course, be involved in such work. Ideally, the completion of this set of legislative revisions should take place as soon as possible, and the **GNWT Department of Renewable Resources** has begun work in this regard, but in any event this work should not be a task that the **Nunavut Legislative Assembly** has to deal with at length.

tine way of dealing with these issues that has been identified by the GNWT is the appointment of a **Statute Review** Commissioner early in the lifetime of the next NWT Legislative Assembly. Equipped with a staff having an appropriate mix of legislative drafting and translation skills, a Statute Review Commissioner could ensure that much of the work needed to deal with these issues **could** be carried out in a professional and expeditious manner.

Recommendations

Recommendation #12-7

The **NIC recommends** that the Office of Statute Review Commissioner be established by legislation of the next **NWT** Legislative Assembly, headed **by** a Statute Review Commissioner appointed by the GNWT and staffed with **persons** having appropriate legal and language expertise, to carry out **the** following tasks:

1. to prepare two statutory revision bills, suitable for consideration in the **first** sessions of the **Nunavut** Legislative Assembly and the **NWT** Legislative Assembly **occurring after April 1, 1999**, drafted to bring the legislation of **Nunavut** and the **remaining NWT** into line with their new jurisdictional circumstances;
2. to oversee the preparation of a complete and accurate **Inuit** language version of the statutes and regulations of **Nunavut** as they would appear **after** the enactment of a statute revision law by the **Nunavut** Legislative Assembly;
3. to prepare an official languages **bill**, suitable for consideration in the first session of the **Nunavut** Legislative Assembly, confining official language status in Nunavut to **English, French**, and the **Inuit language**; and
4. to advise, in concert with line departments having relevant responsibilities, on **those** legislative measures necessary to bring statutes and **regulations** into line with the **Nunavut** Agreement.

Recommendation #12-8

The **NIC** recommends **that**, in carrying out his or her work, the Statute Review Commissioner be directed to **consult** closely with the Government of **Canada**, **NTI** and the **NIC**.

Recommendation #12-9

The **NIC** recommends that reasonable costs associated with the work of the Statute Review Commissioner be identified as transitional costs associated with the creation of the **Nunavut** Territory and **Government**, and be met **by** the Government of Canada.

(c) Symbols of Nunavut

The symbols of a geographic jurisdiction, notably its coat of arms and **flag**, can be powerful **conveyors** of legitimacy and recognition. This is particularly so with respect to a region **such as Nunavut**, which has a rich and distinctive **landscape** and culture but is not often seen first hand by southern Canadians and by **people** from outside Canada.

Conscious of the **importance** of such symbols, and of some of the sensitivities of protocol associated with their adoption and use, the **NIC** has undertaken some **preliminary** discussions with the Office of the Chief Herald of Canada, an office that carries out functions associated with the **exercise** of royal prerogatives and thereby falls within the responsibilities of the Governor General of Canada. Those discussions have suggested a number of things about the kind of symbols that should be employed for the Nunavut Territory and the process through which they should be developed.

Recommendations

Recommendation W2-10

The **NIC** recommends that appropriate symbols, notably a coat of arms and **flag**, be developed for **Nunavut** consistent with the following points:

1. symbols should meet the standards administered by the Office of the Chief Herald of **Canada**, thereby allowing them to be registered and protected as "official" symbols, taking their proper place in international heraldry
2. symbols should reflect the uniqueness of **Nunavut**;
3. symbols, particularly a **flag**, should be easy to recognize and reproduce, thereby supplying the Government **and people** of **Nunavut** with a ready means to identify and market **Nunavut** to the rest of Canada and to the **world**; and

4. the process for developing symbols should draw upon the artistic talents of the people of Nunavut and be informed as to their aesthetic preferences; ideas and opinions from the people of Nunavut should be actively solicited.

Recommendation #12-11

The NIC and the Office of the Chief Herald should continue to co-operate in the development of symbols for Nunavut. DIAND, the GNWT, and NTI should be advised as to progress in this regard, and no application for official status for such symbols should be initiated without further consultation with them.

(d) The Constitution of Canada

The Constitution Acts, 1867-1982 make no mention of Nunavut. This lack of reference does not, of course, render doubtful the application to Nunavut of the vast majority of Constitutional provisions dealing with the basic structures and features of the Canadian federation. The lack of reference does, however, raise some questions as to the implications for Nunavut with respect to two matters: Senate representation for Nunavut; and, the application to the legislature and government of Nunavut of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Section 22 of the Constitution Act, 1867 states that "... the Yukon Territory and the Northwest Territories shall be entitled to be represented in the Senate by one member each." As recently as 1975, this section was amended to ensure that all Canadians, including the residents of territories, would be guaranteed representation in the Senate through at least one Senator. The logic of guaranteed minimum representation of this kind is incontrovertible. The obvious solution in relation to Senate representation is to amend section 22 to provide for one Senator from Nunavut alongside Senators from the Yukon Territory and NWT.

With respect to the Charter, subsection 32(1) reads as follows:

"32. (1) This Charter applies

(a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within the authority of Parliament including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory and Northwest Territories; and

(b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters within the authority of the legislature of each province."

Despite the lack of explicit reference to Nunavut in subsection 32(1), a good argument can be made, based on a purposive analysis, that the Charter would be interpreted to include application to Nunavut; certainly, the judiciary has signalled a willingness to "read" additional text into black letter law dealing with human rights. Notwithstanding such possibilities, the most desirable response to the omission of reference to Nunavut in the Charter would be an amendment to the section making explicit reference to Nunavut in this subsection. Section 30 of the Charter could also be amended to similar effect.

Complicating matters somewhat is that an amendment to the Constitution in relation to the Charter falls within the amendment provisions set out in Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982, and thereby requires the consent of provinces. While there is no obvious reason why any provincial government would object to amending the Constitution in order to make the Charter apply explicitly to Nunavut, a variety of considerations could make the timing of such amendment difficult to predict. Accordingly, it would be advisable for the Government of Canada, in concert with the GNWT, to enter into early discussions with provincial governments in relation to this issue.

Recommendations

Recommendation #12-12

The NIC recommends that the Constitution Acts, 1867-1982, be amended to make appropriate reference to Nunavut, specifically, to provide for the appointment of one Senator to represent Nunavut and for the explicit application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to the legislature and government of Nunavut.

Recommendation #12-13

The NIC recommends that the Government of Canada, in concert with the GNWT, communicate at the earliest opportunity with the provincial governments to determine their willingness to support Constitutional amendments in respect of Nunavut.

The Next Steps

(a) Work to be Done

In supplying this report to the Government of Canada, the GNWT and NTI, the NIC is completing the substantive phase of its work and positioning itself to take on further phases.

Before further substantive work with respect to Nunavut can be carried out by the NIC or, for that matter, by the three parties to whom this report is addressed, it is important to have a shared understanding of the process ahead. A review of the history of Nunavut reveals that the success of efforts to date has come about through a spirit of common purpose and collegiality that has transcended narrow organizational loyalties. The continuing relevance of this spirit is underscored by the diverse but mutually supportive roles that have been established for various organizations through the Nunavut Act, the Nunavut Political Accord, and other important instruments of co-operation. Examples of this point can be found in the multi-party nominating process to the NIC, the consultation involving the GNWT and NTI that was required during the development of the Nunavut Act, and the NIC's supplying its advice to more than one party. Even where working together has not been made obligatory, the various organizations involved in pushing Nunavut work forward have been quick to co-operate. Examples of this point are the periodic meetings of Nunavut leaders, the getting together on a regular basis of the NIC, members of the Nunavut Caucus of the NWT Legislative Assembly, and the executive of NTI, and the network of inter-organizational working groups at the staff level.

The collegial nature of recent work on Nunavut has been, and remains, a source of strength, allowing for productive exchange of information and opinion and

minimizing misunderstandings. Every effort should be taken to preserve the collegial approach. Doing so will require that as much attention be paid in the future to the process for pushing forward the Nunavut work-together as has been the case in the past that attention be paid to short-term issues of process as well as to on-going issues of substance. With these considerations in mind, the NIC believes it appropriate to advise on specific short-term steps that might be taken by the Government of Canada, the GNWT and NTI in response to this report, as well as map benchmarks of progress that should be established for the entire period 1995 to 1999.

The NIC suggests that the following steps be taken in the period following the submission of this report to the Government of Canada, the GNWT and NTI, and prior to the completion of the next comprehensive report by the NIC:

- April 1, 1995: submission of the first comprehensive report from the NIC to the DIAND Minister, GNWT Government Leader, and NTI President;
- April/May, 1995: leaders level meetings/discussions concerning the report involving NIC members, DIAND Minister, GNWT Government Leader, Nunavut Caucus of the NWT Legislative Assembly, and NTI Executive;
- April/May, 1995: staff level meetings/discussions concerning the report involving staff of NIC, Government of Canada, GNWT and NTI;
- May, 1995: public release of the report;
- May to August, 1995: leaders and staff level meetings/discussions involving the Government of Canada, GNWT and NTI, with the

assistance of the NIC, to seek a consensus approach on as many broad policy issues as possible concerning **aspects** of the design and implementation of the Nunavut Government that require federal Cabinet approval; **matters** of consensus to be confirmed by way of an exchange of correspondence among the three parties;

- May to **August**, 1995 reflecting the **consensus** built at meetings /**discussions** described in the **previous step**, **DIAND officials to prepare** and refine a submission to the federal Cabinet to be presented by the **DIAND Minister**; the **submission** should deal, at a minimum, with the following

- federal **financial** resources that will be made available up to 1999 for setting up the new Nunavut Government and for transition costs, notably in relation to infrastructure and education/training
- the factors that will be built into a Government of Canada /**Nunavut** Government agreement to supply the **Nunavut** Government with the financial resources to pay for acceptable levels of territorial programs and services **after April 1, 1999**

offsetting reductions in **federal** expenditures associated with smaller territorial government **operations in the Mackenzie Valley** after **April 1, 1999**

implications of the **creation of Nunavut** on federal government personnel **requirements** in the North

an approach to education/training for the public sector in Nunavut that will be **consistent** with the Government of Canada's obligations under Article 23 of the **Nunavut Agreement** and its commitments under the **Nunavut Political Accord**

an approach to the contracting process for new public sector infrastructure needs in **Nunavut** that will be consistent with the Government of Canada's obligations under Article 24 of the **Nunavut Agreement**

- the selection of a capital for **Nunavut**

aspects of the role, **process** for selection and instruction, and timing of appointment of an Interim Commissioner for **Nunavut**, and

objectives concerning Senate representation for Nunavut and the application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to **Nunavut**;

- September/October, 1995: review of the **DIAND Minister's** Cabinet submission concerning **Nunavut** through the various stages of Cabinet approval;
- November, 1995 conveying of the purport of the federal Cabinet's decisions concerning Nunavut from the Minister of **DIAND** to the **GNWT, NTI** and the **NIC**; and
- November/December, 1995: leaders and staff level **meetings/discussions** (involving the Government of Canada, the **GNWT, NTI** and **NIC**) concerning how to proceed with the work towards Nunavut in light of the federal **Cabinet's** decisions, with a **view** to achieving a consensus on key policy issues concerning finances, human resources, infrastructure, and an **Interim Commissioner**; such a consensus **could** take the form of a "Statement of **Common Outlook** and Intent Regarding **Nunavut**" subscribed to by the **Government** of Canada, the **GNWT** and **NTI**, and this statement could be made available to the public; the **NIC** could facilitate in the preparation of **such a** statement.

Recommendations

Recommendation #13-1

The **NIC** recommends that the Government of **Canada**, the **GNWT** and **NTI** follow the short-term steps outlined above.

Recommendation #13-2

Specifically, the **NIC** recommends that the Government of **Canada**, the **GNWT** and **NTI** commit themselves to seeking to conclude, upon review of **Nunavut** issues by the federal **Cabinet**, a "Statement of Common outlook and **Intent Regarding Nunavut**" covering key policy issues concerning finances, human resources, infrastructure and an Interim Commissioner for **Nunavut**. The **NIC** could assist in the development of the **statement**. Development and conclusion of such a

statement should not detract **from** efforts to build as much consensus as possible among the **Government of Canada, the GNWT and NTI** prior to reference of **Nunavut** issues to federal **Cabinet**.

Recommendation #13-3

The **NIC** recommends **that, in the** event that bona fide efforts to conclude a "Statement of Common Outlook and Intent Regarding **Nunavut**" proved fruitless within a reasonable length of time **following** the federal Cabinet **decision**, the Government of Canada proceed, on the basis of its legal and moral obligations and in exercise of its best **judgement**, to take **those** steps necessary to ensure the **Nunavut** Government is setup to begin **functioning** effectively on **April 1, 1999**.

(b) Prim"ties of the NIC

Since its inaugural meeting of January, 1994, the work of the **NIC** has gone through a number of **stages**:

- an initial phase in the first few months of 1994 that concentrated on putting the **NIC's** own organizational needs in **proper** working order (**adopting by-laws and** procedures, developing a budget, hiring staff, opening offices);
- a **preliminary research** and consultation **program** carried out in the **spring and summer** of 1994 that culminated in the **release** of the Iqaluit discussion paper of June 23, 1994 (Appendix A-7) and the commitment made by the **NIC** on September 19, 1994, to complete the first comprehensive report of the **NIC** on the design and implementation of the **Nunavut** Government by **April, 1995**; and
- the completion of an ambitious program of research and **consultation, involving both** community visits in **Nunavut** and extensive **discussions** with leaders and official of the federal and territorial governments and **NTI**, in the period September, 1994, to March, 1995, resulting in the delivery of this report on time to the parties.

Establishing immediate priorities for the **NIC** will, of course, turn on the way that the **territorial** and federal governments and **NTI** react to this report, and the speed with which they do so. Accordingly, it is outside the control of the **NIC** to set its upcoming priorities with **complete** confidence. Subject to that **qualifier**, it is none-

theless useful for the **MC** to reveal its thinking as to what kinds of **things** it would concentrate on in the near future in the event that most of the commendations contained within this report were found acceptable.

The **NIC** **anticipates** the following priorities in its upcoming work

- April/May, 1995 meetings/discussions concerning this **NIC** report with the Government of Canada, **GNWT** and **NTI**;
- May, **1995**: public release of this **NIC** report in **English, French and Inuit** language versions, accompanied by a summary and other information materials;
- May to December, 1995 (and **on-going**): public information efforts in both the North and the South (a) **to** explain the contents of this report, and (b) **to** obtain reactions to it;
- May to December, 1995: assistance to the Government of Canada, the **GNWT** and **NTI** in **assessing this report**, and in the development of a "Statement of Common Outlook and Intent Regarding **Nunavut**";
- May, 1995, to **April, 1996** development by **NIC** of a second comprehensive report to the Government of Canada, the **GNWT** and **NTI** dealing, among other things, with
 - the size of the **Nunavut Legislative Assembly**, two-member constituencies, **male/female balance** in the Assembly, and the selection and role of the Government Leader and Executive council
 - **detailed** design of the **Nunavut** Government
 - **detailed** plans to recruit/train personnel for the **Nunavut** Government
 - detailed plans for the infrastructure and technology requirements of the **Nunavut** Government
 - aspects of **the role, process for selection and** instruction, and timing of the appointment of an Interim Commissioner for **Nunavut**
 - **practical** ways to assist the transfer of additional governmental responsibilities to the community level

• review of the role of special purpose boards, agencies, councils and similar bodies in relation to the Nunavut Government

in light of expressions of community concerns on the **topic, a look at** the future of the criminal justice system in **Nunavut**, and

convening of the two conferences referred to in Recommendations #8-5 and **#8-6; and**

- April, 1996 submission of a **second** comprehensive **NIC** report to the Government of Canada, the **GNWT** and **NTI**, followed shortly thereafter by its release to the public.

In keeping with **the overall logic** of this approach, the second comprehensive **NIC** report would suggest priorities **for the NIC** in the period following April, 1996.

A Closing Word

In late 1991, negotiators representing the Inuit of Nunavut and the Crown in Right of Canada, at the end of a long march towards Nunavut characterized by many steps forwards; and more than a few steps back, agreed to include the following language in the text of the Nunavut Agreement:

"4.1.1 The Government of Canada will recommend to Parliament, as a government measure, legislation to establish, within a defined time period, a new Nunavut Territory, with its own Legislative Assembly and public government, separate from the Government of the remainder of the Northwest Territories."

The succinct, matter-of-factness of this language could not disguise its importance for all the people involved in the negotiations. For the first time, an unequivocal commitment had been made by the Government of Canada that a Nunavut Territory and Nunavut Government would come about.

The sense of exultation and achievement, on both Inuit and government sides of negotiations, that accompanied the reaching of agreement on Article 4 of the Nunavut Agreement will long be remembered by those who were directly involved. The same sense of excitement and achievement is available, freely and in large measure, to all those who join in the building up of Nunavut.

Nunavut is, and will always be a "breakthrough", just as Article 4 was a breakthrough for those individuals who participated in the land claims negotiations. Nunavut has this breakthrough quality because of the boldness of its conception and implications. For Inuit and other residents of Nunavut, the creation of the Nunavut Territory and Government is an enormous

opportunity to take advantage of political institutions that will focus on the unique society and physical environment of Nunavut while preserving the common bonds of shared Canadian citizenship. For Canadians outside it, Nunavut offers Unparalleled evidence of a contemporary Canadian determination that the flexibilities of Canadian federalism be employed so as to accommodate, not frustrate, the self-determination of aboriginal peoples

It is important to appreciate Nunavut as a breakthrough. It is equally important to appreciate Nunavut as a "work in progress". At one level, this observation is trite. Like all fundamental jurisdictional components of a federal state, Nunavut and its government will be of indefinite duration and of adaptable organizational form. Yet, Nunavut will be a work in progress at a more profound level than other provincial and territorial governments in Canada. Nunavut is being created precisely to focus and hasten the transformation of Nunavut society. This transformation is intended to accomplish an expanded and an intensifying degree of self-control and self-sufficiency. Self-control and self-sufficiency in obtaining greater command of the political agenda affecting Nunavut. Self-control and self-sufficiency in taking greater care of an economy of Nunavut that will be capable of growing in directions that will alleviate outside dependency. Self-control and self-sufficiency in tapping the collective and individual strengths of the people of Nunavut so as to align the cultural uniqueness of Nunavut with sound public policy-making.

In developing this report, it has been the hope of the NIC to make a tangible contribution to the work in progress that is Nunavut. At all times, Commissioners have approached their work with the assumption that the people of Nunavut and the people of Canada are

equally determined to convert the promises that have been exchanged with respect to Nunavut into a successful startup of the new territory and government on April 1, 1999. In their discussions with the public and with representatives of other organizations, and in their internal deliberations concerning various options and possibilities, Commissioners have kept two considerations uppermost in mind – what approach would be most practical with respect to any particular matter; and what must be done in the interests of fairness with respect to any particular matter. Fairness has been judged in terms of both the claims of individuals living in Nunavut and in the context of the common interests of all Canadians.

Whether or not the NIC has succeeded in fulfilling its hopes through this report is, of course, a judgement that must ultimately be formed by the readers of it, most notably by readers having major responsibilities with respect to Nunavut working for the Government of Canada, the GNWT, and NTL, and by all those readers who live in Nunavut. The NIC looks forward to hearing the views of all those who have opinions about the contents of this report. The NIC also looks forward to carrying out the next phases of its work.

Appendix A-1

Map of the Nunavut Territory

(on reverse)

A-1.1

A Chronology of Events on the Road to Nunavut

4500 to **1000 B.P. (approximately)** - Successive **Inuit peoples** enter and spread throughout the Canadian Arctic.

1000 to **1400** - Vikings establish **permanent** communities along western coast of Greenland and establish trading networks into the Canadian Arctic.

1576-78- English explorer **Martin Frobisher explores east** coast of **Baffin** Island. He is followed over the next **three** centuries by many navigators seeking a Northwest Passage to Asia.

1670- King Charles II grants the Hudson's Bay Charter, providing the Hudson's Bay Company with a trading monopoly over much of what is now Canada (**Rupert's Land**).

1867- Confederation.

1870- **After Hudson's Bay Company surrenders Rupert's Land, Rupert's Land** acquired by the **Government** of Canada.

1880- Arctic Islands transferal to Canadian Government by British Government.

1920 - Denmark and Canada engage in a dispute concerning jurisdiction over Danish nationals hunting **mus-koxen** on **Ellesmere** Island.

1926- The Arctic Islands Game Preserve (**AIGP**) is established as an exclusive **Inuit** hunting preserve to bolster Canada's claims to sovereignty in the High Arctic. The AIGP is subsequently expanded in 1929 and 1942 to

cover most of the remaining islands and parts of the mainland.

1928 - **Government of Norway asserts a** claim to the arctic islands visited by Norwegian explorer Sverdrup. Norway subsequently relinquishes its claims in the Canadian Arctic.

1939- Outbreak of World War II, followed by American entry into the war in 1941, leads to the establishment of many new military facilities in the eastern Arctic staffed by Canadian and **American** personnel. Military interest in the **Arctic** extends into the Cold War with the development of long-range bombers, intercontinental missiles, and nuclear-propelled submarines.

1950s - Many non-aboriginal people in the Mackenzie Valley push for dividing the Northwest **Territories**, thereby allowing the western portion to move more rapidly to responsible government.

1960- Aboriginal peoples in Canada are accorded the right to vote in federal elections.

1962 (September) - The Progressive Conservative **government** in Ottawa, through the Throne Speech, indicates that measures **will be introduced** to provide greater self-government in the North leading to the creation of new provinces.

1963 (May) - Based on **requests** by the 1957-60 and **1960-63** Councils of the Northwest **Territories** (N'WT), the Liberal Government in Ottawa introduces legislation to divide the NWT into the Mackenzie and Nunassiatq Territories. The Mackenzie **Territory** is to include Victoria

Island. The legislation dies on the order paper prior to the federal election held that year.

1964- The newly elected Northwest Territories Council opposes division. Dean **A.W.R. Carrothers** is appointed by the federal government to head an "Advisory Commission on the Development of Government in the Northwest Territories".

1966- The Carrothers Commission advises against division within the next ten years, but recognizes that it is inevitable due to the sheer **size** of the NWT. The Commission recommends the establishment of local governments throughout NWT and this **recommendation** is acted on.

1966- The NWT Council abolishes the AIGP and brings the area within the same legislative framework as the rest of the NWT.

1973- The Supreme Court of Canada brings down its decision in the **Calder** case, throwing open the legal question of whether aboriginal title continues to exist in Canada. This decision is followed shortly thereafter by the inauguration of the modern land claims process in Canada, including the NWT.

1973- **Inuit** Tapirisat of Canada (OTC), founded earlier in the decade, begins a study of **Inuit** land **use and occupancy** which demonstrates the extent of **Inuit** aboriginal title in the Arctic. With a few modifications, the area of **Inuit** use and occupancy will eventually form the geographic basis of the **Nunavut** Territory.

1975- The first fully elected NWT Council takes office and styles itself the NWT **Legislative** Assembly. A Speaker is chosen from among its 15 members and three elected members are given Executive Committee portfolios.

1976 (February) - ITC proposes the **creation of a Nunavut** Territory as part of a comprehensive settlement of **Inuit** land claims in the NWT. The "**Nunavut Proposal**" calls for the Beaufort Sea and Yukon North Slope **areas** used by the **Inuvialuit** to be included in the Nunavut Territory.

1976- The **Inuvialuit**, due to development pressure in the Beaufort Sea area, split off from ITC to negotiate a separate land claims **agreement**. The **Inuvialuit** are represented by the **Committee for Aboriginal Peoples' Entitlement (COPE)**.

1976- A federal electoral boundaries commission recommends dividing the NWT into two federal electoral districts: Nunatsiaq and the Western Arctic. This

recommendation is put in effect for the 1979 federal election.

1976- The Dene Nation proposes dividing the NWT into **three separate** territories.

1977 (July) - The Metis Association of the Northwest Territories proposes dividing the NWT by extending the Manitoba /Saskatchewan boundary northward.

1977 (August) - C. M. **Drury**, as Special Representative of the Prime Minister, is commissioned to undertake a study on constitutional development in the NWT.

1977 (**December**) - The NWT **Inuit** Land Claims Commission puts forward a proposal to the federal **government** calling for the formation of a new territory and government in Nunavut along the lines of **Inuit** political institutions.

1978 (**October**) - The **Inuvialuit** sign a land claims agreement-in-principle, expressing an interest in a Western Arctic Regional **Municipality** for the Beaufort Sea region.

1979- The NWT Legislative Assembly is enlarged to 22 seats. The Assembly has a **majority** of aboriginal members.

1979- In its decision in the **Baker Lake Case**, the Federal Court of Canada rules that the **Inuit** of the Baker Lake region continue to enjoy aboriginal rights to the land. Despite this finding, the Court refuses to define aboriginal rights in such a way as to prevent mining exploration in the **area**.

1979 (September) - ITC, at its Annual General Meeting in **Igloodik**, releases a discussion paper entitled "**Political Development in Nunavut**". The paper calls for division of Northwest Territories within ten years and **provincial** status for Nunavut five years after that.

1979 (**November**) - The NWT Legislative Assembly creates the Special Committee on Unity.

1980 (January)- The "**Drury Commission**" Report comes out in support of a **united NWT**, but also suggests that discussions continue regarding the possibility of division.

1980 (**October**) - At its Annual General Meeting in **Copernic**, ITC delegates unanimously pass a resolution calling for the creation of **Nunavut**.

1980 (October) - In its report to the NWT Legislative **Assembly**, the Special Committee on Unity indicates a lack of consensus in the Northwest Territories **favouring** the continued existence of a single territory.

1980 (November) - A Special **Committee** on the Impact of **Division** is established by the NWT Legislative **Assembly**.

1980 - The NWT Legislative Assembly votes 16-1 in **favour** of the division of the Northwest Territories.

1981 (May) - The NWT **Legislative** Assembly votes 12-0 in **favour** of a NWT-wide plebiscite concerning the creation of **Nunavut** through the division of the NWT.

1981 (November) - The NWT Legislative **Assembly** sets the date for the division plebiscite as April 14, 1982. The question for the plebiscite is: "Do you think the Northwest Territories should be divided?"

1981 (November) - The Dene Nation and the Metis Association of the Northwest Territories release "**Public** Government for the People of the North". This document proposes a new government for the Mackenzie Valley with provincial type powers, to be **called** "**Denendeh**".

1982 (February) - Members of the NWT Legislative **Assembly**, ITC, the Dene Nation, the Metis Association of the Northwest Territories and COPE, form a Constitutional Alliance to work on political development issues.

1982 (April) - The NWT-wide plebiscite on division is held. The vote for division is very high in the **Nunavut** area and 56% across the NWT.

1982 (May) - The NWT Legislative Assembly passes a motion calling on the federal **government** to appoint a boundaries commission to assist in the division of the NWT.

1982 (July) - In response to federal reluctance to establish a boundaries coremission, the Constitutional Alliance determines to pursue the matter of division and breaks itself into sub-groups, a **Nunavut** Constitutional Forum (NCF) **to** work on political development in the **Nunavut** area, and a Western Constitutional Forum (**WCF**) to work on political development in the Mackenzie Valley. The **Inuvialuit** are permitted seats **on one or both** forums.

1982 (November) - John **Munro**, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, announces the **federal government's** approval in principle of division of the NWT. Minister **Munro** attaches four conditions to **approval**: a continuing consensus on division; the development of government structures and systems of administration; the settlement of land claims; and, **agreement** on a boundary for division.

1983- The NCF publishes two documents entitled, "**Nunavut**" and "**Building Nunavut: A Working Docu-**

ment with a Proposal for an Arctic Constitution", and conducts community tours.

1984 (May) - COPE and the Tungavik Federation of Nunavut (TFN), now mandated to represent the **Inuit** of **Nunavut** for land claims and political development purposes, sign a boundary agreement separating the **Inuvialuit** and **Nunavut** land claims areas.

1984 (June) - COPE and the Government of Canada sign the **Inuvialuit Final Agreement**. Following ratification legislation by Parliament, the land claims agreement comes into force shortly thereafter.

1984 (October) - The WCF releases "**Resource Management Boundary Problems**", examining five boundary alternatives

1984- At a First Ministers Conference, Rime Minister Pierre Trudeau identifies **Nunavut** as a workable **form** of self-government.

1984 (December) - TFN and the Dene/Metis Negotiation **Secretariat** sign a **memorandum** of understanding concerning principles and a process to guide overlap and boundary negotiations.

1985 (February) - **In** a speech to the NWT Legislative **Assembly**, David **Crombie**, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, announces support for **Nunavut** upon finalization of a **boundary** for division.

1985 (November) - The Dene Nation releases a discussion paper entitled "**Denendeh Public** Government" that foresees **Dene, Metis, Inuvialuit** and some **Inuit** communities being part of a Denendeh province.

1986 (May) - TFN and the **Dene/Metis** sign a boundary and overlap agreement that establishes a **boundary** for the **Kitikmeot** and **Keewatin** regions of **Nunavut**.

1987 (January) - The **Iqaluit Agreement** is signed by leaders of the Constitutional Alliance. The Agreement which establishes **principles** for **constitutional** development and October 1, 1991, as a target date for division endorses the boundary established in the May, 1986, agreement between TFN and the **Dene/Metis**.

1987 (March) - The NWT Legislative Assembly approves the **Iqaluit Agreement** and recommends a plebiscite on the proposed boundary.

1987 (March) - The **boundary** plebiscite tentatively scheduled for May 20, 1987 is **cancelled** after TFN and the **Dene/Metis** fail to firm up understandings struck in their earlier agreement.

1987-- With little evidence of continuing progress, federal government funding for the NCF and the WCF is ended.

1988 (September) - **Dene**/Metis leaders sign a land claims agreement -in-principle with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney.

1990 (April) - **Dene**/Metis leaders sign a final land claims agreement with representatives of the Government of **Canada** and the **GNWT**. The agreement is **subject** to ratification on the part of both **Dene**/Metis and the Crown.

1990 (April) - TFN and representatives of the federal and territorial governments sign a land claims **agreement-in-principle**. The agreement contains language in support of division of the NWT and a plebiscite on a boundary for division.

1990 (July) - The **Dene**/Metis final land claims agreement is rejected at the Annual General Assembly of the Dene Nation at Hay River. The **Gwich'in** Dene leave the Assembly with the intention of negotiating a separate land claims agreement. Other Dene groups pursue this course in the months that follow.

1991 (July) - The **Gwich'in** sign a land claim agreement with the federal and territorial governments.

1992 (January) - TFN and government negotiators come to agreement on the substantive portions of a final land claims agreement for the Nunavut region. The final agreement contains commitments on the creation of a Nunavut Territory and Government, subject to a **boundary** plebiscite and the conclusion of a Nunavut Political Accord setting out more details concerning the **timetable** and process for setting up the new territory and government.

1992 (February) - The NWT Executive **Committee** approves the wording of a boundary plebiscite question and establishes the date for the plebiscite as May 4,1992.

1992 (May) - An overall **majority** of voters in the **NWT** approve the proposed boundary for division. An overwhelming majority in the **Nunavut** area approve the boundary.

1992 (October) - TFN and government representatives sign the **Nunavut** Political Accord. The Accord sets the date for the creation of the **Nunavut** Territory and Government as April 1,1999, and contemplates the creation of a statutory Nunavut Implementation **Commission** to assist with the **design** of the new **government**.

1992 (November) - In a **Nunavut-wide** vote, the Inuit of Nunavut ratify the Nunavut final land claims agreement (**Nunavut** Agreement).

1993 (May) - The **Nunavut** Agreement is signed in Iqaluit by Prime Minister Brian **Mulroney**, NWT Government Leader Nellie Cournoyea and TFN President Paul **Quassa**.

1993 (June) - Two pieces of legislation, ratifying the **Nunavut** Agreement and creating the **Nunavut** Territory and Government (the **Nunavut** Land Claims Agreement Act and the **Nunavut** Act), are erected by Parliament and **receive** Royal **Assent**.

1994 (January) - The first meeting of the Nunavut Implementation Commission takes place.

1999 (April) - The **Nunavut** Territory and Government will come into existence.

Mandate of the Commission (section 58 of the Nunavut Act)

Mandate

56. The mandate of the Commission is to advise the Government of Canada, the Government of the Northwest Territories and Tungavik on the **establishment of Nunavut** and, in particular, to advise on

- (a) the timetable for the assumption by the Government of **Nunavut** of responsibility for the delivery of services;
- (b) the process for the first election of the members of the Assembly, including the number of members and the establishment of **electoral** districts;
- (c) the design **and** funding of training programs;
- (d) the process for determining the location of the seat of government of **Nunavut**;
- (e) the **principles and** criteria for the equitable division of assets and liabilities between Nunavut and the Northwest Territories;
- (f) the new public works **necessitated** by the establishment of Nunavut and the scheduling of the construction of the works;
- (g) the administrative design of the first **Government** of Nunavut;
- (h) the arrangements for delivery of programs and services where the responsibility for delivery by **Nunavut** is to be phased in; and
- (i) any other related matter **referred** to it by the Minister, with the consent of the government leader of the Northwest Territories and of Tungavik.

Article 4 Nunavut Political Development

Part 1: General

- 4.1.1 The Government of Canada will recommend to Parliament, as a government measure, legislation to establish, within a **defined** time period, a new **Nunavut** Territory, with its own **Legislative Assembly** and public government, separate **from** the Government of the remainder of the Northwest Territories.
- 4.1.2 Therefore, Canada and the Territorial Government and Tungavik Federation of Nunavut shall negotiate a political accord to deal with the **establishment** of **Nunavut**. The political accord shall establish a precise date for recommending to Parliament legislation necessary to establish the **Nunavut** Territory and the **Nunavut** Government, and a transitional process. It is the intention of the Parties that the date shall coincide with recommending ratification legislation to Parliament unless Tungavik Federation of Nunavut agrees otherwise. The political accord shall also provide for the types of powers of the **Nunavut** Government, certain principles relating to the financing of the Nunavut Government, and the time limits for the coming into existence and operation of the **Nunavut** Territorial Government. The political accord **shall** be finalized before the **Inuit** ratification vote. It is the intention of the Parties to complete the Political Accord by no later than April 1, 1992.
- 4.13 Neither the said **political** accord nor any legislation enacted pursuant to the political accord shall accompany or form part of this Agreement or any legislation ratifying this Agreement. Neither the said political accord nor anything in the legislation enacted **pursuant** to the **political** accord is intended to be a land claims agreement or treaty right within the **meaning** of Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

Nunavut Political Accord

BETWEEN:

The Tungavik Federation of **Nunavut** (TFN), as represented by the President of TFN;

AND:

The Government of Canada (Canada), as represented by the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development;

AND:

The **Government** of the Northwest Territories (GNWT), as represented by the Minister of **Intergovernmental** and Aboriginal Affairs and the Minister of **Municipal** and community Affairs.

WHEREAS the creation of a new **Nunavut** Territory with its own government is a fundamental objective of the **Inuit of Nunavut**;

AND WHEREAS achievement of the **Inuit objective** is supported by Canada and the GNWT;

AND WHEREAS a **majority** of those voting in a territory-wide plebiscite, held in 1982, **favoured** division of the N.W.T.;

AND WHEREAS the Legislative Assembly of the N.W.T. has passed resolutions supporting division;

AND WHEREAS the parties have committed themselves to securing the **Inuit objective** in a manner consistent with the provisions of Article 4 of an **Agreement** between

the **Inuit** of the **Nunavut** Settlement Area and Her Majesty in Right of Canada ("the final agreement");

NOW THEREFORE THE TFN, CANADA AND THE GNWT ("**the parties**") HEREBY AGREE AS FOLLOWS:

Part 1: General

1.1 This **Agreement** ("the Accord") is the **Nunavut Political Accord** referred to in Article 4 of the final agreement.

Part 2: Nunavut Act

2.1 The legislation proposed to establish Nunavut (the "**Nunavut Act**") shall be similar to the present **Northwest Territories Act** with such **modernization** and clarification as may be appropriate.

2.2 The **Nunavut Act** shall provide that those territorial laws made under the **Northwest Territories Act** that are in force immediately prior to the coming into force and effect of the provisions of the **Nunavut Act** creating the Nunavut Territory will continue to apply to **Nunavut**, except to the extent that they **are** inconsistent with the **Nunavut Act**, or until such laws are revoked or amended by the **Nunavut Legislative Assembly**.

2.3 Canada shall consult with the TFN and the GNWT on **all** matters to be provided for in the **Nunavut Act** prior to recommending the said legislation to Parliament.

Part 3: Recommendation and Timing of Nunavut Act

- 3.1 The Nunavut Act shall be recommended to Parliament, as a Government measure, on the date on which legislation to ratify the final agreement is tabled in Parliament, unless TFN agrees to another date.
- 3.2 Canada shall **seek** Royal Assent for the **Nunavut Act** coincidental to seeking Royal Assent for the legislation to ratify the final agreement unless TFN agrees otherwise.
- 3.3 All sections of the **Nunavut Act** shall come into form and effect no later than **April 1, 1999**. It is anticipated that appropriate sections of the **Nunavut Act** will **be** brought into force prior to April 1, 1999 where those sections support the transition process for the creation of **Nunavut**.

Part 4: Powers of the Nunavut Legislative Assembly and Government

- 4.1 The **types** of powers of the **Nunavut Legislative Assembly** and **Nunavut Government** shall be generally consistent with those in the present **Northwest Territories Act**.
- 4.2 The **Nunavut Government** shall have **sufficient** authority to **fulfil** its lawful obligations under the final agreement.
- 4.3 The **Nunavut Act** shall include provisions regarding the authority to transfer administration and control over public lands to the **Nunavut Government**.

Part 5: Boundaries of the Nunavut Territory

- 5.1 The **Nunavut Territory** shall comprise that area which forms that part of the **Northwest Territories**, pursuant to the **Northwest Territories Act**, situated east of the line **described** in Annex A attached hereto.

Part 6: Transition Process

- 6.1 The **Nunavut Act** shall provide for a **Nunavut Implementation Commission (NIC)** in accordance with this Accord.
- 6.2 The **NIC** shall be established as soon as practicable after the **Nunavut Act** receives **Royal Assent** and in any event no later than six months beyond that date, and shall terminate no later than three months following the coming into force and effect of the provisions of the **Nunavut Act** creating the **Nunavut Territory**.
- 6.3 The **NIC** shall comprise nine Commissioners **appointed** by the Governor in Council, three of whom shall **be** chosen from a list of names submitted by the **GNWT** and three of whom shall be chosen from a list of names submitted by the TFN. Not less than six of the **Commissioners** shall be ordinarily resident in the **Nunavut Settlement Area**.
- 6A In addition to the nine Commissioners, a Chief **Commissioner**, who shall be acceptable to the parties hereto, shall be appointed by the Governor in council.
- 6S An Executive Director **shall** be hired by the Commission, and shall manage the commission's staff and budget. The Executive **Director** shall **report** to the Chief **Commissioner**, and shall act as Secretary to the Commission.
- 6.6 The **NIC** shall provide advice to the **parties** hereto on the creation of **Nunavut**.
 - 6.6.1 Consistent with its general mandate, the **NIC** shall provide advice on
 - (i) a timetable for the assumption of service delivery responsibilities from the **GNWT**, federal government or other authority, by the **Government** of Nunavut;
 - (ii) the process for the first election of the Government of **Nunavut** and for the determination of **electoral** districts for **Nunavut**;
 - (iii) the design of and funding for training plans;
 - (iv) the process for the identification of a capital **city** of Nunavut;
 - (v) the **principles** and criteria for an equitable division of assets and liabilities between the **GNWT** and the Government of Nunavut;
 - (vi) capital infrastructure needs of Nunavut resulting from division and the creation of a new territory, and scheduling for construction;

- (vii) the **appropriate administrative** design for the first Government of Nunavut which may include personnel to administer the functions described in 7.1 with due regard for efficiencies and effectiveness; and
- (viii) such other matters consistent with the Commission's mandate as maybe referred to it.

The **determination** of the administrative design of the first Nunavut government organization is separate from the determination of ongoing federal financing **arrangements** for the two territories.

The responsibility for accepting and implementing the recommendations of the NIC will depend on the jurisdiction to which **recommendations** individually apply.

6.6.2 The NIC shall:

- (i) propose an annual budget for its own operations;
- (ii) hire or engage appropriate **NIC support staff**;
- (iii) recommend arrangements for the continuing provision of programs and services where the assumption by the Government of **Nunavut** of service delivery responsibilities is to be phased;
- (iv) establish public information programs, which may include public meetings, to keep residents of Nunavut apprised of the Commission's **work**; and
- (v) undertake such other tasks within its mandate as may be required.

6.7 The Commission shall prepare an annual report, and a copy of the annual report shall be tabled by the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development in Parliament, and immediately thereafter provided to the Government Leader for tabling in the Legislative **Assembly**. A copy shall also be provided to the TFN.

Part 7: Administrative Capacity of the Nunavut Government

7.1 The arrangements made regarding the **administrative** design of the **first Nunavut** Government (as recommended by the NIC pursuant to 6.6.1 (vii)) shall provide the **Nunavut** Government with the administrative **capacity** to:

- (i) establish and maintain a Legislative Assembly and Executive Council;
- (ii) manage the financial affairs of Nunavut;

- (iii) secure independent legal advice for the Government;
- (iv) undertake personnel recommitment, **administration** and training for and of **government** employees;
- (v) maintain certain aspects of public works and government **services**; and
- (vi) support municipal affairs; and
- (vii) **provide** adult education programming as part of a comprehensive human resource development plan.

72 It is anticipated that other areas of administrative responsibility at present administered by the GNWT which are not part of the core administrative capacity of the Nunavut **Government**, referred to in 7.1, shall be discharged through inter-governmental agreements or contracts with appropriate governments, public institutions or non-governmental bodies.

73 In discharging its duties with regard to the design and implementation of the structures of the first Nunavut Government (see 6.6.1 (vii) and 6.6.2 (iii)) the NIC shall work toward the following goals:

- (i) an equitable distribution of **government** activities among Nunavut communities;
- (ii) appropriate utilization of information management systems and supporting technology to support a decentralized and **efficient** government delivery system; and
- (iii) **employment** of local residents in new **government positions** through strong emphasis on training and work support programs.

Part 8: Financing the Nunavut Territory

8.1 Prior to the coming into form and effect of the provisions of the Nunavut Act creating the **Nunavut** Territory, Canada, following consultation with the other parties hereto, shall establish the financial arrangements for the Government of **Nunavut**. Recognizing the desirability of formula based **financing**, such **financial** arrangements may be analogous to those which currently exist for the GNWT with such modifications as may be **necessary**.

8.2 Prior to the coming into force and effect of the provisions of the Nunavut Act creating the Nunavut Territory, Canada, following consultation with the **GNWT**, shall establish formula based **financial** arrangements for the **GNWT** for the

period following such coming into force and effect of the provisions of the **Nunavut Act**. Such **financial** arrangements shall be analogous to those with currently exist with the **GNWT** with such modifications as maybe necessary,

- 8.3 Prior to the coming into force and effect of the provisions of the **Nunavut Act** creating the **Nunavut Territory** a process shall be established by the parties to consult on the matters referred to in 8.1 and 8.2 herein and to clarify, as necessary, the **financial** arrangements referred to in 8.1 and 8.2.
- 8.4 In establishing the financial arrangements referred to in 8.1, and following consultation with the other parties hereto, Canada shall determine and fund reasonable incremental costs arising from the creation and operation of the **Government of Nunavut**.
- 8.5 The **financial** arrangements referred to in 8.1 and 8.2 shall support the need for financial stability for the territories and provide both territorial **governments** the opportunity to continue to provide public services for residents, recognizing the existing scope and quality of such services.
- 8.6 The **GNWT** will continue to provide an **equitable allocation** of its capital, **maintenance**, and **operating** expenditures in the **Nunavut** area and the western part of the Northwest Territories until the coming into force and effect of the provisions of the **Nunavut Act** creating the **Nunavut Territory**.

Part 9: Training and Human Resources Planning

- 9.1 The **parties** recognize the central importance of training in enabling Nunavut residents to access jobs resulting from division of the Northwest Territories, and that investing in **people** is of greater value than investing in infrastructure.
- 9.2 Training plans shall be **incorporated** into all **planning**, design and implementation activities of the **NIC** as **reflected** in the general mandate provided through 6.6.1. Planning shall identify existing training programs and associated funding programs, as well as new program **requirements**. Planning efforts shall consider all **aspects** of training activities including skills surveys, **pre-employment** education, skills upgrading, co-operative **education** and **on-the-job** training opportunities.

9.3 The parties shall begin preparation of a preliminary human resources plan within six weeks of the signing of this Accord.

9.4 **Coordination** may occur between the training effort for implementation of the **final agreement** and that to establish **Nunavut**.

Part 10: Other

- 10.1 This Accord may be amended with the consent of the parties.
- 10.2 This Accord shall be revised by the parties in the event of any amendments to Article 4 of the **final agreement** in order to reflect that amendment.
- 10.3 Where there is any inconsistency or conflict between the provisions of this Accord and the final agreement, the final agreement shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency or conflict.
- 10.4 This Accord shall come into effect upon signing by the parties, and, subject to 10.6, shall continue in effect until three months after the date of the coming into force and **effect** of the provisions of the **Nunavut Act** creating the **Nunavut Territory**.
- 10.5 This Accord is subject to the appropriation of funds by Parliament.
- 10.6 In the event that the final agreement is not ratified **by the Inuit in the ratification** vote, this Accord shall have no force and effect.
- 10.7 Any reference in this Accord to the **GNWT** in relation to that period after the coming into **force** and effect of the provisions of the **Nunavut Act** creating the **Nunavut Territory** shall be construed as a reference to the government responsible for the western **part** of the Northwest Territories.

Annex A

The following legal description is the western boundary of the Tungavik Federation of Nunavut (TFN) Land Claim Settlement Area:

60th Parallel Commencing at the intersection of **60°00'N** latitude with **102°00'W longitude**, being the intersection of the Manitoba, Northwest Territories and Saskatchewan borders;

TheIon River thence due north to the **intersection** of **64°14'N** latitude and **102°00'W** longitude, near the south shore of the TheIon River;

Gloworm Lake thence west northwesterly in a straight line to the **intersection** of **64°50'N** latitude and **109°20'W** longitude, north of **Gloworm** Lake;

Contwoyto Lake thence northwesterly in a straight line to the intersection of **65°30'N** latitude and **110°40'W** longitude, west of **Contwoyto** Lake;

Itchen Lake thence due west to the intersection of **65°30'N** latitude and **112°30'W** longitude, east of **Itchen** Lake;


Inuvialuit Settlement Region thence northwesterly in a straight line to a point on the southeastern boundary of the **Inuvialuit** Settlement Region, being the **intersection** of **68°00'N** latitude and **120°40'51"W** longitude;

thence following the adjusted boundary of the **Inuvialuit** Settlement Region, as set out in the **TFN/COPE** Agreement of May 19, 1984, to the **intersection** of **70°00'N** latitude and **110°(D'W)** longitude; and finally

thence due north along said **meridian** of longitude, along the eastern boundary of the **Inuvialuit** Settlement Region, to its **intersection** with the Territorial Sea Boundary north of **Borden** Island, being the **terminatio**n of this boundary.

SIGNED by the parties hereto this 30th day of October 1992.

FOR CANADA:



Minister of Indian Affairs
and Northern Development


J. NORRIS

Witness

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
NORTHWEST TERRITORIES



Minister of Intergovernmental and
Aboriginal Affairs



Witness




Minister of Municipal and
community Affairs




Witness

FOR THE TUNGAVIK FEDERATION OF NUNAVUT



President



Witness

Appendix A-6

Demographics and Socio-Economic Conditions

Introduction

This appendix presents basic demographic and socio-economic data for Nunavut. Where appropriate, data is presented both in chart form and as a map.

Pages A-6.2 and A-6.3 provide a population projection as of April 1, 1999.

Pages A-6.4 and A-6.5 summarize ethnic composition, 'mother tongue', crude birth rate, and population under the ages of 15 and 25.

Pages A-6.6 and A-6.7 detail the adult population—persons aged 15 years and over.

Pages A-6.8 and A-6.9 detail the employed population.

Pages A-6.10 and A-6.11 detail the existing Nunavut-based work force of the GNWT. This data does not reflect employment by community governments or community housing associations.

Pages A-6.12 and A-6.13 detail the number of adults who told surveyors for the GNWT's 1994 Labour Force Survey that they "want a job". This data includes both individuals who meet the national criteria for being considered unemployed and individuals who have given up actively seeking employment but who state that if work were available in their community they would seek it. The latter group are sometimes referred to as 'discouraged workers'.

Pages A-6.14 and A-6.15 detail the 'real unemployment rate' in the various communities. This rate is calculated using the number of people who state that they "want a job", rather than those people who meet the national criteria for being considered unemployed, and gives a more accurate picture of the level of 'real unemployment' in historically economically depressed communities and regions.

Pages A-6.16 to A-6.19 detail social assistance (SA) spending. It should be noted the amounts listed are the actual amounts of the 5A cheques issued to individuals, for whatever reasons, in the various communities—these amounts do not include the cost of the social services system itself. Per capita spending is calculated using the adult aboriginal population (from the 1991 Census) because, unlike the western NWT, almost no welfare is paid to non-aboriginal residents of Nunavut.

Finally, page A-6.20 summarizes suicides in Nunavut during the period 1985 to 1994.

Population Projection for Nunavut

Projected Population on April 1, 1999

for Nunavut as a whole

Nunavut total 26,528

NOTE: Nunavut total includes the population living outside of the 26 communities with populations greater than 700.

by Region

Baffin communities	13,906	53.1%
Keewatin communities	7,272	27.8%
Kitikmeot communities	4,989	19.1%

by Type of Community

regional centres	8,038	30.7%
other communities	18,129	69.3%

by % Real Unemployment in the Community

3-19%	8,751	33.0%
20-39%	8,529	32.2%
40-47%	9,248	34.9%



by Community

Iqaluit	4,440	17.0%
Rankin Inlet	2,179	8.3%
Arviat	1,657	6.3%
Baker Lake	1,463	5.6%
Pangnirtung	1,419	5.4%
Cambridge Bay	1,405	5.4%
Coppermine	1,325	5.1%
Pond Inlet	1,206	4.6%
Igloolik	1,169	4.5%
Cape Dorset	1,167	4.5%
Gjoa Haven	1,001	3.8%
Coral Harbour	735	2.8%
Taloyoak	727	2.8%
Clyde River	701	2.7%
Arctic Bay	670	2.6%
Sanikiluaq	670	2.6%
Hail Beach	663	2.5%
Repulse Bay	626	2.4%
Broughton Island	569	2.2%
Pelly Bay	509	1.9%
Lake Harbour	450	1.7%
Chesterfield Inlet	414	1.6%
Nanisivik	341	1.3%
Whale Cove	289	1.1%
Resolute Bay	209	0.8%
Grise Fiord	163	0.6%


NOTE: This projection does not include the population influx which will result from the establishment of the Nunavut government.

source: GNWT Bureau of Statistics


**Projected Population
on April 1, 1999**




Ethnic Composition




Language - Mother Tongue



Crude Birth Rate



Population under the ages of 15 and 25



source: 1991 Census

Nunavut Labour Force information- 1994

Population Aged 15 Years & Over

for Nunavut as a whole

Nunavut total 14,404

by Ethnicity

aboriginal 11,599 80.5%
non-aboriginal 2,806 19.5%

by Sex

males 7,542 52.4%
females 6,863 47.6%

by Age

15-24 years 4,256 29.5%
25-44 years 7,062 49.0%
45-64 years 2,638 18.3%
65 years & over 448 3.1%

by Region

Baffin 7,625 52.9%
Keewatin 4,066 28.2%
Kitikmeot 2,714 18.8%

by Type of Community

regional centres 4,843 33.6%
other communities 9,561 66.4%

by % Real Unemployment in the Community

3-19% 5,290 36.7%
20-39% 4,291 29.8%
40-47% 4,823 33.5%



by Community

Iqaluit	2,697	18.7%
Rankin Inlet	1,319	9.2%
Arviat	883	6.1%
Baker Lake	860	6.0%
Cambridge Bay	827	5.7%
Pangnirtung	746	5.2%
Coppermine	710	4.9%
Cape Dorset	638	4.4%
Igloolik	625	4.3%
Pond Inlet	616	4.3%
Gjoa Haven	492	3.4%
Taloyoak	392	2.7%
Clyde River	357	2.5%
Coral Harbour	348	2.4%
Hall Beach	325	2.3%
Sanikiluaq	325	2.3%
Arctic Bay	308	2.1%
Broughton Island	307	2.1%
Repulse Bay	282	2.0%
Pelly Bay	259	1.8%
Lake Harbour	235	1.6%
Chesterfield Inlet	213	1.5%
Nanisivik	212	1.5%
Whale Cove	161	1.1%
Resolute Bay	156	1.1%
Grise Fiord	79	0.5%
Bay Chimo	34	0.2%

source: 1994 GNWT Labour Force Survey

Population Aged 15 Years & Over

1994



Nunavut Labour Force information- 1994

Employed Persons

for Nunavut as a whole

Nunavut total	7,417	
by Ethnicity		
aboriginal	4,976	67.1%
non-aboriginal	2,441	32.9%
by Sex		
males	4,138	55.8%
females	3,279	44.2%
by Age		
15-24 years	1,323	17.8%
25-44 years	4,572	61.6%
45-64 years	1,482	20.0%
65 years & over	40	0.5%
by Region		
Baffin	4,189	55.5%
Keewatin	1,938	25.7%
Kitikmeot	1,427	18.9%
by Type of Community		
regional centres	2,917	39.30%
other communities	4,500	60.7%
by % Real Unemployment in the Community		
3-1970	3,172	42.8%
20-390/.	1,938	26.1%
40-47 %	2,307	31.1%



by Community

Iqaluit	1,748	23.6%
Rankin Inlet	804	10.8%
Cambridge Bay	542	7.3%
Pangnirtung	400	5.4%
Arviat	365	4.9%
Baker Lake	328	4.4%
Pond Inlet	311	4.2%
Cape Dorset	295	4.0%
Coppermine	263	3.5%
Igloolik	234	3.2%
Nanisivik	194	2.6%
Gjoa Haven	193	2.6%
Taloyoak	168	2.3%
Lake Harbour	159	2.1%
Clyde River	149	2.0%
Arctic Bay	144	1.9%
Broughton Island	138	1.9%
Hall Beach	132	1.8%
Coral Harbour	128	1.7%
Chesterfield Inlet	124	1.7%
Sanikiluaq	114	1.57%
Pelly Bay	112	1.50%
Repulse Bay	111	1.5%
Resolute Bay	106	1.4%
Whale Cove	79	1.1%
Grise Fiord	65	0.9%
Bay Chimo	11	0.1%

source: 1994 GNWT Labour Force Survey

Employed Persons

1994



Nunavut Labour Force Information -1994

GNWT Direct Employment

for Nunavut as a whole

Nunavut total	2,161	
by Ethnicity		
Inuit	953	44.1%
other aboriginal	38	1.8%
non-aboriginal	1,137	52.6%
'indigenous non-aboriginal'	33	1.5%
by Region		
Baffin	1,177	54.5%
Keewatin		27.9%
Kitikmeot	382	17.7%
by Type of Community		
regional centres	1,045	48.4%
other communities	1,116	51.6%
by % Real Unemployment in the Community		
3-19%	1,093	50.6%
20-39%	455	21.1%
40-47%	613	28.4%



by Community

Iqaluit	662	30.5%
Rankin Inlet	289	13.3%
Cambridge Bay	182	8.4%
Baker Lake	99	4.6%
Arviat	94	4.3%
Coppermine	93	4.3%
Pangnirtung	78	3.6%
Igloolik	68	3.1%
Pond Inlet	66	3.0%
Cape Dorset	57	2.6%
Coral Harbour	50	2.3%
Gjoa Haven	46	2.1%
Arctic Bay	41	1.9%
Taloyoak	39	1.8%
Clyde River	37	1.7%
Hall Beach	31	1.4%
Broughton Island	31	1.4%
Repulse Bay	30	1.4%
Sanikiluaq	29	1.3%
Lake Harbour	28	1.3%
Chesterfield Inlet	23	1.1%
Pelly Bay	22	1.0%
Nanisivik	19	0.9%
Resolute Bay	18	0.8%
Whale Cove	17	0.8%
Grise Fiord	12	0.6%
Bay Chimo	9	0.4%

source: GHRS run on November 2, 1994
with allowance for a 10% vacancy rate

“ GNWT Direct Employment

1994



A-6.11

Nunavut Labour Force information- 1994

Number of Adults who 'Want a Job'

for Nunavut as a whole

Nunavut total	4,710	
by Ethnicity		
aboriginal	4,492	95.4%
non-aboriginal	218	4.6%
by Sex		
males	2,454	52.1%
females	2,256	47.9%
by Age		
15-24 years	2,117	44.9%
25-44 years	1,900	40.3%
45-64 years	633	13.4%
65 years & over	60	1.3%
by Region		
Baffin	2,390	50.1%
Keewatin	1,391	29.2%
Kitikmeot	988	20.7%
by Type of Community		
regional centres	1,369	29.1%
other communities	3,341	70.9%
by % Real Unemployment in the Community		
3-19%	1,448	30.7%
20-39%	1,468	31.2%
40-47%	1,794	38.1%



by Community

Iqaluit	683	14.5%
Arviat	412	8.7%
Baker Lake	299	6.3%
Coppermine	292	6.2%
Igloolik	274	5.8%
Rankin Inlet	273	5.8%
Cape Dorset	252	5.4%
Pangnirtung	239	5.1%
Gjoa Haven	195	4.1%
Taloyoak	167	3.5%
Pond Inlet	158	3.4%
Coral Harbour	154	3.3%
Sanikiluaq	153	3.2%
Hall Beach	143	3.0%
Cambridge Bay	141	3.0%
Clyde River	135	2.9%
Broughton Island	134	2.8%
Repulse Bay	130	2.8%
Pelly Bay	125	2.7%
Arctic Bay	101	2.1%
Whale Cove	64	1.4%
Lake Harbour	61	1.3%
Chesterfield Inlet	59	1.3%
Resolute Bay	36	0.8%
Grise Fiord	11	0.2%
Nanisivik	9	0.2%
Bay Chimo	9	0.2%

source: 1994 GNWT Labour Force Survey

of Adults who 'Want a Job'

1994



A-6.13

Nunavut Labour Force information- 1994

Real Unemployment Rate ('No Jobs Available' Criteria)

for Nunavut as a whole

Nunavut total	29%
by Region	
Baffin	26%
Keewatin	34%
Kitikmeot	30%
by Type of Community	
regional centres	17%
other communities	35%
by % Real Unemployment in the Community	
3-19%	16%
20-39%	30%
40-47 %	43%



by Community

Repulse Bay	47%
Baker Lake	47%
Coral Harbour	45%
Pelly Bay	43%
Gjoa Haven	42%
Clyde River	42%
Arviat	41%
Coppermine	41%
Hall Beach	40%
Broughton Island	40%
Sanikiluaq	39%
Igloodik	37%
Cape Dorset	36%
Arctic Bay	35%
Taloyoak	35%
Bay Chimo	31%
Chesterfield Inlet	27%
Pangnirtung	25%
Whale Cove	25%
Pond Inlet	23%
Lake Harbour	20%
Iqaluit	19%
Rankin Inlet	18%
Resolute Bay	13%
Cambridge Bay	10%
Grise Fiord	8%
Nanisivik	3%

source: 1994 GNWT Labour Force Survey

Real Unemployment Rate

1994



Social Assistance Spending in Nunavut

Region/ Community	Total SA Spending (actual \$)			A FY90- FY93	FY1993 SAS per 1991 Adult Aboriginal Pop.
	FY 1985	FY1990	FY1993		
Regions					
Baffin	2,896,000	5,898,000	10,198,000	72.9 %	1,986
Keewatin	2,467,000	3,625,000	4,972,000	37.2 %	1,676
Kitikmeot	1,302,000	3,162,000	3,466,000	9.6 %	1,672
Regional Centres					
Iqaluit	684,000	898,000	2,105,000	134.4 %	1,704
Rankin Inlet	519,000	597,000	784,000	31.3 %	1,025
Cambridge Bay	331,000	354,000	313,000	-11.6 %	632
Communities receiving more than \$1 million SA per year					
Iqaluit	684,000	898,000	2,105,000	134.4 %	1,704
Baker Lake	520,000	887,000	1,392,000	56.9 %	2,093
Cape Dorset	410,000	1,200,000	1,349,000	12.4 %	2,725
Gjoa Haven	253,000	1,006,000	1,213,000	20.6 %	2,923
Igloolik	271,000	643,000	1,154,000	79.5 %	2,308
Pangnirtung	418,000	562,000	1,147,000	104.1 %	1,880
Arviat	588,000	890,000	1,144,000	28.5 %	1,611
Pond Inlet	168,000	754,000	1,113,606	47.7 %	2,344
Communities with per capita SA spending greater than \$2,000 per year					
Taloyoak	241,000	621,000	866,000	39.5 %	2,936
Gjoa Haven	253,000	1,006,000	1,213,000	20.6 %	2,923
Repulse Bay	378,000	536,000	675,000	25.9 %	2,813
Sanikiluaq	158,643	446,579	825,035	84.7 %	2,797
Cape Dorset	410,000	1,200,000	1,349,000	12.4 %	2,725
Clyde River	186,427	392,979	695,600	77.0 %	2,399
Pond Inlet	168,000	754,000	1,113,606	47.7 %	2,344
Igloolik	271,000	643,000	1,154,000	79.5 %	2,308
Broughton Island	133,000	279,000	581,000	108.2 %	2,235
Pelly Bay	96,000	413,000	471,000	14.0 %	2,141
Baker Lake	520,000	887,000	1,392,000	56.9 %	2,093
Coral Harbour	261,000	490,000	606,000	23.7 %	2,090

Social Assistance spending in Nunavut, FY1980 - FY1993

Chart A:
Total SA spending,
in actual dollars,
by region









Chart B:
Total SA spending,
in actual dollars,
regional centres





Social Assistance spending in Nunavut, FYI 993/94

Charts C & D:
Average Social Assistance spending per aboriginal adult (age 15+) resident, FY1 993/94



A-6.18

**Avg. Per Capita Social Assistance
Spending – FY1993**




Suicide in Nunavut

Between January 1, 1985 and December 31, 1994, 226 people committed suicide in the NWT. 8 out of 10 were male, and 7 out of 10 were Inuit. 147 of these suicides occurred in Nunavut.

Of the 25 people who committed suicide in the NWT in 1994, 21 were residents of Nunavut. All 21 were Inuit, and almost all were male.

The youngest was 13 years old; and their average age was 23.

Suicides in Nunavut, 1985-94



Suicides by Region and Community, 1985-94

Baffin	99	Keewatin	24	Kitikmeot	24
Arctic Bay	6	Arviat	3	Cambridge Bay	3
Broughton Island	13	Baker Lake	5	Coppermine	13
Cape Dorset	8	Chesterfield Inlet	2	Gjoa Haven	2
Clyde River	5	Coral Harbour	2	Pelly Bay	3
Grise Fiord	1	Rankin Inlet	10	Spence Bay	1
Hall Beach	4	Repulse Bay	1	Taloyoak	2
Igloolik	3	Whale Cove	1		
Iqaluit	37				
Lake Harbour	3				
Pangnirtung	9				
Pond Inlet	7				
Resolute Bay	1				
Sanikiluaq	2				

source: GNWT Dep't of Health and Social Services

Discussion Paper Concerning the Development of Principles to Govern the Design and Operation of the Nunavut Government

Nunavut Implementation Commission

Iqaluit, June 23, 1994

Part I: Background

Since its inaugural meeting in January 1994, the Nunavut Implementation Commission has been concentrating on the identification of appropriate principles to shape the design and operation of the new Nunavut Government (NTG). This effort has focused on some of the specific issues falling within the Commission's mandate, such as the degree of centralization/decentralization of the NTG. It has also extended to broader questions, such as the best ways to bring about public involvement and confidence in the process of creating Nunavut.

Commissioners have been conscious of the tight interdependence of many of the issues bound up in the successful setting up of the NTG. They have also been conscious that practical logistical considerations, in the form of such things as construction lead times, argue for moving forward as quickly as is realistic.

With such considerations in mind, Commissioners began the work of suggesting relevant "principles" for the design and operation of the NTG at their meeting in Cambridge Bay in April. At that meeting, Commissioners adopted a number of principles in relation to

- working in concert with others
- the process for determining a capital for Nunavut, and
- decentralization of the NTG.

These principles were set out in the communique issued by the Commission at Cambridge Bay. "

The principles set out in the Cambridge Bay communique respected the principles contained in the 1992 Nunavut Political Accord, particularly those dealing with the administrative capacity and financing of the NTG.

In this discussion paper, the Commission is seeking to elaborate further on the crafting of appropriate principles to guide the process of building Nunavut. With respect to some of the principles identified, a consensus of support now exists among Commissioners. Other principles are identified for the purpose of securing response and, in that sense, are as much "possibilities" as principles. In all cases, Commissioners invite reflection and reaction from all those holding responsibilities and opinions regarding Nunavut.

Commissioners acknowledge that many principles, however sound within their own terms, tend to compete or conflict when combined with others in a list. Commissioners also acknowledge that changes in public preferences, political circumstances, and logistical developments are likely to require continuing adjustments to be made in the choice, expression, and priority of principles. These factors argue for continuing flexibility and adaptability on the part of all those involved in helping to build Nunavut.

Part II: Identifying Relevant Themes

In identifying relevant principles to govern the design and operation of the Nunavut Government, it is helpful to construct a thematic framework. While a variety of frameworks could be used for this purpose, Commissioners have grouped principles around the following points

- Section A: The process for Creating the NTG
- Section B: Broad Principles Concerning What Kind of Government the NTG Will Be
- Section C: Broad Principles Concerning the Administrative Organization of the NTG
- Section D: Organizing the Nunavut Legislative Assembly
- Section E: Making Government Operations Close to Regions and Communities
- Section F: Making Best Use of the People of Nunavut
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Section A: The Process for Creating the NTG

A1. The process for setting up the NTG can contribute to the strength and vitality of Nunavut, as will the new institutions and infrastructure that will be the results of

that process. More specifically, the process should feature

- active involvement of the Nunavut public
- open exchange of information, ideas, and positions among organizations playing a role in the process
- regular meetings involving organizations playing a role in the process (such as the Northern Leaders Meetings that have been held in Iqaluit and Rankin inlet), with a view to defining and confirming consensus in a timely fashion on various policy choices concerning the design and setting up of the NTG, and
- dissemination of information about the design and setting up of the NTG to Canadians living outside Nunavut and to the international community.

Section B: Broad Principles Concerning What Kind of Government the NTG Will Be

B1. The NTG will be a democratic government, with law making authority vested in the elected Nunavut Legislative Assembly and with ultimate accountability to the people of Nunavut.

B2. The NTG will be a responsible government, with its Executive Council (Ministers) appointed on the recommendation of the Nunavut Legislative Assembly and exercising executive authority based on its retention of the confidence of the Assembly.

B3. Consistent with the NTG being a democratic and responsible government, the timing of the appointment of an Interim Commissioner for Nunavut in the period prior to April 1, 1999, and the selection and mandating of an Interim Commissioner, should be supported by an adequate and demonstrated consensus among political leaders within Nunavut.

B4. Consistent with the course of political development in the North, the intergovernmental relationship between the NTG and the Government of Canada should respect conventions and practices that have evolved, and are evolving, to reinforce the political autonomy of the North.

B5. The NTG will be a public government, with participation in the political life of Nunavut open to all residents.

B6. The jurisdiction and activities of the NTG will take place against the backdrop of the Nunavut Agreement, which supplies the Inuit of Nunavut with constitutionally protected rights in relation to a number of matters, including the ownership and enjoyment of proprietary rights and participation in joint government/ Inuit resource management bodies.

B7. Given the constitutional status of the Nunavut Agreement, and the relevance of its provisions to the majority of Nunavut residents, the planning process for the establishment of the NTG must conform in all respects to the letter and spirit of the Nunavut Agreement, including those provisions dealing with public sector employment and government contracts.

B8. Planning for the establishment of the NTG should be coordinated with the implementation of the Nunavut Agreement; this is particularly true with respect to the location of NTG offices and the offices of joint government/Inuit resource management bodies.

B9. While the "grandfathering" forward of existing territorial government laws into Nunavut will ensure legal continuity, it is important that the existing statute books are revised in a timely fashion to accommodate the scheduled creation of Nunavut. This is especially the case in relation to laws that should be substantially amended as soon as possible to reflect the Nunavut Agreement, such as territorial wildlife laws and federal fisheries regulations.

B10. The NTG will be subject to the application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

B11. Inuktitut shall be an official language of Nunavut.

B12. Based on the Nunavut Political Accord, the financing of the creation and operation of the NTG should reflect the following

- the funding by the Government of Canada of the reasonable incremental costs arising from the creation and operation of the Government of Nunavut, including infrastructure and training costs
- the maintenance of financial stability
- the maintenance of the scope and quality of territorial government services, and
- the conclusion of an appropriate formula based financing agreement between the NTG and the Government of Canada, effective April 1, 1999.

Section C: Broad Principles Concerning the Administrative Organization of the NTG

C1. The administrative structure of the NTG should be consistent with the responsibility and accountability of the Legislative Assembly and Executive Council (Ministers).

C2. The administrative structure of the NTG should be as simple as possible, in keeping with the relatively small population of Nunavut.

C3. The scope and quality of territorial government programs and services should be maintained at least at pre-Nunavut levels.

C4. Territorial government programs and services should be delivered fairly and equitably throughout the various regions and communities of Nunavut and, more specifically, should be of similar standards in communities of similar size in Nunavut.

C5. The interests of both the residents of Nunavut, and of Canadians as a whole, will best be served by a NTG that operates efficiently and effectively. Efficiency and effectiveness can be pursued by designing the NTG

- to avoid duplication and overlap in the provision of government services
- to make best use of existing facilities, infrastructure, and related services
- to emphasize the recruitment into the NTG of persons currently resident in Nunavut and to avoid a sudden influx of persons from outside, and
- to adopt sensible plans for building up the administrative capacity of the NTG at a manageable rate.

C6. The NTG will be an Arctic government operating in a high cost part of Canada, and its finances and its administrative design and capacity should reflect this.

C7. The NTG will be a government operating within the circumpolar world, and it should be equipped with the ability to develop relations, consistent with Canada's overall foreign policies, with other parts of the circumpolar world.

Section D: Organizing the Nunavut Legislative Assembly

D1. Recognizing that the first elected Nunavut Legislative Assembly will be able to make changes to the number and boundaries of assembly **constituencies**, it would be sensible to use the existing eastern and central Arctic constituency boundaries for the organization of the first **Assembly** elections in 1999. Additional representation might be warranted for **Iqaluit**, on account of its size, and the **Belcher Islands**, on account of their geographic detachment from the rest of **Nunavut**. These considerations would result in the first **Nunavut Legislative Assembly** having between 10 and 12 elected members.

D2. While the permanent chamber of the **Nunavut Legislative Assembly** will be located in the capital, it is **important** that the Assembly sit, with some frequency and predictability, in the different regions of **Nunavut**. This can best be achieved by ensuring that each of the regions is provided with appropriate facilities (including interpretation equipment, adequate computer hook-ups for assembly staff, space for the public and journalists) to allow the Assembly to set in a designated location in each region **from** time to time.

D3. The existence of a designated location in each region having facilities adequate to house the **Nunavut Legislative Assembly** on a regular basis should not preclude the Assembly **sitting**, on an exceptional basis, in other communities.

D4. The **permanent** chambers of the Nunavut **Legislative Assembly** should be made readily accessible to the public, and might usefully be connected to other facilities/spaces of a **institutional/commercial** nature that are well used by the public.

Section E: Making Government Operations Close to Regions and Communities

E1. Without detracting from the need for a capital, the NTG should be a **decentralized** government, with conscious efforts made to distribute government functions and activities across the regions and communities of **Nunavut**.

E2. The extent of the NTG's decentralization should not be constrained by the way in which the Government of the Northwest Territories (GNWT) is now organized,

but should take into account existing administrative capacity that has been built up in the regions and communities of **Nunavut**.

E3. The unity of Nunavut would be promoted by organizing departments of the NTG along functional (e.g. renewable resources, housing) rather than geographic lines (e.g. departments for **Baffin, Keewatin, Kitikmeot**).

E4. The organization of departments along functional lines should be accompanied by delegating as much authority as possible to **NTG** officials working at the regional and community levels.

E5. The **Nunavut Legislative Assembly** will have law-making authority over regional and local councils, and questions of whether to devolve significant new **legislative** and financial powers to regional bodies and community councils could readily be reserved for debate by the members of the new Assembly.

E6. **Reserving** major decisions about redefining the future roles of regional and local councils to the **Nunavut Legislative Assembly** need **not entail interfering** with the **continued** transfer of administrative powers and **resources** in the period up to 1999 to **those councils** interested in doing so. The **initiatives undertaken** in this regard by the **municipal** council in Cape **Dorset** should be closely reviewed by other communities.

E7. The reality of regional diversities and identities in **Nunavut** should be translated into a design for the NTG that results in the government offices of the NTG being allocated fairly among the regions.

E8. The people of Nunavut today usually think in terms of three constituent regions within **Nunavut**, namely, **Baffin**, Keewatin, and **Kitikmeot**. For the purpose of a fair allocation of the government offices of the NTG, however, it might be preferable to think in terms of four regions, namely, North **Baffin**, South **Baffin**, Keewatin, and **Kitikmeot**. It might also be preferable to consider **the Belcher Islands to be a distinct sub-region** warranting special consideration in the **allocation** of government activities.

E9. For the **purpose** of a fair allocation of the government offices of the NTG, it might be desirable to seek to **locate** approximately equal proportions of the offices in each region, with some special consideration for **Sanikiluaq**.

E10. "Central agency" type functions (such as the offices of the Commissioner, Clerk of the Assembly, Cabinet secretariats, and the departments of justice and finance) should be concentrated in the capital.

E1. Apart from central agency functions, it could be desirable to combine government headquarters operations into a number of thematic groups (for example, “people ministries” such as health, education and social services, “land and resource departments” such as renewable resources, energy and economic development, and “services departments” such as housing and transportation). Each grouping could be situated in a different region.

E12. It would be desirable to examine whether the number of departments currently within the GNWT needs to be replicated for the NTG. For the purpose of running a “leaner” government, it could be advantageous to merge various departmental functions into a smaller number of departments.

E13. In the event that groupings of departmental headquarters are allocated across the regions of Nunavut, considerations of coherence and efficiency might suggest that each grouping be “clustered” in one particular community designated as a regional centre. Logically, a community chosen as a regional centre for this purpose would be the one in a region with the best existing infrastructure. In some regions, however, there might be convincing reasons to locate various departmental and agency headquarters outside regional centres.

Section F: Making Best Use of the People of Nunavut

F1. The success of the project to set up the NTG will be measured against the degree to which Nunavut residents make up the bureaucracy of the NTG.

F2. The Nunavut Agreement sets out a clear objective in relation to Inuit participation within government employment in Nunavut, namely, “to increase Inuit participation in government employment in the Nunavut Settlement Area to a representative level” (that is, to a level of Inuit employment at least equivalent to the proportion of Inuit to the total population of Nunavut). Given its constitutional status, this objective must be the starting and consistent reference point in all activities associated with the design and staffing of the NTG.

F3. Currently, the rate of Inuit employment within Nunavut by the GNWT is somewhat less than 50%, and Inuit are concentrated within the unskilled and semi-skilled job categories. In staffing the NTG, the current situation should be seen as a floor on which steadily improving results will be constructed.

F4. A phased build up of the administrative capacity of the NTG must take squarely into account the factor of local recruitment. Any schedule for phasing in of administrative capacity by the NTG must result in

- significantly improved Inuit and local recruitment results, and
- no negative consequences for the quality of government services.

F5. Federal government undertakings for meeting the incremental costs of establishing the NTG should include the substantial costs associated with providing educational and training programs adequate to move towards and, over time, fulfil the objective of having representative levels of Inuit employees in the federal government, territorial government, and municipal work forms of Nunavut. Such costs should be attributed to the implementation of the Nunavut Agreement as well as with reference to the division of the Northwest Territories.

F6. Job categories and descriptions within the NTG should be based on genuine skill requirements and be purged of unnecessary references to minimum levels of educational achievement. Appropriate weight should be given to the degree of motivation of job seekers and to their knowledge of Nunavut’s culture and command of Inuktitut.

F7. The NTG should be designed to permit, and in many circumstances promote, part-time and seasonal employment and job-sharing.

F8. New and enhanced training programs geared towards the staffing of the NTG must build on existing institutional and organizational actors such as Arcti College, NITC, ATII, etc. Programs should draw on the strengths of communities, particularly in the provision of cross-cultural orientation to those new employees of NTG recruited from outside Nunavut.

F9. Without detracting from current efforts, new and enhanced training programs should be built into the overall plans for the NTG submitted for approval by the federal Cabinet, and such programs should commence immediately upon such approval. All such training programs should be based on realistic objectives and effective follow-up and monitoring and should not result in the paper fulfilment of artificial quotas.

F10. Training programs leading to and following the establishment of the NTG should discourage an intensity of competition among government departments

and agencies for promising individuals that results in disrupted and incomplete pursuit of training activities.

F11. Training programs are unlikely to be **effective** unless the educational system becomes more successful at graduating young people with adequate levels of basic knowledge and skill. A communications plan should be prepared in co-operation with educational authorities and introduced into the educational curriculum that is aimed at convincing young people of the importance and advantages of acquiring **adequate** education.

F12. The physical design of new government offices should emphasize accessibility by the public and service to the public.

F13. The physical design of new **government** offices should emphasize the requirements for in-house **training** by government departments and agencies and for close collaboration with educational and training facilities operated outside government.

F14. The physical design of new **government** offices should emphasize the needs of children and parents of children, including the need for **government** employees to have access to child-care **services**.

Section G: Strengthening the Nunavut Economy

G1. The Nunavut economy will best be served by a NTG that delivers government services efficiently and effectively, that draws its work force primarily from **Nunavut**, and that **operates in harmony with a diverse** and robust private sector. All aspects of planning for the NTG should be guided by such considerations, including approaches taken to

- . the number, responsibilities and **decentralization** of **departments** and agencies
- . the recruitment, training and compensation of employees, and
- the use of the private sector to deliver services to the public, consistent with public **preferences** and mindful of the need to maximize recruitment of **Nunavut** residents.

G2. While the NTG will be an important and valuable part of the economy of **Nunavut**, **Nunavut** will be best served by an economy that represents a mix of public sector and private sector activities. For that reason, and for others, it is **desirable**

- to give careful attention to ways of delivering government services through private sector actors
- to design new infrastructure with private sector **needs** and opportunities in mind, and
- generally, to encourage private sector investment in **Nunavut**.

G3. **Full** respect must be accorded by the federal and territorial governments to the government contracts provisions of the **Nunavut Agreement**.

G4. The highest possible proportion of government awarded contracts associated with the establishment of the NTG should go to **Nunavut-based** and other northern businesses. A role must be given to the **GNWT** and/or **Nunavut** organizations in the design and **sub-contracting** of major **infrastructure** projects.

G5. **Infrastructure installed** to facilitate the operations of the NTG should, to the **extent** possible, & designed so as to contribute to the growth of the private sector. In particular, attention should be paid to promoting the tourist **industry** through the construction of **conference** and **meetings facilities** suitable for use by persons in addition to **government** employees.

Section H: The Evolution of the NTG

H1. A number of factors must be taken into account in striking an appropriate balance between the need to effect the **early** and complete administrative gearing up of the NTG and the need to do things in an orderly manner

- most importantly, the uninterrupted and undiminished continuation of government programs and service at “ground level” in **Nunavut**
- **the objective of** relying heavily on the residents of **Nunavut** to run the NTG
- the lead times **required** in order to convert the most appropriate administrative design of the NTG into the **necessary** physical infrastructure, and
- the requirement to plan in a way that is **mindful** of both the high cost of supplying **government** programs and **services** in the Arctic and the constraints on federal government finances.

H2. As provided in the Nunavut Political Accord, the NTG must be equipped at its coming into operation on April 1, 1999, with the administrative capacity

- to establish and maintain the Legislative Assembly and Executive Council
- to manage the financial affairs of Nunavut
- to secure independent legal advice for the NTG
- to undertake personnel recruitment, administration and training in relation to government employees
- to maintain certain aspects of public works and government services
- to support municipal affairs, and
- to provide education programming as part of a comprehensive human resource development plan.

H3. The administrative functions referred to in the preceding section should be approached as a minimal core of administrative capacity to be in place by April 1, 1999, and not a pre-determined target. The question of how much additional administrative capacity should be in place in 1999, and how quickly Nunavut-based administrative capacity should build up afterwards, must be decided on practical grounds. Importance should be attached to building up the NTG's administrative capacity with respect to resource management and the renewable resource economy.

H4. Priority should be given to negotiating fair and workable intergovernmental agreements and/or private sector sourcing contracts prior to April 1, 1999, which will provide for continuity in government programs and services in relation to those matters where the NTG will lack initial administrative capacity.

H5. Priority should be given to creating an effective bureaucratic apparatus within the NTG for the negotiation and implementation of intergovernmental agreements and private sector sourcing contracts for the provision of government programs and services after April 1, 1999.

H6. Early attention should be given to question surrounding the transfer of employees of the GNWT to the NTG before or after April 1, 1999, including the application and negotiation of current and new collective agreements.

H7. The Nunavut Legislative Assembly and NTG should benefit in like measure as the Mackenzie Valley region from the devolution of any legislative, administrative, or proprietary powers to the North in the period prior to April 1, 1999, notably in relation to energy and mineral issues.

Section I: The Distinctiveness of Nunavut and Diversity Within Nunavut

11. The NTG must be capable of employing Inuktitut as a working language of administration at all levels, and of providing programs and services to the Nunavut public in Inuktitut and in Canada's official languages.

12. Attention should be given to the issues involved in the standardization of oral and written forms of Inuktitut with respect to the operations of the NTG.

13. Encouragement should be given to the early realignment of transportation and communications networks in Nunavut to accommodate the emergence of the new territory and government, without detracting from existing links. A CBC radio station should be established in the Kitikmeot region prior to 1999.

14. The architecture and interior design of new office buildings and other facilities for the NTG should be sympathetic to the cultural identity and history of Nunavut. A small, fixed percentage of the value of all building contracts should be devoted to the acquisition and display of works by Nunavut artists.

Section J: Neighboring Jurisdictions

J1. Many factors favour the maintenance and enhancement of co-operation between the governments and peoples of Nunavut and those of adjoining jurisdictions, including

- in general, the need to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of the NTG and, in particular, the need to obtain certain goods and services from outside Nunavut that are not available from within Nunavut, and
- the desirability of sustaining and developing shared bonds of geography, history, and family and personal relations.

J2. Go-operative arrangements between the NTG and other governments in relation to the sharing of administrative programs and services must be mutually beneficial and be subject to periodic review and revision in order to ensure that this is so.

J3. Where reasons of efficiency and effectiveness are compelling, and issues of political responsibility and accountability can be adequately dealt with, the delivery of some government programs and services might be delivered on a joint Nunavut / Western basis indefinitely into the future.

J4. For at least the initial period of its operation, the NTG may find it desirable to have a number of its employees based outside Nunavut, notably in Yellowknife.

- position/accessibility within the overall circumpolar region
- attitude of the population of the community, taking into account its social, cultural and economic priorities
- . the extent of regional support, and
- . climate.

Section K: New and Emerging Technologies

K1. Full advantage should be taken of new and emerging technologies in order

- to facilitate the coherent operation of government departments and agencies that are distributed across the various regions of communities
- to accommodate distance education and training programs, and
- to provide open access to government information banks (subject to specific exceptions).

Section L: Choosing a Capital

L1. As set out in the communique issued by the NIC earlier this year, the following factors are relevant to the selection of a community as capital of Nunavut:

- existing infrastructure, services and amenities
- potential for additional infrastructure, services and amenities
- . existing and potential transportation links within Nunavut and outside Nunavut
- . cost of living in the community

Nunavut Implementation Commission

Twe-Member Constituencies and Gender Equality: ***A*** “Made in Nunavut” Solution for an Effective and Representative Legislature

Discussion Paper Released by the Nunavut Implementation Commission

revised version — February 15, 19%

Introduction

In designing a new Nunavut government, with its own Legislative Assembly, the Nunavut Implementation Commission (NIC) and the people of Nunavut have a unique opportunity to find ways of ensuring balanced representation of men and women at the highest political level.

The important thing is not that the Nunavut Legislative Assembly look and operate exactly like most other legislatures in the world: the experience of the Legislative Assembly of the Northwest Territories shows that for a legislature to best serve the people of the north, it has to reflect the needs and aspirations of the people of the north. In order to do so it may have to be structured—and it may have to operate—somewhat differently than other legislatures.

The important thing is that the Assembly must reflect the needs and aspirations of the people of Nunavut.

One of those needs is for an effective legislature. A very small legislature would likely have problems functioning effectively. For this reason, this discussion paper begins by asking “How Large Should The Nunavut Legislative Assembly Be?”

One of those applications is for a representative legislature. The most under-represented group in politics - in Nunavut in Canada, and in much of the world—is women. The Commissioners are committed to the principle of gender equality. For this reason, this discussion paper then asks, “Why Is Equal Representation For Women In Politics An Issue?”, “Are Women Full Participants In Decision-Making In Nunavut?” and “What Has Been Done to Try and Achieve Balanced Participation In Politics Between Men And Women?”

These questions are separate but related, as it is difficult to imagine a system which could provide balanced representation for men and women in a legislature that only has 10 or 12 seats.

The section ‘Wow Could The Design Of The Nunavut Legislative Assembly Guarantee Balanced Representation Of Men and Women?’ suggests that a system of two-member constituencies, with **all** the voters in each electoral district electing both one male MLA and one female MLA, would be the fairest, simplest, and most effective way to design a **Nunavut Legislative Assembly** which is both **effective** and **representative**. The section ‘Can Two-Member Constituencies Work?’ shows that two-member constituencies work well in many countries, including Canada.

This would be a ‘Made in Nunavut’ solution that is (as a participant in the NIC’s regional consultation in the Kitikmeot put it) ‘simply the right thing to do.’

How Large Should The Nunavut Legislative Assembly Be?

How many MLAs should there be in the Nunavut Legislative Assembly? This is a serious question, as political scientists have advised the NIC that an assembly of less than 15 to 20 members will likely experience serious operating difficulties due to its small **size—especially** if ‘party politics’ comes into play.

Background: The Legislative Assembly of the Northwest Territories is composed of 24 **members**, 10 of whom represent constituencies in **Nunavut**. Three of the 24 **MLAs** are women, and one of the 10 **Nunavut MLAs** is a woman. **Greenland’s Home Rule Parliament**, the *Landsting*, is composed of 27 members, four of whom are women.

This discussion paper therefore takes **as its starting points that:**

- the legislature **should be composed of at least 15 to 20 MLAs;** and
- people are generally satisfied with the existing electoral **boundaries.**

If NIC’s consultations with the **Nunavut Caucus**, **Nunavut Tunngavik Inc.**, regional and community leaders and the general public suggest that **people** want a legislature with fewer than 15 to **20 members**, or a legislature with significantly **different electoral** boundaries, then these assumption would no longer be valid.

The size and **make-up** of the Legislative Assembly of the Northwest Territories has evolved over time, in recent years as a result of **recommendations** made by the

Electoral Boundaries Commission. The 10 **members** of the **Nunavut Caucus** are currently elected to represent the following electoral districts:

Baffin region

- Arnittuq
- **Baffin Centre**
- **Baffin south**
- High Arctic
- Iqaluit

Keewatin region

- Aivilik
- **Keewatin Central**
- Kivallivik

Kitikmeot region

- Kitikmeot
- Natilikmeot

There are **any** number of options for **structuring** the Nunavut Legislative Assembly. For discussion purposes, **let’s** assume that after consulting with the communities the NIC concludes that the present structure of 10 electoral districts plus a separate **electoral** district for **Sanikiluaq—a total of 11 members¹—is the preferred option.**

Would this legislature be large enough to **function** smoothly, keeping in mind that a Cabinet of five would leave only six **MLAs** to serve as ‘ordinary members’ and that a Cabinet of six would be larger than the five ‘ordinary members’? If party politics **were** to be **implemented**, it would be possible for the governing party to elect just six **MLAs—and** each of them would have to **be** in the Cabinet!

This **is** a serious point- The first Nunavut **Cabinet** can only be as effective as the ‘talent pool’ from which it is selected.

If one agrees that an 11 seat legislature is too small to function smoothly, then one **needs to ask:** in what other fashion might the Nunavut Legislative Assembly be **structured?**

One method would **be** to use the 10 existing electoral districts ‘as is,’ give **Sanikiluaq** back its own electoral district, but give each constituency two seats. This would **result** in a legislature of 22 **members.²**

This method of structuring the makeup of the legislature would:

- **result** in the legislature being a reasonable **size—large** enough to function smoothly but small enough to be cost-effective;

- make life a little easier for each MLA; and
- offer a simple, effective and fair way to achieve something that many people in Nunavut would like to see: balanced representation for men and women in the new Nunavut Legislative Assembly.

Why Is Equal Representation For Women In Politics An Issue?

The answer to this question has been neatly summed up by Canada's Deputy Prime Minister, Sheila Copps:

The main *answer* is obvious. **Plain fairness.**³

Women make up just over half the population, but are systematically under-represented in politics—not just in Nunavut, but across Canada and all around the world. Why? The Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing agreed that women face a number of barriers to participation in politics, including:

- sex-stereotyping
- the difficulty of juggling career, family and political responsibilities, including:
 - inadequate child-care facilities, and
 - a tendency to hold jobs that are less flexible with respect to taking time off to participate in political activities;
- negative attitudes within political parties;
- the fact the men tend to have better political “networks”; and
- negative stereotypes of women in the media.

Because these barriers form part of a system of “systemic (or structural) **discrimination**,”

practices and attitudes that have, whether by design or impact, the effect of limiting an individual's or group's right to the opportunities generally available because of attributed rather than actual characteristics,

they are often referred to as “systemic barriers”

barriers to people realizing opportunities or receiving equal protection of the law. These barriers are understood to be communicable to the social, economic, political and cultural arrangements in a society.

If these systemic **barriers** could be completely eliminated, then one can assume that women would run for—and be elected to—political office in equal numbers with men. But we must be clear: nowhere in the world have these systemic **barriers** been eliminated, and as a result nowhere in the world is there **balanced participation** in politics between men and women.

As groups, men and women have had different relationships with the laws and institutions created through public policy, and have had different life experiences. As a result, there are differences in the ways in which men and women approach politics. Collectively, women place greater emphasis on the ways in which public policy impacts on the family and the community. Some individual men and women do, of course, have different opinions.

These points suggest that women have shared interests in their day-to-day lives, and therefore have shared interests in seeking equal representation in politics.

One can go a step further, however, and acknowledge that women's under-representation in politics helps explain why they are more likely to be poor (especially if they're single parents) than men are, earn lower wages for work of equal value, face other forms of discrimination in the **workplace**, are discriminated against by pension systems, and have limited access to affordable child **day-care**. The call for balanced representation in politics is therefore more than a call for recognition of shared interests, it is a call for recognition for **equality** for a historically mistreated group in society.

Canadian society has long recognized that certain groups of **people—the Québécois** and Francophones outside Quebec for example—should be recognized as having group rights. **More** recently, **Canadian** society has **recognized** the existence of aboriginal rights the **Nunavut** land claim and the future Government of Nunavut are in fact products of that recognition. The human rights of women can also be **understood—and implemented—as** a form of group rights.

Some critics of equal political representation for women criticize the idea by asking whether there shouldn't be equal representation for other groups in society: elders and youth, the disabled, etc. Some even try and make a bad joke out of it by adding tall and short people, long-haired and short-haired people, blue-eyed and brown-eyed people, etc., to the list.

This discussion paper is premised on the idea that our gender **differences** overlay all of our other individual, cultural or socio-economic characteristics. The male /female grouping is unique in that men and women

exist in roughly equal numbers, tend to approach politics somewhat differently, have different levels of access to the political system, and are currently able to **participate** in politics to **very** different degrees.

This is not to say that human beings identify solely as men and women, or that all men and all women think exactly the same way. Not at all. But society as a whole can hardly benefit from a political system that fails to provide balanced representation for as universal, abiding and numerically equal subsets of **humanity** as men and women.

This model presented in this discussion paper is therefore not an attempt to **create** divisions in society—rather, it is an attempt to recognize differences and address the systemic inequality and unfairness which already exists in society.

Are Women Full Participants In Decision-Making In Nunavut?

Women have **always** played a prominent role in **Inuit** society. There can be no denying that the communities in Nunavut today **could** not function without the contributions made by women—in the home, in the workplaces, and in a wide range of **organizations**. And women in **Nunavut** certainly do participate in the full range of decision-making processes at the community, regional, territorial and national levels.

Indeed, northern women in general and Inuit women in particular have earned **national** attention for their strength and commitment to public life. **Only Inuit** could (and did) field a team like the 'Mothers of Confederation'—Rosemarie Kuptana, Nellie Coumoyea and Mary Simon—during the constitutional reform process.

But women in **Nunavut** remain **significantly under-represented** in electoral politics at the territorial **level**: only one of the 10 **Nunavut MLAs** is a woman. The reason why women are less **politically** active at the territorial level than at the **municipal** level could be that the systemic barriers to participation in politics are **weaker** in women's home communities than they are at the territorial level.

There's no need to blame anyone for this situation - and no one person or group of people is **really** to blame. But more and more women (and men) are saying that there is a need to remedy the situation by taking steps to address the systemic barriers to women's **participation** in politics and ensure that women are full and equal **participants** in the political **process** at **all** levels.

It is also important to distinguish between participation in "formal" (i.e. electoral) politics and **participation** in "informal" politics (women and men volunteering their time and talents to cooperatively make the communities better places to live), because it is the people who **participate** in the "formal" politics of legislatures who determine the level of resources that people who participate in "informal" politics have **available** to work with. Participation in **electoral** politics is therefore particularly important during times of **fiscal** restraint.


What Has Been Done To Try And Achieve Balanced Participation In Politics Between Men And Women?

Women continue to struggle to **increase** their levels of **participation** in politics - both in Canada and around the world.


The *Globe* and *Mail* recently reported that the **governing Australian Labour Party has committed** itself to make sure that women make up 35 per cent of its candidates for parliament by the year 2002. "When half our population is more adequately **represented** in our party and our parliament, we'll be stronger for it," the **Australian Prime Minister** said. **Currently only 10 per cent** of the members of Australia's House of Representatives are **women**.

The part of the world where the most progress has been made with respect to ensuring equal representation of women in politics is Europe, especially the Nordic countries—Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark and **Iceland**.⁴ But not every country in Europe has tried very hard to **achieve this goal**, and as a result women in the different European countries have very different levels of representation.

This graph shows the degree of gender equality in selected legislatures in Europe, the United States and Canada:



and this graph shows the degree of gender equality in the legislatures of Canada's provinces and territories:



Lisa Young, a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at the University of Toronto, has extensively researched women's representation in politics and notes that:

*few voters are aware of the extent to which, at a practical level, electoral systems shape electoral outcomes. . . . A study of factors (including electoral structures, political parties, and socio-economic conditions) contributing to the election of women in 23 democracies found that the type of electoral system is the most significant predictor of the number of women elected.*⁵

Some of the different electoral systems used in western democracies include.

- **single-member plurality** (the system used most often in Canada), where the candidate who receives the most votes in a constituency is elected (even if they don't have anywhere near a **majority** of the total votes cast);

- **single-member majority**, where **either**: voters rank the candidates in order of preference, and candidates with the least votes have their votes redistributed according to the ranking until one candidate achieves a majority; **or** a "**run-off** election" of the two top candidates is held if no candidate wins a majority of votes in the **first** election; and

- **proportional representation**, where parties present a list of **candidates** and voters cast their ballots for their **favourite party**. (There are many different kinds of proportional representation systems, too many to be described here.)

This chart shows the degree of gender equality in selected legislatures, grouped by type of electoral system

Electoral System	country, Legislature (Year of Election)	Women as% of Legislature
proportional Representation	Sweden, <i>Riksdag</i> (1994)	41%
	Norway, <i>Storting</i> (1993)	39%
	Finland, <i>Eduskunta</i> (1991)	39%
	Denmark, <i>Folketing</i> (1990)	33%
	Greenland, <i>Landsting</i> (1991)	15%
	Italy, chamber of Deputies (1992)	8%
Mix of Single-Member and proportional Representation	Germany, <i>Bundestag</i> (1990)	20%
SingleMemberPlurality	New Zealand, House of Representatives (1993)	21%
	Canada, House of commons (1993)	18%
	United States, House of Representatives (1994)	11%
	United Kingdom, House of Commons (1992)	9%
Single-Member Majority	Australia, House of Representatives (1993)	8%
	France, National Assembly (1993)	6%

What trends do we see when we look at the results of using these different systems?

Among West European and North American countries, the countries with the greatest proportion of women in their legislatures - Finland, Norway and Sweden - employ proportional representation systems, while the countries with a lower proportion of women - the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada - employ single-member systems.

Proportional representation systems offer political opportunities for women primarily because the various political parties know that it is in their best interest to "balance the ticket" by listing both men and women on their list of potential legislators. Many parties, beginning with the Norwegian Labour Party in 1983, have recently adopted guidelines or quotas for women's representation on the party list. This has been an important development, as the outcome of an election in a proportional representation system is only as representative as the lists put forward by the parties.

For example, during the run-up to the recent general election in Sweden a coalition of women's groups made it clear that if the political parties didn't do a better job of including women on their lists then they would form a "women's party" (as was done in Iceland). Each of the main Swedish parties promised to do better, and they did: 41 per cent of the MPs elected were women, and both of the main parties promised to have women make up half of their cabinet.

However, simply adopting a proportional representation system doesn't guarantee balanced political participation of men and women some countries which use proportional representation systems lag far behind the Nordic countries - where the under-representation of women is widely considered to be a public problem, against the interests of women and ultimately as a disadvantaged for the society as a whole.

It is no exaggeration to suggest that women have only been elected in significant numbers "in countries where major political parties have made commitments to achieving representative outcomes. Generally, parties have made these commitments only after women both inside and outside the party have exerted pressure on the party to implement affirmative action programs, such as reserving half of the places on the party list for women."⁷ Political parties have also played a crucial role in increasing the level of women's participation in politics in Canada.

Canada is a signatory to the United Nations; *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination*

Against Women, which states that "women shall be entitled to hold public office . . . on equal terms with men, without any discrimination,"⁸ and women's participation in formal Canadian politics certainly has increased significantly in recent years. But women are still a very long way from being equal participants in the Canadian political system.

It was only 12 years ago that a female MP stood up in the House of Commons and began a speech on violence against women... and was heckled and laughed at. Since that day, women in Canada-north and south-have learned a lot about using the political system to make positive changes on issues of concern to them. As MP Mary Clancy has noted, "At least they're not laughing any more."

Most Canadian women received the right to vote in federal elections in 1917⁹, not long after women in the Nordic countries, but the number of women elected to the national legislature increased much more slowly here to 13 per cent of MPs elected in 1988 and 18 per cent of MPs elected in 1993.¹⁰ Similar trends can be found in provincial and territorial legislatures.¹¹

Lisa Young notes that:

The three main parties holding official party status in the House prior to the 1993 election ... demonstrated at least a nominal commitment to increasing the number of women holding office. When a proportional representation system was being discussed in the context of an elected Senate during the 1992 constitutional round, there was support for using such a system to increase the social representatives of the Senate. All three parties represented in the Special Joint Committee on a Renewed Canada agreed that "parties should use the opportunity presented by multiple nominations to promote gender equality and the representation of Canada's social and cultural diversity within the political process."¹²

Each of the political parties which elected MPs to the House of Commons in 1993 were contacted for information about the manner in which they currently promote the participation of women.

The Liberal Party endorses a campaign, chaired by Deputy Leader (and Deputy Prime Minister) Sheila Copps, to recruit female candidates in "winnable" constituencies. The Liberals also have an active National Women's Liberal Commission (NWLC). According to the report of the 1994 NWLC biennial meeting,

The mandate of the NWLC is to represent and promote the interests of women within the Liberal Party of

*Canada and to encourage the active participation of women at all levels of the Party. By the turn of the century, they anticipate that at least fifty percent of all members of Parliament and the Senate will be women. The NWLC strives to ensure that federal policies do not discriminate against women.*¹³

This is worth noting: the goal of the NWLC, an official body of the Liberal Party, is "to bring about equal representation in the House of Commons, the Senate and the provincial and territorial legislatures by the end of the century" as well as "at all levels of the party." An assessment of the gender representivity of the various party bodies and committees must be presented at each party convention.

Perhaps in part due to the work of the NWLC, the Liberals elected 36 female MPs in 1993—the largest number of women that any caucus has ever held in Parliament.

The Bloc Québécois was unable to respond to NIC's request for information within the tight time frame required for the preparation of this discussion paper.

Reform Party MP Diane Ablonczy stated that the Reform Party believes in treating all its members, candidates and MPs equally, and as a result there is no formal women's network or association within the party, although she acknowledged that women make up far fewer than half of the Reform MPs or high-ranking party officials.¹⁴

New Democratic Party leader Audrey McLaughlin stressed that the NDP has made encouraging equal participation of women a priority for many years. The NDP has been more willing to use quotas than the other parties: during the last election the NDP divided the federal electoral districts into regions, and then insisted that each region ensure that 50 per cent of the NDP candidates were women.¹⁵

The Progressive Conservative Party also has a women's commission, however the party office informed NIC that it was more of an informal 'network' than anything resembling the National Women's Liberal Commission.

The Liberals, the NDP and the Conservatives also carry out fund-raising (through the Judy LaMarsh, Agnes McPhail, and Ellen Fairclough funds, respectively) to provide women candidates with additional resources (usually amounting to a few thousand dollars) during the election campaign.

In summary;

- all four of the political parties who responded to NIC's request for information acknowledge that women face system barriers to full participation in politics (the Reform Party's acknowledgment coming from an individual MP);
- three of those four parties have internal structures and /or policies which attempt to assist women in overcoming those barriers; and
- despite the significant advances that have been made, women cannot yet be considered to be full and equal participants in any of these Canadian political parties.

The participation of women in politics has also been addressed by the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing (RCERPF), which submitted its final report to the government in 1991. It made a number of important statements on the participation of women in Canadian politics. The RCERPF found that "women are the most under-represented segment of Canadian society," being under-represented by 66 per cent relative to their presence in the electorate.¹⁶ That statistic supports the claim of the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women that "the voice of government" remains "a man's voice," 20 years after the Royal Commission on the Status of Women.

The "virtual exclusion" of several segments of the Canadian population, especially women, is "no longer acceptable," the RCERPF concluded, because "the full range of Canada's interests" will remain unrepresented until they begin more "reasonably" to reflect the actual composition of society.

Specifically, the RCERPF acknowledged the sex-bias in existing electoral practices, supported the use of gender-neutral language in Canada's Elections Act, and introduced the notion of under-representation as a catch-phrase and reform slogan. In summary, the most important factors in increasing the participation of women in politics have been:

- the use of electoral systems which increase women's political opportunities;
- political parties which actively support increasing women's participation in legislatures; and
- effective and credible women's movements and organizations in the society as a whole, and broad support in the society as a whole for the participation of women in politics.

The work of Pauktuutit (the Inuit Women's Association); the informal network of prominent Inuit women leaders, and the support of the many Inuit men who believe in equal participation of women in politics have all helped create a social and political climate which allows the current discussions to be taken seriously. As Martha Flaherty, Pauktuutit's President, recently commented, 'We do not seek power over men—but, rather, equality with men—respect, fairness, and openness.'¹⁷

How Could The Design Of The Nunavut Legislative Assembly Guarantee Balanced Representation of Men and Women?

Nunavut does not yet—and may never have party politics, so we can't assume that progressive political parties will help close the political "gender gap" in Nunavut as they have elsewhere.

Among the three most important factors in increasing the participation of women in politics, this leaves the use of an appropriate electoral system as a critical factor in any strategy to increase women's political opportunities in Nunavut.

One simple and effective way of structuring the Nunavut Legislative Assembly both:

- to ensure that it is of sufficient size to function smoothly; and
- to guarantee balanced participation of men and women;

would be to have two-member **constituencies** for the existing electoral districts, with one seat being held by a man and the other seat being held by a woman.

When election time approaches, the returning officer would keep two lists of candidates instead of **one**—one list of male candidates and one list of female candidates. If party politics were to emerge in **Nunavut**, each party could run one man and one woman in each constituency. On election day, each voter could cast votes for two **MLAs**—one from the list of male candidates and one from the list of female candidates. The male candidate with the highest number of votes and the female candidate with the highest number of votes would both be elected.

Each constituency would then be represented by two **MLAs**, with equal rights and equal responsibilities. They may agree on some issues and disagree on others,

but it is reasonable to assume that they would work together to promote the interests of their constituency as a whole on addition to focusing on the issues of particular interest to them as individual legislators. It is also reasonable to assume that the women **MLAs** would **co-operate** to ensure that issues of particular importance to women get the attention they deserve.

The model presented in this discussion paper would be simple and effective. It operates on the "single-member **plurality**" system that people are used to. There would be no need for quotas, or **proportional** representation, or any other methods that people might find complicated or too "different" from the electoral system we've had to date. It would work with either 'consensus government' or party politics. It would be a **fundamental** step forward for both men and women, and it would lay the foundation for a better future for our children.

Can Two-Member Constituencies Work?

The model presented in this discussion paper suggests using two-member **constituencies** as a tool to meet the goals desired for the design of the legislature. This is not a new or an untested tool Canada has actually had quite a lot of experience with two-member (and multi-member) **constituencies**, and they are very common in Europe today.

Canada's House of Commons had five, two-member **constituencies** in 1921, four, two-member **constituencies** until 1930, and two, two-member **constituencies** from 1935 until 1966.

At the **provincial** level, nine of the 10 **provinces** have used two-member or multi-member **constituencies** in the past 50 years¹⁸, and Prince Edward Island still does so today (see below). Most provinces were still doing so as **recently** as the 1960s, when some 20 per **cent** of all members of the provincial legislatures were elected from districts returning more than one member. Some provinces combined proportional representation systems for their larger, multi-member constituencies with simple plurality single-member systems in the smaller constituencies.

PEI's Legislative Assembly has historically been structured on the basis of 16 two-member **constituencies** - for a total of 32 **MLAs**. Like many systems using two-member and multi-member constituencies, PEI's system has as its historical roots the notion of representation for different groups in society as well for in-

dividuals. Landholders elected **Assemblymen** and non-landholders elected **Councilors**, however over the years the two positions effectively became the same.¹⁹ (This is similar to the difference between Britain's House of Lords and House of Commons, except that in PEI's case the two types of **representatives** operate within the **same** legislature.)

The *use of two-member constituencies* in Canada has its origins in England. The historical pattern of representation in the British House of Commons before 1832 was for each country and enfranchised borough to elect two MPs. **Two-member** and multi-member **constituencies** remained the rule (with some exceptions) until 1885, and **Britain** continued to have 15 two-member constituencies until 1945.

It should be stressed that nothing in the **political** science literature indicates that there has ever been problems with two-member or multi-member constituencies.

Some - but **certainly** not all-countries have, over the years, developed electoral systems which emphasize individual representation at the expense of group **representation**. Others developed electoral systems which also allow for more representation by various groups in society, and many of **them use multi-member constituencies** as a tool to **achieve that goal**.

Indeed, multi-member constituencies are the norm in most Western European countries today. **Switzerland**, for example, has five **single-member** constituencies and 21 constituencies which elect between two and 35 members. Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, The Netherlands, France, Germany, Austria, Spain, **Greece** and others have widely differing legislative systems, all of which use multi-member constituencies. The **Greenlandic Landsting**, with the **Danish Folketing** as its model, also operates in this manner.

Most European countries have found a way of meeting both the nineteenth century demand for equality of representation and the other principle of community representation by varying numbers **rather** than drawing boundaries. In the same manner, the **model presented** in this discussion paper would satisfy both the demand for equality of representation and the principle of balanced participation by men and women by increasing the **number** of MLAs rather than by redrawing the electoral boundaries.

Conclusion: Simple, Fair, Effective, And "Made in Nunavut"

Democracy is best **served** when the composition of a legislature closely mirrors, in terms of social characteristics, the composition of the population represented. This is true on the level of **day-to-day** government decision making and resource allocation, and this is also true on a symbolic level because **legislatures—which** are supposed to be representative institutions—represent society to itself.

In designing a new Nunavut government, with its own Legislative Assembly, the **Nunavut Implementation Commission** has been **challenged** to find ways of ensuring balanced representation of men and women at the highest **political** level. The people of **Nunavut** have a rare and wonderful opportunity to create a legislature and a government which are appropriate, innovative and progressive.

What we learn from studying women's **representation** around the world is that the structure of the political system makes a big **difference**. The evidence from across **Canada** and around the world suggests that if **balanced** participation for man and women is not designed into the very make-up of the legislature, then women *in Nunavut* are **unlikely to achieve full and equal participation** in politics.

Two-member constituencies—with both one male MLA and one female MLA representing each constituency—could be a simple, fair, effective and "Made in Nunavut" solution for designing a Legislative Assembly that is both effective and truly representative.

The **Nunavut Legislative Assembly** could be a model for democratic peoples **everywhere**. **Nunavut** could have the first legislature in the world to have balanced representation of men and women designed right into its make-up.

The **Nunavut Implementation Commission** welcomes your comment on this discussion paper.

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Appendix: In Response To Critics

In late 1994 and early 1995 the possibility of gender equality in political representation in Nunavut has received a brief flurry of attention from the northern media, and has become a **subject** of discussion in the communities. **All** one can say for sure is that some people are in **favour** of it in principle, some people are opposed to it in **principle**, and with the release of this discussion paper all Nunavut residents have an opportunity to consider an **actual model of how balanced participation between men and women** might be implemented.

What kinds of **criticisms** have been **expressed** about gender equality, and how does the model presented in this discussion **paper** address those criticisms?

- One Criticism is that having two MLAs for each constituency would be more expensive than having one MLA for each constituency.

But this is only true if one compares (for example) a 22-seat Assembly to an 11-seat Assembly. If one agrees that an Assembly should have at least 15 to 20 MLAs to function smoothly, then it doesn't matter how those 15 to 20 MLAs are chosen... the cost is still the same. Besides, the NIC is emphasizing elected bodies over non-elected boards and agencies, and the money saved by doing so could go towards operating a Legislative Assembly which is both a reasonable size and which ensures the balanced representation of men and women in formal politics.

- A second criticism that people might make is that this would be a "quota system," when it is better to have representatives elected on the basis of merit.

But this isn't a "quota system." All MLAs would be freely elected, presumably on the basis of merit (or party affiliation, or both). It wouldn't be a system where men only vote for men, and women would only vote for

women - both MLAs would be elected by both men and women. It would be a system consistent with fundamental democratic principle%

- A third criticism is that some people like the system "just the way it is."

To accept this criticism one must not be too concerned by the systemic under-representation of women in politics, both in Nunavut and elsewhere. One must not be too concerned that the issues that women tend to care most about tend to get less attention by male politicians. And one must not be too concerned about-as Sheila Copps put it—"plain fairness."

An editorial in *News/North* ("Women don't need a leg up," October 3, 1994) identified several of the obstacles which will have to be overcome if the model presented in this discussion paper is to become a working reality:

- The editorial implies that the handful of prominent northern women politicians it names is proof that our political system is OK the way it is.

Our existing political system is not OK. One woman member in the 10-member Nunavut Caucus is not good enough. Northern Women face the same systemic barriers to participating in politics as women everywhere else in the world do, and as a result women are significantly under-represented in formal politics in the north.

- The editorial suggests that people who want equal participation for women "should have the confidence to allow women to be treated on individual merits."

The model presented in this discussion paper does that - but it also recognizes that there is a big difference between a political system that talks about gender equality and a political system that delivers gender equality.

The model also recognizes that **merit is not a value-free concept**: different groups in society assign merit differently. For example, the Government of Nunavut can be expected to value the ability to speak Inuktitut more than a government which represents a primarily English or French speaking population. The Government of Nunavut would therefore arrive at a different calculation of the relative "merit" of different job applicants than governments who do to place the same value on the ability to speak Inuktitut.

- The editorial concludes that guaranteeing equal representation is not the best way for women to be represented in the Nunavut legislature.

The editorial supports using **limited measures to reduce some of the systemic barriers to women's participation in politics—a timid approach which has not resulted in balanced participation in politics anywhere in the world. There is no reason to believe that it would do so in Nunavut.**

This discussion paper suggests that a simple, fair, and effective way of designing the Nunavut Legislative Assembly is to create a system of two-member constituencies, with all voters in each electoral district electing **both** one male MI-A and one female MLA.

Endnotes

- 12 if the Premier were to be directly **elected**, instead of chosen from among the MLAs.
- 23 if the Premier were to be directly elected instead of **chosen** from among the MLAs.
- Copps (1992), p.3.
- see Nordic Council of Ministers (1994) for a remarkably thorough assessment of the status of men and women in the Nordic countries.
- Young (1994), p. 4.
- Young (1994), p. 40. We all know the **expression** "one man, one vote," but the reality appears to be "one vote, one man."
- Young (1994), p. 33.
- this sentence is from **Article 7** of the convention, which was adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 18, 1979 and ratified by Canada on December 10, 1981.
- All residents of the Eastern Arctic—Inuit and non-Inuit alike—were **disenfranchised** until the federal election of 1962. The area we know today as Nunavut had no **representation** in the House of Commons, and **therefore** neither men nor women **could** vote. As well, **First Nations** women did not **receive** the right to vote until the *Indian Act* was amended in 1960.
- the record of the **Canadian Senate**—an appointed body—is rather worse. For **example**, it **has** only been 65 years since women have been **allowed** to sit in the **Senate**—they were not considered "persons" in the law before a 1929 decision of the British Privy Council **overturned** Canadian **courts** in the famous "Persons Case." But during the 65 years since the "Persons **Case**," **92 per cent** of the Canadians **appointed** to the Senate have been men—and today only 13 per cent of **Senators** are **women**.
- getting women elected to national and provincial /territorial legislatures is particularly **important** in **Canada**, where Cabinet ministers can **only** be selected from the **elected** MPs or MLAs.
- This is not the case in many European countries, including Greenland-
- Young (1994), pp. 36-7.
- National Women's Liberal Commission (1994), especially the sections "Historical review of the NWLC," "Mission statement of the NWLC," and "Liberal Party of Canada: **gender assessment**," May 1994.
- Ms. Ablonczy **also stated** that **she completely** agrees that women face systemic **barriers to participation** in politics. Where "Reform women" differ, **she said**, is that they choose to overcome these barriers **as individuals**.
- New Democratic Party** (1993?).
- 75% at the time their report was issued; the **statistics** improved slightly after the 1993 **election**.
- Flaherty** (1994), p. 8.
- only **Québec** has never done so.
- the 1993 election in PEI was the last to **use two-member constituencies**. The legislature recently **passed** a law establishing a **system of 27 single-member** electoral districts to **come into effect** when the writ is issued for the next provincial election. According to the office of Premier Catherine **Callbeck**, the change was not in **response** to any **unhappiness** with the traditional **arrangement**. Rather, the residents of PEI had expressed a desire for fewer **politicians** generally, and the government responded by creating a Royal **Commission** which **recommended** the new system.

Report on the NIC Community Consultation Tours. December 1994- January 1995: A Summary of What Was Said

The community tours were conducted from **December** 6 through December 15, 1994, in the **Kitikmeot** and **North Baffin** regions, and from January 5 through January 12, 1995, in the **Keewatin** and **South Baffin** regions. An extra visit to **Baker Lake** was conducted **February** 1, 1995. The NIC visited 26 communities and held a **total** of 62 meetings with students, hamlet councils and the general public. In addition, the **NIC** conducted three radio phone-in shows in the **North Baffin**.

Meetings

North Baffin:

December 6- Pond Inlet
- students (approx. 30)
- Hamlet Council (seven **councillors** & mayor)
- **Nunavut Tunngavik Inc.** AGM
(approx. 100 & media)

December 7- Hall Beach
- students (approx. 50 & 6 teachers)
- Hamlet Council (seven **councillors** & mayor)
- public meeting (approx. 50)

December 8- Igloolik
- **Inullariit Society** (15 Elders, **IBC** & **Isuma**)
- students (approx. 50 & four teachers)
- Hamlet Council (six **councillors** & mayor)
- radio phone-in-show (nine callers)

December 9- Arctic Bay
- students (approx. 30 & four **teachers**)
- Hamlet Council (five **councillors** & mayor)
- public meeting (approx. 60)

December 10- Grise Fiord
- public meeting (approx. 15)

December 11- Pond Inlet
- radio phone-in show (26 callers)

December 12 - Resolute Bay
- students (approx. 29 & two teachers) .
- public meeting (approx. 20)

December 13- Clyde River
- Hamlet Council (seven **councillors** & mayor)
- radio phone-in show (23 callers)

Kitikmeot:

December 8 - Coppermine
- Hamlet Council (six **councillors** & mayor)
- public meeting (approx. 45)

December 9- Cambridge Bay
- students (approx. 40 & four teachers & principal)
- Hamlet Council (four **councillors** & mayor)
- public meeting (approx. 13)

December 12- Gpa Haven
- students (approx. 60 & six teachers)
- Hamlet Council (seven councillors & mayor)
- public meeting (approx. 70)

December 13- Taloyoak
- students (approx. 26 & four teachers)
- Hamlet Council (four councillors & deputy mayor)
- public meeting (approx. 56)

December 14- Pelly Bay
- Hamlet Council (six councillors & mayor)
- public meeting (approx. 39)

South Baffin:

January 6- Lake Harbour
- students (approx. 25 & two teachers)
- Hamlet Council (six councillors & mayor)
- public meeting (approx. 50)

January 7- cape Dorset
- Hamlet Council (six councillors & mayor)
- public meeting (approx. 90)

January 9- Broughton Island
- students (approx. 40 & teachers)
- Hamlet Council (councillors & mayor)
- public meeting (approx. 106)

January 10- Pangnirtung
- students (approx. 45 & teachers)
- Hamlet Council (councillors & mayor)
- public meeting (approx. 146)

January 11- Iqaluit
- students - (approx. 95 & seven teachers)
- Town Council (councillors & mayor)
- public meeting (approx. 62)

January 12- Sanikiluaq
- Hamlet Council (councillors & mayor)
- public meeting (approx. 128)

Keewatin:

January 5- Arviat
- students (approx. 100)
- Hamlet Council (eight councillors & mayor)
- public meeting (approx. 60)

January 6-Whale Cove
- Hamlet Council (eight councillors & mayor)
- public meeting (approx. 25)

January 7 & February 1- Baker Lake
- Hamlet Council (seven councillors & mayor)
- public meeting - Jan. 7, (approx. 35), Feb. 1, (approx. 150)

January 9- Repulse Bay
- Hamlet & Education councils (approx. 15)

January 10- Coral Harbour
- students (approx. 14)
- Hamlet Council (eight councillors & mayor)
- public meeting (approx. 35)

January 11- Chesterfield Inlet
- Hamlet Council (six councillors & mayor)
- public meeting (approx. 30)

January 12- Rankin Inlet
- students (approx. 75)
- Hamlet Council (eight councillors)
- public meeting (approx. 150)
- Rankin Chamber of Commerce (approx. 15)

NIC Participants

North Baffin

John Amagoalik - Commissioner (NIC Chairperson)
David Alagalak - Commissioner
Joe Ohokannoak - Commissioner

Kitikmeot

Peter Emerk - Commissioner
George Qulaut - Commissioner
Guy Alikut - Commissioner

South Baffin

Bill Lyall - Commissioner (NIC Vice - Chairperson)
Guy Alikut - Commissioner
David Alagalak - Commissioner

Keewatin

John Amagoalik - Commissioner (NIC Chairperson)
Joe Ohokannoak - Commissioner
Meeka Kilabuk - Commissioner (NIC Treasurer)
George Qulaut - Commissioner

- In addition to the Commissioners, the following NIC staff took part in the tours

Simon Awa - Executive Director (Iqaluit)
Elisapi Davidee - Regional Communications/Field Officer (Baffin)
Leah Inutiq - Administrative Assistant (Iqaluit)
Thomas Suluk - Regional Communications/Field Officer (Keewatin)
Paul Emingak - Regional Communications/Field Officer (Kitikmeot)
Bert Rose - Director of Human Resources (Iqaluit)
Jack Hicks - Director of Research (Iqaluit)
Larry Elkin - Liaison/Rescind (Yellowknife)
John Merritt - Legal Counsel (Ottawa)
Randy Ames - Liaison/Research (Ottawa)

Public Participation

Meetings were held with: senior students and teachers in the schools; the hamlet councils in the hamlet offices; and, the general public in community halls, school gymnasiums and classrooms. Phone-in shows were conducted in the local radio stations. The NIC also addressed the Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. (NTI) Annual General Meeting in Pond Inlet, the Inullariit Society (Elders) in Igloolik, and the Rankin Inlet Chamber of Commerce. Isuma Productions and the Inuit Broadcasting Corporation recorded the school and council meetings in Igloolik, and IBC recorded the Inullariit Society meeting. Members of the media were present for the NIC's presentation to the NTI AGM in Pond Inlet.

Attendance at public meetings ranged from 13 people in Cambridge Bay to 150 people in Rankin Inlet and Baker Lake. School meetings ranged from 14 to 100 students plus a few teachers. There were approximately 100 people in attendance at the NTI AGM, and 15 people at the Inullariit Society meeting. There is no way of knowing how many people heard the radio phone-in-shows, but the number of callers varied from nine in Igloolik, to 26 in Pond Inlet, and 23 in Clyde River.

In the North Baffin, some 150 or so statements/questions were made by the public, and some 500 people (including students and hamlet councillors) in total were reached (exclusive of the phone-in-shows). In the Kitikmeot, some 190 or so statements/questions were made by the public, and some 395 people in total were reached (including students and hamlet councillors). In the South Baffin, some 260 or so statements were made by the public, and some 850 people in total were reached (including students and hamlet councillors). In the Keewatin, some 115 or so statements/questions were made by the public, and some 739 people in total were reached (including students and hamlet councillors).

Council meetings generally involved six to eight councillors and the mayor.

The meetings were conducted mainly in Inuktitut except for the meetings in the schools which were conducted both in Inuktitut and English. Radio phone-in shows were conducted in Inuktitut. Interpretation was provided for the public meetings. Pamphlets explaining the mandate and work of the Commission were handed out and maps of Nunavut produced by the Commission were given to the schools and hamlet councils.

Format & Presentations

In general, the format for the meetings involved an initial opening statement by a Commissioner, an introduction of the other Commissioners and staff, a brief history regarding the establishment of the Commission, and an explanation of the Commission's mandate. It was explained that the Commission wanted to provide the public with information regarding its work and that it wanted feedback on a number of main points.

The presentations and content varied slightly from meeting to meeting, but generally people were provided the same information and the meetings followed a similar format.

After the introductions, it would be explained that in 1993 two pieces of legislation were passed, one ratifying the Nunavut Agreement and the other establishing the Nunavut Territory and Government and the NIC. Nunavut, people were told, would come into existence on April 1, 1999, and that it was the work of the Commission to help prepare for it. The work of the commission is to advise the federal and territorial governments and NTI on a number of matters, including: the design of the government; the process for determining the location of the capital; and the make up of the Legislative Assembly. It was explained that NTI was responsible for implementing the Nunavut Agreement, whereas the NIC was responsible for advising government on the implementation of the Nunavut Government. On the North Baffin tour, Nunavut was likened to that of a headless Inukshuk. To build an Inukshuk, one started with the base; this was the land claim. The building of the body, arms and legs was to be the work of the NIC. Putting the head in place was to be the responsibility of the Nunavut Legislative Assembly. The first elections would be held in 1999.

It was explained that Nunavut would be similar to the existing GNWT with an elected Legislative Assembly, a Government Leader, ministers and deputy ministers.

Nunavut would maintain the three regions that exist now, but **this** could change in the future. It was explained that the government would be decentralized as much as is possible and the Community Transfer Initiative for Cape Dorset was cited as an example. **Decentralization** would be a means of ensuring that the people throughout the regions would get the **jobs**, and was also a means of reducing the impact on the communities. The role and numbers of education and health boards were being brought as were the role of regional councils. The number of boards would likely be reduced and the regional councils, **with** the exception the Kitikmeot Regional Council, could be eliminated or **transformed**. **Remaining** regional bodies would have no law making **authority**.

In the schools, the Commissioners would stress the importance of **education** and the need for students to stay in school. **Nunavut** would initially need people to fill middle management positions, but later on would need **people** such as doctors, lawyers, and "WI-IL" hockey players to fill other **Nunavut needs**.

The Territory of Nunavut and its boundaries would be explained using a map. Currently, the **government** and many of the **government departments** are located in the capital in Yellowknife, but with Nunavut there will be a need to decide on a new capital location. With **Nunavut's** Government located in **Nunavut**, the policies and laws for **Nunavut** would better **reflect** the needs of the **Nunavut** residents. Current laws would be **carried** over into Nunavut and would remain the same until **changed** by the Nunavut **Legislature**.

People were told that three communities were **interested** in being the capital: Cambridge Bay; **Iqaluit**; and **Rankin Inlet**. People in those communities **were** working very hard to ensure that theirs would be the community chosen. Deciding on the capital location **required** taking a number of matters into account, such as the existing infrastructure, the potential for community growth, the cost of **living**, climate, transportation and community support. The NIC was under pressure to complete a report at the end of **March** regarding the capital, the design of the Nunavut **government** and other matters.

The make of the current NWT Legislative Assembly (24 **MLAs**, 10 of who are from the Nunavut region) was explained, and **people** were told that after division the number of **Nunavut** **MLAs** would have to be **increased**. If the number were not increased Nunavut might end up with more ministers than ordinary **MLAs**, which would not allow for the effective functioning of the **Assembly**. Fifteen to 20 **MLAs**, at a minimum, are **required**. A way around this problem would be to establish two-member

constituencies. A means of increasing the presence of women in the Assembly would be to have separate lists of male and **female** candidates in each two member constituency, with both men and women voting for the best male and female candidates. This idea was proposed in the NIC discussion paper "Two Member **Constituencies** and Gender Equality in the **Nunavut Assembly**". People were also **asked** for their reactions to the idea of an elected Government Leader. With the Government Leader selected by the **MLAs**, **the Government Leader has little** ability to control the Cabinet.

After the opening **the** NIC presentations, **the meetings** were then **opened** to the floor for statements and questions.

Statements, Questions and Responses

Nunavut and the Nunavut Territory

Many people wanted to know how the borders of the **Nunavut** Territory were decided upon. It was explained that the Territory was based on **Inuit** land use and that the boundaries used were those of the **Nunavut** Agreement. Some people wanted to know what would happen if Nunavut **did not go ahead**; they were told that it was a done deal. Some people asked why 1999 was chosen for **Nunavut**. They were told that it was a compromise between the year 1997 and 2000; some **people** wanted it delayed in order to train people, while others wanted Nunavut earlier. A few people wanted to know if Nunavut would maintain a presence in **Yellowknife**. They were told this was likely **because** **Nunavut** and the GNWT had to work together.

Benefits of Nunavut

People wanted to know how their lives would be affected by **Nunavut**. It was **explained** that in the past **people** had **little** say in how they were governed and that with **Nunavut** they would be in charge. There would be more **jobs**, and students were encouraged to get an education. Initially, the **Nunavut** Government would be similar to the existing **GNWT**, but would change **gradually over time**.

Location Of the Capital

For the most part, people said that the capital should be located in one of the three main regional **centres**, citing population, infrastructure, weather and transportation as the main factors for doing **so**. The **majority** of people

in the **Baffin** that voiced specific opinions on the location preferred **Iqaluit** because of its climate and transportation links (airlines and ships), and because it is already a regional **centre** delivering **regional services**. In **Kitikmeot**, many people thought Cambridge Bay best met the Commission's criteria for capital selection. Moreover, they thought that **Iqaluit** was too far away, and that a central location, such as **Rankin Inlet**, would be better than **Iqaluit**. In the Keewatin, some people said **Rankin Inlet** or **Arviat** should be the capital. A couple of **people** suggested Baker Lake as the capital.

Two people thought that Nanisivik would make a good location for a **capital** because the infrastructure was already in place and the mine might be out of operation at some point in the future. Some people in **Igloolik** thought that their **community** should be considered because of its **Inuit** traditions and abundance of wildlife; if not chosen as capital, **Igloolik** should at least get the **headquarters** of a government department (wildlife). One person suggested that **Taloyoak** should be the capital because of its central location, but he was also concerned that it would be too expensive. Baker **Lake** was suggested as a training capital.

A few people thought that centrality of location and cost considerations should **determine** the capital location. Several people emphasized climate and transportation links as key criteria. A few people thought that a medium sized community should be the capital because the larger regional centres already have **all** the pbs.

Some **people** did not want **their communities** to be the capital. In Pond Inlet, for instance, one person said he did not want Pond Inlet to be the capital **because** he feared the impact of it upon the environment and wildlife. Another person countered that Pond Inlet should be the capital because of its beauty and climate.

One person suggested that **there** be more than two capital **locations** so as to provide better services to the people.

Some people in **Sanikiluaq** wanted the capital in the Keewatin because it is close to Churchill where they receive medical **care**.

One person said that, with the proper use of communication technologies, the location of the capital should not be an important issue. Another said that the capital **location** was not important at all.

Some people **asked** why the three larger **centres** were interested in being the capital. It was suggested that regional **centres** were used to being responsible for other communities, and they also wanted the **jobs** and the prestige of being the capital.

A few thought that there should be a plebiscite on the capital location. They were told that the federal **government** might want to avoid a plebiscite. They were also told that a plebiscite might not be fair **because** of the inequities in regional populations (i.e. Baffin has 52% of the **Nunavut** population).

One person expressed fear that **Inuit** might lose out, regardless of the community chosen for capital, unless proper precautions were exercised. Others supported a decision on a capital location being made from outside Nunavut **because** they did not want fighting on the issue inside **Nunavut**. Some people said that the capital issue was driven by businessmen who were only concerned about making money.

Some people queried why the federal government should make the final decision and stated that **Inuit** should decide. It was explained that the **NIC's** mandate was to recommend only on the process for selection, not make the choice itself. It was also said that the federal government was going to pay for the Nunavut **Government** headquarters, and therefore would want to decide on the location. It may be the **Prime Minister** that makes the final decision. Cost of living in the communities was an important factor in deciding on the capital location. Money is tight and government is concerned about the impact of **Nunavut** on its **finances**. The **NIC** is trying to keep the costs of **Nunavut** down to reasonable levels.

Nunavut and Jobs

Many people asked about **jobs** with **Nunavut**. Some people wanted to know what level of employment could be **expected** by 1999. They were told that the **NIC expected** that about 500 new pbs would be created with **Nunavut**, of which 300 would be headquarters **jobs**. Seventy-five **jobs** would be with the federal government. They were also told that because of the multiplier effect (1.5-2.0) of new government **jobs**, **1000 to 1500 jobs might** be created altogether. People were told that **Inuit** should get about 85% of the government jobs when the Nunavut Government was fully implemented and running in accordance with the **Nunavut Agreement**.

It was pointed out that **Nunavut** was going to be a **decentralized government** so that the **jobs** would go to people in the communities and regions. One person in Hall **Beach** said that there were too many government workers today which resulted in too much "red tape". One person in **Arviat** thought that Nunavut Government workers should be paid less than GNWT workers **because** government competes unfairly with private business.

Some people expressed concern about the lack of trained Inuit. It was recognized that training was critical, should begin now, and carry on beyond 1999. Training would take time, and initially some people from the outside would have to be hired.

Concerns were raised regarding unilingual workers and their ability to acquire jobs. People in Coppermine expressed concern about the difference in writing systems between the eastern and western parts of Nunavut and wondered whether they would have to learn syllabics.

Some people asked whether there would be training for jobs in the trades. Many expressed concern about having to travel to get jobs.

A few people wanted to know if staff would be re-located as a result of decentralization.

MLAs and Ministers

Many people expressed dissatisfaction about their MLAs saying that once elected to their positions, the people never saw them again in the communities. When an MLA became a minister, the problem became worse. They hoped that the NIC would look into these matters.

Some people thought that ministers should have only one portfolio each, so that they would not be overworked and would do a better job. One person said that there should be enough MLAs to head all departments, and at the same time, have enough acting as an opposition.

One person said MLAs should be elected for two years and that the terms of the MLAs should be staggered so as to provide for continuity.

Two-Member Constituencies, Gender Equality and Electoral Boundaries

People were told that gender equality through two-member constituencies would not be an affirmative action program, but a means of guaranteeing a balance of women and men in the legislature. Views on gender equality in the Nunavut Legislative Assembly were mixed, with perhaps a slight majority of views expressed in favour of the idea. Those in favour, at least on the North Baffin tour, appeared mainly to be men. Some said that women now performed valuable functions and the idea of gender equality was demeaning. Others said that they had no problem with women taking over "men's jobs".

Women appeared to be more reserved in their support for two member constituencies. Several levelled criticism at organizations representing Inuit women for lack of consultation on various matters and for putting up barriers between men and women. Opinions expressed against the concept of gender equality in the Assembly generally centred on a preference for electing persons based solely on their individual capabilities, not because of gender. Women, some said, were equal today and did not require assistance to become MLAs. The existence of female MLAs was cited as evidence that the current system works. It was expressed a number of times that gender equality should not be an issue.

Some people were confused on the concept of two-member constituencies. Some wondered how it would work and whether too many women might be elected. One person suggested it should be up to the Nunavut MLAs to decide the issue. Others voiced caution on the issue so as not to create conflicts.

One person in Hall Beach suggested that Hall Beach and Igloolik should form one constituency. One person in Igloolik suggested that Igloolik become part of the Kitikmeot region because of community ties, and to improve the population balance between the regions. Another person suggested Pelly Bay be attached to the Keewatin region for cultural and land use reasons. One person in Grise Fiord proposed one MLA for each of the following reconstituted Baffin constituencies: Grise Fiord & Resolute Bay; Pond Inlet, Arctic Bay & Nanisivik; Igloolik & Hall Beach; Cape Dorset & Sanikiluaq; Lake Harbour & Pangnirtung; and, Clyde River & Broughton Island. One person in Arviat suggested that Baker Lake and Arviat should get their own constituencies.

One person asked if Sanikiluaq was going to get an MLA because it was not well represented. The person was told that the MC hoped it would.

Some people thought that each community should have its own MLA, but it was suggested that this would be too expensive. One person suggested two MLAs for each region.

Another person said that they did not mind gender equality guarantees and thought that two-member constituencies would have the advantage of allowing one MLA to become a minister, while the other ordinary MLA could represent the constituency.

One person suggested that constituencies be based on community population to ensure fairness. Larger communities should have more than one MLA.

Other people said they were satisfied with the current electoral system.

It was pointed out that the NIC had to recommend on the basis of organizing **constituencies**, but a boundary commission should establish actual **boundaries** of constituencies.

Elected Government Leader

Many people thought the idea of the **people** electing the Government Leader was a good one. A few people said that it might be too expensive to elect the Government Leader.

Design of Government

One person thought that government departments should be amalgamated.

Another said that large **centres** tended to dominate regions.

One person feared that all **qualified Inuit** might end up in one community.

One person said that some **departments**, such as highways and forestry, were not required for **Nunavut**. It was pointed out that some **Keewatin** communities are pretty close to the **treeline** and that smoke from forest fires in Manitoba had been seen in Arviat last summer.

Some people **wanted** party politics **introduced**, stating that consensus politics was nothing more than a "free for all". A few people asked if there would be party politics; they were told that **NIC** could not stop such a development.

Some people **asked** whether traditional **Inuit** ways of organizing government had been considered. Several people said that the **NIC** should look at other governments for ideas as to how to model the Nunavut Government. It was indicated that the **NIC** plans to look more closely at experiences in Greenland and Alaska.

Some **people** wanted to know how the **Speaker** of the Legislative Assembly would be selected. They also wanted to know how ministers would respect the existing land claim organizations, and things such as the wildlife board and the social development council.

Some people worried that in 15 to 20 years, there would be more **Inuit** than non **Inuit** in **Nunavut** and suggested that there be guaranteed seats (50%) for **Inuit** in the Assembly. They were told that it would be up to the Assembly to look into this idea.

One person thought that **Nunavut** should have a Senator at the federal level to ensure protection of

Nunavut legislation. Another person **asked** whether the make up of the Nunavut Legislative Assembly would entail having **Senators**. They were told that the **Assembly** might want to **look** into this possibility.

Some people expressed concern that Deputy Ministers have too much influence over Ministers.

A few people wanted to know if the **Nunavut Government** would have an opposition. They were told that this was likely because governments operate better that way.

One person wanted **NTI** and the **Nunavut Commissioner** to have a lot of influence in the **Nunavut Government**.

Some people wanted to know the role that elders would have in designing the government. Others wanted to know the place of youth in the government. Some wanted to know the role of **non-Inuit**.

People were advised that the **NIC** was only recommending on the design and structure of government, and that the federal **government** had the final say. They were told **also** that the **NIC** wanted to leave some design flexibility so that elected representatives would have some choices.

Boards and Agencies

Several people brought up problems of duplication created by **too** many **boards**. The MC told people that there were three separate regional boards for both health and education at the moment, and that it was **necessary** to **take a close look at them**.

Boards were **criticized** for employing too many of the same people, the limited ability of some of their members, their cost, and the lack of accountability of their members.

Several people said that health boards were very expensive and that hospital care had to be improved. Too many patients were still being sent down South.

Regions/Regional Councils

Some people asked whether the three current administrative regions of Nunavut would remain the same, and they were **assured** that they would. One **person** suggested that there should be four regions; **Baffin** should be divided in **two**.

One **person** at the **NTI** AGM expressed a strong view that the **Kitikmeot** Regional Council be kept. People

were told that the NIC was reviewing the role of the regional councils, and that the effectiveness of the Kitikmeot Regional Council had been widely noted. The NIC was considering regional bodies composed of mayors and representatives of other regional organizations that would meet from time to time to express collective regional views. These bodies would not be law making bodies.

Hamlets/Decentralization/Community Transfer Initiative

It was proposed by the MC that there be only two levels of government in Nunavut—community and territorial. The Community Transfer Initiative now being implemented in Cape Dorset was one way of decentralizing the government and it would be monitored by the NIC. Decentralization was a means of ensuring that jobs were spread equitably throughout the regions and also a means of reducing impacts on specific communities.

One person thought that Resolute Bay should get some government departments such as government services and tourism. Igloolik was suggested as the “executive capital”. Baker Lake was suggested as the “training capital”. Sanikiluaq was suggested for the department of renewable resources.

Some people said that they did not want communities changed too drastically, but wanted them to have more power. Others wanted to see drastic changes to combat the imposition of government polices on municipalities.

Some people said that municipal councils are not involved enough with the GNWT and they hoped this would change with Nunavut. One person argued for larger municipal budgets.

People in Arviat complained about how decentralization in the Keewatin had occurred. When renewable resources and housing positions were transferred to Arviat, so were the people to fill the jobs. This did not create new employment for local people.

Economy/Economics

A number of people raised economic problems faced by people. One person said Inuit should get first priority for economic opportunities. Another person said women should receive better support. A couple of people remarked on the need for a hunter income support program. Some complained that the inter-community trade of country food was being thwarted by

federal government regulations. A few people spoke of the need for commercial fishing and hunting programs.

Several people spoke of the need for financial training for Inuit. A couple of people remarked on the need for a decent banking system in the communities. One person spoke of a need for a credit union system.

One individual complained that money from non-Inuit businesses in Iqaluit goes South, but in the Keewatin, where many business people are Inuit, the money stays in the Keewatin.

People were told that the government contracting provisions of the Nunavut Agreement would have to be enforced. This would help more money stay to in Nunavut.

Several people suggested that economic planning be the basis for planning Nunavut.

A few people complained that the GNWT Business Incentive Policy was not working.

cost of Nunavut

Some people asked about the cost of the Nunavut and who was going to pay for it. It was indicated that the federal government was going to pay for it, but because monies were tight the NIC was working to keep the costs down. One person thought that Inuit needs, not government costs, should drive the design of Nunavut.

Revenues and Taxes

Several people wanted to know whether the Nunavut Government would abolish or raise taxes. They were told that territorial level taxation would be up to the Nunavut Government. Other people wanted to know how much revenue Nunavut would generate. They were told that more than 80% of the GNWT revenues comes from the federal government. Once Nunavut is created, 90-95% of the revenues will come from the federal government.

Several people expressed concern about deficits and recommended that Nunavut avoid them. Spending should be controlled.

Several people complained about the GST and wanted to know if Nunavut would eliminate it. They were told it was a federal responsibility and that they should discuss it with their MP, Jack Anawak.

Language

Some “people said that they wanted the Inuit language protected. They were assured that the Inuit language, as well as French and English, would be the working languages in Nunavut. People in Kitikmeot expressed concern that their dialect and writing system be specifically **recognized** and **protected**. Some people wanted signs in Nunavut written in the Inuit language.

Policing/Justice

One person asked **about the** role of the RCMP in Nunavut. They were told that the RCMP serves all of Canada and that the RCMP had sent a letter to the NIC asking the NIC how it could improve **policing** in Nunavut.

Several people raised the matter of justice, remarking on the inappropriateness of the southern system. They claimed it did not reflect Inuit values and was not in tune with Inuit culture. Some people advocated **implementing** Inuit traditional justice systems.

Culture

Many people reflected upon the need to pass on **traditional values**, land **based skills** and Inuit culture. Family values were stressed. People complained that government **policies** do little to protect and promote Inuit culture. Others complained of the lack of cultural understanding by teachers and social workers. Some people wanted to know if there would be **sufficient** funding for cultural programs.

Education

Many people **raised** the **matter** of education and asked what was going to change. They were told that Nunavut would control education. Some people complained about the lack of Inuit teachers and the problems associated with children having to go **away to school**. **Some** people suggested that **social** studies should form a larger part of the school curriculum. Some teachers stressed the need for more Inuit cultural programs and language **materials** in the schools. A few people stressed the need for elders to teach in the schools.

Child day care was seen as important if women were to further their education.

Health

Several people expressed **concerns** about health care. Would there be a change in **services**? Some people in Sanikiluaq wanted to become part of the Keewatin in order to be closer to their health care facilities in Churchill. They also spoke of the cost and expense of having to go to Iqaluit if health care arrangements **changed**.

Security

Several people wanted to know whether, with Nunavut, they would receive such things as pensions, old age security, **welfare**, and Canadian passports. They were told **things** SUCH as these would remain as they are today. They asked whether Nunavut would remain a part of Canada. People were also told that Nunavut was not separating from Canada, that it would be subject to the Canadian Constitution, and that it would be governed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Transportation

Many people remarked on the importance of transportation and complained about airline service and routes. People were told that airline operators had **asked** the NIC how they could improve airline services. People in Sanikiluaq **expressed** a desire to get freight through Churchill **because** it would be cheaper.

Lack of Non-Inuit

It was apparent at many meetings that there were few **non-Inuit present**. It was thought that **non-Inuit** did not appear because they did not want to interfere in what they mistakenly concluded was Inuit only business.

Nunavut Tungavik Inc.

There was confusion in the minds of many over the mandates of NTI and the NIC. People **often** asked questions **relating** to the Nunavut Agreement. It was explained that NTI was responsible for implementing the Nunavut Agreement and looking after land claim monies, and that the land claims settlement was for Inuit beneficiaries only. The NIC was responsible for helping set up the Nunavut Government, which was a public government for **all** Nunavut residents. Some **people** said that the Nunavut Government should adhere **fully** to the Nunavut Agreement.

Northern Quebec

Several **people** brought up the matter of the possible separation of Quebec from Canada, and its potential effects upon Canada, **Nunavut**, and **Inuit** in northern Quebec. People in **Sanikiluaq** expressed the **greatest** concerns, due to **Sanikiluaq's** location close to the Quebec coast. Many people thought that **Nunavut Inuit** should help northern Quebec **Inuit** to remain in Canada. They were told that the islands off the Quebec coast belonged to Nunavut and that Nunavut **Inuit** would want to support northern Quebec **Inuit**. **Nunavut** is dependent upon a stable and united Canada. The **NIC** hoped that Canada remained together. **Inuit** should stick together and help each other.

Lack of Information

Most people *expressed* support for the Commission, but others were critical of a lack of information regarding **Nunavut**. Criticisms were **levelled** not only at the **NIC** but also at **NTI**, regional **Inuit organizations**, and **MLAs**. The **NIC** assured people that it would return again annually over the **life** of its five year mandate. People were **told that NIC would be holding a general Nunavut Conference** in February or March of 1995.

Some wanted to know how they **could make their views known**. It **was** suggested that they make use of **public meetings**, and by sending their comments **to the NIC office in Iqaluit**. Some **people** wanted to know if they could get a copy of the **NIC** recommendations expected in the spring of 1995. They were told that the **NIC's** recommendations concerning the **Nunavut Government** would be sent to **NTI**, the **GNWT** and the federal government and anyone **else** who wants them-

Organization of Nunavut Government and HQs Positions

Introduction

This appendix details the proposed structure of the Government of Nunavut as modeled by the NIC

Pages A-10.2 to A-10.13 are organization charts which show the proposed departments, the proposed divisions within the departments, and the proposed corporations. A power corporation and a workers' compensation board have been included in the overview chart, but they have not been included in the modeling of the Government of Nunavut.


Page A-10.14 to A-10.35 are department by department position listings.

This proposed structure was developed for two reasons.


The first reason was to develop a proposal which could serve as the basis for the cost estimates contained in Appendix A-17. Detailed financial modeling could only take place after the fleshing out of a design for a government which the NIC believes is of appropriate size—large enough to 'get the job done', but small enough to reflect the NIC's commitment to an efficient and cost effective public sector.

The second reason was to develop a design proposal which could serve as the basis of detailed consultation with the Government of Canada, the GNWT, NIT and the residents of Nunavut about the most appropriate structure for the Government of Nunavut—a consultative process which will begin with the release of this document.

Proposed Departmental Structure




Legislative Assembly




A-103

Dep't of Executive & Intergovernmental Affairs




A-10.4




Dep't of Finance & Administration

A-10.5




Dep't of Human Resources

A-10.6




Dep't of Justice & Regulatory Affairs




A-10.7

Dep't of Community Government, Housing & Transportation




Dep't of Culture, Language, Elders & Youth

A-10.9




Dept of Education




A-10.10


Dep't of Health & Social Services

A-10.11





Department of Sustainable Development



**Government of Nunavut
Proposed Headquarters Positions List**

	Total HQ FTEs	Location of HQ FTEs		
		Must be in capital	Must be outside	Could be outside
All Government of Nunavut PYs				
TOTAL	555.0	379.0	2.0	174.0
Legislative Assembly	15.5	15.5		
Executive & Intergovernmental Affairs	39.0	32.0	2.0	5.0
Finance & Administration	39.5	39.5		
Human Resources	20.0	20.0		
Justice & Regulatory Affairs	61.0	53.0		8.0
Community Government, Housing & Transportation	75.5	48.5		27.0
Culture, Language, Elders & Youth	15.5	5.0		10.5
Education	63.5	21.0		42.5
Health & Social Services	54.0	41.0		13.0
Public Works & Government Services	42.5	29.5		13.0
Sustainable Development	68.0	43.0		25.0
<i>Financial Processing Unit</i>	15.0	15.0		
Boards, Commissions & Corporations:				
Nunavut Business Credit Corporation	4.0			4.0
Nunavut Development Corporation	4.0			4.0
Nunavut Legal Services Board	5.0			5.0
Nunavut Liquor Commission	5.0			5.0
Nunavut Liquor Licencing Board	2.0			2.0
Nunavut Systems Corporation	26.0	16.0		10.0

NOTE: FTE = Full Time Equivalent, sometimes referred to as a PY (Person Year)

Net Change in FTEs:

New Headquarters FTEs	555
Headquarters functions decentralized to the regional level	+72
Savings at the regional level due to reduction in # of departments	-27
Net change	600

Government of Nunavut Proposed Headquarters Positions List	Total HQ FTEs	Location of HQ FTEs		
		Must be n capital	Must be outside	Could be outside
Legislative Assembly	15.	15.5		
<i>Speaker of the Assembly's Office</i>	0.			
Executive Secretary		0.5		
<i>Ombudsman, Language Commissioner and Access to Information Coordinator</i>	2.			
Executive Assistant		1.0		
		1.0		
<i>Clerk of the Assembly's Office</i>	3.			
Clerk of the Assembly		1.0		
Executive Secretary		1.0		
Clerk/Member's Assistant		1.0		
<i>Finance and Administration</i>	5.			
Manager		1.0		
Finance Officer		1.0		
Administrative/Human Resource Officer		1.0		
Interpreter/Translators		2.0		
<i>Research & Library Services</i>	5.			
Manager, Research Services		1.0		
Research Officers		2.0		
Manager, Legislative Library		1.0		
Library Technician		1.0		

Government of Nunavut Proposed Headquarters Positions List	Total HQ FTEs	Location of HQ FTEs		
		Must be in capital	Must be outside	Could be outside
Executive & Intergovernmental Affairs	39.	32.0	2.0	5.0
Headquarters				
<i>Commissioner's Office</i>	2.			
Executive Assistant		1.0		
Executive Secretary		1.0		
<i>Premier's Office</i>	4.			
Principal Secretary		1.0		
Executive Secretary		1.0		
Executive Assistant		1.0		
Press Secretary		1.0		
<i>Ministers' Offices (Premier + 4)</i>	8.			
Executive Secretaries		4.0		
Executive Assistants		4.0		
<i>Cabinet Office</i>	2.			
Deputy Minister & Secretary to the Cabinet		1.0		
Executive Secretary		1.0		
<i>Audit Bureau</i>	5.			
Director				1.0
Secretary				1.0
Auditors				3.0
<i>Evaluation & Planning</i>	8.			
Director		1.0		
Secretary		1.0		
Manager, Evaluation		1.0		
Evaluation Specialists		3.0		
Planning Analysts		2.0		
<i>Intergovernmental Affairs</i>	7.			
Director		1.0		
Secretary		1.0		
Aboriginal Rights & Constitutional Dev. Advisor		1.0		
Circumpolar Policy Advisor		1.0		
Territorial Policy Advisor		1.0		
Ottawa Liaison			1.0	
Secretary			1.0	
<i>Statistics</i>	3.			
Chief Statistician		1.0		
Statistical Analysts		2.0		

**Government of Nunavut
Proposed Headquarters Positions List**

	Total HQ FTEs	Location of HQ FTEs		
		Must be capital	Must be outside	Could be outside
Finance & Administration	39.	39.5		
Headquarters				
<i>Directorate</i>	2.			
Deputy Minister		1.0		
Executive Secretary		1.0		
<i>Finance & Administration</i>	5.			
Director		1.0		
Secretary		1.0		
Budget Planner/Analyst		1.0		
Finance & Administration Analyst		1.0		
Information Systems Officer		1.0		
<i>Accounting</i>	12.			
Director		1.0		
Secretary		1.0		
Manager, Accounting		1.0		
Accounting Services Clerk		1.0		
Corporate Accounting Officer		1.0		
Data Entry Supervisor		1.0		
Financial Consulting Officer		1.0		
Manager, Revenue & Collections		1.0		
Collections Officers		2.0		
Revenue Officers		2.0		
<i>Financial Evaluation</i>	3.			
Director		1.0		
Secretary		0.5		
Financial Analysts		2.0		
<i>Fiscal Policy</i>	3.			
Director		1.0		
Fiscal Policy Advisor		1.0		
Tax Policy Advisor		1.0		
<i>Government Accounting</i>	6			
Director		1.0		
Secretary		1.0		
Manager, Corporate Control		1.0		
Corporate Control Officer		1.0		
Manager, Corporate Reporting		1.0		
Corporate Reporting Officer		1.0		

**Government of Nunavut
Proposed Headquarters Positions List**

	Total HQ FTEs	Location of HQ FTEs		
		Must be in capital;	Must be outside;	Could be outside
Finance & Administration (cntd.)				
<i>Revenue, Asset Management & Taxation</i>	8.0			
Director		1.0;		
Secretary		1.0		
Banking & Investment Advisor		1.0		
Risk Management & Insurance Advisor		1.0		
Manager, Tax Administration		1.0		
Tax Auditor		1.0		
Tax Technician		1.0		
Payroll Tax Compliance Officer		1.0		

Government of Nunavut Proposed Headquarters Positions List	Total HQ FTEs	Location of HQ FTEs		
		Must be in capital	Must be outside	Could be outside
Human Resources	20.0	20.0		
Headquarters				
<i>Directorate</i>	2.0			
Deputy Minister		1.0		
Executive Secretary		1.0		
<i>Labour Relations</i>	7.0			
Director		1.0		
Secretary		1.0		
Benefits Policy Advisor		1.0		
Manager, Labour Relations		1.0		
Labour Relations Officer		1.0		
Manager, Labour Research		1.0		
Labour Research Officer		1.0		
<i>Staffing Policy & Human Resource Planning</i>	6.0			
Director		1.0		
Secretary		1.0		
Manager, Staffing Policy		1.0		
Staffing Policy Officer		1.0		
Manager, Human Resource Planning		1.0		
Human Resource Planning Officer		1.0		
<i>Work Evaluation</i>	5.0			
Director		1.0		
Secretary		1.0		
Work Analysts		3.0		

Government of Nunavut Proposed Headquarters Positions List	Total m FTEs	Location of HQ FTEs		
		Must be in capital	Must be outside	Could be outside
Justice & Regulatory Affairs	61.0	53.0		8.0
Headquarters				
<i>Directorate</i>	3.0			
Deputy Minister		1.0		
Assistant Deputy Minister		1.0		
Executive Secretary		1.0		
<i>Policy, Planning & Human Resources</i>	5.0			
Director		1.0		
Secretary		1.0		
Policy Analysts		2.0		
Human Resources Officer		1.0		
<i>Finance & Administration</i>	5.0			
Director		1.0		
Secretary		1.0		
Budget Planner/Analyst		1.0		
Finance & Administration Analyst		1.0		
Information Systems Officer		1.0		
<i>Constitutions/ Law</i>	2.0			
Director		1.0		
Constitutional Counsel		1.0		
<i>Corrections & Community Justice</i>	8.0			
Director				1.0
Secretary				1.0
Manager, Corrections				1.0
Corrections Specialists				2.0
Manager, Community Justice				1.0
Community Justice Specialists				2.0
<i>Court Services</i>	10.0			
Director		1.0		
Secretary		1.0		
Clerk of Territorial Courts		1.0		
Chief Court Reporter		1.0		
Court Reporters		3.0		
Juridical Administrator		1.0		
Maintenance Enforcement Officer		1.0		
Sheriff		1.0		

**Government of Nunavut
Proposed Headquarters Positions List**

	Total	Location of HQ FTEs		
	HQ FTEs	Must be in capital	Must be outside	Could be outside
Justice (cntd.)				
Law Enforcement	6.0			
Secretary		1.0		
Chief Coroner		1.0		
Chief Fire Marshall		1.0		
Chief Firearms Officer		1.0		
Manager, Labour Services		1.0		
Labour Services Inspector		1.0		
Legal Division	6.0			
Director		1.0		
Secretary		1.0		
Public Trustee		1.0		
Legal Counsels		3.0		
Legal Registries	5.0			
Director		1.0		
Secretary		1.0		
Registrar, Legal Registries		1.0		
Deputy Registrar, Legal Registries		1.0		
Legal Registries Clerk		1.0		
Legislation	5.0			
Director		1.0		
Secretary		1.0		
Legislative Counsels		2.0		
Legal Translator		1.0		
Safety	6.0			
Director		1.0		
Secretary		1.0		
Boiler & Vessel Inspector		1.0		
Manager, Electrical/Elevator Systems		1.0		
Manager, Occupational Health & Safety		1.0		
Environmental Health & Safety Officer		1.0		

Government of Nunavut Proposed Headquarters Positions List	Total HQ FTEs	Location of HQ FTEs		
		Must be capital	Must be outside	Could be outside
Community Government, Housing & Transportation	75.	48.5		27.0
Headquarters				
<i>Directorate</i>	3.			
Deputy Minister		1.0		
Assistant Deputy Minister		1.0		
Executive Secretary		1.0		
<i>Policy, Planning & Human Resources</i>	6.			
Director		1.0		
Secretary		0.5		
Policy Analyst		1.0		
Program Evaluation Officer		1.0		
Human Resources Officer		1.0		
Transportation Planners		2.0		
<i>Finance & Administration</i>	8.			
Director		1.0		
Secretary		1.0		
Budget Planner/Analyst		1.0		
Finance & Administration Analyst		1.0		
Information Systems Officer		1.0		
Accounting & Claims Officer (Housing)		1.0		
Motor Vehicles Officers		2.0		
<i>Arctic Airports</i>	16			
Director				1.0
Secretary				1.0
Manager, Program Development & Standards				1.0
Airport Planning & Develop. Engineer				1.0
Program Develop. & Standards Officer				1.0
Manager, Airport Operations & Standards				1.0
Coordinator, Aviation Programs Training				1.0
positions yet to <i>be</i> defined				2.0
Manager, Airport Facilities				1.0
Airport Surface Technologist				1.0
Airport Electronics Technologist				1.0
positions yet <i>to be</i> defined				4.0

Government of Nunavut Proposed Headquarters Positions List	Total	Location of HQ FTEs		
	HQ FTEs	Must be n capital	Must be outside	Could be outside
Community Government, Housing & Transportation (cntd.)				
<i>Capital Works & Capital Planning</i>	4.5			
Director		1.0		
Secretary		0.5		
Capital Program Officer		1.0		
Senior Planning Engineer		1.0		
Project Manager		1.0		
<i>Community Planning & Lands</i>	7.0			
Director		1.0		
Senior Community Planner		1.0		
Community Planning Officer		1.0		
Manager, Land and Property Management		1.0		
Senior Lands Policy Officer		1.0		
Lands Policy Officer		1.0		
Lands Record Clerk		1.0		
<i>Housing Programs & Services</i>	10.0			
Director		1.0		
Secretary		1.0		
Needs Assessment & Standards Advisor		1.0		
Rental Housing Programs Advisor		1.0		
Manager, Home Ownership Programs		1.0		
Home Ownership Analyst		1.0		
Financial Support Programs Officer		1.0		
Mortgage, Loans & Investment Officer		1.0		
Community Development & Training Officer		1.0		
Technical & Maintenance Advisor		1.0		
<i>Municipal Operations & Assessment</i>	5.0			
Director		1.0		
Secretary		1.0		
Legislation & Political Development Advisor		1.0		
Manager, Municipal Programs		1.0		
Municipal Programs Officer		1.0		
<i>Property Assessment</i>	5.0			
Manager				1.0
Appeals Administrator				1.0
Property Assessors				2.0
Assessment Technician				1.0

Government of Nunavut Proposed Headquarters Positions List	Total t-u FTEs	Location of HQ FTEs		
		Must be n capital	Must be outside	Could be outside
Community Government, Housing & Transportation (cntd.)				
Sports & Recreation	6.0			
Director				1.0
Secretary				1.0
Facility Development Advisor				1.0
Recreation Programs Advisor				1.0
Manager, Sports Programs				1.0
Sports Programs Officer				1.0
Transportation Engineering	4.5			
Director		1.0		
Secretary		0.5		
Project Design Advisor- Airports		1.0		
Project Design Advisor- Marine		1.0		
Project Manager		1.0		

**-Government of Nunavut
Proposed Headquarters Positions List**

	Total HQ FTEs	Location of HQFTEs		
		Must be n capital	Must be outside	Could be outside
Culture, Language, Elders & Youth	15.5	5.0		10.5
Headquarters				
Directorate	2.0			
Deputy Minister		1.0		
Executive Secretary		1.0		
Policy, Planning & Human Resources	1.0			
Director		1.0		
Finance & Administration	2.0			
Director		1.0		
Administrative Assistant		1.0		
Cultural Affairs	2.5			
Director				1.0
Secretary				0.5
Policy Analyst				1.0
Elders & Youth Affairs	3.5			
Director				1.0
Secretary				0.5
Coordinator, Elders Policy & Programs				1.0
Coordinator, Youth Policy & Programs				1.0
Language Bureau	4.5			
Director				1.0
Secretary				0.5
Inuktitut Linguists				3.0

**Government of Nunavut
Proposed Headquarters Positions List**

	Total HQ FTEs	Location of HQ FTEs		
		Must be in capital,	Must be outside	Could be outside
Education	63.5	21.0		42.5
Headquarters	21.0			
<i>Secretariat</i>				
Deputy Minister		1.0		
Assistant Deputy Minister		1.0		
Executive Secretary		1.0		
Director, Finance & Management Services		1.0		
Secretary		1.0		
Contracts Advisor		1.0		
Finance Officer		1.0		
Finance Clerks		2.0		
Manager, Capital Planning & Construction Clerk		1.0 1.0		
Manager, Payroll & Analysis Clerk		1.0 1.0		
Director, Policy & Evaluation		1.0		
Secretary		1.0		
Policy Analyst		1.0		
Evaluation Specialist		1.0		
Labour Market Analyst		1.0		
Manager, Career Development		1.0		
Manager, Child Care		1.0		
Coordinator, Student Financial Services		1.0		

Government of Nunavut Proposed Headquarters Positions List	Total	Location of HQ FTEs		
	HQ FTEs	Must be in capital	Must be outside	Could be outside
Nunavut Board of Education	26.5			
<i>Directorate</i>	2.0			
Director				1.0
Executive Secretary				1.0
<i>Policy, Planning & Human Resources</i>	5.0			
Director				1.0
Secretary				1.0
Policy Analysts				2.0
Human Resources Officer				1.0
<i>Finance & Administration</i>	5.0			
Director				1.0
Secretary				1.0
Budget Planner/Analyst				1.0
Finance & Administration Analyst				1.0
Information Systems Officer				1.0
<i>Curriculum Services</i>	9.0			
Manager, Curriculum Services				1.0
Secretary				1.0
Coordinator, Distance Learning				1.0
Coordinator, Elementary Programs				1.0
Coordinator, English/French				1.0
Coordinator, Inuktitut				1.0
Coordinator, Math/Sciences				1.0
Coordinator, Secondary Programs				1.0
Coordinator, Social Studies				1.0
<i>Early Childhood Development</i>	2.0			
Manager, Early Childhood Development				1.0
Secretary				0.5
Early Childhood Development Officer				1.0
<i>Library Services</i>	3.0			
Territorial Librarian				1.0
Library Technician				2.0

**Government of Nunavut
Proposed Headquarters Positions List**

	Total HQ FTEs	Location of HQ FTEs		
		Must be in capital	Must be outside	Could be outside
Arctic College	16.0			
<i>Directorate</i>	2.0			
President				1.0
Executive Secretary				1.0
<i>Policy, Planning & Human Resources</i>	4.0			
Director				1.0
Secretary				1.0
Public Affairs Officer				1.0
Human Resources Officer				1.0
<i>Finance & Administration</i>	6.0			
Director				1.0
Secretary				1.0
Budget Planner/Analyst				1.0
Finance & Administration Analyst				1.0
Student Records Officer				1.0
Information Systems Officer				1.0
<i>Nunavut Science Institute</i>	4.0			
Executive Director				1.0
Administrative Assistant				1.0
Coordinator, Scientific Liaison				1.0
Manager, Scientific/Technical				1.0

**Government of Nunavut
Proposed Headquarters Positions List**

	Total HQ FTEs	Location of HQ FTEs		
		Must be in capital	Must be outside	Could be outside
Health & Social Services	54.	41.0		13.0
Headquarters				
<i>Directorate</i>	3.			
Deputy Minister		1.01		
Assistant Deputy Minister		1.0		
Executive Secretary		1.0		
<i>Policy, Planning & Human Resources</i>	5.			
Director		1.0		
Secretary		1.0		
Policy Analysts		2.01		
Human Resources Officer		1.0		
<i>Finance & Administration</i>	5.			
Director		1.0		
Secretary		1.0		
Budget Planner/Analyst		1.0		
Finance & Administration Analyst		1.0		
Information Systems Officer		1.01		
<i>Child Protection & Family Support</i>	11.			
Director		1.0		
Secretary		1.0		
Manager, Child Protection		1.0		
Secretary		1.01		
Adoptions Officer		1.0		
Child Abuse Officer		1.0		
Foster Care Officer		1.0		
Residential Care Officer		1.0		
Manager, Family Support		1.0		
Family Life Education Officer		1.0		
School-Based Services Officer		1.01		

**Government of Nunavut
Proposed Headquarters Positions List**

	Total HQ FTEs	Location of HQ FTEs		
		Must be in capital	Must be outside	Could be outside
Health & Social Services (cntd.)				
Community Health Programs	12.0			
Director		1.0		
Secretary		1.0		
Manager, Health Promotion		1.0		
Health Promotion Officer		1.0		
Nutritionist		1.0		
Manager, Independent Living		1.0		
Rehab. & Community Living Advisor		1.0		
Residential & Home Care Advisor		1.0		
Manager, Preventative Programs		1.0		
Additions Policy Advisor		1.0		
Mental Health Policy Advisor		1.0		
Suicide Prevention Advisor		1.0		
Health Insurance Services	13.0			
Director				1.0
Secretary				1.0
Policy Officer				1.0
Senior Consultant, Benefits Coordinator				1.0
Medical Travel Specialists				2.0
Medical Travel Clerk				1.0
Senior Insured Services Specialist				1.0
Insured Services Specialist				1.0
Insured Services Clerk				1.0
Registration Specialist				1.0
Registration Assistants				2.0
Health Services Development	5.0			
Director		1.0		
Secretary		1.0		
Dental Consultant		1.0		
Disease Control Consultant		1.0		
Senior Nursing Officer		1.0		

Government of Nunavut Proposed Headquarters Positions List	Total HQ FTEs	Location of HQ FTEs		
		Must be in capital	Must be outside	Could be outside
Public Works & Government Services	42.5	29.5		13.0
<i>Directorate</i>	3.0			
Deputy Minister		1.0		
Assistant Deputy Minister		1.0		
Executive Secretary		1.0		
<i>Policy, Planning & Human Resources</i>	5.0			
Director		1.0		
Secretary		1.0		
Policy Analysts		2.0		
Human Resources Officer		1.0		
<i>Finance & Administration</i>	5.0			
Director		1.0		
Secretary		1.0		
Budget Planner/Analyst		1.0		
Finance & Administration Analyst		1.0		
Information Systems Officer		1.0		
<i>Construction Management</i>	4.0			
Director		1.0		
Secretary		1.0		
Strategic Planning Advisor		1.0		
Project Management Advisor		1.0		
<i>Contracts & Purchasing Standards</i>	3.0			
Director		1.0		
Secretary		0.5		
Construction Contracts Advisor		1.0		
Purchasing Contracts Advisor		1.0		
<i>Operations, Maintenance & Accommodations</i>	6.0			
Director		1.0		
Secretary		1.0		
Maintenance Management Advisor		1.0		
Building Maintenance Specialist		1.0		
Equipment Maintenance Specialist		1.0		
Senior Property Manager		1.0		

**Government of Nunavut
Proposed Headquarters Positions List**

	Total HQ FTEs	Location of HQ FTEs		
		Must be in capital	Must be outside	Could be outside
Public Works & Government Services (cntd.)				
<i>Petroleum Products</i>	13.0			
Director				1.0
Secretary				1.0
General Operations Manager				1.0
Quality Control Officer				1.0
Inventory Control Officer				1.0
Capital Planning Officer				1.0
Regional Petroleum Products Officer				1.0
Petroleum Products Clerk				1.0
Chief Accountant				1.0
Financial Operations Analyst				1.0
Systems Coordinator				1.0
Manager, Revenue Operations				1.0
Revenue Clerk				1.0
<i>Publications, Printing & Records Management</i>	3.0			
Manager		1.0		
Purchasing Officer		1.0		
Records Systems Advisor		1.0		

**Government of Nunavut
Proposed Headquarters Positions List**

	Total HQ FTEs	Location of HQ FTEs		
		Must be n capital	Must be outside	Could be outside
Sustainable Development	68.0	43.0		25.0
<i>Directorate</i>	3.0			
Deputy Minister		1.0		
Assistant Deputy Minister		1.0		
Executive Secretary		1.0		
<i>Policy, Planning & Human Resources</i>	9.0			
Director		1.0		
Secretary		1.0		
Senior Policy & Planning Officer		1.0		
Policy Officers		2.0		
Environmental Assessment Biologist		1.0		
Land Use Planning & Water Mgmt. Officer		1.0		
WHISP Officer		1.0		
Human Resources Officer		1.0		
<i>Finance & Administration</i>	5.0			
Director		1.0		
Secretary		1.0		
Budget Planner/Analyst		1.0		
Finance & Administration Analyst		1.0		
Information Systems Officer		1.0		
<i>Business Development</i>	8.0			
Director		1.0		
Secretary		1.0		
Senior Business Analyst		1.0		
Arts & Crafts Advisor		1.0		
Business & Technical Services Advisor		1.0		
Business & Technical Services Officer		1.0		
Manager, Economic Development Agreement		1.0		
Administrative Officer		1.0		
<i>Conservation Education</i>	2.0			
Manager		1.0		
Conservation Education Information Officer		1.0		
<i>Environmental Control</i>	4.5			
Manager		1.0		
Secretary		0.5		
Environmental Pollution Specialist		1.0		
Hazardous Waste Specialist		1.0		
Water Management Officer		1.0		

**Government of Nunavut
Proposed Headquarters Positions List**

	Total HQ FTEs	Location of HQ FTEs		
		Must be capital,	Must be outside	Could be outside
Sustainable Development (cntd.)				
<i>Income Support</i>	4.5			
Director		1.0		
Secretary		0.5		
Policy Analyst		1.0		
Income Support Officers		2.0		
<i>Non-Renewable Resources</i>	11.0			
Director		1.0		
Secretary		1.0		
Manager, Mineral Policy		1.0		
Claims inspector		1.0		
Mining Recorder		1.0		
Industrial Benefits Analyst		1.0		
District Geologist				1.0
Regional Geologist				1.0
Assessment Geologist				1.0
Core Librarian Technician				1.0
Oil & Gas Policy Advisor		1.0		
<i>Parks Visitors' Services</i>	5.0			
Director				1.0
Facilities Development Specialist				1.0
Manager, Capital Program				1.0
Parks Planner				1.0
Visitor Centres & Interp. Projects Planner				1.0
<i>Renewable Resources</i>	12.0			
Director				1.0
Secretary				1.0
Caribou Biologist				1.0
Furbearer Biologist				1.0
Marine Biologist				1.0
Marine Technician				1.0
Waterfowl Biologist				1.0
Wildlife Biologists/Technologists				3.0
Wildlife Veterinarians/Technicians				2.0
<i>Tourism Development</i>	4.0			
Director				1.0
Coordinator, Marketing Programs				1.0
Coordinator, Training & Regulations				1.0
Tourism Counselor				1.0

Government of Nunavut Proposed Headquarters Positions List	Total	Location of HQ FTEs		
	HQ FTEs	Must be in capital	Must be outside	Could be outside
Shared Among the Program Departments				
<i>Financial Processing Unit</i>	15.0			
Director			1.0	
Secretary			1.0	
Processing Clerks			13.0	
Boards, Commissions & Corporations				
<i>Nunavut Business Credit Corporation</i>	4.0			4.0
<i>Nunavut Development Corporation</i>	4.0			4.0
<i>Nunavut Legal Services Board</i>	5.0			5.0
<i>Nunavut Liquor Commission</i>	5.0			5.0
<i>Nunavut Liquor Licensing Board</i>	2.0			2.0
<i>Nunavut Systems Corporation</i>	26.0	16.0		10.0

Design of the Nunavut Government: Cambridge Bay as Capital

Introduction

This appendix details a decentralized design model which could be employed if Cambridge Bay was chosen to be the capital.

The Legislative Assembly and the headquarter of all 10 departments would be located in Cambridge Bay. Departmental divisions which do not have to be located in the capital (e.g. the Parks & Visitor Services division of the Department of Sustainable Development) would be located in Arviat, Igloolik, Iqaluit, Pangnirtung and Rankin Inlet. Boards, commissions and corporations would be located in Cambridge Bay, Cape Dorset, Iqaluit and Rankin Inlet.

In order to increase decentralization in the Kitikmeot region, Copernine would replace Cambridge Bay as the regional centre. The regional level positions currently located in Cambridge Bay would be re-located to Coppermine and Gjoa Haven. After gaining headquarters positions and having regional positions transferred elsewhere, Cambridge Bay would experience a net increase of 255 full-time equivalent positions (FTEs) of direct Government of Nunavut employment and the community would grow by just under 700 people.

Iqaluit would remain the regional centre for the Baffin region and Rankin Inlet would remain the regional centre for the Keewatin region; however, some regional departmental offices would be located outside those communities.

Pages A-11.6 to A-11.10 detail, in chart form, how employment would be structured if this model were to be employed. Data is presented for projected GN employment in 1999: at the headquarters level, for territorial facilities (e.g. the Baffin Correctional Centre), at the regional level, and for community-based positions. The total for the GN as a whole be 2,806 FTEs. Add 1,008 employees of community governments and community housing associations, and the total level of employment funded directly or indirectly by the GN would be 3,814 FTEs.

Data on the existing level of non-federal public sector employment is then presented, followed by data on the overall employment impact of establishing the GN. From a current level of 3,214 FTEs, the establishment of the GN would add 553 headquarters-level positions in Nunavut (379 of which would be located in Cambridge Bay) and would also result in a net gain of 47 regional-level positions, for a net increase of 600 FTEs or 15.77%. This in turn would result in an influx


of 1,031 people into Nunavut, for an estimated population of 27289-an increase of 9.4% over the current population projections for 1999. At this level of employment and this population, there would be 9.4 residents for every direct Government of Nunavut position.

This data is presented for Nunavut as a whole; by region; by type of community (regional centres vs. the smaller communities); by the three regional centres; by the communities grouped by their current levels of 'real unemployment'; by the communities grouped by their projected populations as of April 1, 1999; and, for each community,

It should be noted that the population estimates in the 'breakdowns' do not equal the estimate of 27,289 which is given for Nunavut as a whole. The reason for this is that the population growth model estimates the number of people who will be hired from within each community, the number of people who will be hired from other Nunavut communities, and the number of people who will be hired from outside Nunavut. It was impossible to estimate how many people would leave each individual community (or region) to seek employment elsewhere in Nunavut so, for each of the 'breakdowns', this factor was ignored.


Capital: Cambridge Bay

Distribution of Headquarters FTEs



Capital: Cambridge Bay

Distribution of Regional Offices



Capital: Cambridge Bay Summary of Locations	Headquarters	Baffin	Keewatin	Kitikmeot
Legislative Assembly	Cambridge Bay			
Executive & Intergovernmental Affairs <i>Audit Bureau</i>	Cambridge Bay <i>Iqaluit</i>	Iqaluit	Rankin Inlet	Coppermine
Finance & Administration	Cambridge Bay	Iqaluit	Rankin Inlet	Coppermine
Human Resources	Cambridge Bay	Iqaluit	Rankin Inlet	Coppermine
Justice & Regulatory Affairs <i>Corrections & Community Justice</i>	Cambridge Bay <i>Iqaluit</i>	Iqaluit	Rankin Inlet	Coppermine
Community Government, Housing & Trans. <i>Arctic Airports</i> <i>Property Assessment</i> <i>Sports & Recreation</i>	Cambridge Bay <i>Iqaluit</i> <i>Igloolik</i> <i>Arviat</i>	Igloolik	Arviat	Coppermine
Culture, Language, Elders & Youth <i>Cultural Affairs</i> <i>Elders & Youth Affairs</i> <i>Language Bureau</i>	Cambridge Bay <i>Igloolik</i> <i>Igloolik</i> <i>Igloolik</i>		Baker Lake	Coppermine
Education <i>Arctic College</i> <i>Nunavut Board of Education</i>	Cambridge Bay <i>Iqaluit</i> <i>Iqaluit</i>	<i>Iqaluit</i> <i>Pond Inlet</i>	Baker Lake Baker Lake	Gjoa Haven Gjoa Haven
Health & Social Services <i>Health Insurance Services</i>	Cambridge Bay <i>Iqaluit</i>	Iqaluit	Rankin Inlet	Coppermine
Public Works & Government Services <i>Petroleum Products</i>	Cambridge Bay <i>Rankin Inlet</i>	Iqaluit	Rankin Inlet	Coppermine
Sustainable Development <i>Geology</i> <i>Parks & Visitors Services</i> <i>Renewable Resources</i> <i>Tourism Development</i>	Cambridge Bay <i>Iqaluit</i> <i>Pangnirtung</i> <i>Iqaluit</i> <i>Pangnirtung</i>	Pangnirtung	Rankin Inlet	Gjoa Haven
<i>Financial Processing Unit</i>	Cambridge Bay			
Boards, Commissions & Corporations:				
Nunavut Business Credit Corporation	Cape Dorset			
Nunavut Development Corporation	Cape Dorset			
Nunavut Legal Services Board	Iqaluit			
Nunavut Liquor Commission	Rankin Inlet			
Nunavut Liquor Licencing Board	Rankin Inlet			
Nunavut Systems Corporation	Cambridge Bay	Iqaluit	Rankin Inlet	Cambridge Bay

**Capital: Cambridge Bay
FTEs by Department & Community**

	Total HQ FTEs	HQ FTEs in...			
		Iqaluit	Rankin	Cam Bay	Other Comms.
All Government of Nunavut FTEs					
TOTAL	555.0	112.5	23.0	379.0	38.5
Legislative Assembly	15.5			15.5	
Executive & Intergovernmental Affairs	39.0	5.0		32.0	
Finance & Administration	39.5			39.5	
Human Resources	20.0			20.0	
Justice & Regulatory Affairs	61.0	8.0		53.0	
Community Government, Housing & Transportation	75.5	16.0		48.5	11.0
Culture, Language, Elders & Youth	15.5			5.0	10.5
Education	63.5	42.5		21.0	
Health & Social Services	54.0	13.0		41.0	
Public Works & Government Services	42.5		13.0	29.5	
Sustainable Development	68.0	16.0		43.0	9.0
<i>Financial Processing Unit</i>	15.0			15.0	
Boards, Commissions & Corporations:					
Nunavut Business Credit Corporation	4.0				4.0
Nunavut Development Corporation	4.0				4.0
Nunavut Legal Services Board	5.0	5.0			
Nunavut Liquor Commission	5.0		5.0		
Nunavut Liquor Licencing Board	2.0		2.0		
Nunavut Systems Corporation	26.0	7.0	3.0	16.0	

A-11.5

Capital: Cambridge Bay

Summary of FTEs	Projected GN Employment in 1999				Total Direct GN FTEs	Hamlet/Housing FTEs	Total Non-Federal FTEs
	HQ FTEs	Facilities FTEs	Reg. FTEs	Comm. FTEs			
Nunavut total:	553.0	304	689	1,26	2,806.0	1,008.0	3,814.0
by region:							
Baffin	145.0	292	300	63	1,376.0	537.0	1,913.0
Keewatin	29.0	12	212	39	646.0	259.0	905.0
Kitikmeot	379.0		177	228	784.0	212.0	996.0
% Baffin	26.2%				49.0%		50.2%
% Keewatin	5.2%				23.0%		23.70%
% Kitikmeot	68.5%				27.9%		26.1%
by type of community:							
regional centres	514.5	304	315	30	1,440.5	182.0	1,622.5
other communities	38.5		374	95	1,365.5	826.0	2,191.5
% regional centres	93.0%				51.3%		42.5%
% other communities	7.0%				48.7%		57.5%
by regional centre:							
Iqaluit	112.5	292	178	13	717.5	103.0	820.5
Rankin Inlet	23.0	12	137	11	286.0	41.0	327.0
Cambridge Bay	379.0			58	437.0	38.0	475.0
% Iqaluit	21.9%				49.80%		50.60%
% Rankin Inlet	4.5%				19.9%		20.2%
% Cambridge Bay	73.7%				30.30%		29.30%
by real unemployment rate:							
less than 20%	514.5	304	315	356	1,489.5	217.0	1,706.5
20% to 40%	32.5		122	43	589.5	391.5	981.0
above 40%	6.0		252	469	727.0	399.5	1,126.5
% less than 20%	93.0%				53.1%		44.7%
% 20% to 40%	5.9%				21.0%		25.70%
% above 40%	1.1%				25.9%		29.5%

Capital: Cambridge Bay

Summary of FTEs	Total Existing FTEs	Change in FTEs 1994 > 1999		Change in FTEs '94 - '99	Change in FTEs as % of '94	1999 Pop. After Estab. of GN	1999 Pop. per Direct GN FTEs
	FTEs	HQ	Reg.				
Nunavut total:	3,214.0	+553.0	+47	+600.0	+15.7%	27,289	9.7
by region:							
Baffin	1,758.0	+145.0	+10	+155.0	+8.1%	14,251	10.4
Keewatin	864.0	+29.0	+12	+41.0	+4.5%	7,473	11.6
Kitikmeot	592.0	+379.0	+25	+404.0	+40.6%	6,047	7.7
% Baffin	54.7%			25.80/0		51.3%	
O/. Keewatin	26.9%			6.80/0		26.9%/0	
O/. Kitikmeot	18.4%			67.3%		21.80/0	
by type of community:							
regional centres	1,368.0	+514.5	-260	+254.5	+15.7%	8,704	6.0
other communities	1,846.0	+38.5	+307	+345.5	+15.8%	19,066	14.0
% regional centres	42.6%			42.4%		31.3%	
% other communities	57.4%			57.60/0		68,70/0	
by regional centre:							
Iqaluit	818.0	+112.5	-110	+2.5	+0.3%	4,447	6.2
Rankin Inlet	330.0	+23.0	-26	-3.0	-0.90/0	2,171	7.6
Cambridge Bay	220.0	+379.0	-124	+255.0	+53.7%	2,087	4.8
% Iqaluit	59.8%			1.0%		51.1%	
O/. Rankin Inlet	24.1%			-1.20/0		24.9%	
O/. Cambridge Bay	16.1%			100.2%		24.0%	
by real unemployment rate:							
less than 20%	1,452.0	+514.5	-260	+254.5	+14.9%	9,417	6.3
20% to 40%	828.5	+32.5	+120	+152.5	+15.5%	8,589	14.6
above 40%	933.5	+6.0	+187	+193.0	+17.1%	9,765	13.4
% less than 20/0	45.2%			42.4%		33.9%	
% 200/0 to 40%	25.8%			25.4%		30.9%	
% above 40%	29.0%			32.2%		35.2%	

Capital: Cambridge Bay

Summary of FTEs	Projected GN Employment in 1999				Total Direct GN FTEs	Hamlet/Housing FTEs	Total Non-Federal FTEs
	HQ FTEs	Facilities FTEs	Reg. FTEs	Comm. FTEs			
by 1999 size of community:							
2,000+	135.5	304.0	315.0	249.0	1,003.5	144.0	1,147.5
1,000-2,000	417.5		322.0	538.0	1,277.5	439.0	1,716.5
less than 1,000			52.0	473.0	525.0	425.0	950.0
% 2,000+	24.5%				35.8%		30.1%
% 1,000-2,000	75.5%				45.5%		45.0%
% less than 1,000					18.7%		24.9%
by community:							
Arctic Bay				41	41.0	29.5	70.5
Broughton Island				31	31.0	35.5	66.5
Cape Dorset	8.0			48	56.0	75.0	131.0
Clyde River				37	37.0	29.0	66.0
Grise Fiord				12	12.0	23.0	35.0
Hall Beach				31	31.0	23.5	54.5
Igloolik	15.5		51	68	134.5	45.5	180.0
Iqaluit	112.5	292	178	135	717.5	103.0	820.5
Lake Harbour				28	28.0	24.0	52.0
Nanisivik				19	19.0		19.0
Pangnirtung	9.0		32	78	119.0	58.5	177.5
Pond Inlet			39	64	103.0	55.5	158.5
Resolute Bay				18	18.0	12.0	30.0
Sanikiluaq				29	29.0	23.0	52.0
Arviat	6.0		41	77	124.0	49.5	173.5
Baker Lake			34	82	116.0	51.5	167.5
Chesterfield Inlet				23	23.0	24.5	47.5
Coral Harbour				50	50.0	39.5	89.5
Rankin Inlet	23.0	12	137	114	286.0	41.0	327.0
Repulse Bay				30	30.0	33.5	63.5
Whale Cove				17	17.0	19.5	36.5
Bathurst Inlet							
Bay Chimo							
Cambridge Bay	379.0			58	437.0	38.0	475.0
Coppermine			125	63	188.0	65.5	253.5
Gjoa Haven			52	46	98.0	42.5	140.5
Pelly Bay				22	22.0	29.5	51.5
Taloyoak				39	39.0	36.5	75.5

Capital: Cambridge Bay

Summary of FTEs	Total Existing FTEs	Change in FTEs 1994 > 1999		Change in FTEs '94-'99	Change in FTEs as % of '94	1999 Pop. After Estab. of GN	1999 Pop. per Direct GN FTEs
		m	Reg.				
by 1999 size of community:							
2,000+	1,148.0	+135.5	-136	-0.5	-0.0%	6,618	6.6
1,000-2,000	1,168.0	+417.5	+131	+548.5	+32.0%	12,277	9.6
less than 1,000	898.0		+52	+52.0	+5.5%	7,736	14.7
% 2,000+	35.7%			-0.1%		23.8%	
% 1,000-2,000	36.3%			91.4%		44.2%	
% less than 1,000	27.9%			8.7%		27.9%	
by community:							
Arctic Bay	70.5					670	16.3
Broughton Island	66.5					569	18.4
Cape Dorset	123.0	+8.0		+8.0	+6.5%	1,188	21.2
Clyde River	66.0					701	18.9
Grise Fiord	35.0					163	13.6
Hall Beach	54.5					663	21.4
Igloolik	113.5	+15.5	+51	+66.5	+58.6%	1,347	10.0
Iqaluit	818.0	+112.5	-11 C	+2.5	+0.3%	4,447	6.2
Lake Harbour	52.0					450	16.1
Nanisivik	19.0					341	17.9
Pangnirtung	136.5	+9.0	+32	+41.0	+30.0%	1,529	12.8
Pond Inlet	121.5		+37	+37.0	+30.5%	1,305	12.7
Resolute Bay	30. C					209	11.6
Sanikiluaq	52. C					670	23.1
Arviat	146.5	+6.0	+21	+27. C	+18.4%	1,729	13.9
Baker Lake	150.5		+17	+17. C	+11.3%	1,508	13.0
Chesterfield inlet	47.5					414	18.0
Coral Harbour	89.5					735	14.7
Rankin Inlet	330. C	+23.0	-26	-3. C	-0.9%	2,171	7.6
Repulse Bay	63.5					626	20.9
Whale Cove	36.5					289	17.0
Bathurst Inlet							
Bay Chimo							
Cambridge Bay	220. (+379.0	-124	+255. C	+115.9%	2,087	4.8
Coppermine	156.5		+97	+97. C	+62.0%	1,584	8.4
Gjoa Haven	88. !		+54	+52. C	+58.8%	1,140	11.6
Pelly Bay	51. !					509	23.1
Taloyoak	75. !					727	18.6

Capital: Cambridge Bay

Summary of FTEs

Total Existing FTEs	Change in FTEs 1994 > 1999		Change in FTEs '94-'99	Change in FTEs as % of '94	1999 Pop. After Estab. of GN	1999 Pop. per Direct GN FTEs
	HQ	Reo.				

which communities would benefit the most from this option?

Cambridge Bay	+115.9%
Coppermine	+62.0%
Gjoa Haven	+58.8%
Igloolik	+58.6%
Pond Inlet	+30.5%
Pangnirtung	+30.0%
Arviat	+18.40%
Baker Lake	+11.3%
Cape Dorset	+6.5%
Iqaluit	+0.3%
Rankin Inlet	-0.9%
Arctic Bay	<i>no change</i>
Broughton Island	<i>no change</i>
Chesterfield Inlet	<i>no change</i>
Clyde River	<i>no change</i>
Coral Harbour	<i>no change</i>
Grise Fiord	<i>no change</i>
Hall Beach	<i>no change</i>
Lake Harbour	<i>no change</i>
Nanisivik	<i>no change</i>
Pelly Bay	<i>no change</i>
Repulse Bay	<i>no change</i>
Resolute Bay	<i>no change</i>
Sanikiluaq	<i>no change</i>
Taloyoak	<i>no change</i>
Whale Cove	<i>no change</i>

Design of the Nunavut Government: Iqaluit as Capital

Introduction

This appendix details a decentralized model which could be employed if Iqaluit was chosen to be the capital.

The Legislative Assembly and the headquarters of all 10 departments would be located in Iqaluit. Departmental divisions which do not have to be located in the capital (e.g. the Parks & Visitors Services division of the Department of Sustainable Development) would be located in Arviat, Baker Lake, Cambridge Bay, Coppermine, Gjoa Haven, Igloolik, Pangnirtung and Rankin Inlet. Boards, commissions and corporations would be located in Cambridge Bay, Coppermine, Iqaluit and Rankin Inlet.

In order to increase decentralization in the Baffin region, Igloolik would replace Iqaluit as the regional centre. The regional-level positions currently located in Iqaluit would be relocated to Igloolik, Cape Dorset, Pangnirtung and Pond Inlet. After gaining headquarters positions and having regional positions transferred elsewhere, Iqaluit would experience a net increase of 99 full-time equivalent positions (FTEs) of direct Government of Nunavut employment and the community would grow by just under 275 people.

Rankin Inlet would remain the regional centre for the Keewatin region and Cambridge Bay would remain the regional centre for the Kitikmeot region, however some regional departmental offices would be located outside three communities.

Pages A-12.6 to A-12.10 detail, in chart form, how employment would be structured if this model were to be employed. Data is presented for projected GN employment in 1999: at the headquarters level, for territorial facilities (e.g. the Baffin Correctional Centre), at the regional level, and for community-based positions. The total for the GN as a whole be 2,806 FTEs. Add 1,008 employees of community governments and community housing associations, and the total level of employment funded directly or indirectly by the GN would be 3,814 FTEs.

Data on the existing level of non-federal public sector employment is then presented, followed by data on the overall employment impact of establishing the GN. From a current level of 3,214 FTEs, the establishment of the GN would add 553 headquarters-level positions in Nunavut (387 of which would be located in Iqaluit) and would also result in a net gain of 47 regional level positions, for a net increase of


600 FTEs—or 15.7%. This in turn would result in an influx of 1,031 people into Nunavut, for an estimated population of 27,289—an increase of 9.4% over the current population projections for 1999. At this level of employment and this population, there would be 9.4 residents for every direct Government of Nunavut position.

This data is presented for Nunavut as a whole; by region; by type of community (regional centres vs. the smaller communities); by the three regional centres; by the communities grouped by their current levels of 'real unemployment'; by the communities grouped by their projected populations as of April 1, 1999; and for each community.

It should be noted that the population estimates in the 'breakdowns' do not equal the estimate of 27,289 which is given for Nunavut as a whole. The reason for this is that the population growth model estimates the number of people who will be hired from within each community, the number of people who will be hired from other Nunavut communities, and the number of people who will be hired from outside Nunavut. It was impossible to estimate how many people would leave each individual community (or region) to seek employment elsewhere in Nunavut, so for each of the 'breakdowns' this factor was ignored.


Capital: Iqaluit

Distribution of Headquarters FTEs



Capital: Iqaluit

Distribution of Regional Offices



Capital: Iqaluit Summary of Locations	Headquarters	Baffin	Keewatin	Kitikmeot
Legislative Assembly	Iqaluit			
Executive & Intergovernmental Affairs <i>Audit Bureau</i>	Iqaluit Gjoa Haven	Igloolik	Rankin Inlet	Cambridge Bay
Finance & Administration	Iqaluit	Igloolik	Rankin Inlet	Cambridge Bay
Human Resources	Iqaluit	Igloolik	Rankin Inlet	Cambridge Bay
Justice & Regulatory Affairs <i>Corrections & Community Justice</i>	Iqaluit Iqaluit	Cape Dorset	Rankin Inlet	Cambridge Bay
Community Government, Housing & Trans. <i>Arctic Airports</i> <i>Property Assessment</i> <i>Sports & Recreation</i>	Iqaluit Rankin Inlet Cambridge Bay Baker Lake	Cape Dorset	Arviat	Cambridge Bay
Culture, Language, Elders & Youth <i>Cultural Affairs</i> <i>Elders & Youth Affairs</i> <i>Language Bureau</i>	Iqaluit Igloolik Igloolik Igloolik	Cape Dorset	Baker Lake	Cambridge Bay
Education <i>Arctic College</i> <i>Nunavut Board of Education</i>	Iqaluit Rankin Inlet Rankin Inlet	Iqaluit Pangnirtung	Rankin Inlet Rankin Inlet	Coppermine Coppermine
Health & Social Services <i>Health Insurance Services</i>	Iqaluit Rankin Inlet	Igloolik	Baker Lake	Cambridge Bay
Public Works & Government Services <i>Petroleum Products</i>	Iqaluit Arviat	Pond Inlet	Rankin Inlet	Cambridge Bay
Sustainable Development Geology <i>Parks & Visitors Services</i> <i>Renewable Resources</i> <i>Tourism Development</i>	Iqaluit Coppermine Pangnirtung Cambridge Bay Pangnirtung	Pangnirtung	Arviat	Coppermine
<i>Financial Processing Unit</i>	Iqaluit			
Boards, Commissions & Corporations:				
Nunavut Business Credit Corporation	Coppermine			
Nunavut Development Corporation	Coppermine			
Nunavut Legal Services Board	Cambridge Bay			
Nunavut Liquor Commission	Rankin Inlet			
Nunavut Liquor Licencing Board	Rankin Inlet			
Nunavut Systems Corporation	Iqaluit	Iqaluit	Rankin Inlet	Cambridge Bay

A-12.5

Capital: Iqaluit HQ FTEs by Department & Community	Total HQ FTEs	HQ FTEs in...			
		Iqaluit	Rankin Inlet	Cambridge Bay	Other Comms.
Government of Nunavut HQ FTEs					
TOTAL	555.0	387.0	85.5	25.0	55.5
Legislative Assembly	15.5	15.5			
Executive & Intergovernmental Affairs	39.0	32.0			5.0
Finance & Administration	39.5	39.5			
Human Resources	20.0	20.0			
Justice & Regulatory Affairs	61.0	61.0			
Community Government, Housing & Transportation	75.5	48.5	16.0	5.0	6.0
Culture, Language, Elders & Youth	15.5	5.0			10.5
Education	63.5	21.0	42.5		
Health & Social Services	54.0	41.0	13.0		
Public Works & Government Services	42.5	29.5			13.0
Sustainable Development	68.0	43.0		12.0	13.0
<i>Financial Processing Unit</i>	15.0	15.0			
Boards, Commissions & Corporations:					
Nunavut Business Credit Corporation	4.0				4.0
Nunavut Development Corporation	4.0				4.0
Nunavut Legal Services Board	5.0			5.0	
Nunavut Liquor Commission	5.0		5.0		
Nunavut Liquor Licencing Board	2.0		2.0		
Nunavut Systems Corporation	26.0	16.0	7.0	3.0	

Capital: Iqaluit

Summary of FTEs	Projected GN Employment in 1999				Total Direct GN FTEs	Hamlet/Housing FTEs	Total Non-Federal FTEs
	HQ FTEs	Facilities FTEs	Reg. FTEs	Comm. FTEs			
Nunavut total:	553.0	304	689	1,260	2,806.0	1,008.0	3,814.0
by region:							
Baff in	406.5	292	300	639	1,637.5	537.0	2,174.5
Keewatin	104.5	12	212	393	721.5	259.0	980.5
Kitikmeot	42.0		177	228	447.0	212.0	659.0
% Baffin	73.5%				58.40%		57.0%
% Keewatin	18.9%				25.7%		25.7%
% Kitikmeot	7.6%				15.9%		17.3%
by type of community:							
regional centres	497.5	304	239	307	1,347.5	182.0	1,529.5
other communities	55.5		450	953	1,458.5	826.0	2,284.5
% regional centres	90.0%				48.0%		40.1%
% other communities	10.0%				52.0%		59.9%
by regional centre:							
Iqaluit	387.0	292		135	814.0	103.0	917.0
Rankin Inlet	85.5	12	111	114	322.5	41.0	363.5
Cambridge Bay	25.0		128	58	211.0	38.0	249.0
% Iqaluit	77.8%				60.4%		60.0%
% Rankin Inlet	17.2%				23.9%		23.8%
% Cambridge Bay	5.0%				15.7%		16.3%
by real unemployment rate:							
less than 20%	497.5	304	239	356	1,396.5	217.0	1,613.5
20% to 40%	19.5		300	435	754.5	391.5	1,146.0
above 40%	36.0		150	469	655.0	399.5	1,054.5
% less than 20%	90.0%				49.8%		42.3%
% 20% to 40%	3.5%				26.9%		30.0%
% above 40%	6.5%				23.3%		27.6%

Capital: Iqaluit

Summary of FTEs	Total Existing FTEs	Change in FTEs 1994 > 1999		Change in FTEs '94 - '99	Change as % of Total FTEs in '94	1999 Pop. After Estab. of GN	1999 Pop. per Direct GN FTEs
		HQ	Reg.				
Nunavut total:	3,214.0	+553.0	+47	+600.0	+15.7%	27,289	9.7
by region:							
Baffin	1,758.0	+406.5	+10	+416.5	+19.2%	14,950	9.1
Keewatin	864.0	+104.5	+12	+116.5	+11.9%	7,674	10.6
Kitikmeot	592.0	+42.0	+25	+67.0	+10.2%	5,146	11.5
% Baffin	54.7%			69.4%		53.8%	
% Keewatin	26.9%			19.4%		27.6%	
% Kitikmeot	18.4%			11.2%		18.5%	
by type of community:							
regional centres	1,368.0	+497.5	-336	+161.5	+10.6%	8,456	6.3
other communities	1,846.0	+55.5	+383	+438.5	+19.2%	19,315	13.2
% regional centres	42.6%			26.9%		30.4%	
% other communities	57.4%			73.1%		69.6%	
by regional centre:							
Iqaluit	818.0	+387.0	-288	+99.0	+10.8%	4,705	5.8
Rankin Inlet	330.0	+85.5	-52	+33.5	+9.2%	2,269	7.0
Cambridge Bay	220.0	+25.0	+4	+29.0	+11.6%	1,483	7.0
% Iqaluit	59.8%			61.3%		55.6%	
% Rankin Inlet	24.1%			20.7%		26.8%	
% Cambridge Bay	16.1%			18.0%		17.5%	
by real unemployment rate:							
less than 20%	1,452.0	+497.5	-336	+161.5	+10.0%	9,169	6.6
20% to 40%	828.5	+19.5	+298	+317.5	+27.7%	9,030	12.0
above 40%	933.5	+36.0	+85	+121.0	+11.5%	9,572	14.6
% less than 20%	45.2%			26.9%		33.0%	
% 20% to 40%	25.8%			52.9%		32.5%	
% above 40%	29.0%			20.2%		34.5%	

Capital: Iqaluit

Summary of FTEs	Projected GN Employment in 1999				Total Direct GN FTEs	Hamlet/Housing FTEs	Total Non-Federal FTEs
	HQ FTEs	Facilities FTEs	Reg. FTEs	Comm. FTEs			
by 1999 size of community:							
2,000+	472.5	304.0	111.0	249. C	1,136.5	144.0	1,280.5
1,000-2,000	80.5		578.0	584. C	1,242.5	481.5	1,724.0
less than 1,000				427. C	427.0	382.5	809.5
0/0 2,000+	85.4%				40.50/0		33.60/0
% 1,000-2,000	14.6%				44.3%		45.20/0
% less than 1,000					15.2%		21.20/0
by community:							
Arctic Bay				4	41.0	29.5	70.5
Broughton Island				3	31.0	35.5	66.5
Cape Dorset			67	48	115.0	75.0	190.0
Clyde River				37	37.0	29.0	66.0
Grise Fiord				1	12.0	23.0	35.0
Hall Beach				3	31.0	23.5	54.5
Igloolik	10.5		83	68	161.5	45.5	207.0
Iqaluit	387.0	292		131	814.0	103.0	917.0
Lake Harbour				28	28.0	24.0	52.0
Nanisivik				19	19.0		19.0
Pangnirtung	9.0		71	71	158.0	58.5	216.5
Pond Inlet			79	6	143.0	55.5	198.5
Resolute Bay				11	18.0	12.0	30.0
Sanikiluaq				29	29.0	23.0	52.0
Arviat	13.0		62	77	152.0	49.5	201.5
Baker Lake	6.0		39	82	127.0	51.5	178.5
Chesterfield Inlet				23	23.0	24.5	47.5
Coral Harbour				50	50.0	39.5	89.5
Rankin Inlet	85.5	12	111	114	322.5	41.0	363.5
Repulse Bay				30	30.0	33.5	63.5
Whale Cove				17	17.0	19.5	36.5
Bathurst Inlet							
Bay Chimo							
Cambridge Bay	25.0		128	51	211.0	38.0	249.0
Coppermine	12.0		49	63	124.0	65.5	189.5
Gjoa Haven	5.0			41	51.0	42.5	93.5
Pelly Bay				22	22.0	29.5	51.5
Taloyoak				3	39.0	36.5	75.5

Capital: Iqaluit

Summary of FTEs	Total Existing FTEs	Change in FTEs 1994 > 1999		Change in FTEs '94-'99	Change as % of Total FTEs in '94	1999 Pop. per Direct GN FTEs	
		HQ	Req.			1999 Pop. of GN	1999 Pop. per Direct GN FTEs
by 1999 size of community:							
2,000+	1,148. C	+472.5	-34C	+132.5	+10.3%	6,973	6.1
1,000-2,000	1,256.5	+80.5	+387	+467.5	+27.1 %	12,047	9.7
less than 1,000	809.5					7,736	18.1
% 2,000+	35.7%			22.1%		25.10/.	
0/0 1,000-2,000	39.1%			77.9%		43.40/.	
% less than 1,000	25.2%					27.9%	
by community:							
Arctic Bay	70.5					670	16.3
Broughton Island	66.5					569	18.4
Cape Dorset	123. C		+67	+67.0	+54.5%	1,346	11.7
Clyde River	66. C					701	18.9
Grise Fiord	35. C					163,	13.6
Hall Beach	54.5					663	21.4
Igloolik	113.5	+10.5	+83	+93.5	+82.40/0	1,419	8.8
Iqaluit	818. C	+387.0	-288	+99.0	+12.1%	4,705	5.8
Lake Harbour	52. C					450	16.1
Nanisivik	19. C					341	17.9
Pangnirtung	136.5	+9.0	+71	+80.0	+58.6%	1,633	10.3
Pond Inlet	121.5		+77	+77.0	+63.40/0	1,412	9.9
Resolute Bay	30. C					209	11.6
Sanikiluaq	52. C					670	23.1
Arviat	146.5	+13.0	+42	+55.0	+37.5%	1,804	11.9
Baker Lake	150.5	+6.0	+22	+28.0	+18.6%	1,538	12.1
Chesterfield Inlet	47.5					414	18.0
Coral Harbour	89.5					735	14.7
Rankin Inlet	330. C	+85.5	-52	+33.5	+10.2%	2,269	7.0
Repulse Bay	63.5					626	20.9
Whale Cove	36. S					289	17.0
Bathurst Inlet							
Bay Chimo							
Cambridge Bay	220. C	+25.0	+4	+29.0	+13.2%	1,483	7.0
Coppermine	156.5	+12.0	+2	+33.0	+21.1%	1,413	11.4
Gjoa Haven	88. !	+5.0		+5.0	+5.6%	1,014	19.9
Pelly Bay	51.5					509	23.1
Taloyoak	75. !					727	18.6

Capital: Iqaluit

Summary of FTEs

Total Existing FTEs	Change in FTEs 1994 > 1999		Change in FTEs '94 - '99	Change as % of Total FTEs in '94	1999 Pop. After Estab. of GN	1999 Pop. per Direct GN FTEs
	HQ	Reg.				

which communities would benefit the most from this option?

Igloolik	+82.4%
Pond Inlet	+63.4%
Pangnirtung	+58.6%
Cape Dorset	+54.5%
Arviat	+37.5%
Coppermine	+21.1%
Baker Lake	+18.6%
Cambridge Bay	+13.2%
Iqaluit	+12.1%
Rankin Inlet	+10.2%
Gjoa Haven	+5.6%
Arctic Bay	<i>no change</i>
Broughton Island	<i>no change</i>
Chesterfield Inlet	<i>no change</i>
Clyde River	<i>no change</i>
Coral Harbour	<i>no change</i>
Grise Fiord	<i>no change</i>
Hall Beach	<i>no change</i>
Lake Harbour	<i>no change</i>
Nanisivik	<i>no change</i>
Pelly Bay	<i>no change</i>
Repulse Bay	<i>no change</i>
Resolute Bay	<i>no change</i>
Sanikiluaq	<i>no change</i>
Taloyoak	<i>no change</i>
Whale Cove	<i>no change</i>

Design of the Nunavut Government: Rankin Inlet as Capital

Introduction

This appendix details a decentralized design model which could be employed if Rankin Inlet was chosen to be the capital.

The Legislative Assembly and the headquarters of all 10 departments would be located in Rankin Inlet. Departmental divisions which do not have to be located in the capital (e.g. the Parks & Visitors Services division of the Department of Sustainable Development) would be located in Cambridge Bay, Coppermine, Igloolik, Iqaluit and Pangnirtung. Boards, commissions and corporations would be located in Coppermine, Iqaluit and Rankin Inlet.

In order to increase decentralization in the Keewatin region, Baker Lake would replace Rankin Inlet as the regional centre. The regional level positions currently located in Rankin Inlet would be relocated to Baker Lake and Arviat. After gaining headquarters positions and having regional positions transferred elsewhere, Rankin Inlet would experience a net increase of 216 full-time equivalent positions (FTEs) of direct Government of Nunavut employment and the community would grow by just under 600 people.

Iqaluit would remain the regional centre for the Baffin region and Cambridge Bay would remain the regional centre for the Kitikmeot region, however some regional departmental offices would be located outside those communities.

Pages A-13.6 to A-13.10 detail, in chart form, how employment would be structured if this model were to be employed. Data is presented for projected GN employment in 1999 at the headquarters level, for territorial facilities (e.g. the Baffin Correctional Centre), at the regional level, and for community-based positions. The total for the GN as a whole be 2,806 FTEs. Add 1,008 employees of community governments and community housing associations, and the total level of employment funded directly or indirectly by the GN would be 3,814 FTEs.

Data on the existing level of non-federal public sector employment is then presented, followed by data on the overall employment impact of establishing the GN. From a current level of 3,214 FTEs, the establishment of the GN would add 553 headquarters-level positions in Nunavut (379 of which would be located in Rankin Inlet) and would also result in a net gain of 47 regional level positions, for a net increase of 600 FTEs or 15.7%. This in turn would result in an influx of 1,031


people into Nunavut, for an estimated population of 27,289—an increase of 9.4% over the current population projections for 1999. At this level of employment and this population, there would be 9.4 residents for every direct Government of Nunavut position.

This data is presented for Nunavut as a whole; by region; by type of community (regional centres vs. the smaller communities); by the three regional centres; by the communities grouped by their current levels of 'real unemployment'; by the communities grouped by their projected population as of April 1, 1999; and for each community.

It should be noted that the population estimates in the 'breakdowns' do not equal the estimate of 27,289 which is given for Nunavut as a whole. The reason for this is that the population growth model estimates the number of people who will be hired from within each community, the number of people who will be hired from other Nunavut communities, and the number of people who will be hired from outside Nunavut. It was impossible to estimate how many people would leave each individual community (or region) to seek employment elsewhere in Nunavut, so for each of the 'breakdowns' this factor was ignored.


● Capital: Rankin Inlet

Distribution of Headquarters FTEs



Capital: Rankin Inlet

Distribution of Regional Offices



Capital: Rankin Inlet Summary of Locations	Headquarters	Baffin	Keewatin	Kitikmeot
Legislative Assembly	Rankin Inlet			
Executive & Intergovernmental Affairs <i>Audit Bureau</i>	Rankin Inlet <i>Iqaluit</i>	Iqaluit	Baker Lake	Cambridge Bay
Finance & Administration	Rankin Inlet	Iqaluit	Baker Lake	Cambridge Bay
Human Resources	Rankin Inlet	Iqaluit	Baker Lake	Cambridge Bay
Justice & Regulatory Affairs <i>Corrections & Community Justice</i>	Rankin Inlet <i>Iqaluit</i>	Iqaluit	Baker Lake	Cambridge Bay
Community Government, Housing & Trans. <i>Arctic Airports</i> <i>Property Assessment</i> <i>Sports & Recreation</i>	Rankin Inlet <i>Iqaluit</i> <i>Cambridge Bay</i> <i>Cambridge Bay</i>	Igloolik	Arviat	Cambridge Bay
Culture, Language, Elders & Youth <i>Cultural Affairs</i> <i>Elders & Youth Affairs</i> <i>Language Bureau</i>	Rankin Inlet <i>Igloolik</i> <i>Igloolik</i> <i>Igloolik</i>	Igloolik	Arviat	Coppermine
Education <i>Arctic College</i> <i>Nunavut Board of Education</i>	Rankin Inlet <i>Iqaluit</i> <i>Iqaluit</i>	<i>Iqaluit</i> <i>Iqaluit</i>	<i>Arviat</i> <i>Arviat</i>	<i>Coppermine</i> <i>Coppermine</i>
Health & Social Services <i>Health Insurance Services</i>	Rankin Inlet <i>Iqaluit</i>	Pond Inlet	Baker Lake	Cambridge Bay
Public Works & Government Services <i>Petroleum Products</i>	Rankin Inlet <i>Iqaluit</i>	Iqaluit	Baker Lake	Cambridge Bay
Sustainable Development <i>Geology</i> <i>Parks & Visitors Services</i> <i>Renewable Resources</i> <i>Tourism Development</i>	Rankin Inlet <i>Coppermine</i> <i>Pangnirtung</i> <i>Iqaluit</i> <i>Pangnirtung</i>	Pangnirtung	Arviat	Coppermine
<i>Financial Processing Unit</i>	Rankin Inlet			
Boards, Commissions & Corporations:				
Nunavut Business Credit Corporation	Coppermine			
Nunavut Development Corporation	Coppermine			
Nunavut Legal Services Board	Iqaluit			
Nunavut Liquor Commission	Iqaluit			
Nunavut Liquor Licencing Board	Iqaluit			
Nunavut Systems Corporation	Rankin Inlet	Iqaluit	Rankin Inlet	Cambridge Bay

**Capital: Rankin Inlet
FTEs by Department & Community**

All Government of Nunavut FTEs

TOTAL

Legislative Assembly

Executive & Intergovernmental Affairs

Finance & Administration

Human Resources

Justice & Regulatory Affairs

Community Government, Housing & Transporta

Culture, Language, Elders & Youth

Education

Health & Social Services

Public Works & Government Services

Sustainable Development

Financial Processing Unit

Boards, Commissions & Corporations:

Nunavut Business Credit Corporation

Nunavut Development Corporation

Nunavut Legal Services Board

Nunavut Liquor Commission

Nunavut Liquor Licencing Board

Nunavut Systems Corporation

Capital: Rankin Inlet

Summary of FTEs	Projected GN Employment in 1999				Total Direct GN FTEs	Hamlet/Housing FTEs	Total Non-Federal FTEs
	HQ FTEs	Facilities FTEs	Reg. FTEs	Comm. FTEs			
Nunavut total:	553.0	304	689	1,260	2,806.0	1,008.0	3,814.0
by region:							
Baffin	148.0	292	300	639	1,379.0	537.0	1,916.0
Keewatin	379.0	12	212	393	996.0	259.0	1,255.0
Kitikmeot	26.0		177	228	431.0	212.0	643.0
% Baffin	26.8%				49.1%		50.2%
% Keewatin	68.5%				35.5%		32.9%
% Kitikmeot	4.7%				15.4%		16.9%
by type of community:							
regional centres	521.5	304	287	307	1,419.5	182.0	1,601.5
other communities	31.5		402	953	1,386.5	826.0	2,212.5
% regional centres	94.3%				50.6%		42.0%
% other communities	5.7%				49.4%		58.0%
by regional centre:							
Iqaluit	128.5	292	162	135	717.5	103.0	820.5
Rankin Inlet	379.0	12		114	505.0	41.0	546.0
Cambridge Bay	14.0		125	58	197.0	38.0	235.0
% Iqaluit	24.6%				50.5%		51.2%
% Rankin Inlet	72.7%				35.6%		34.1%
% Cambridge Bay	2.7%				13.9%		14.7%
by real unemployment rate:							
less than 20%	521.5	304	287	356	1,468.5	217.0	1,685.5
20% to 40%	19.5		138	435	592.5	391.5	984.0
above 40%	12.0		264	469	745.0	399.5	1,144.5
% less than 20%	94.3%				52.3%		44.2%
% 20% to 40%	3.5%				21.1%		25.8%
% above 40%	2.2%				26.6%		30.0%

Capital: Rankin Inlet

Summary of FTEs	Total Existing FTEs	Change in FTEs 1994 >> 1999		Change in FTEs '94-'99	Change in FTEs as % of '94	1999 Pop. After Estab. of GN	1999 Pop. per Direct GN FTEs
		HQ	Reg.				
Nunavut total:	3,214.0	+553.0	+47	+600.0	+15.7%	27,289	9.7
by region:							
Baffin	1,758.0	+148.0	+10	+158.0	+8.2%	14,259	10.3
Keewatin	864.0	+379.0	+12	+391.0	+31.2%	8,408	8.4
Kitikmeot	592.0	+26.0	+25	+51.0	+7.9%	5,103	11.8
% Baffin	54.7%			26.30/o		51.30/o	
% Keewatin	26.9%			65.20/o		30.30/o	
% Kitikmeot	18.4%			8.5%		18.40/.	
by type of community:							
regional centres	1,368.C	+521.5	-288	+233.5	+14.60/o	8,648	6.1
other communities	1,846.C	+31.5	+335	+366.5	+16.6%	19,123	13.8
% regional centres	42.6%			38.90/o		31.1%	
% other communities	57.4%			61.1%		68.90/o	
by regional centre:							
Iqaluit	818.(+128.5	-126	+2.5	+0.3%	4,447'	6.2
Rankin Inlet	330.(+379.0	-163	+216.0	+39.6%	2,756	5.5
Cambridge Bay	220.(+14.0	+1	+15.0	+6.4%	1,445	7.3
% Iqaluit	59.8%			1.1%		51.4%	
% Rankin Inlet	24.1%			92.50/o		31.9%	
% Cambridge Bay	16.1%			6.40/o		16.7701	
by real unemployment rate:							
less than 20%	1,452. C	+521.5	-288	+233.5	+13.9%	9,361	6.4
200/0 to 400/0	828. !	+19.5	+136	+155.5	+15.8%	8,597'	14.5
above 40%	933. !	+12.0	+199	+211.0	+18.4%	9,813	13.2
% less than 200/.	45.2%			38.90/o		33.7%	
% 200/0 to 40%	25.8%			25.9%o		31.0%o	
% above 40%	29.0%			35.20/o		35.30/,	

Capital: Rankin Inlet

Summary of FTEs	Projected GN Employment in 1999				Total Direct GN FTEs	Hamlet/Housing FTEs	Total Non-Federal FTEs
	HQ FTEs	Facilities FTEs	Reg. FTEs	Comm. FTEs			
by 1999 size of community:							
2,000+	507.5	304.0	162.0	249.0	1,222.5	144.0	1,366.5
1,000-2,000	45.5		527.0	538.0	1,110.5	439.0	1,549.5
less than 1,000				473.0	473.0	425.0	898.0
% 2,000+	91.8%				43.6%		35.8%
% 1,000-2,000	8.2%				39.6%		40.6%
% less than 1,000					16.9%		23.5%
by community:							
Arctic Bay				41	41.0	29.5	70.5
Broughton Island				31	31.0	35.5	66.5
Cape Dorset				48	48.0	75.0	123.0
Clyde River				37	37.0	29.0	66.0
Grise Fiord				12	12.0	23.0	35.0
Hall Beach				31	31.0	23.5	54.5
Igloolik	10.5		51	68	129.5	45.5	175.0
Iqaluit	128.5	292	162	135	717.5	103.0	820.5
Lake Harbour				28	28.0	24.0	52.0
Nanisivik				19	19.0		19.0
Pangnirtung	9.0		32	78	119.0	58.5	177.5
Pond Inlet			55	64	119.0	55.5	174.5
Resolute Bay				18	18.0	12.0	30.0
Sanikiluaq				29	29.0	23.0	52.0
Arviat			96	77	173.0	49.5	222.5
Baker Lake			116	82	198.0	51.5	249.5
Chesterfield Inlet				23	23.0	24.5	47.5
Coral Harbour				50	50.0	39.5	89.5
Rankin Inlet	379.0	12		114	505.0	41.0	546.0
Repulse Bay				30	30.0	33.5	63.5
Whale Cove				17	17.0	19.5	36.5
Bathurst Inlet							
Bay Chimo							
Cambridge Bay	14.0		125	58	197.0	38.0	235.0
Coppermine	12.0		52	63	127.0	65.5	192.5
Gjoa Haven				46	46.0	42.5	88.5
Pelly Bay				22	22.0	29.5	51.5
Taloyoak				39	39.0	36.5	75.5

Capital: Rankin Inlet Summary of FTEs	Total Existing FTEs	Change in FTEs 1994 > 1999		Change in FTEs 94-'99	Change in FTEs as % of '94	1999 Pop. after Estab. of GN	1999 Pop per Direct GN FTEs
		HQ	Reg.				
by 1999 size of community:							
2,000+	1,148.0	+507.5	-28.5	+218.5	+16.0%	7,203	5.9
1,000-2,000	1,168.0	+45.5	+33.6	+381.5	+24.60/0	11,831	10.7
less than 1,000	898.0					7,736	16.4
% 2,000+	35.7%			36.4%		25.9%	
% 1,000-2,000	36.3% ⁰			63.60/.		42.60/0	
% less than 1,000	27.9%					27.90/o	
by community:							
Arctic Bay	70.5					670	16.3
Broughton Island	66.5					569	18.4
Cape Dorset	123.0					1,167	24.3
Clyde River	66.0					701	18.9
Grise Fiord	35.0					163	13.6
Hall Beach	54.5					663	21.4
Igloolik	113.5	+10.5	+5.5	+61.5	+54.2%	1,333	10.3
Iqaluit	818.0	+128.5	-12.0	+2.5	+0.3%	4,447	6.2
Lake Harbour	52.0					450	16.1
Nanisivik	19.0					341	17.9
Pangnirtung	136.5	+9.0	+3.0	+41.0	+30.0%	1,529	12.8
Pond Inlet	121.5		+5.0	+53.0	+43.6%	1,348	11.3
Resolute Bay	30.0					209	11.6
Sanikiluaq	52.0					670	23.1
Arviat	146.5		+7.0	+76.0	+51.9%	1,860	10.8
Baker Lake	150.5		+9.0	+99.0	+65.8%	1,728	8.7
Chesterfield Inlet	47.5					414	18.0
Coral Harbour	89.0					735	14.7
Rankin Inlet	330.0	+379.0	-16.0	+216.0	+65.5%	2,756	5.5
Repulse Bay	63.0					626	20.9
Whale Cove	36.5					289	17.0
Bathurst Inlet							
Bay Chimo							
Cambridge Bay	220.0	+14.0	+1.0	+15.0	+6.8%	1,445	7.3
Coppermine	156.5	+12.0	+2.0	+36.0	+23.0%	1,421	11.2
Gjoa Haven	88.5					1,001	21.8
Pelly Bay	51.5					509	23.1
Taloyoak	75.5					727	18.6

Capital: Rankin Inlet

Summary of FTEs	Total Existing FTEs	Change in FTEs 1994 > 1999		Change in FTEs '94 - '99	Change in FTEs as % of '94	1999 Pop. After Estab. of GN	1999 Pop. per Direct GN FTEs
		HQ	Reg.				

which communities would benefit the most from this option?

Baker Lake	+65.8%
Rankin Inlet	+65.50/0
Igloolik	+54.2%
Arviat	+51.9%
Pond Inlet	+43.6%
Pangnirtung	+30.0%
Coppermine	+23.0%
Cambridge Bay	+6.8%
Iqaluit	+0.3%
Arctic Bay	<i>no change</i>
Broughton Island	<i>no change</i>
Cape Dorset	<i>no change</i>
Chesterfield Inlet	<i>no change</i>
Clyde River	<i>no change</i>
Coral Harbour	<i>no change</i>
Gjoa Haven	<i>no change</i>
Grise Fiord	<i>no change</i>
Hall Beach	<i>no change</i>
Lake Harbour	<i>no change</i>
Nanisivik	<i>no change</i>
Pelly Bay	<i>no change</i>
Repulse Bay	<i>no change</i>
Resolute Bay	<i>no change</i>
Sanikiluaq	<i>no change</i>
Taloyoak	<i>no change</i>
Whale Cove	<i>no change</i>

Comparison of the Distribution and Demographic Impacts of the Three Decentralized Design Models

Introduction


This appendix presents comparative data for the three decentralize models--the first with Cambridge Bay as capital, the second with Iqaluit as capital, and the third with Rankin Inlet as capital.

Pages A-14.1 to A-14.3 present maps which show which communities would experience increased employment with each of them- and

pages A-14.4 and A-14.5 show the same data in chart form. Pages A-14.6 and A-14.7 detail the estimated population growth which would result from each of the three models. Pages A-14.8 to A-14.11 detail the estimated population growth and the ratio of residents per Government of Nunavut employee which would result from each of the three models by region; by the three regional centres; by the communities grouped by their current levels of 'real unemployment'; and, by the communities grouped by their projected populations as of April 1, 1999.



Net Change in Nunavut Gov't FTEs

Cambridge Bay model





Net Change in Nunavut Gov't FTEs

Iqaluit model




Net Change in Nunavut Gov't FTEs


Rankin Inlet model




Net Change in the Number of Territorial Gov't FTEs with the Cambridge Bay model




Net Change in the Number of Territorial Gov't FTEs with the Iqaluit model




Net Change in the Number of Territorial Gov't FTEs with the Rankin Inlet model




% Change in Territorial Gov't FTEs with the Cambridge Bay model




% Change in Territorial Gov't FTEs with the Iqaluit model




% Change in Territorial Gov't FTEs with the Rankin Inlet model




Estimated Population Growth with the Cambridge Bay model




Estimated Population Growth with the Iqaluit model




Estimated Population Growth with the Rankin Inlet model




% Estimated Population Growth with the Cambridge Bay model




% Estimated Population Growth with the Iqaluit model




% Estimated Population Growth with the Rankin Inlet model




% Estimated Population Growth, by Region




1999 Population per Nunavut Government Employee, by Region



% Estimated Population Growth, by Regional Centre




1999 Population per Nunavut Government Employee by Regional Centre




% Estimated Population Growth, by Size of Communities


'small': less than 1000 persons
 'medium': 1001-2000 persons
 'large': more than 2000 persons




1999 Population per Nunavut Government Employee, by Size of Communities



% Estimated Population Growth, by Level of Unemployment in Communities



1999 Pop. per Nunavut Gov't Employee, by Level of Unemployment in Communities



An Education and Training Program for the Nunavut Government Work Force

Introduction

As discussed in the paper, "Strategic Directions for Collaborative and Co-operative Training Preparatory to the Establishment of Nunavut" (a paper prepared by the MC for a meeting of interested parties in Gpa Haven in January, 1995, and attached as a supplement to this appendix), the existing education system of Nunavut is well **developed** in its established **educational** facilities and its potential to offer new **services** for lifelong learning.

A system of day care and home child care facilities is gaining strength in **all** parts of **Nunavut**. **Communities** are informally testing systems for the provision of **support** for parents in the work force who have **pre-school** aged children. Appropriate to the varying size of communities, day care and home child care facilities are being set up through both the public and private sectors. Operators of such facilities are increasingly professionally trained. They are proving to be highly competent in their delivery of services.

A child's years of formal schooling typically cover the ages of five through 18. These years are associated with grade levels stretching from **Kindergarten** to **Grade 12**. **More** and more communities have all these grade levels **Offered in community schools**. **Professional staff are** more often **Inuit** than in **the past**. Formal learning within the primary grades is no longer delayed by the child's struggle to comprehend a new language when first entering the school. Education philosophy and curricula are achieving a custom fit between the expressed desires

of the parents and the **capacity** of the education system to respond to the academic needs of children in a culturally acceptable manner.

The establishment of a college system within Nunavut, currently named College East, provides a vehicle for the **re-engagement** of adults in the formal education system at both **pre-secondary** and post-secondary **levels**. College East offers training in a broadly based range of disciplines. Especially in the field of teacher education, operational barriers preventing **Inuit** adults from completing **professional** training have been all but **eliminated**. Similar strategies in programs such as the Community Administration Certificate Program and the new community Lands Administration Program focus on delivery of courses as close to the **student's** home as possible. **These** programs are offering direct vehicles for **Inuit in Nunavut** to complete **post-secondary** training **in their home** communities.

The existing education system can be **described** as providing a continuous stream of educational opportunity under public control. College East operates under the direction of a politically appointed board of governors with membership drawn from a diverse range of **Nunavut's** public and private sectors.

Students entering this system of education are receiving an excellent education **experience** within the limits of the financial abilities of the GNWT Department of Education, Culture and Employment. There is little evidence of dollars being **spent** in a **non-constructive** manner within the system.

The school system has approximately 5,000 children currently enrolled. College East enrolls 500 adults full-time and 2000 adults part-time in advanced studies. These enrollments represent in excess of 25% of the population of Nunavut. These high enrollments provide strong evidence of public recognition that training and education are critical issues for the future growth and prosperity of Nunavut.

Given that Nunavut has a impressive range of existing education programs, it is important to strengthen the engagement of the population of Nunavut in the pursuit of education and training opportunities. The interest and commitment of the public is required to enhance the ability of the school and college system in Nunavut to meet the needs of an ever increasing population base.

To increase the education and training opportunities of the people of Nunavut, efforts must be placed on children in the school system, on adults in professional

training (both within and outside Nunavut), on the employees of government agencies at the hamlet, regional and Nunavut levels, on the employees of Inuit organizations (especially "Designated Inuit Organizations" within the meaning of the Nunavut Agreement), and on those residents currently not involved in formal training, but who are interested in undertaking additional training in order to build more productive and rewarding futures.

For reasons of both cultural continuity and heightened parental confidence in and support for the educational system, building up the role of elders would be very desirable. Doing so will require the dedication of significant funding support.

With this broad view of the present education and training situation, the Commission recommends the specific projects described in the following section of this appendix.

The Projects

Project A: Heritage Programing: Elders in the Schools

Target Group	Program Initiative	Location	Duration	Cost per Location	Comments
elders/school aged children and youth	Heritage Programing: Elders in the Schools	schools	annually, 1995-99, October to December and January to May	4 elders each@ 20 hours/ week @\$15.00/hour (\$10.00 + \$5,00 benefits) @ 30 weeks/ year@ 26 locations@ 4 years =\$936,000/yr. =\$3,744,000	program to continue after the establishment of Nunavut with 20% annual budget reductions commencing in academic year 2000-01

The NIC recommends that:

In the period September 1995 through June 1999, funding in the amount of \$3,744,000 be identified for the provision of wages, benefits and the purchase of materials for the creation and implementation of Heritage Programing creating employment for elders as educators working directly within the schools of Nunavut. These funds shall be provided by service contract with each existing regional board of education. The funding shall be used to provide a minimum of four elders per community for the delivery of Heritage Programing for children in the classrooms of Nunavut. The wages for the elders will be established at a minimum of \$10.00 per hour plus \$5.00 per hour for employee benefits and materials in support of their role in the school. Heritage programing shall be available for operation at 20 hours per elder, per week, on an annual basis in the periods October through December and January through May, for a total of 30 weeks per year.

Throughout the community consultations completed by the NIC preparatory to the development of this report, a frequent observation was made about the need to find mechanisms to support Heritage Programing through the creation of a funded role for elders in the schools. Historically, from 1949 (as the starting point of formal public schooling in the NWT), there has been a segregation of children and adults in the delivery of education. With the recognition, especially in the past 10 years, that all parts of a community have a role to play in the education of children and youth, there is interest in greater involvement by Inuit elders in formal participation in the work of the Nunavut.

Funding programs to engage the accumulated knowledge of elders in the school system has the support of Inuit and non-Inuit alike.

With financial support from the Nunavut Secretariat, DIAND, in the 1994-95 fiscal year, curriculum discussion meetings with elders have taken place and have dealt with the role of elders within the school system.

Funding of Heritage Programing within the schools will see the application of the recommendations of the elders' meetings in the environment which children and youth occupy for the greatest portion of the day the school classroom.

At the present time, some funding for Heritage Programing is available through the regional boards of education. Historically, the total contribution from the GNWT Department of Education, Culture and Employ-

ment has been insufficient to support the requests received from the boards of education and at the community level for the delivery of Heritage Programing.

The NIC initiative proposes to provide incremental funding for the establishment of Heritage Programing through the recruitment and employment of four elders per community to work directly with children and youth in the school system. The elders recruited to provide Heritage Programs will be funded at an hourly rate of \$10.00 per hour for wages and an additional \$5.00 per hour for benefits and teaching support materials. Additional wages, benefits and materials for Heritage Programing will continue to be purchased through the existing cultural funds provided annually to each school. Each elder recruited will be paid for a total of 900 hours per year. This time may be appropriately divided between preparation of Heritage Program classroom materials, delivery of Heritage Programing in the classrooms of the schools, professional training in pedagogical methodology at the community, regional or Nunavut level, and other education related activities aimed at fostering linkages among children, youth and elders.

It is proposed that in the school years 1995-96 through 1999-2000, a total of \$3,744,000 (\$938,000 per year) be dedicated to Heritage Programing. The funding mechanism for provision of this training shall be through service contracts between the Nunavut Secretariat, DIAND, and each of the Baffin, Keewatin and Kitikmeot School Boards.

As the NIC moves to detailing the operations of the future Nunavut Government, funding mechanisms under the Department of Education, Culture and Employment or the Department of Culture, Language, Elders, and Youth, will be examined as a way to provide secure funding for Heritage Programing within Nunavut's schools.

Continued and enhanced mechanisms are critically required to develop and implement a communication strategy within the school system focused on efforts to improve pupil retention. Heritage Programing that involves elders in the schools represents a major initiative in this direction and concentrates a powerful community resource: the support of children and youth in the school system by elders. Students completing their primary schooling will, in turn, be more likely to be successful in completing post-secondary training, thereby creating a broad base of potential employees for the Nunavut Government.

It is further recommended that funding for this project be continued in the period after the establishment of

Nunavut, 1999 to 2004. Funding shall continue to be provided in the amount of 100% of the yearly budget for 1999-2000, and shall subsequently decline by 20% per

year after that. Project funding shall be 100% for 1999-2000, 80% for 2000-2001, 60% for 2001-2002, 40% for 2002-2003, and 20% for 2003-2004.

Project B: Junior High School/Senior High School: Peer Tutorial Services

Target Group	Program Initiative	Location	Duration	Cost per Location	Comments
students studying at the junior and senior high school level	Tutorial services: mathematics and sciences	community schools	annually, 1995-99, October to December and January to May	2 tutors @ 4 hours @ 30 weeks/ year @ \$12.75/hour (\$850 +4.25 for benefits) @ 20 locations = \$61,200/yr. @ 4 years = \$244,800	program will provide appropriate part-time employment opportunities for Youth; program funding will continue after Nunavut's establishment with 20% annual budget reductions

The NIC recommends that:

For the annual periods October through December and January through May for the academic years 1995-96 through 1998-1999, funding be provided for the establishment of Peer Tutorial Services at the junior and senior high school levels with concentration on the provision of tutorial support in mathematics and science. The funding provided shall be in the form of service contracts between the Nunavut Secretariat, DIAND, and the Baffin, Keewatin and Kitikmeot Boards of Education in Nunavut. The total commitment of funding for the four year period shall be \$244,800.

Since 1980, there has been a growing support within the communities of Nunavut for the provision of a complete schooling system for children and youth at the community level. Early efforts in this direction in Pangnirtung and Pond Inlet set the ground work for the expansion of delivery of grades at the community level.

The GNWT Department of Education, Culture and Employment, in its planning document entitled, "People: Our Focus for the Future, Education, Culture and Employment, A Strategy to 2010", is attempting to continue the expansion of the delivery of senior high school grades in the majority of communities.

With the expansion of grade levels in communities has come new challenges for educators, especially at senior levels of the school system. Traditionally, students have relied on a school environment with its **five-and-one-half-hour** day to complete all phases of the education process. Inculcating ways of consistently completing homework assignments has frequently been frustrated by the physical home environments of students. **Large** family sizes, lack of experience with the requirement for students to finish homework assignments, and lack of suitable study space within many northern homes have impeded the progress of students.

In the past, and to some extent today, students were taken to a **central location** where they **lived** in a residence **facility** with other students from a multitude of communities. A key feature of residence life routine is a formal evening study period. There is sound pedagogical evidence to support this practice; indeed, in the early through **mid-1980s** in **Iqaluit**, at the then Gordon Robertson Education Center, significantly better academic results were being achieved by students living at the Ukiivik Residence with its enforced study program than by students living at home in the community.

Recognizing the need to support students in their studies, significant numbers of community education councils have, with the support of school professional staff, moved to establish evening study periods. During these periods, youth of the community have an opportunity to return to the school in the evening to complete assignments, undertake research, study or prepare for examinations. Professional staff in the school system volunteer their time to support the efforts of youth **participating** in these evening sessions.

Lacking in the evening study period is a formalized system of tutorial support. Students currently have access to the **services** of professional staff, but as the **grade** levels have increased proportionally with **enrolment**, the time available for each student to obtain extra assistance in the evening study period is pushed beyond the ability of educators to fully respond.

As grade levels increase, certain **subject** areas become more of a challenge. At the upper grade levels, advanced mathematics and science courses present significant problems for youth. Without these courses, access to advanced technical programs in fields such as engineering, **medicine** and law become problematic, and chances for success at the post-secondary level become significantly weakened.

There exists among the youth of Nunavut a strong will to complete a Grade 12 program. Youth **leaders** are seeking **meaningful** roles at community and regional levels in support of the development of the Nunavut Government. Their interest is a key building block at the **grassroots** level of the education system.

In many communities, youth with a record of success in the education system are unable to find a way to support siblings who are progressing through the education system. Youth moving through higher grades should be able to support the efforts of those students enrolled in the lower grades of the school system by offering a peer tutorial service during the evening study hall period.

It is proposed that a sum of \$244300.00, at a rate of \$61,200.00 annually, be provided to the schools of Nunavut through the three regional boards of education to create and fund a Peer Tutorial Service. This funding should be used to establish a **twice-weekly** evening tutorial service running for a period of four hours per **week** for 30 weeks of the academic school calendar. Two peer tutors should be **recruited** in each community and paid at **the rate of \$8.50 per hour**. An additional \$4.25 per hour should be provided to fund the benefits payments for each peer tutor and to purchase additional materials and supplies in support of the program. This program should be instituted in 20 communities in Nunavut.

The result of the establishment of such a formal program will be immediate. More students will find success in their studies and, with this success, will be encouraged to **remain** within the school system. The old maxim of "success breeds success" remains reliable. For teachers, the opportunity to work with youth better prepared for schooling on a daily basis will lead to more effective **education**. For those students already doing well in the school system, their chances **for continued future** success will be enhanced. For students who are *having* problems in the **school** system, the opportunity for better **results** will be aided.

It is further recommended that funding for this project be continued in the **post-Nunavut** establishment period for the fiscal years, 1999 through 2004. Funding shall continue to be provided in the amount of 100% of the yearly budget for 1999-2000, and shall subsequently decline by 20% **per** year after that. Project funding shall be 100% for 1999-2000, 80% for 2000-2001, 60% for 2001-2002, 40% for 2002-2003, and 20% for 2003-2004.

Project C: Stay in School Initiatives: Professional

In-Service Workshops for Communities and Educators

Target Group	Program Initiative	Location	Duration	Cost per Location	Comments
students, parents, educators	Stay in School Initiatives: community and educators' workshops	communities, schools	semi-annual professional in-service workshops on Stay in School Initiatives for the communities and educators	26 communities @ 2/year @ \$3,000 /location professional fees + \$2,500 /location transportation and accommodations =5,500 @ 26 =\$288,000/yr. @ 4 years =\$1,144,000	program funding will continue after Nunavut's establishment with 20% annual budget reductions

The NIC recommends that:

In the academic years 1995 through 1998, funding in the amount of **\$1,144,000** be identified for the provision of semi-annual professional in-service workshops on "Stay In School Initiatives" for delivery in communities in Nunavut. In the academic years 1995-96, 1996-97, 1997-98 and 1998-99, funding shall be provided in each community for a parent workshop focused on raising community awareness of the types of stay in school initiatives available and the range of support **mechanisms required for student success. Funding shall be provided for an educators' workshop focused on establishing and improving stay in school initiatives at the school and community level. The funding provided shall be in the form of service contracts between the Nunavut Secretariat, DIAND, and the Baffin, Keewatin and Kitikmeot Boards of Education**

In the planning for the future of education in Nunavut, it is imperative to bring a clear focus to the residents of Nunavut on barriers which students face in trying to complete their education. Community-based support strategies for encouraging children and youth to complete their initial schooling, and for youth and adults

to undertake and complete their **post-secondary** training must be debated, selected and implemented at the **community** level.

In the past 10 years, various literacy strategies and adult basic education programs have been used to integrate adults with incomplete formal education **backgrounds** into academic programs. **Following** the completion of these programs, individuals have sought integration into the existing **labour** force or further training for entry into professions. Wonderful success stories, in which the residents of **Nunavut** take great pride, have been **achieved** by individuals enrolling in programs stemming from these strategies.

Unfortunately, for those students who have dropped out of school because of their inability to adapt to the increasingly rigorous demands of higher grades, the option of returning to adult basic education programs is less than appealing. In the years immediately following "dropping out", the memories and anger of the disengagement process (which often begins about the Grade 6 level), are **too** fresh and **too** painful to allow a return to **school** or to an adult basic education classroom. Although the issue has not been specifically researched with **Inuit**, it is reasonable to speculate that personal failure in the education system is a significant

contributing factor to the malaise and lack of social adjustment manifested in the high rates of incarceration and suicide among Inuit youth, especially males.

In Canada, while efforts at providing adult basic education have proven to be quite successful, there is still primary reliance on the period between the ages of five and 20 to provide formal education to children and youth. These "learning years" are filled with experiences for the child and the youth which will shape personality and career success throughout life.

Since 1985, with the control of schooling in Nunavut moving more into the hands of parents, there has been a significant increase in public awareness of the need for children and youth to remain in the school system to complete their education. Parents want sons and daughters to finish school successfully.

Elders recognize the future needs of the population of Nunavut. They see a need to build a solid education experience based on formal and informal schooling. Elders and parents speak with considerable dismay about the prospects for children who are unable to function in either the modern world of the communities or in the traditional lifestyle of living on the land.

Since 1989, the GNWT Department of Education, Culture and Employment and the boards of education have made considerable progress in establishing programs under the rubric of Stay in School Initiatives. These types of programs and the impact of grade extensions at the community level are creating an improving potential for success for children and youth in Nunavut's school system.

With the establishment of Stay in School Initiatives, professional in-service opportunities are available for parents and educators to place attention on the needs of children. The impact of these programs is significant and immediate. As parental awareness of the opportunities available within the schools and college to meet the educational needs of children increases, parents will provide encouragement and support to children and youth, thereby ensuring that family resources are aligned with the education path for children and youth.

To further develop and expand the efforts of the regional boards of education, the NIC recommends that a sum of \$1,144,000, over a period of four years, be committed to the funding of semi-annual professional workshops related to Stay in School Initiatives delivered at the community level. The first year's workshop for parents, youth, community members, and educators shall focus on development of communication strategies, such as the ones discussed in a report prepared for the NIC by Mark Stiles Associates Inc., to increase public awareness and motivation. The second year's workshop will emphasize the professional in-service needs of educators related to the Stay in School Initiatives at the community, board, or Department of Education level. The funding provided shall be in the form of service contracts between the Nunavut Secretariat, DIAND, and the regional boards of education. Funding shall be calculated at the rate of two training sessions per academic year in each of 26 communities. It is projected that the delivery of these workshops will require the commitment of \$3,000 in professional fees and \$2,500 in transportation and accommodation costs for each workshop.

This series of community development workshops will assist children and youth to receive support at the family and community level to complete their education. Increased parental involvement following the workshops will lead to improvement in the academic climate of the schools. As more children and youth remain in school for longer periods of time to complete higher grades and advanced levels of education, they will be equipped with the keys to unlock new doors of opportunity as they move into adulthood and enter Nunavut's labour force.

It is further recommended that funding for this project be continued in the post-Nunavut establishment period for the fiscal years, 1999 through 2004. Funding shall continue to be provided in the amount of 100% of the yearly budget for 1999-2000, and shall subsequently decline by 20% per year after that. Project funding shall be 100% for 1999-2000, 80% for 2000-2001, 60% for 2001-2002, 40% for 2002-2003, and 20% for 2003-2004.

Target Group	Program Initiative	Location	Duration	Cost per Location	Comments
college students	Tutorial services: Supplementary Instruction and Video Supplementary Instruction	College East campuses and community learning centres	academic semesters	6 locations@ 6 courses per year @ \$15.00/hour (\$10.00 salary + \$5.00 benefits) @ 15 hours/ week @ 24 weeks/year @ 4 years = \$194,400/ year = \$777,600	program funding will continue after Nunavut's establishment with 20% annual budget reductions

The NIC recommends that:

In the academic years 1995-96 through 1999-2000, funding in the amount of \$777,600 be identified for the implementation of a peer based Supplementary Instruction Student Support System through the campuses of College East. A total of 36 courses per academic year, 18 courses at Nunatta Campus, nine courses at Keewatin Campus and nine courses at the Kitikmeot Campus, shall receive funding for tutorial support. The program shall be funded through the provisions of a service contract between the Nunavut Secretariat, DIAND, and College East, with funding transferred without administration fees directly to appropriate campuses.

With the recognition in the late 1960s of the need to provide advanced level training for the aboriginal peoples of the North, efforts have concentrated on the development and expansion of education and training programs. Starting, initially, with the recruitment of students into training programs offered at institutions across southern Canada, but quickly expanding to northern delivery locations, training opportunities for ad-

vanced level training and education have expanded in the range of disciplines covered and in the scope of course content.

As the impetus towards a greater role for the northern labour force in the northern economy grew, and aboriginal people achieved greater success, technical demands of the workplace also grew. In the past 20 years we have seen, in rapid succession, the electric typewriter replace the mechanical typewriter, the word processor replace the electric typewriter, and the microcomputer replace the word processor. In this example involving the office environment, employees have required access to additional training at each stage of technological advancement. Similar changes have pervaded every aspect of the life of public and private sector employees.

For those employees who have not been able to upgrade their skills for personal or professional reasons, the consequences are always significant and usually negative. The loss of productivity from an employee unable to stay abreast of technological change is immediate and negative. The costs of such loss of productivity are detrimental to organizational viability.

For students enrolled in post-secondary education, similar observations can be made.

The consequences for those who are unable to complete their studies are measurable in economic terms through impairment of earning power and mobility and are experienced in a variety of non-economic ways. There are costs to society, as well.

Within the college system in Nunavut, a single student living in the residence is charged \$75.00 per week for accommodation and meals. The actual cost of this service is estimated to be \$350.00 per week. Through the political process, the decision to subsidize a residence student in the amount of \$225.00 per week has been made. If a student is enrolled in a three year program, such as the Teacher Education Program or the Environmental Technology Program, it is reasonable to expect that student to spend 35 weeks per year in the residence. Over the course of a three year program, an individual receives indirect financial subsidy in the amount of \$23,625.00 for accommodation costs alone. Indirect financial support at the post-secondary level creates additional costs.

When a student fails to achieve academic success, these "sunk" societal costs are not recovered. Offering students greater help in completing their course of studies will help ensure that subsidies are appropriately spent.

The University of Missouri in Kansas City has developed and implemented a student support system known as Supplementary Instruction (S1). This system has been used within the United States, and more recently has attracted attention internationally, with considerable interest in Great Britain, Australia and South Africa.

S1 and its recent modification, Video Supplementary Instruction (VSI), are formalized programs of peer support for students in an "at risk" category. If a particular course has a significantly higher than average number of students achieving grading of D (50-59%), F (0-49%) or W (Withdraw), that course is identified as a course where the addition of S1 offers potential for improvement in the achievement levels of the enrolled students.

Key to the success of S1 is the voluntary nature of student participation. Students that are achieving top grades in their courses are motivated to seek out support systems that will allow them to achieve even higher grades. Students who are achieving marginal or no success in their programs will seek out S1 support programs because they do not want to fail.

S1 does not stigmatize weak students. Nor does it offer exclusionary benefits for academically strong students.

VSI follows a similar pattern of student support, but replaces the traditional classroom teacher with a video taped lecturer. No special arrangements are required. Students apply appropriate learning strategies to course content materials presented to the class via the medium of the video tape recorder and television set. The VSI learning model incorporates a high measure of student control within a classroom setting. At any point, students may stop the tape to discuss the lecture, to clarify points contained within the lecture, to review material covered by the lecturer, and to pose questions based on pre-reading of the course syllabus.

Both S1 and VSI are used by College East at the present time. To date, both campus and community based college staff have had opportunity to participate in three workshops presented by the University of Missouri staff related to S1 and VSI. In each test of these student support techniques, course instructors have reported significant improvement in the performance of northern students.

The ongoing research carried out on S1 through the University of Missouri establishes a positive linkage between courses with S1 and ongoing student enrolment and academic success. Anecdotal reporting indicates similar results at the Nunatta Campus of College East.

It is the recommendation of the NIC that a sum of \$777,600.00 be identified over a period of four years for the provision of S1 Student Support. The support will be offered to a total of 36 courses per year, with 18 courses at Nunatta Campus, nine courses at Keewatin Campus and nine courses at the Kitikmeot Campus over the four year period. Funding provided shall be calculated at the rate of \$10.00/ hour for salary plus \$5.00/ hour for benefits and materials through an annual delivery cycle of 15 hours per week for 24 weeks per year.

Providing funding in support of the peer tutorial service S1 will have an impact in three directions. Initially, it will improve student performance in academic studies, and with each success, the potential of students for completing enrolled course of studies will be enhanced. Secondly, as the number of students completing their training increases, the indirect student support required for the operation of college facilities will become more effective in achieving their targets. Finally, successful

students will bring positive experiences and work habits to the labour market, amplifying productivity within the Nunavut Government labour force.

It is further recommended that funding for this project be continued in the post Nunavut establishment period

for the fiscal years, 1999 through 2004. Funding shall continue to be provided in the amount of 100% of the yearly budget for 1999-2000, and shall subsequently decline by 20% per year after that. Project funding shall be 100% for 1999-2(M), 80% for 2000-2001, 60% for 2001-2002, 40% for 2002-2003, and 20% for 2003-2004.

Project E: College East Academic Support Servicing: Counselors

Target Group	Program Initiative	Location	Duration	Cost per Location	Comments
College East students enrolled in Nunavut post secondary education programs within Nunavut	counseling services: student recruitment, on campus referral services, personal and professional counseling services	college students mapr campus program locations: 1 /2 positions working on specialized concerns of the community learning centres	academic semesters seasonal positions starting 3 weeks prior to semester and ending one week after the end of the semester	8 positions (4 Nunatta, 2 Keewatin, 2 Kitikmeot) (0.75 FTE) @ \$50,000/position @ 4 years = \$400,000/yr = \$1,600,000	program funding will continue after Nunavut's establishment with 20% annual budget reductions

The NIC recommends that:

In the academic years 1995-1996 through 1997-1999, funding in the amount of \$1,600,000 be identified for the provision of a total of eight part time counseling positions (each position = 0.75 FTE) through the campuses of College East. The proposed counseling positions shall be distributed as four positions at Nunatta Campus, two positions at the Keewatin Campus, and two positions at the Kitikmeot Campus. Funding for these positions shall be provided in the form of a service contract between the Nunavut Secretariat, DIAND, and College East and shall flow through the headquarters of the college to each of the regional campuses without administration fees.

Of critical concern to College East are issues related to student welfare. From the experience gained in the 10 year history of the college, the absence of appropriate student counsellors supporting adult students undertaking advanced level training through enrolment at College East has diminished all aspects of student performance.

Examination of programs across Canada with successful experience in offering opportunities for post-secondary training for aboriginal peoples reveals the common feature of a well equipped counseling service to support students.

The Aboriginal Medical Program at the University of Manitoba has a proven history of graduating aboriginal

students trained as medical doctors. Students in this program are provided with access to counseling services at each step of their training experience through medical school. For 15 years the Native Law Center at the University of Saskatchewan has provided a successful bridge program from general degree programs into the academic rigors of law school for **aboriginal** students. Students **enroling** in this **pre-law** orientation program are heavily counseled to ensure that they are aware of the nature of the program in which they propose to **enrol** and are fully aware of the academic discipline required to complete a law degree.

College East is currently **funded** to employ only one full-time counselor. The college annually **enrols** 450-500 full-time students and in excess of 2000 part-time students.

At the **Nunatta** Campus, the median age for these students is 28. Students often disrupt well established lifestyles to return to the role of student-a role they may not have played successfully in formative school years. Considerable pressure, debilitating to academic success, will build through the course of the year.

At the college, there is an annual pattern of negative events.

In the opening week of each semester, the **Nunatta** Campus of College East is pro-active in the organization and delivery of a Student Success Week, a student orientation program which has its roots in the Freshman 101 reedit courses at the University of South Carolina. The program is organized through the offices of the Director of Student Services, who, despite fiscal restraint, delivers an orientation program for up to 120 new students. The purpose of Student Success Week is to provide orientation to the realities of life as a student living in **Iqaluit**. Anecdotal evidence accumulated through the first three years of the operation of Student Success Week clearly indicates the *positive effect which this orientation program* has on students **enroling** for the first time in a **post-secondary** institution.

Through the fall semester at the **Nunatta** campus, the realities of student life living in single or family **accommodation** start to sink in. By early **October**, the novelty of the new community has worn off, the weather is increasingly inclement with the consequence of individuals spending significantly more time indoors, and the academic pressure of being a student starts to build. Problems with personal financing start appearing at about this time with unhappy consequences leading to

the departure of some students. In late November, with semester examinations approaching and money getting very short, students reach another crisis period. This is a **period when** many students withdraw, **returning** to their home communities without successfully completing even a full semester of academic work or technical training. The arrival of the Christmas recess, instead of providing a period of relief for students, increases the pressure. Students returning to their **home** community and wishing to take home gifts **for** family and friends find themselves **financially** crippled and feel unable to meet obligations in culturally appropriate ways.

At **present**, there are only sparse resources available to assist students to overcome such problems. The student with family problems in a new community may not find support within the extended family that is available in the home community. A student with financial problems, due to unfamiliarity with the need to budget carefully the funding received in student financial assistance, often has no extended family in the community where courses are being delivered. Students encountering a community with readily accessible bars for the first time are unprepared to deal with the pressures and consequences of alcohol consumption. New college students prove easy prey for the sale of illegal drugs, which rapidly drain away **their financial resources**.

Where do such students turn for professional assistance? With one counselor at the **Nunatta** Campus, and an ever increasing contact load for instructors, the **required** personnel **resources** are simply not available.

Establishment of **additional** counseling positions offers great potential to assist students in overcoming obstacles to the successful completion of their **post-secondary** training programs. The establishment of eight full-time (0.75 **FTE**) **counselling positions** within College East will represent a major step in this direction. Under the authority of the campus director, or the appropriate senior staff member, positions will be available on a **academic** year basis to assist in meeting specific needs of aboriginal students in each of the fall, winter, and spring/summer semesters. In addition to traditional counseling responsibilities, the counselors could undertake a broad spectrum of duties within **each** campus, including preparing students for the scheduled cycle of events such as Student Success Week, College Week, career fairs and student recruitment.

It is the recommendation of the NIC that a fund in the amount of \$1,600,000 be allocated over four academic years, 1995-96 through 1998-99, for eight 75% full-time equivalent counseling positions provided through College East. The funding provided to the college for each of these positions shall not exceed \$50,000 per year.

The impact of the provision of this additional support service for students enrolling in the programs of College East will increase the opportunities for students to complete their courses successfully. Successful graduates

will be trained individuals available for employment in the future Nunavut Government.

It is further recommended that funding for this project be continued in the post-Nunavut establishment period for the fiscal years, 1999 through 2004. Funding shall continue to be provided in the amount of 100% of the yearly budget for 1999-2000, and shall subsequently decline by 20% per year after that. Project funding shall be 100% for 1999-2000, 80% for 2000-2001, 60% for 2001-2002, 40% for 2002-2003, and 20% for 2003-2004.

Project F: Nunavut Sivuniksavut Program

Target Group	Program Initiative	Location	Duration	Cost per Location	Comments
Inuit youth	Nunavut Sivuniksavut Program	At the regional campuses of College East and the Nunavut Sivuniksavut Program in Ottawa	10 month program - 8 months with students and 2 month preparatory	\$150,000 @ 4 years =\$150,000/yr =\$600,000	matching funding from Pathways or alternate sources to be identified; program funding will continue after Nunavut's establishment with 20% annual budget reductions

The NIC recommends that:

In the period of the academic years 1995-96 through 1998-1999, funding in the amount of \$600,000 be identified for the provision of 50% of the funding required to operate the Nunavut Sivuniksavut Program in association with Arctic College and Algonquin College. A requirement of the provision of this funding shall be that the Nunavut Sivuniksavut Program establish a formal linkage with College East and that, at a minimum, two courses of the annual curriculum of the Program be delivered within Nunavut.

The Nunavut Sivuniksavut Program (NSP) grew from the training initiatives of the Tungavik Federation of Nunavut. With the evolution of that organization after the settlement of land claims, the program's original sponsorship arrangements disappeared.

The NSP has two primary education functions. The first of these is to provide Inuit students with a transition year to prepare them for an academic career in a post-secondary institution. The second function is to prepare students for life and employment at a location other than their home communities.

At present, NSF is formally linked to Algonquin College in Ottawa with students of NSP receiving credit for studies in Inuit culture under the Algonquin College Aboriginal Studies Program. The one year program covers curricular content equivalent to a certificate program.

Within Nunavut, students and educators express complete confidence in the goals of the program and in the successes achieved by graduates. Anecdotal reports from graduates of the program tend to emphasize the value of a curriculum of studies that explores Inuit culture of the past and present. By formally exposing the students to the strength of Inuit culture, students gain immeasurable confidence, preparing them to deal effectively with work environments and training in southern and northern Canada that are remote from students' home communities.

The program has the endorsement of all relevant Inuit organizations.

To date, despite exploratory discussions in 1991, no formal connection with the post-secondary education system of College East has been established. For the future well-being of NSP, establishment of such a linkage is imperative. While there is no doubt that the NSP is successful in preparing students for living and employment in southern Canada, there is a need to increase the mobility of youth within the communities of Nunavut. Establishing a formal linkage between NSP and College East that provides for the annual delivery of at least two courses within Nunavut would expose the students of the NSP to a broader range of training and future employment possibilities within Nunavut.

Because of the nature of the NSP and its openness to enrolment of students from jurisdictions outside Nunavut, the NIC cannot recommend 100% funding support for the program. Rather, support for 50% of the annual operating budget for the program should be identified to ensure the continuation of the program for the next four years.

It is the recommendation of the NIC that funding in the amount of \$600,000 be supplied over the four academic year period, 1995-96 through 1998-99, in order to provide 50% of the required operational budget of the NSP. This funding should be provided by contract between the Nunavut Secretariat, DIAND, and the corporate body responsible for the overall operation of the NSP.

The results of the continuation and stabilization of this program will have a direct impact on the labour pool available for recruitment into the Nunavut Government. Graduates of the NSP are recognized to have acquired critical life skills training, giving them the discipline required of successful students and workers. Graduates of this program are known to be employees who are reliable, punctual and willing to do their assigned duties to the best of their abilities.

It is further recommended that funding for this project be continued in the post-Nunavut establishment period for the fiscal years, 1999 through 2004. Funding shall continue to be provided in the amount of 100% of the yearly budget for 1999-2000, and shall subsequently decline by 20% per year after that. Project funding shall be 100% for 1999-2000, 80% for 2000-2001, 60% for 2001-2002, 40% for 2002-2003, and 20% for 2003-2004.

Target Group	Program Initiative	Location	Duration	Cost per Location	Comments
GNWT/federal government employees	professional in-service: staff development for existing employees of territorial and federal government	work sites across Nunavut and the Northwest Territories	part-time enrolment in GNWT Staff development courses	75 employees (25 per Region) enrolled in GNWT Staff development courses @ \$1,500/employee + replacement salary \$1,500/employee @ 3 courses/yr. @ 4 years = \$675,000/year = \$2,700,000	post-establishment of Nunavut, funding will transfer to the Nunavut Government; program funding will continue after Nunavut is established with 20% annual budget reductions

The NIC recommends that:

In the fiscal years 1998-99 through 1998-99 in-service funding in the amount of \$2,700,000 be identified for the provision of in-service and management level training through the GNWT Public Service Career Training Program. Seventy-five employees annually shall be offered an opportunity to complete a minimum of three courses per year. The funding provided shall include both funding for the participation of the employees in the training program and funding for replacement employees. Funding shall be provided in the form of a service contract between the Nunavut Secretariat, DIAND, and the GNWT Department of Education Culture and Employment. Delivery of the program shall follow the arrangements of the GNWT Department of Education, Culture and Employment. Inuit employees working at headquarters in Yellowknife shall be eligible to access this training.

A core group of employees necessary for the establishment of the Nunavut Government already exists in the form of employ- working for DIAND and the GNWT inside the NWT.

The GNWT Department of Education, Culture and Employment has invested in the development of officer level career training programs designed for the benefit of its present labour pool. Similar training programs are offered by the Government of Canada for its employees currently working in the NWT.

There are two major impediments to employees attempting to access available training. These impediments have reduced the effectiveness of the available training. One problem has been the difficulty of accessing funding which supports a full range of costs related to the enrolment of employees, including tuition, transportation and accommodation. The second problem relates to the completion of the duties of the employee on education leave. who does the work when an employee is absent on training?

Through this proposal, both of these issues are addressed. Provision of \$1,500 dirtily for each student participating provides employees working in distant communities with additional transportation and accommodation subsidies. An additional \$1,500 for replacement employment costs ensures that critical functions of an employee on the training program are not adversely

affected. The provision of funding for replacement workers will also result in substitute employees getting a wider exposure and understanding of the duties of other positions.

It is the recommendation of the NIC that funding in the amount of \$2,700,000 be identified over a four fiscal year period, 1995-96 through 1998-99, to provide for staff development training for 75 employees, with each employee taking three courses annually. This funding shall be provided by contract between the Nunavut Secretariat, DIAND, and the GNWT Department of Education Culture and Employment.

Further training and development of the existing labour force working for the two upper levels of govern-

ment in the NWT is a logical focus for training efforts in preparation for the establishment of Nunavut. The experience and knowledge accumulated by the existing staff cannot be duplicated. The present labour pool will only benefit from additional training and development that avoids disruption to the organization sponsoring training or the public that relies on government services.

It is further recommended that funding for this project be continued in the post-Nunavut establishment period for the fiscal years, 1999 through 2004. Funding shall continue to be provided in the amount of 100% of the yearly budget for 1999-2000, and shall subsequently decline by 20% per year after that. Project funding shall be 100% for 1999-2000, 80% for 2000-2001, 60% for 2001-2002, 40% for 2002-2003, and 20% for 2003-2004.

Project H: Senior Level Management Development: C.C.M.D./RADIANT/College East Programing

Target Group	Program Initiative	Location	Duration	Cost per Location	Comments
employees of boards and agencies external to GNWT i.e. NTI, Nunavut Wildlife Management Board., NWT Water Board, NTPCs etc.	professional in-service senior staff development	work sites across Nunavut Territory	part-time/distance enrolment in staff development courses	75 senior staff enrolled on a part-time basis in senior level management courses such as the proposed CCMD/RADIANT -3 year program cycle with 25 students/ course repeated 3 times over 5 years =\$408,800/yr =\$2,044,900	program funding will continue after Nunavut's establishment with 2090 annual budget reductions

The NIC recommends that:

In the period 1995 through 1999, funding in the amount of \$2,044,900 be identified for the delivery of Senior Level Management Training to employees and representatives of the Government of Canada, the GNWT, the boards and agencies of senior levels of government, municipalities, and organizations playing roles under the Nunavut Act.

This recommendation flows from a program proposal

developed and submitted to NIC by CCMD/RADIANT Learning and communications Network.

It is further recommended that funding for this project be continued in the post Nunavut establishment period for the fiscal years, 1999 through 2004. Funding shall continue to be provided in the amount of 100% of the yearly budget for 1999-2000, and shall subsequently decline by 20% per year after that. Project funding shall be 100% for 1999-2000, 80% for 2000-2001, 60% for 2001-2002, 40% for 2002-2003, and 20% for 2003-2004.

*Project I: Human Resource **Development** Planning: Municipalities and
Community-Based **Boards** and Agencies*

Target Group	Program Initiative	Location	Duration	Cost per Location	Comments
employees of hamlets and related boards and agencies operated at the community level	staff development planning at a community level	hamlets across Nunavut	develop a hamlet staff training program for all staff members	26 hamlets@ \$25,000/location: researching and development a community Human Resource Development Plan for each community = \$650,000	<i>matching</i> dollars may be available from GNWT Department of Municipal and community Affairs

The NIC recommends that:

In the period 1995 through 1997, funding in the amount of \$650,000 be identified for the provision of financial support to the existing municipalities in Nunavut to establish Community Human Resource Development Plans for municipal staff and the staff of boards and agencies operating at the community level. The funding required shall be allocated at \$25,000 per community, and shall be provided in the form of a service contract between the Nunavut Secretariat DIAND, and each municipality.

With the impact of the creation of Nunavut in 1999 on all of the communities, it is imperative that a focus on training at the broad level for the future Nunavut Government be supplemented with the development of a Community Human Resource Development Plan to meet the needs of each community.

The NIC has indicated broad support for the principles of community transfer and devolution of authority to the community level. Initiatives in this

regard have started well in advance of the creation of Nunavut and maybe expected to expand. Devolution of authority to the community level entails development of training programs related to the human resources at the community level. These must be planned so as to achieve the most favorable impacts.

A second impetus to the provision of funding for the development of Community Human Resource Development Plans is implicit within the design models for the Nunavut Government. The creation of Nunavut will lead to a net employment gain for Nunavut. The direction of much discussion in community consultations is towards the improvement of the employment base of the communities. If smaller communities outside the capital of Nunavut are to exploit fully the potential for new jobs through a decentralized Nunavut Government, the staffs of both the municipalities and community-based boards and agencies must be included in the planning process for human resource development.

It is the recommendation of the NIC that funding in the amount of \$625,000 be spent in a series of one-time

only funding contracts between the Nunavut Secretariat, DIAND, and the municipalities of Nunavut. It is further recommended that the funding be provided only to those communities which have undertaken the supply of a significant portion of the required funding (25%) from other sources.

Provision of funding to the municipalities and com-

munity-based boards and agencies of Nunavut will allow planning for specific training activities. Development of the human resource potential at the ground level of governance will enhance administrative capacity in the communities, thereby promoting increased effectiveness and efficiency of program delivery. Community training plans will further develop the broad pool of potential future employees for the Nunavut Government.

Project J: Staff Development: Municipalities of Nunavut

Target Group	Program Initiative	Location	Duration	Cost per Location	Comments
employees development workshops for staff at the community level	staff development workshops delivered at a community level with funding provided to the municipalities	municipalities across Nunavut using the facilities of the boards of education or College East	annually	26 municipalities @ 2 courses/year @ \$9,000/course @ 4 years = \$468,000/year = \$1,872,000	program funding will continue after Nunavut's establishment with 20% annual budget reductions

The NIC recommends that:

In the fiscal years 1995-96 through 1998-99, funding in the amount of **\$1,872,000** be identified for the provision of officer and manager level training programs through municipalities. The courses shall be delivered semi-annually in each Nunavut community using existing education infrastructure operated either by regional boards of education or College East. The municipalities shall be encouraged to purchase training from either College East or from Inuit owned and operated training programs such as Unaaq or Nunavut Sivuniksavut. The training delivered shall be in direct response to the separate funding proposed for Community Human Resource Development Plans. No funding will be made available to a community unless a Community Human Resource Development Plan

has been developed and adopted 'by the municipality and any relevant community level board or agency. Funding for this program shall be provided by service contracts between municipalities and the Nunavut Secretariat, DIAND.

Subject to the approval of Project I ("Human Resource Development Planning: Municipalities and Community-Based Boards and Agencies"), this initiative will provide funding for the delivery of two courses per year under the direction of the municipalities.

The future Nunavut Government will rely very much on the training and experience of aboriginal residents of Nunavut. With the exception of the larger communities which serve as administrative centres in each of the regions, Inuit are the majority in the employed work

force ● in each community. Staff working for **local organizations**, because of the **pressures** of duties in their home communities, have difficulty in **participating in** training initiatives delivered at distant locations. Additionally, these employees often have family responsibilities which prevent their participation in lengthy advanced level training programs.

It is the recommendation of the NIC that funding in the amount of \$1272,000 be **identified** for the delivery of purchased training by each of the municipalities of **Nunavut**. Each municipality shall be funded by service **contract** with the **Nunavut Secretariat, DIAND**, for the purchase of semi-annual training programs in **conformity** with its Community Human Resource Development **Plan**. **The municipalities** shall be encouraged to purchase training programs tapping into existing **expertise** and resources of College East or from **Inuit** firms. Courses shall be delivered at the **community** level using facilities of the regional boards of **education** or College East during periods when these facilities are not required for the delivery of normally scheduled programming.

Providing the municipalities with funding to purchase two training courses annually, each of which could be delivered for 15 to 20 **participants**, **maximizes** the

amount of training which could be completed for the broadest range of staff over the next four year period. If every community enrolled 20 employees in the eight courses suggested for delivery over the next four years, 520 **employees** would **receive** training equivalent to the completion of a certificate program through the Canadian College system.

By creating the opportunity for the municipalities to purchase the training for community residents, more **Inuit** and other residents in **Nunavut** will be engaged in the process of building up human resources for the future **Nunavut** public sector. At the same time, there will be growing awareness of the need for the **support** of the full range of the population to assist in finding solutions to issues **facing** families, communities, regions and the new **territory** as a whole.

It is further recommended that funding **for this project** be continued in the post **Nunavut** establishment period for the fiscal years, 1999 through 2004. Funding shall **continue** to be provided in the amount of 100% of the yearly budget for 1999-2000, and shall subsequently decline by 20% per year after that. Project funding shall be 100% for 1999-2000, 80% for **2000-2001**, 60% for **2001-2002**, 40% for **2002-2003**, and 20% for **2003-2004**.

Project K: Development of Education and Orientation Training Materials for Use in Staff Orientation, Future Training for New Employees, Management Training within College East and Schools and Community Learning Centres in Nunavut

Target Group	Program Initiative	Location	Duration	Cost per Location	Comments
employees of the Nunavut Government, students enrolling in programs through College East and the schools of Nunavut	development of durational resource materials related to the historical development of the Nunavut Agreement, the establishment of Nunavut Territory, and the linkages between the processes	available for future utilization within the Government of the Northwest Territories, the Nunavut Government and the school and college system of Nunavut	two years; materials developed will have a minimum life span of 15 years	research and production costs estimated @ \$300,000 ¹	additional future year education resource development projects to be undertaken

1. This cost estimate is subject to significant revision once details of the project are more fully explored and developed.

It is the recommendation of the NIC that:

Funding in the amount of **\$600,000** be identified for the development of computer **interactive software in a CD-ROM format, freely available to the public, detailing the historic processes leading to the Nunavut Agreement and; the creation of Nunavut, and the linkages between the two processes. Funding for this project shall be coordinated through a steering committee made up of representatives of NTI, the NIC, College East, and the three regional boards of education. Overall responsibility for development of the project shall rest with the NIC. A funding contract between the Nunavut Secretariat and the NIC shall supply the required funding to NIC.**

It is recommended that funding for the production of an education tool in the form of an interactive CD-ROM disc formatted for both common microcomputer platforms be identified. The CD-ROM will provide a single accurate source of information for the orientation of employees and for the use of college and schools students with respect to the conclusion of the Nunavut Agreement, and the creation of the Nunavut **Territory**.

It is estimated that an initial sum of \$300,000 will be required over a period of two years to develop, produce and distribute such a training resource.

Given the contents of the material to be recorded on an interactive CD-ROM disc, it is estimated that a total of four hours of interactive materials will be assembled in the form of text, photographs, sound clips and video clips.

It is the recommendation of the NIC that a sum of \$300,000 be identified for the development and distribution of this form of educational material. The NIC shall play the lead role in the development of such materials in collaboration with NTI, College East and the **regional boards of education**. The actual assembly of the materials and production of the discs shall be contracted between the **NIC** and an appropriate **Inuit** firm such as Umaq Management and **ICSL**. Funding for the project shall be in the form of a **service** contract between the Nunavut **Secretariat, DIAND, and the NIC**.

Future projects will be identified as appropriate to the identification of training and education **financial** resources.



*Nunavut Leaders Summit held in Gjoa Haven,
January 19-21, 1995*

Nunavut implementation Commission

Strategic Directions for Collaborative and Co-operative Training Preparatory to the Establishment of Nunavut

*A Presentation by the Human Resources Committee of NIC**

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is:

- . to stimulate discussion of education and training issues;
- . to outline general strategic directions for education and training in preparation for the establishment of the **Nunavut** government; and
- . to present information concerning **the direction** and establishment of training programs for **Nunavut**.

This paper directs the focus of Nunavut political leaders to critical issues in education and training. Discussions by the leaders will add to the dialogue and assist in adopting common strategies for human resource development preparatory to establishment of Nunavut.

Objectives

We need to pursue the following objectives

*This paper is slightly edited from the version presented at Gjoa Haven.

- . public **education** and training development of the **Nunavut** public service

to prepare a qualified, representative work force available for recruitment into the Nunavut public service at community, regional and territorial levels, and

to ensure an abundant, highly motivated, hi-lingual, resident work force prepared for employment;

- co-operative development and **delivery** of education and training programs responsive to the jurisdictional interests and training mandates of the partner agencies within Nunavut;
- collaboration between the stakeholders to improve school and **post-secondary enrolment**, retention, and graduation rates; and
- fostering a training culture within **Nunavut** focused on maximizing **Inuit** employment.

These objectives focus on the development of **Nunavut's** human resources. The **underlying** principle is the development of a climate of engagement and support for the education and training of the **Nunavut**

labour force maximizing the potential for Inuit employment at senior levels of government management.

Since government started moving north in the 1950s, tension has existed between program function and public access. Our history abounds with examples. Education took children from their families. External authority figures overwhelmed traditional community regulatory structures. Processes of returning authority are the modern focus of Inuit Tapiritsat of Canada, regional Inuit organizations and the GNWT. This evolution culminated in the signing of the "Agreement Between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area and Her Majesty the Queen in right of Canada" (Nunavut Agreement).

Development of our labour force builds on the energy and enthusiasm of the land claim. Training captures and engages the will and authority of the individual, the family and community. Education and training are linked to incremental job creation. The human resources of Nunavut can achieve a representative work force, motivated and challenged to run the Government of Nunavut.

The Government of Canada, the GNWT and NTI are the major partners. Each shares responsibility for the development of Nunavut's labour force. Co-operation and collaboration by the partners fosters effective and efficient delivery of education and training programs. Training for Nunavut is proceeding in this climate.

Nunavut Implementation Training Committee training scholarships are now available. The NIC, through the Nunavut Secretariat of DIAND, has recommended funding of supplement programs through Arctic College and the Nunavut boards of education. Annually, the GNWT Department of Education, Culture and Employment commits \$50,000,000 on schools and \$20,000,000 on the College within Nunavut. The Nunavut Secretariat is working in partnership with the GNWT Department of Education, Culture and Employment in funding senior staff training for managers and officers. The GNWT Department of Education, Culture and Employment sponsors training institutes as comprehensive as Arctic College and the Baffin Management Training Program, and as technologically advanced as the computerized Plato Learning Resource Program and the delivery of televised education programs.

Such co-operative and shared approaches to education and training ensure that the Government of Nunavut will pass successfully on to the residents. Citizens' lives through education training and employment are enhanced and improved.

The training partners share responsibility for the creation of a labour force prepared for meaningful citizenship. In 1999, Nunavut will arrive. Nunavut's future labour force today has experience with education and training. Nunavut's residents are optimistic that their experience predicts well-being in the future. They leave no question as to the representative nature of the future Nunavut Government work force. Progress is ongoing to engage this labour force. Education and training can help assure preparedness of the residents to assume roles in the organization, management and governance of Nunavut.

The Present

We must make plans based on:

- education and training infrastructures;
- current employment successes for Inuit;
- the human resources of Nunavut.

The establishment of Nunavut's Government makes assumptions. The public service will largely remain intact after 1999. There will be employee movement between key agencies.

Employment statistics for Inuit working at the officer level or higher present increasing success. A proportional increase of Inuit employment has occurred in government in the eastern arctic over the past 25 years. Today, Inuit work at senior levels as regional directors and regional superintendents. In the GNWT Department of Renewable Resources, an Inuk is in training at the deputy minister level. Opportunities for advanced training within Nunavut area key to this success.

Community schools are developing and implementing appropriate curricula for children. Grade extensions allow completion of senior high school in the child's home community. Graduates are academically prepared for post-secondary education or for roles in Nunavut's labour force.

Arctic College, with regional and community facilities, offers advanced training in a wide range of professional and technical fields. Adults have the opportunity to return to education as literacy students. Journeyman training is available. Inuit are enrolling in degree programs as teachers and social workers. Future managers are receiving nationally certified management

training. Advanced level Inuktitut language training, including a certified Interpreter Translator program, is available. Land resource and environmental technology programs are available.

We have a school system that organizes public education from kindergarten to Grade 12. We have an early childhood education system **operated by trained professionals**. We have a College with linkages to national universities. The divisional boards and college staff are world leaders in the delivery of education and training programs. **Representatives** of our education systems travel internationally to **share** with other aboriginal people and scholars the programs of Nunavut. Our students have an available wealth of education and many career options. Students can access the financial support systems required to assist their development and exploration of potential.

Our youth celebrate the arrival of **Nunavut**. Today's young people involved with their education are tomorrow's **labour** force running **Nunavut**.

In the preparatory years leading to Nunavut, no new institutional creation is required. With more effective use of resources and some incremental **funding**, training programs and infrastructures that currently are **underdeveloped** may blossom.

Education and training have helped to create our northern work form. By 1999, with the commitment of the Government of Canada and the **GNWT**, students will study a wider range of **education and training disciplines**.

Improved communications infrastructure **will** link Nunavut with a broader range of education delivery in specialized and **technical** fields.

Thirty years ago, **Inuit** started accessing training and **accepting positions** in professional and technical fields. **Today, 45% of Nunavut's labour** force are **Inuit**. **Inuit** are an increasing presence in the private sector as both employers and employees. Nunavut needs broadly based training to meet future requirements at middle and upper management levels.

There is no question about the employment wishes of **Inuit**. The **Nunavut Agreement** is complete. **Inuit** have defined anew Territory. Today, **Inuit** are consulting and designing the new government. **Tomorrow's** Nunavut government **will be different**. Predictably, a new **government** may feature decentralized management. A **greater** role for **Inuit** is expected.

A challenge for Nunavut is the training of **Inuit** for the hundreds of primary and secondary jobs that will be created. The target is 8570 **Inuit** employment. The task for **Nunavut** planners is to achieve this goal as quickly as possible.

The *Future*

In looking to the future, we must consider:

- there are statutory obligations in the Nunavut Agreement and the "Contract Relating to the Implementation of the Nunavut Final Agreement";
- the Nunavut Government will assume responsibility for education and **training**; and
- **Nunavut's** initial **labour** force is today either in school or employed in occupations supporting the family, the community, the region or the **territory**.

The people who will run **Nunavut** are alive today. More than half of **Nunavut's** population is enrolled in school, college or university. Students are receiving a quality education experience and range of programs unavailable in the past. Students are children, youth and adults. They **are** confident in the certainty of Nunavut. They will not face the struggle to secure **Nunavut**. Their education must prepare them to undertake the **management** of a new government.

Their expectations require cultivation. Significant numbers of youth are enrolling in post-secondary training. **This** trend will continue. These young adults form the vanguard of **Nunavut's** future employees.

Nunavut needs skilled residents to stabilize family, community and territorial structures. Nunavut needs mothers and fathers in a balance of **traditional** and modern employment. **Nunavut needs** acceptance of the validity of traditional and modern career paths. **Nunavut** needs to ensure the viability of those in **traditional** and modern economies. Nunavut needs continued investment in the education system, **especially** in support of programs for children in mathematics and sciences. **Nunavut** will need **Inuit** working as doctors, lawyers, engineers and scientists.

Nunavut needs secretaries, daycare workers and building maintainers. Nunavut needs **Inuit** educated for employment as deputy ministers, directors, officers, CEOs and presidents.

Roles and Mandates

We must **ask ourselves**:

- who are the partners in training?
- why **are** they partners?
- what is their mandate in training?

Role and Mandate in the Government of Canada: Nunavut Secretariat

The Nunavut Secretariat has been established within DIAND to co-ordinate the federal government's roles relating to the transition period leading to the creation of Nunavut in 1999, including the development and implementation of incremental training activities for the establishment of the Government of Nunavut. This role includes the determination of reasonable incremental costs, including training, and the preparation of costed training options.

In addition, issues associated with transition require the involvement of a number of federal departments and agencies. Of significant importance is Human Resource Development Canada as an employment training partner for the development of Nunavut residents.

The Nunavut Secretariat responsibilities related to training include:

1. overall management of the federal roles in the establishment of Nunavut related to training;
2. determination of "reasonable incremental costs" for the establishment of the Government of Nunavut;
3. reviewing recommendations from the NIC to assess funding procedural timing and other implications;
4. participation at inter-governmental meetings with the GNWT and NTI to consult on recommendations from NIC;
5. co-ordination of the federal role in training in conjunction with Human Resource Development Canada, the GNWT and other bodies;
6. monitoring transition budgets and ensuring each party meets its obligations; and
7. co-ordination of involvement of other federal departments as required

Roles and Mandate in the GNWT: Department of Education, Culture and Employment

The GNWT has broad responsibility for the planning, delivery and evaluation of education and training programs for residents of the NWT. This mandate is described in legislation and in various agreements with the federal government, including those agreements

regarding the development of the Nunavut Territory. To provide service, the GNWT has established boards, agencies and departments which plan, deliver and evaluate program activities. Broadly speaking, the GNWT provides funding, programs and basic infrastructure for early childhood development programs, K -12 programs, adult and post-secondary education and training, as well as career and employment development services. For example, the GNWT has established and provided funding for the divisional boards of education and for the college system. In addition, the GNWT also provides supporting services, such as student financial assistance for post-secondary students and career counseling, which assist students and other clients in developing their skills and abilities to take advantage of the opportunities which are available in the communities across the North.

While there is ongoing responsibility for the GNWT to provide education and training opportunities to support both private and public sector development, the planned creation of Nunavut creates special challenges. Several specific actions are being undertaken by the GNWT to organize and co-ordinate additional activities in preparation for the establishment of the Nunavut Government. These actions include

1. the establishment of a Special Joint Committee on Division, composed of members of the Legislative Assembly, to review actions taken to date and to advise the GNWT on priorities for future action;
2. development of a senior committee of officials to co-ordinate government planning activities across the GNWT;
3. approval of a planning framework for development of human resource plans for training and development of staff who will work for the public governments in the Western and Nunavut Territories, and
4. development of employment plans by departments which will identify ways in which the departments, boards and agencies will prepare for employment following division.

As the organization responsible for the provision of public government across the NWT, the GNWT plays a key role in the planning and development of government for the new territories. In this role, it must co-ordinate a broad range of various education and training activities carried out by various departments, boards and agencies.

Role and Mandate of NTI

NTI is an Inuit organization responsible for the implementing of the Nunavut Agreement. NTI represents Inuit of all regions and communities of Nunavut, in a fair and democratic way, to safeguard, administer and advance the rights and benefits that belong to the Inuit of Nunavut as an aboriginal people, and to promote their economic, social and cultural well-being through succeeding generations. Without limiting that objective, NTI shall:

1. serve as the Inuit party to implement the terms of any "land claims agreements" (as defined by the Constitution of Canada), including any collateral agreements, entered into on behalf of the Inuit of Nunavut, and to specifically carry out its functions described in the Nunavut Agreement;
2. ensure that the rights and benefits flowing to Inuit through any land claims agreements are secured and defended in law;
3. represent the Inuit of Nunavut in the negotiation and conclusion of any amendments to any land claims agreements;
4. hold and manage rights and benefits flowing to the Inuit of Nunavut through aboriginal title, statutory recognition, land claims agreements and any other means; and
5. seek, on its own initiative or in concert with other like minded organizations;
 - (a) to promote the enhancement of the rights, benefits and opportunities of the Inuit of Nunavut as an aboriginal people through whatever avenues and mechanisms are available at the international, national and regional levels,
 - (b) to encourage and support the development of policies for Nunavut that will contribute to Inuit economic self-sufficiency while nurturing environmental values,
 - (c) facilitate the preservation and strengthening of Inuit language, traditions and beliefs, and
 - (d) build on the rich regional and community diversities among the Inuit of Nunavut while fostering the unity of all Inuit.

Role and Mandate: Nunavut Implementation Training Committee

The Nunavut Implementation Training Committee (NITC) is a public non-profit organization created and mandated by sections 37.5.1 and 37.5.2 of the Nunavut Agreement.

The mission of the NITC is to ensure the fullest Inuit participation possible under the direction of the Nunavut Agreement by co-ordinating and planning and providing training funds and services to Designated Inuit Organizations (DIOs) charged with implementing the Agreement.

To accomplish its mission, the NITC shall:

1. organize and direct the Inuit Implementation Training Study and Implementation Training Plan;
2. negotiate funding from existing government training programs to support the implementation training requirements of the DIO and, where necessary, use Training Trust funds;
3. provide grants and contributions to fund training within DIOs where such training support is not available through existing government training programs and services;
4. establish consultative arrangements between Government and Inuit that ensure effective integration of training funded under implementation of the Training Trust with existing government training programs;
5. promote the use of appropriate training standards and principles in DIO training throughout Nunavut;
6. participate in the Nunavut labor market analysis;
7. participate in the development and implementation of Inuit Employment Plans and Programs; and
8. participate in the development of training and career development plans and programs to promote Inuit employment in government as specified in Section 23 of the Nunavut Agreement.

Role and Mandate of the NIC

The NIC is established under the Nunavut Act. The Commissioners are appointed by federal order-in-council.

The NIC's function is to serve in a consultative and advisory capacity to the Government of Canada, the GNWT and NTI on issues concerning the design and implementation of the future Government of Nunavut. Three specific areas under examination at this time include:

1. **recommendations on the process** to be used for the determination of the capital of Nunavut;
2. recommendations on the design and makeup of the Nunavut Legislative Assembly; and
3. recommendations on the design and operational nature of the Government of Nunavut.

The NIC makes recommendations to the Nunavut Secretariat, DIAND, on the allocation of incremental federal funding to the existing infrastructures of the Department of Education, Culture and Employment, the college system, and the divisional boards of education, for human resource development within Nunavut.

Strategic Directions

We should consider the following:

- education and training opportunities should further Nunavut's existing institutional development by seeking appropriate access and partnership with agencies such as CcMD/RADIAN, Banff School of Advanced Management, Unaaq Management, and other management development institutions;
- the training partners will seek mechanisms to support cooperation and coordination to enhance effective and efficient training and education programs; and
- broadly based communication strategies will promote education and training, create visibility, foster imperative approaches and develop a Nunavut Training Culture.

Education and training enhancement will be offered within Nunavut's existing educational institutions. The quality of programs in the schools and colleges should be enhanced by establishing performance standards, modernizing delivery techniques and improving

programs. This requires incremental support. Consultative processes with divisional boards of education, the College, and the GNWT Department of Education, Culture and Employment will direct these improvements.

A ripple of enthusiasm follows each success. Providing education and training focused on improving skills of Inuit already working in government enhances success. Government staff with their wealth of experience offer stability and credibility. Funding to allow work release for these employees to undertake the training programs removes the greatest impediment to their advancement within the public service.

Identifying and fast-tracking training for individuals working at community, regional, territorial and federal levels to upgrade their skills for successful middle and senior level management is logical and desirable. Existing programs are training to the deputy minister level. Enhancement of training efforts is an initiative requiring the commitment of adequate financial resources. Funding co-operative work experience opportunities for students studying at senior high school gains experience for Nunavut's future work force. Larger centers could accommodate summer employment experiences for students. Students enrolled in post-secondary education streams could participate in advanced co-operative work site placements over longer periods.

Nunavut's education and training initiatives must seek and promote access to partnerships with all the potential sources for training programs. Nunavut needs new linkages between existing programs, programs available through the federal government and training delivered by the private sector. Action supporting a training climate has commenced with cooperative initiatives of the Nunavut Secretariat, NITC, the GNWT Department of Education, Culture and Employment, Arctic College and the divisional boards of education. Future initiatives will include training co-ordinated and delivered at the community level through existing and new education partnerships. Private sector training with an established presence in Nunavut readily supplements the initiatives of the three levels of government.

Nunavut suggests adopting a communications strategy to build public confidence and further engage the residents in appropriate levels of training. Dissemination of information on training and education initiatives of the three levels of government builds a training climate through increased public awareness. Higher visibility for training initiatives maximizes the impact of the money spent on education. With partnership co-operation, the training impact on students is enhanced.

Conclusion

We can conclude:

- . Nunavut presents a unique opportunity to **improve the social** conditions of its residents;
- . Nunavut requires a co-operative approach to education and **training**; and
- . **Nunavut's** partners in education and training have the resources and potential to create successes for residents in modern and traditional lifestyles.

References

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"**Nunavut Management Trainee Program Concept Paper**", CcMD/RADIAN, Ottawa, 1994

"**People: Our Focus for the Future Education, Culture and Employment, A Strategy to 2010**", GNWT Department of Education, Culture and Employment, Yellowknife, 1994

"**Situation Analysis for a Campaign to Promote Education and Training for the Youth of Nunavut**", Mark Stiles Associates Inc., DIAND, Ottawa, 1994

G*overnment of Nunavut: *Financial Model Overview and Comparison with Previous Studies

The Commission recognized the need to assess and present the financial implications of its recommendations. In January 1995, it retained the international accounting and management consulting firm of Price Waterhouse to develop a financial model to estimate the costs of establishing and operating the Government of Nunavut.

Price Waterhouse Model Overview

In developing the model, Price Waterhouse obtained information from a variety of sources including:

- the NIC;
- the Government of the Northwest Territories (GNWT);
- Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC);
- Statistics Canada; and
- previous studies carried out by the consulting firm of Coopers and Lybrand (C&L) in 1991 for the Government of the Northwest Territories (GNWT) and in 1992 for the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development.

The Nunavut Expenditure Relationships diagram, which follows, displays the various costs and cost drivers. The structure of the model and the assumptions used in developing it are described in detail in an appendix entitled "Government of Nunavut Financial Model Design and Assumptions". The numeric values associated with these assumptions are also detailed in the model itself. It should be recognized that some of the information which would be useful in developing such a model is unavailable or imprecise. The financial model has been based on the best available information, and assumptions have been discussed with various stakeholders to ensure that they are reasonable.

The model focuses on the headquarters of the future Government of Nunavut, including positions of a headquarters nature which would be located outside the capital and additional regional office positions created due to decentralization of authority. It does not deal with existing regional offices, or with the costs of delivering programs to communities. Because the focus is on headquarters costs, the model does not consider the effect on ongoing program expenditures of the population influx expected to result from the creation of the Government of Nunavut.


All costs expressed in thousands of dollars (000s) and are calculated using 1995-1996 dollars. The model has the capability to account for either a short or extended phase-in period, but all projected expenditures are currently calculated based on a full phase-in by 1999-2000.

Ongoing expenditures are calculated for the 1999/2000 fiscal year. They include salaries and benefits, other operations and maintenance (O&M), and grants and contributions (G&C). Salaries and benefits are calculated based on GNWT statistics. Other O&M costs are estimated based on a O&M/salary expenditure ratio calculated from GNWT data. G&C costs are based on an expenditure per capita figure calculated from the 1991 C&L report.

Capital expenditures, including those on staff housing, office buildings and base infrastructure, were estimated for each community. Staff housing is expected to be provided to every GN FTE, and base infrastructure expenditures are based on current service provision methods. Other set-up expenditures, including training, legislative development, systems development and the Interim Commissioner's office, would not be affected significantly by the choice of the capital city.

Nunavut

Expenditure Relationships



Cost Differences among Decentralization Models

In developing the financial model, Price Waterhouse took into account differences in cost among communities in the following respects:

- settlement allowances and vacation travel allowances paid to employees;

- cost of living indices developed by Statistics Canada, which were used to indicate possible differences in operating costs;

- construction costs, as indicated by existing GNWT cost indices; and

- infrastructure requirements, to the extent that some communities would require more upgrading of facilities such as water or sewage treatment plants in order to support a larger population.

Comparing costs among different potential capitals is complex because the Commission is proposing a decentralized model. Under this model, headquarters jobs would be distributed among a number of locations and any existing regional offices in the future capital would be relocated. The cost for any particular capital scenario will therefore depend on the costs in other centres where positions are located, as well as in the capital itself.

The available statistics suggest that differences between Iqaluit and Rankin Inlet in terms of construction costs and the cost of living are relatively small. Costs in Cambridge Bay, and particularly in some of the other centres to which regional office positions may be relocated, are higher. However, the table which follows shows that the capital and operating costs for the three different capital scenarios are relatively close.

It is important to note that for all scenarios, regardless of the capital, the same assumptions are used. For example, the assumption that 25% of the positions in any community will be filled by people already in that community has been used for all scenarios. This assumption may be more or less realistic, depending on the community.

Cost Differences among Decentralization Models

Decentralization Models	Cambridge Bay as Capital	Iqaluit as Capital	Rankin Inlet as Capital
Operating Costs			
Settlement Allowance	3,771	3,712	3,671
Vacation Travel Allowance	2,430	2,661	2,512
O&M Price Differential	8,916	7,913	7,581
Non-location Dependant	62,948	62,948	62,948
Total Operating Costs	78,065	77,234	76,712
% difference from Iqaluit	1.1%	0.0%	-0.7%
Capital Costs			
Equipment and Furniture	18,920	17,844	17,846
Facilities	176,151	167,510	173,051
Base Infrastructure	18,240	24,356	22,393
Total Capital Costs	213,311	209,710	213,290
% difference from Iqaluit	1.7%	0.0%	1.7%

Comparison with Previous Studies

As the following table shows, the estimated costs for establishing and operating the Government of Nunavut would be significantly lower than indicated by previous studies. Comparisons have been made both with a study carried out by the consulting firm of Coopers and Lybrand (C&L) in 1991 for the Government of the Northwest Territories (GNWT) and a subsequent study by the same firm in 1992 for the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development.

The primary reason for this difference is a lower estimate of the number of employees in the headquarters of the Nunavut government. Commission staff estimate that 600 full-time equivalents (FTEs) will be required. Of these, 555 will be in the various headquarters locations and 45 will be additional regional office staff required by a more decentralized approach to management. This is a 45.8% reduction from the 1,1081 FTEs estimated in the 1991 C&L study, and a 35.5% reduction from the 930 FTEs estimated in the 1992 study.

It is also interesting to compare the 600 FTEs proposed for the Nunavut government to the number of FTEs in the GNWT in 1990/91, the base year for the C&L analysis. Their figures showed that, after subtracting employees located in Yellowknife but performing functions of a regional nature, the GNWT had 1,725 headquarters employees in 1990/91. Dividing these between Nunavut and the West based on population implies that there were the equivalent of 622 GNWT headquarters employees performing Nunavut-related work in 1990/91². The proposed staffing of the Nunavut government headquarters represents an 3.5% reduction compared to this figure.

The PW study also indicates that the population influx to Nunavut as a result of the establishment of the territorial government would be about one thousand people, far smaller than the previous studies had suggested. Key reasons for the smaller estimated population influx are that:

- a lower number of headquarters employees is assumed;
- half of the new territorial employees are assumed to be recruited within Nunavut, either in the communities where positions are located or elsewhere. Achieving this objective will require extensive education and training programs, which were not addressed in the 1991 study; and

the PW study recognizes that some territorial government employees are married to other territorial government employees, reducing the number of additional households.

Fewer headquarters employees and a smaller population influx imply lower capital spending requirements for office accommodation, staff housing and community infrastructure. The

¹ To achieve comparability, figures from the previous studies have been adjusted to exclude the Power Corporation and Workers Compensation Board. These bodies were not included in the work carried out for the Commission.

² It should be noted that C&L did not make any calculations on this basis. Their report was used only as a source of information on the existing GNWT headquarters staff numbers.

Commission has also assumed a **more modest approach to other facilities, such as the legislature. On the other hand, the Commission takes the view that the housing situation in any of the prospective capitals is so critical that staff housing will be required for all headquarters employees, regardless of where they are recruited.**

The PW study suggests that one-time costs other than capital expenditures will be higher than the 1991 C&L study had suggested, but significantly below **those in the 1992 C&L study. The 1992 study assumed that having the Nunavut government fully operational in 1999 would require a substantial build-up of staff before that date. The PW study assumes that the Interim Commissioner's office would require 15 FTEs in 1997/98 and 60 FTEs in 1998/99, together with related operating and maintenance costs. The other large one-time "set-up" costs will be for training (discussed in a separate chapter), systems, legislation development and initial recruitment.**

Comparison With Previous Studies
(assuming Iqaluit as capital)

	GNWT 1991 Pro-Rated	C&L 1991	C&L 1992 (1)	PW 1995
Nunavut HQ FTEs (2)	622	1,108	930	600
Population Influx (3)		4,453	2,527	1,031
HQ Operating Costs				
Salaries & Benefits	38,479	68,108	64,033	32,622
Other O&M	37,346	49,807	72,687	41,356
G&C	2,797	4,438	48,827	3,256
Total	78,622	122,353	185,547	77,234
Capital Expenditures				
Staff Housing		180,713	128,638	116,338
Offices		102,917	61,324	49,935
Land Development		Inc.	29,265	Inc.
Workstations		4,729	7,563	7,775
Vehicles		459	721	1,052
Special Facilities		111,322	Inc.	Inc.
Municipal Facilities		36,375	15,281	10,253
Base Infrastructure (4)		83,525	67,592	24,356
Subtotal		520,040	310,386	209,709
1.0% contingency		Inc.	Inc.	20,971
Total		520,040	310,386	230,680
Set-Up Costs				
Legal		3,000	3,000	1,750
Training (5)		0	4,863	27,497
Personnel Related		11,226	Inc.	2,850
Systems		4,500	2,825	15,000
Transition		12,500	2,800	Inc.
Interim Commissioner (6)		0	188,667	9,654
Supplies Inventory		5,000	5,000	0
Total (7)		36,226	207,155	56,751

"Notes:

- (1) Figures for 1992 C&L study are for the short transition, completed in 1999.
- (2) PW 1995 and C&L 1992 FTE figures include additional regional FTEs due to decentralization. Figures on HQFTEs exclude the NWT Power Corporation and Workers Compensation Board.
- (3) Population influx numbers in the 1991 C&L study are higher partly because they include additional program staff, such as teachers or nurses, required by a larger population.
- (4) PW 1995 base infrastructure costs do not include upgrading of electrical generation facilities, which are assumed to be recovered through rates.
- (5) Training costs shown include those for 1995-2004. The model only reflects training expenditures up to and including 1999-2000.
- (6) C&L 1992 figures for Interim Commissioner reflect the assumption that all GNHQ employees would be in place by 1998/99, and a more rapid build-up prior to that date.
- (7) Totals may differ due to rounding.

Systems

The C&L studies provided relatively modest amounts **for systems because it was assumed that the Nunavut government would adopt existing GNWT systems.** This assumption is incompatible with two of the Commission's key tenets - decentralization and bilingualism. Decentralization requires that **information to deliver and manage programs be readily available to managers and staff in the various headquarters locations,** in regional offices and in the communities. This will require **a shift from mainframe systems used by specialists to modern client/sewer systems accessed by many employees and individual citizens using microcomputers.** The adoption of **Windows-based systems will also make it easier to provide staff and citizens with the option of inputting, requesting and receiving information in either Inuktitut or English.**

It is assumed that the informatics and telecommunications needs of the Government of Nunavut will be met through a Nunavut Systems Corporation similar to the BC Systems Corporation. The Corporation will acquire and implement finance, human resources and other administrative systems. These systems will probably be commercially available software packages, with limited customization to meet language requirements. Program systems will be required to support the delivery and management of a wide variety of services, such as health care, education, social assistance and housing.

Both administrative and program systems will require a telecommunications infrastructure which enables staff at the headquarters, regional and community levels to work together effectively without frequent travel. This infrastructure will have to provide for reliable, reasonably-priced voice and data communications among all communities, and potentially for two-way video communications. The Nunavut Systems Corporation could contract for the building and operation of dedicated facilities. On the other hand, expansion of common carrier facilities would provide spin-off benefits for other users, including businesses and individuals.

Traditionally, government systems have focused on helping managers and government employees to carry out their individual jobs. Governments are now attempting to use systems to provide one-stop shopping to their citizens, either directly through kiosks similar to banking machines or by enabling employees to carry out a wider range of functions. This transition is a difficult one for established governments because they have so many distinct, incompatible systems which support individual functions. Moreover, these legacy systems were designed to support specialist employees, not to enable generalist employees to deliver services or to enable individual citizens (many of whom have limited formal education and no previous computer experience) to access those services directly. Because the Government of Nunavut will not be encumbered by legacy systems, it will have the option to create systems which are much more closely integrated and user-friendly. These systems can make Nunavut a leader and a showcase of information highway applications in government.

No study of the technology requirements of the Nunavut government has yet been carried out. To provide a preliminary indication of costs, Price Waterhouse has incorporated a microcomputer in the costing of every employee workstation. In addition, it has assumed a preliminary budget of \$15 million for the acquisition, development or customization of software and for servers and network infrastructure. Capital costs for the upgrading of telecommunications infrastructure are assumed to be borne by the common carrier.

Appendix A-17

Government of Nunavut: Financial Model Design and Design Assumptions

A-17.1

Government of Nunavut - Financial Model Design and Assumptions

Model	Section	Assumptions
Model	Scope	<p>The model only deals with the costs of the GN. It does not make any forecasts with respect to offsetting cost impacts in the remainder of the GNWT, either before or after the creation of the GN. Moreover, it does not estimate any financial impacts on federal government departments.</p>
		<p>The model includes departments, agencies, the Attic College and Crown corporations which are not considered self-supporting i.e., Petroleum Products and the Housing Corporation. The Power Corporation and Workers Compensation Board are excluded. The Liquor Commission is included in the model for the purposes of calculating the population influx only, i.e., operating costs and revenues will not be calculated.</p>
Time Frame		<p>The model deals primarily with the period from April 1997, when the Interim Commissioner is assumed to be appointed, to the completion of the phase-in period for the Nunavut government. However, it also includes preparatory costs before April 1997, such as training.</p>
Presentation of Expenditure Information	General	<p>Salaries, employee benefits and other O&M costs for HO and regions are estimated at the departmental level. HQ capital costs (i.e., infrastructure, office buildings, capital facilities, staff housing, residential furniture, office furniture and equipment), legislation and systems development, revenues, grants and contributions and those aspects of operating costs which are location-dependent (settlement allowances, vacation travel and incremental O&M costs) are calculated for the GN as a whole, rather than for individual departments.</p>
		<p>Cost estimates for infrastructure (e.g., sewers, roads), office buildings, capital facilities, staff housing and residential furniture costs were supplied by PWGSC based on NIC program requirements.</p>
Alternative Scenarios		<p>The financial model allows the NIC to assess the implications of alternative scenarios for the establishment of the GN, particularly for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · the location of the capital (i.e., Cambridge Bay, Iqaluit or Rankin Inlet), · the number of FTEs carrying out HQ activities, · the allocation of HQ FTEs between the capital and the other existing regional centres, · the number of existing regional FTEs transferred from the capital to other communities, and · the rate at which the GN is phased in (independent of capital costs) . <p>Any community that is identified as incurring a net loss of FTEs is considered unaffected for the purposes of this model.</p>

Module	Section	Assumptions
Allocation of Jobs	General	The model details the distribution of HQ positions by department or agency. An aggregate number for the regional FTEs relocated to all other communities is incorporated.
		The number of HQ FTEs that will be required if the GN is fully operational in April 1999 has been estimated by NIC staff.
		It is assumed that all HQ FTEs will be new hires. It is recognized that in practice some currently regional FTEs may "trickle- up" but the additional recruitment costs to replace these FTEs at the regional level will offset the savings.
		The percentage of FTEs recruited from the community in which a position is located is assumed to be 25%, regardless of the choice of capital. 25% of new FTEs will come from other communities within Nunavut, and the remaining 50% will come from outside of Nunavut.
	Phase-in Process	<p>The model allows for individual GN departments to be established in two phases:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · the Deputy Minister and immediate staff in a designated year, and · other HQ staff in a subsequent year. <p>The model allows for specific departments to be phased in more gradually.</p>
		It is currently assumed that all departments will be fully operational in 1999/2000.
Population Influx	General	<p>The Population influx to Nunavut is calculated based on the initial recruitment figures "and the following assumptions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · the average household size (including married and single) for GNHQ FTEs is estimated based on the 1991 Census of Canada. It is assumed to be 4.2 for Nunavut hires and 2.7 for non-Nunavut hires (Canadian average), · the 6288 current GNWT employees include 549 known couples. In estimating the number of living units required we have divided the number of GN employees by 1.1 in order to take this into account, · 0.4 additional private sector and federal government jobs will be assumed to be created for every new GN position, and · the demographics for private sector and federal government staff will be the same as for new GN staff. Whether people employed in these positions have a spouse employed with GN is not taken into account. <p>For purposes of estimating community infrastructure and program costs it is assumed that the impact of increased population due to new federal and private sector jobs would be the same as the impact of increases in Nunavut population.</p>

Module	Section	Assumptions
		<p>It is assumed that the number of GN employees residing with federal employees in federal housing is non-consequential.</p> <p>Spouses of GN employees who fill new jobs in the federal and private sectors are assumed to be included in the local hire percentage.</p> <p>The impact of the influx in population (due to HQ, federal and public sector positions) on the number of HQ FTEs required is non-consequential.</p>
HQ Staff Requirements	Initial Recruitment	<p>Costs for initial recruitment, including advertising, applicant travel and relocation, have been separately identified in the model. They have been calculated based on GNWT averages.</p> <p>Costs related to replacement of turnover and initial hiring for new positions created after set-up due to population increases are assumed to be reflected in regular operating and capital budgets, and therefore are not addressed specifically in this model.</p> <p>Applicant travel costs are assumed to be comparable to GNWT average figures per applicant (i.e., no distinction has been made in the model between new hires from the south versus the north as these factors (local versus distance) are already a component of GNWT's average cost).</p> <p>Relocation costs are assumed to be \$5,000 for each new hire from outside of the communities where the new positions are located. This reflects the fact that furniture is provided in staff housing in "fly-in" communities.</p> <p>Applicant travel costs are calculated at an average cost per position filled of \$371. This reflects the fact that many interviews are done by telephone&r as part of recruiting trips outside the territory.</p> <p>Advertising costs are comparable to GNWT average figures per new hire (i.e., no distention has been made in the model between new hires from the south versus the north as these factors are already a component of GNWT's average cost).</p> <p>Advertising costs are calculated at an average of \$596 per position filled.</p>
	Salaries	<p>In the model, GN HQ salary and wage costs are estimated based on current average salary and wages (excluding benefits) per employee at \$48,000, This assumption was based on average salaries for the GNWT as a whole, because current average salaries for GNWT headquarters were unavailable. It should be noted that this assumption is lower than the apparent average HQ salary figure from the 1991 C&L report.</p>

Module	Section	Assumptions
	Core Benefits	Employee benefits, other than settlement allowances and vacation travel, are assumed to remain at the same proportion of salaries as in the GNWT HQ. Settlement allowances and vacation travel for GN HQ and relocated regional jobs are calculated based on existing GNWT rates for those communities.
		Core benefits are calculated at 13.3% of salaries.
		Core benefits include: superannuation, unemployment insurance, Canada Pension Plan, disability insurance, workers' compensation, dental, PSHCP (Health Care), SUB (Maternity), and PSMIP (long term disability).
	Settlement Allowance	Costs are based on the actual projected expenditures for the three major communities and the average for the aggregate of other communities.
	Vacation Travel Assistance (VTA)	All FTEs hired in any year will remain employed for at least one year.
		An additional VTA currently comes into effect after five years of employment. The impact of this benefit will not be material within the time parameters of the model, therefore is not calculated, It is assumed that the VTA for teachers is included in regional costs.
	Other benefits	Other benefits are calculated at 3.2% of salaries.
Other benefits include: household allowance, bilingual bonus, education allowance, medical travel assistance, severance pay, storage, cafeteria and entertainment.		
Training	Training costs have been estimated by NIC staff.	
Operating and Maintenance	costs	<p>GN HQ costs by department have been estimated based on: estimated GN HQ salaries by department, an average of the ratio of O&M to salary costs in the existing GNWT departments most closely related to each future GN department, and a percentage price differential.</p> <p>Costs for leasing of HQ office space were not separately identified in the original C&L report. As a result, there may be some double counting, but this is not significant in relation to the total cost.</p> <p>Existing levels of government services and programs are to be maintained.</p>

Module	Section	Assumptions
	Agency Costs	O&M for the Financial Processing Unit, the Nunavut Business Credit Corporation, the Nunavut Development Corporation, the Nunavut Legal Services Board, the Nunavut Liquor licensing Board, and the Nunavut Systems Corporation are calculated based on the overall average of O&M costs as a percentage of salaries for all GNWT departments.
Capital Expenditures	General	As all HQ facilities and equipment have been costed as new, replacement costs will not significantly impact this model. As a result, ongoing HQ capital expenditures are not considered for the purpose of this study.
Grants and Contributions	General	For G&Cs administered through the existing GNWT HQ, GN HQ are assumed to take over any which relate specifically to the Nunavut area and a per capita share of G&Cs not related to any specific area.
	costs	HQ grants and contributions are based on appropriate GNWT 1991/92 grants and contributions calculated by C&L at a cost per capita. Existing levels of government grants and contributions are to be maintained at 1991/92 levels.
	Revenues	Revenues will be estimated based on actual GNWT revenues per capita based on 1991/92 figures calculated by C&L. Incremental revenues will be assumed to increase due to population growth resulting from new GN positions.
Set-Up Costs	Staff Housing costs	It is assumed that new staff housing will be required for all GN initial recruits,
		All Government of Nunavut HQ residential accommodation are costed as new. Operating and maintenance costs are assumed to be incorporated in the budget of Public Works and Government Services.
		The ongoing costs and revenues associated with staff housing need further examination because the general approaches for determining operating and maintenance costs and revenues for departments is not applicable to staff housing. Additionally, the GN may have different policies with respect to standards of construction, distribution of types of units, etc. which would impact on the costs and revenues.
		The following ratio is assumed for the housing type distribution: 5% single detached houses, 50% row houses, 45% apartment.
	office Space costs	All Government of Nunavut HQ offices will be costed as new with the exception of those vacated by regional FTEs moved into smaller communities.
		Office space will be provided according to existing GNWT space standards.


Module	Section	Assumptions
		PWGSC calculated the space required and construction costs based on GNWT data and industry standards.
Other	Office Furniture and Equipment costs	Office furniture and equipment (including computers) will be costed as new at the time of initial hire. Costs will be estimated based on a standard workstation. Subsequent replacements will be estimated based on normal useful lives and will be considered part of the normal annual budget.
		A workstation for a Nunavut FTE is comparable to that of a GNWT FTE.
		All HQ FTEs have a workstation.
		A GNWT workstation costs, on average, \$9,800.
	Capital Facilities	This model incorporates basic Capital facilities (office space, staff housing, schools, legislative assembly and the infrastructure to support them). Additional health facilities are included to the extent necessary to serve the increased population. Operating costs for the facilities costed are included in the O&M budgets of GNWT.
		Calculations in the body of the model will be based on GN ownership of all Capital facilities. Supplementary calculations will be made with respect to the alternative of leasing.
	Infrastructure costs	Costs for infrastructure, such as water, sewer, roads, waste management and site development were estimated by PWGSC based on industry standards. These estimates reflect the existing facilities and conditions in the various potential capitals, and a composite for the smaller communities to which existing regional jobs might be relocated.
		Capital costs are calculated initially based on the assumption that facilities would be located in Yellowknife, at the costs historically incurred by the GNWT. These costs are adjusted based on relative cost factors used by the GNWT for various locations.
	Software and Systems Development	An allowance for the possible development of new systems or acquisition of commercial software packages by the GN has been developed by Price Waterhouse's IT Practice.
	Legislation Development	NIC staff estimate the one-time cost to review current legislation and develop new legislation at \$1 million.
Interim Commissioner	Costs associated with the interim commissioner are assumed to be \$1,5 million in 1997-98, and \$6 million 1998-99.	

Module	Section	Assumptions
	Office Relocation	The model does not allow for office relocation costs because it is assumed that all furniture and equipment will be purchased new. Additionally, it is assumed that records will be retained by GNWT because it had jurisdiction at the time.
Division of Assets and itie	General	The model does not address the division of assets and liabilities at this time. It therefore treats interest costs and interest revenues as zero.
Inflation	General	The model has the capability to calculate the impact of inflation on capital, other set-up and operating costs at an aggregate level . Original calculations are made in 1995/1996 dollars.

Appendix A-18

Cost Implications; Cambridge Bay as Capital

Price Waterhouse



Nunavut Cost Analysis

Capital:

Cambridge Bay

A-18.2

Assumptions

Population Influx

Assumption

Percentage of Headquarters FTEs hired from "Nunavut community"	25%
Percentage of Headquarters FTEs hired from "Nunavut non-community"	25%
Percentage 01 FTEs hired that are "non-Nunavut"	50%
Number 01 employees per household	1.1
Average household size for married and single employees - Non-Nunavut hire	2.7
Average household size for married and single employees - Nunavut hire	4.2
Private sector and federal growth as a percentage of GN FTE growth	40%

Salaries and Wages

Average salary per FTE	\$48,000
Core benefits as a percentage of salaries	13.3%
Other benefits (i.e., settlement allowance, vacation travel assistance, removal assistance) as a % of salaries	13.5%

Location Dependent Benefits

Vacation Travel Assistance for employee in Cambridge Bay	\$987
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Capital: Cambridge Bay

Vacation Travel Assistance for employee in Iqaluit	\$1,218
Vacation Travel Assistance for employee in Rankin Inlet	\$1,057
Average Vacation Travel Assistance for employee in other communities	\$1,514
Settlement Allowance for employee in Cambridge Bay	\$6,000
Settlement Allowance for employee in Iqaluit	\$5,100
Settlement Allowance for employee in Rankin Inlet	\$5,500
Average Settlement Allowance for employee in other communities	\$6,496

A-18.4

Price Indices

Price index for Cambridge Bay	1.36
Price index for Iqaluit	1.23
Price index for Rankin Inlet	1.23
Average price index for Other Communities	1.31

Community Specific Sal-Up Costs

Equipment and Furniture	\$ 1994/95	\$ 1995/96
Equipment - Cambridge Bay	\$494,000	\$502,892

Capital: Cambridge Bay

	Residential furniture - Cambridge Bay	\$3,767,045	\$3,834,852
	Workstations - Cambridge Bay	\$3,248,700	\$3,307,177
	Equipment - Iqaluit	\$0	\$0
	Residential furniture - Iqaluit	\$35,511	\$36,150
	Workstations - Iqaluit	\$30,625	\$31,176
	Equipment - Rankin Inlet	\$0	\$0
	Residential furniture - Rankin Inlet	\$0	\$0
	Workstations - Rankin Inlet	\$0	\$0
	Equipment - Other Communities	\$1,131,600	\$1,151,969
	Residential furniture - Other Communities	\$5,303,864	\$5,399,334
	Workstations - Other Communities	\$4,574,052	\$4,656,385
	Facilities - Cambridge Bay		
	Office / Administrative - Cambridge Bay	\$27,456,465	\$27,950,681
	Municipal Facilities - Cambridge Bay	\$800,743	\$815,156
	Housing - Cambridge Bay	\$44,439,851	\$45,239,768

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Capital: Cambridge Bay

A-18.6

Social - Cambridge Bay	\$0	\$0
Educational - Cambridge Bay	\$5,744,615	\$5,848,018
Health - Cambridge Bay	\$659,610	\$671,483
Recreational - Cambridge Bay	\$1,133,831	\$1,154,240
Culture - Cambridge Bay	\$0	\$0
Base Infrastructure - Cambridge Bay		
Water - Cambridge Bay	\$1,642,856	\$1,672,427
Sewage - Cambridge Bay	\$1,126,483	\$1,146,760
Solid Waste Disposal - Cambridge Bay	\$423,623	\$431,248
Power Supply - Cambridge Bay	\$467,133	\$475,541
Bulk Fuel Storage - Cambridge Bay	\$2,434,667	\$2,478,491
Air Transportation - Cambridge Bay	\$0	\$0
Marine Transportation - Cambridge Bay	\$0	\$0
Facilities - Iqaluit		
Office/ Administrative - Iqaluit	\$158,949	\$161,810

Capital: Cambridge Bay

Municipal Facilities - Iqaluit

\$0

\$0

Housing - Iqaluit

\$435,513

\$443,352

Social - Iqaluit

\$0

\$0

Educational - Iqaluit

\$0

\$0

Health - Iqaluit

\$0

\$0

Recreational - Iqaluit

\$0

\$0

Culture - Iqaluit

\$0

\$0

Base Infrastructure - Iqaluit

A-18.7

Water - Iqaluit

\$0

\$0

Sewage - Iqaluit

\$0

\$0

Solid Waste Disposal - Iqaluit

\$0

\$0

Power Supply - Iqaluit

\$5,500

\$5,599

Bulk Fuel Storage - Iqaluit

\$0

\$0

Air Transportation - Iqaluit

\$0

\$0

Marine Transportation - Iqaluit

\$0

\$0

Capital: Cambridge Bay

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Facilities - Rankin Inlet

Office / Administrative - Rankin inlet

Municipal Facilities - Rankin Inlet

Housing - Rankin Inlet

Social - Rankin Inlet

Educational - Rankin Inlet

Health - Rankin inlet

Recreational - Rankin Inlet

Culture - Rankin Inlet

Base Infrastructure - Rankin Inlet

Water - Rankin inlet

Sewage - Rankin Inlet

Solid Waste Disposal - Rankin inlet

Power Supply - Rankin Inlet

Bulk Fuel Storage - Rankin Inlet

Air Transportation - Rankin Inlet

Capital: Cambridge Bay

A-18.9

Marine Transportation - Rankin Inlet

\$0 \$0

Facilities - Other Communities

Office / Administrative - Other Communities

\$21,175,052 \$21,556,203

Municipal Facilities - Other Communities

\$2,310,875 \$2,352,471

Housing - Other Communities

\$62,576,782 \$63,703,164

Social - Other Communities

\$0 \$0

Educational - Other Communities

\$5,364,417 \$5,460,977

Health - Other Communities

\$684,980 \$697,310

Recreational - Other Communities

\$94,921 \$96,630

Culture - Other Communities

\$0 \$0

Base Infrastructure - Other Communities

Water - Other Communities

\$4,279,849 \$4,356,886

Sewage - Other Communities

\$1,900,030 \$1,934,231

Solid Waste Disposal - Other Communities

\$1,099,504 \$1,119,295

Power Supply - Other Communities

\$1,113,273 \$1,133,312

Capital: Cambridge Bay

Bulk Fuel Storage - Other Communities	\$3,424,667	\$3,486,311
Air Transportation - Other Communities	\$0	\$0
Marine Transportation - Other Communities	\$0	\$0
Inflation		
Inflation rate, 1992-1993 (input in decimal form)	1.1%	
Inflation rate, 1993-1994 (input in decimal form)	1.7%	
Inflation rate, 1994-1995 (input in decimal form)	1.8%	
Inflation rate, 1995-2006 (input in decimal form)	0.0%	
Population Driven Components		
Population of Northwest Territories, 1991	57,649	
Population of Nunavut, 1999	26,528	
Government-Wide Set-Up Costs		
New computer systems and software	\$15,000,000	
Legislation development	\$1,750,000	

A-18.10

Capital: Cambridge Bay

A-1811

Interim Commissioner FTEs	75
Interim Commissioner (salaries and wages, benefits, O&M, and G&Cs)	\$9,758,089
Training Costs	
Projected training cost for 1995-1996 to 2003-2004	\$27,497,000
Recruitment Costs	
Average applicant travel costs per new hire	\$383
Average advertising costs per new hire	\$617
Relocation cost per employee	\$5,000
Capital Costs	
Average cost of a workstation	\$9,800
Construction index for Cambridge Bay	1.30
Construction index for Iqaluit	1.25
Construction index for Rankin Inlet	1.25
Average construction index for Other Communities	1.36

Capital: Cambridge Bay

Impact on Cambridge Bay, 1999-2000	
Population Influx	
GN FTEs (including change in regional FTEs)	255.0
GN FTEs - non-Nunavut hires	127.5
GN non-Nunavut households	115.9
GN population influx (inc. household size)	313.0
Incremental private sector and federal FTEs	102.0
Incr'l private sector and federal FTEs - non-Nunavut	51.0
Incr'l private sector and federal non-Nunavut households	46.4
Private sector and federal pop. influx (inc. hshld. size)	125.2
Total Annual Population Influx	438.1
GN Population	
GN FTEs (net of regional FTEs relocated)	255.0
GN households	231.8
Total GN Population (inc. household size)	799.8
Cumulative GN Population	799.8
Total Salaries and Wages (excluding benefits) (S000s)	
	12,240
Total Benefits (excluding location dependent benefits) (S000s)	
	1,624
Benefits (location dependent) (S000s)	
Settlement Allowances	1,530
Vacation Travel Assistance	789
Total Benefits (location dependent)	2,319
Other O&M (S000s)	
Other O&M (S000s)	11,505
by Price Differential	136
Total Other O&M	15,646
Total Ongoing Expenditures (excluding Grants & Contributions)	
	31,830

Impact on Cambridge Bay	Total
Community Specific Set-Up Costs:	
Equipment and Furniture (\$000s)	
Equipment	503
Residential furniture	3,835
Workstations	3,307
Total Equipment and Furniture	7,645
Facilities (\$000s)	
Office / Administrative	27,951
Municipal Facilities	815
Housing	45,240
Social	0
Educational	5,848
Health	671
Recreational	1,154
Culture	0
Total Facilities	81,679
Base Infrastructure (\$000s)	
Water	1,672
Sewage	1,147
Solid Waste Disposal	431
Power Supply	476
Bulk Fuel Storage	2,478
Air Transportation	0
Marine Transportation	0
Total Base Infrastructure	6,204
Total Community Specific Set-Up Costs (\$000s)	95,529

Capital: Cambridge Bay

A-18.13

Impact on Igaliut:	1999-2000
Population influx	
GN FTEs (including change in regional FTEs)	2.5
GN FTEs - non-Nunavut hires	1.3
GN non-Nunavut households	1.1
GN population influx (inc. household size)	3.1
Incremental private sector and federal FTEs	1.0
Incr'l private sector and federal FTEs - non-Nunavut	0.5
Incr'l private sector and federal non-Nunavut households	0.5
Private sector and federal pop. influx (inc. hshld. size)	1.2
Total Annual Population Influx	4.3
GN Population	
GN FTEs (net of regional FTEs relocated)	2.5
GN households	2.3
Total GN Population (inc. household size)	7.8
Cumulative GM Population	7.8
Total Salaries and Wages (excluding benefits) (\$000s)	
	120
Total Benefits (excluding location dependent benefits) (\$000s)	
	16
Benefits (location dependent) (\$000s)	
Settlement Allowances	13
Vacation Travel Assistance	10
Total Benefits (location dependent)	22
Other O&M (\$000s)	
	113
by Price Differential	1,23
Total Other O&M	139
Total Ongoing Expenditures (excluding Grants & Contributions)	
	297

Capital: Cambridge Bay

A-18.14

Impact on Capital	Total
Community Specific Set-Up Costs:	
Equipment and Furniture (\$000s)	
Equipment	0
Residential furniture	36
Workstations	31
Total Equipment and Furniture	67
Facilities (\$000s)	
Office / Administrative	162
Municipal Facilities	0
Housing	443
Social	0
Educational	0
Health	0
Recreational	0
Culture	0
Total Facilities	605
Base Infrastructure (\$000s)	
Water	0
Sewage	0
Solid Waste Disposal	0
Power supply	6
Bulk Fuel Storage	0
Air Transportation	0
Marine Transportation	0
Total Base Infrastructure	6
Total Community Specific Set-Up Costs (\$000s)	678

Capital: Cambridge Bay

A-18.15

Impact on Rankin Inlet		1999-2000
Population Influx		
GN FTEs (including change in regional FTEs)		(3.0)
GN FTEs - non-Nunavut hires		(1.5)
GN non-Nunavut households		(1.4)
GN population influx (inc. household size)		(3.7)
Incremental private sector and federal FTEs		(1.2)
Incr'l private sector and federal FTEs - non-Nunavut		(0.6)
Incr'l private sector and federal non-Nunavut households		(0.5)
Private sector and federal pop. influx (inc. hshld. size)		(1.5)
Total Annual Population Influx		(5.2)
GN Population		
GN FTEs (net of regional FTEs relocated)		(3.0)
GN households		(2.7)
Total GN Population (inc. household size)		(9.4)
Cumulative GN Population		(9.4)
Total Salaries and Wages (excluding benefits) (\$000s)		
		(144)
Total Benefits (excluding location dependent benefits) (\$000s)		
		(19)
Benefits (location dependent) (\$000s)		
Settlement Allowances		(17)
Vacation Travel Assistance		(10)
Total Benefits (location dependent)		(26)
Other O&M (\$000s)		
		(135)
by Price Differential		1.23
Total Other O&M		(166)
Total Ongoing Expenditures (excluding Grants & Contributions)		
		(356)

Capital: Cambridge Bay

A-18.16

Impact on Other Communities	Total
Community Specific Set-Up Costs:	
Equipment and Furniture (\$000s)	
Equipment	1,152
Residential furniture	5,399
workstations	4,656
Total Equipment and Furniture	11,208
Facilities (\$000s)	
Office / Administrative	21,556
Municipal Facilities	2,352
Housing	63,703
Social	0
Educational	5,461
Health	697
Recreational	97
Culture	0
Total Facilities	93,867
Base Infrastructure (\$000s)	
Water	4,357
Sewage	1,934
Solid Waste Disposal	1,119
Power Supply	1,133
Bulk Fuel Storage	3,466
Air Transportation	0
Marine Transportation	0
Total Base Infrastructure	12,030
Total Community Specific Set-Up Costs (\$000s)	117,104

Capital: Cambridge Bay

A-18.19

Summary		1999-2000
Population Influx		
GN FTEs (including change in regional FTEs)		600.01
GN FTEs - non-Nunavut hires		300.0
GN non-Nunavut households		272.7
GN population influx (inc. household size)		736.4
Incremental private sector and federal FTEs		240.0
Incr'l private sector and federal FTEs - non-Nunavut		120.0
Incr'l private sector and federal non-Nunavut households		109.1
Private sector and federal pop. influx (inc. hshld. size)		294.5
Total Annual Population Influx		1,030.9
Cumulative Population Influx		1,030.9
GN Population		
GN FTEs (net of regional FTEs relocated)		600.0
GN households		545.5
Total GN Population (inc. household size)		1,881.8
Cumulative GN Population		1,881.8
Total Salaries and Wages (excluding benefits) (\$000s)		
		28,800
Total Benefits (excluding location dependent benefits) (\$000s)		
		3,822
Benefits (location dependent) (\$000s)		
Settlement Allowances		3,771
Vacation Travel Assistance		2,430
Total Benefits (location dependent)		6,200
Other O&M (\$000s)		
		27,070
by Price Differential		1.33
Total Other O&M		35,986
Total Grants and Contributions (\$000s)		
		3,256
Total Ongoing Expenditures (including G&Cs) (\$000s)		
		78,065
Inflation Factor		0.0%
Total Ongoing Expenditures after Inflation		78,065

Capital: Cambridge Bay

A-1820

Impact on Rankin Island	Total
Community Specific Set-Up Costs:	
Equipment and Furniture (\$000s)	
Equipment	0
Residential furniture	0
Workstations	0
Total Equipment and Furniture	0
Facilities (\$000s)	
Office / Administrative	0
Municipal Facilities	0
Housing	0
Social	0
Educational	0
Health	0
Recreational	0
Culture	0
Total Facilities	0
Base Infrastructure (\$000s)	
Water	0
Sewage	0
Solid Waste Disposal	0
Power Supply	0
Bulk Fuel Storage	0
Air Transportation	0
Marine Transportation	0
Total Base Infrastructure	0
Total Community Specific Set-Up Costs (\$000s)	0

Capital: Cambridge Bay

A-18.17

Impact on Other Communities		1999-2000
Population Influx		
GN FTEs (including change in regional FTEs)		345.5
GN FTEs - non-Nunavut hires		172.8
GN non-Nunavut households		157.0
GN population influx (inc. household size)		424.0
Incremental private sector and federal FTEs		138.2
Incr'l private sector and federal FTEs - non-Nunavut		69.1
Incr'l private sector and federal non-Nunavut households		62.8
Private sector and federal pop. influx (inc. hshld. size)		169.6
Total Annual Population Influx		593.6
GN Population		
GN FTEs (net of regional FTEs relocated)		345.5
GN households		314.1
Total GN Population (inc. household size)		1,083.6
Cumulative GN Population		1,083.6
Total Salaries and Wages (excluding benefits) (\$000s)		
		16,584
Total Benefits (excluding location dependent benefits) (\$000s)		
		2,201
Benefits (location dependent) (\$000s)		
Settlement Allowances		2,244
Vacation Travel Assistance		1,641
Total Benefits (location dependent)		3,885
Other O&M (\$000s)		
by Price Differential		1.31
Total Other O&M		20,368
Total Ongoing Expenditures (excluding Grants & Contributions)		
		43,037

Capital: Cambridge Bay

A-18.18

Summary	Total
Set-Up Costs	
Community Specific Set-Up Costs:	
Equipment and Furniture (\$000s)	
Equipment	1,655
Residential furniture	9,270
Workstations	7,995
Total Equipment and Furniture	18,920
Facilities (\$000s)	
Office / Administrative	49,669
Municipal Facilities	3,168
Housing	109,386
Social	0
Educational	11,309
Health	1,369
Recreational	1,251
Culture	0
Total Facilities	176,151
Base Infrastructure (\$000s)	
Water	6,029
Sewage	3,081
Solid Waste Disposal	1,551
Power Supply	1,614
Bulk Fuel Storage	5,965
Air Transportation	0
Marine Transportation	0
Total Base Infrastructure	18,240
Total Community Specific Set-Up Coats (\$000s)	213,311

Capital: Cambridge Bay

A-18.21

Summary	Total
Government-Wide Set-Up” Costs “	
New computer systems and software	15,000
Legislation development	1,750
Interim Commissioner	9,758
Training	27,497
Recruitment Costs	
Advertising	370
Applicant travel	230
Employee relocation (for non-community hires)	2,250
Total Recruitment Costs	2,850
Total Government-Wide Set-Up Costs	56,855
Total Set-Up Costs	270,166
Inflation Factor	0.0%
Total Set-Up Costs after Inflation	270,166.

Cambridge Bay	255.0
Iqaluit	2.5
Rankin Inlet	(3.0)
Other Communities	345.5
Incremental FTEs	600.0


Capital: Cambridge Bay

A-18.22

Appendix A-19

Cost Implications: Iqaluit as Capital

Price Waterhouse



Nunavut Cost Analysis

Capital:

Iqaluit

Assumptions

Population Influx

Assumption

Percentage of Headquarters FTEs hired from "Nunavut community"	25%
Percentage of Headquarters FTEs hired from "Nunavut non-community"	25%
Percentage of FTEs hired that are "non-Nunavut"	50%
Number of employees per household	1.1
Average household size for married and single employees - Non-Nunavut hire	2.7
Average household size for married and single employees - Nunavut hire	4.2
Private sector and federal growth as a percentage of GN FTE growth	40%

A-19.3

Salaries and Wages

Average salary per FTE	\$48,000
Core benefits as a percentage of salaries	13.3%
Other benefits (i.e., settlement allowance, vacation travel assistance, removal assistance) as a % of salaries	13.5%

Location Dependent Benefits

Vacation Travel Assistance for employee in Cambridge Bay	\$987
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Capital: Iqaluit

Vacation Travel Assistance for employee in Iqaluit	\$1,218
Vacation Travel Assistance for employee in Rankin Inlet	\$1,057
Average Vacation Travel Assistance for employee in other communities	\$1,514
Settlement Allowance for employee in Cambridge Bay	\$6,000
Settlement Allowance for employee in Iqaluit	\$5,100
Settlement Allowance for employee in Rankin Inlet	\$5,500
Average Settlement Allowance for employee in other communities	\$6,496

Price Indices

A-19.4

Price index for Cambridge Bay	1.36
Price index for Iqaluit	1.23
Price index for Rankin Inlet	1.23
Average price index for Other Communities	1.31

Community Specific Set-Up Costs

Equipment and Furniture

	\$ 1994/95	\$ 1995/96
Equipment - Cambridge Bay	\$26,000	\$26,468

Capital: Iqaluit

A-195

Residential furniture - Cambridge Bay	\$428,409	\$436,120
Workstations - Cambridge Bay	\$369,460	\$376,110
Equipment - Iqaluit	\$325,000	\$330,850
Residential furniture - Iqaluit	\$1,406,250	\$1,431,563
Workstations - Iqaluit	\$1,212,750	\$1,234,580
Equipment - Rankin Inlet	\$25,000	\$25,450
Residential furniture - Rankin inlet	\$475,852	\$484,417
Workstations - Rankin Inlet	\$410,375	\$417,762
Equipment - Other Communities	\$657,800	\$669,640
Residential furniture - Other Communities	\$6,545,909	\$6,663,735
Workstations - Other Communities	\$5,645,192	\$5,746,805
Facilities - Cambridge Bay		
Office / Administrative - Cambridge Bay	\$1,714,476	\$1,745,337
Municipal Facilities - Cambridge Bay	\$0	\$0
Housing - Cambridge Bay	\$5,053,944	\$5,144,915

Capital: Iqaluit

A-19.6

Social - Cambridge Bay	\$0	\$0
Educational - Cambridge Bay	\$379,090	\$385,914
Health - Cambridge Bay	\$0	\$0
Recreational - Cambridge Bay	\$11,490	\$11,697
Culture - Cambridge Bay	\$0	\$0
Base Infrastructure - Cambridge Bay		
Water - Cambridge Bay	\$304,233	\$309,709
Sewage - Cambridge Bay	\$0	\$0
Solid Waste Disposal - Cambridge Bay	\$105,248	\$107,142
Power Supply - Cambridge Bay	\$87,707	\$89,286
Bulk Fuel Storage - Cambridge Bay	\$234,667	\$238,891
Air Transportation - Cambridge Bay	\$0	\$0
Marine Transportation - Cambridge Bay	\$0	\$0
Facilities - Iqaluit		
Office /Administrative - Iqaluit	\$18,621,474	\$18,956,661

Capital: Iqaluit

A-197

Municipal Facilities - Iqaluit	\$216,503	\$220,400
Housing - Iqaluit	\$17,271,279	\$17,582,162
Social - Iqaluit	\$0	\$0
Educational - Iqaluit	\$1,215,033	\$1,236,904
Health - Iqaluit	\$0	\$0
Recreational - Iqaluit	\$50,558	\$51,468
Culture - Iqaluit	\$0	\$0
Base Infrastructure - Iqaluit		
Water - Iqaluit	\$3,876,158	\$3,945,929
Sewage - Iqaluit	\$877,594	\$893,391
Solid Waste Disposal - Iqaluit	\$275,138	\$280,090
Power Supply - Iqaluit	\$297,000	\$302,346
Bulk Fuel Storage - Iqaluit	\$0	\$0
Air Transportation - Iqaluit	\$0	\$0
Marine Transportation - Iqaluit	\$0	\$0

Capital: Iqaluit

A-198

Facilities - Rankin Inlet

Office / Administrative - Rankin Inlet

\$2,122,641 \$2,160,849

Municipal Facilities - Rankin Inlet

\$90,237 \$91,861

Housing - Rankin Inlet

\$5,844,322 \$5,949,520

Social - Rankin Inlet

\$0 \$0

Educational - Rankin Inlet

\$364,510 \$371,071

Health - Rankin Inlet

\$0 \$0

Recreational - Rankin Inlet

\$25,966 \$26,433

Culture - Rarrkirr Inlet

\$0 \$0

Base Infrastructure - Rankin Inlet

Water - Rankin Inlet

\$2,502,442 \$2,547,486

Sewage - Rankin Inlet

\$474,375 \$482,914

Solid Waste Disposal - Rankin Inlet

\$117,013 \$119,119

Power Supply - Rankin Inlet

\$99,000 \$100,782

Bulk Fuel Storage - Rankin Inlet

\$286,000 \$291,148

Air Transportation - Rankin Inlet

\$0 \$0

Capital: Iqaluit

A-199

Marine Transportation - Rankin Inlet	\$0	\$0
Facilities - Other Communities		
Office /Administrative - Other Communities	\$26,593,695	\$27,072,382
Municipal Facilities - Other Communities	\$1,938,445	\$1,973,337
Housing - Other Communities	\$77,255,088	\$78,645,680
Social - Other Communities	\$0	\$0
Educational - Other Communities	\$5,663,023	\$5,764,957
Health - Other Communities	\$0	\$0
Recreational - Other Communities	\$116,432	\$118,528
Culture - Other Communities	\$0	\$0
Base Infrastructure - Other Communities		
Water - Other Communities	\$5,111,941	\$5,203,956
Sewage - Other Communities	\$2,594,945	\$2,641,654
Solid Waste Disposal - Other Communities	\$1,394,472	\$1,419,572
Power Supply - Other Communities	\$1,368,033	\$1,392,658

Capital: Iqaluit

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Capital: Iqaluit

A-19.11

Interim Commissioner FTEs	75
Interim Commissioner (salaries and wages, benefits, O&M, and G&Cs)	\$9,654,194
Training Costs	
Projected training cost for 1995-1996 to 2003-2004	\$27,497,000
Recruitment Costs	
Average applicant travel costs per new hire	\$383
Average advertising costs per new hire	\$617
Relocation cost per employee	\$5,000
Capital Costs	
Average cost of a workstation	\$9,800
Construction index for Cambridge Bay	1.30
Construction index for Iqaluit	1.25
Construction index for Rankin Inlet	1.25
Average construction index for Other Communities	1.36

Capital: Iqaluit

Impact on Expenditures by 1999-2000	
Population Influx	
GN FTEs (including change in regional FTEs)	29.0
GN FTEs - non-Nunavut hires	14.5
GN non-Nunavut households	13.2
GN population influx (inc. household size)	35.6
Incremental private sector and federal FTEs	11.6
Incr'l private sector and federal FTEs - non-Nunavut	5.8
Incr'l private sector and federal non-Nunavut households	5.3
Private sector and federal pop, influx (inc. hshld. size)	14.2
Total Annual Population Influx	49.8
GN Population	
GN FTEs (net of regional FTEs relocated)	29.0
GN households	26.4
Total GN Population (inc. household size)	91.0
Cumulative GN Population	91.0
Total Salaries and Wages (excluding benefits) (\$000s)	
	1,392
Total Benefits (excluding location dependent benefits) (\$000s)	
	185
Benefits (location dependent) (\$000s)	
Settlement Allowances	174
Vacation Travel Assistance	90
Total Benefits (location dependent)	264
Other O&M (\$000s)	
by Price Differential	1,36
Total Other O&M	1,779
Total Ongoing Expenditures (excluding Grants & Contributions)	
	3,620

Community Specific Set-Up Costs:	
Equipment and Furniture (\$000s)	
Equipment	26
Residential furniture	436
Workstations	376
Total Equipment and Furniture	839
Facilities (S000s)	
Office / Administrative	1,745
Municipal Facilities	0
Housing	5,145
Social	0
Educational	386
Health	0
Recreational	12
Culture	0
Total Facilities	7,288
Base Infrastructure (S000s)	
Water	310
Sewage	0
Solid Waste Disposal	107
Power Supply	89
Bulk Fuel Storage	239
Air Transportation	0
Marine Transportation	0
Total Base Infrastructure	745
Total Community Specific Set-UP Costs (S000s)	8,872

Capital: Iqaluit

Impact on Iqaluit 1996-2000	
Population Influx	
GN FTEs (including change in regional FTEs)	99.0
GN FTEs - non-Nunavut hires	49.5
GN non-Nunavut households	45.0
GN population influx (inc. household size)	121.5
Incremental private sector and federal FTEs	39.6
Incr'l private sector and federal FTEs - non-Nunavut	19.8
Incr'l private sector and federal non-Nunavut households	18.0
Private sector and federal pop. influx (inc. hshld. size)	48.6
Total Annual Population Influx	170.1
GN Population	
GN FTEs (net of regional FTEs relocated)	99.0
GN households	90.0
Total GN Population (inc. household size)	310.5
Cumulative GN Population	310.5
Total Salaries and Wages (excluding benefits) (S000s)	
	4,752
Total Benefits (excluding location dependent benefits) (S000s) 	
	631
Benefits (location dependent) (S000s)	
Settlement Allowances	505
Vacation Travel Assistance	378
Total Benefits (location dependent)	883
Other O&M (S000s)	
	4,456
by Price Differential	1.23
Total Other O&M	5,494
Total Ongoing Expenditures (excluding Grants & Contributions) 	
	11,759

Capital: Iqaluit

A-19.14

Community Specific Set-Up Costs:	
Equipment and Furniture (S000s)	
Equipment	331
Residential furniture	1,432
Workstations	1,235
Total Equipment and Furniture	2,997
Facilities (S000s)	
Office / Administrative	18,957
Municipal Facilities	220
Housing	17,582
Social	0
Educational	1,237
Health	0
Recreational	51
Culture	0
Total Facilities	3s,043
Base Infrastructure (s000s)	
Water	3,946
Sewage	893
Solid Waste Disposal	280
Power Supply	302
Bulk Fuel Storage	0
Air Transportation	0
Marine Transportation	0
Total Base Infrastructure	5,422
Total Community Specific Set-Up Costs (S000s)	46,466

Capital: Iqaluit

A-19.15

Impact on Handicraft		1999-2000
Population Influx		
GN FTEs (including change in regional FTEs)		33.51
GN FTEs - non-Nunavut hires		16.8
GN non-Nunavut households		15.2
GN population influx (inc. household size)		41.1
Incremental private sector and federal FTEs		13.4
Incr'l private sector and federal FTEs - non-Nunavut		6.7
Incr'l private sector and federal non-Nunavut households		6.1
Private sector and federal pop. influx (inc. hshld. size)		16.41
Total Annual Population Influx		57.61
GN Population		
GN FTEs (net of regional FTEs relocated)		33.5
GN households		30.5
Total GN Population (inc. household size)		105.1
Cumulative GN Population		105.1
Total Salaries and Wages (excluding benefits) (\$000s)		
		1,608
Total Benefits (excluding location dependent benefits) (\$000s) 		
		213
Benefits (location dependent) (\$000s)		
Settlement Allowances		184
Vacation Travel Assistance		111
Total Benefits (location dependent)		295
Other O&M (\$000s)		
Other O&M (\$000s)		1,511
by Price Differential		1.23
Total Other O&M		1,859
Total Ongoing Expenditures (excluding Greats & Contributions) 		
		3,976

Capital: Iqaluit

A-19.16

Impact on Handicapped	Total
Community Specific Set-Up Costs:	
Equipment and Furniture (\$000s)	
Equipment	25
Residential furniture	484
Workstations	418
Total Equipment and Furniture	928
Facilities (\$000s)	
Office / Administrative	2,161
Municipal Facilities	92
Housing	5,950
Social	0
Educational	371
Health	0
Recreational	26
Culture	0
Total Facilities	8,600
Base Infrastructure (\$000s)	
Water	2,547
Sewage	483
Solid Waste Disposal	119
Power Supply	101
Bulk Fuel Storage	291
Air Transportation	0
Marine Transportation	0
Total Base Infrastructure	3,541
Total Community Specific Set-Up Costs (\$000s)	13,069

Capital: Iqaluit

A-19.17

Impact on Other Communities		1999-2000
Population Influx		
GN FTEs (including change in regional FTEs)		438.5
GN FTEs - non-Nunavut hires		219.3
GN non-Nunavut households		199.3
GN population influx (inc. household size)		538.2
Incremental private sector and federal FTEs		175.4
Incr'l private sector and federal FTEs - non-Nunavut		87.7
Incr'l private sector and federal non-Nunavut households		79.7
Private sector and federal pop. influx (inc. hshld. size)		215.3
Total Annual Population Influx		753.4
GN Population		
GN FTEs (net of regional FTEs relocated)		438.5
GN households		398.6
Total GN Population (inc. household size)		1,375.3
Cumulative GN Population		1,375.3
Total Salaries and Wages (excluding benefits) (S000s)		
		21,04a
Total Benefits (excluding location dependent benefits) (3000s) 		
		2,793
Benefits (location dependent) (S000s)		
Settlement Allowances		2,848
Vacation Travel Assistance		2,082
Total Benefits (location dependent)		4,931
Other O&M (S000s)		
		19,783
by Price Differential		1.31
Total Other O&M		25,850
Total Ongoing Expenditures (excluding Grants & Contributions) 		
		54,622

Capital: Iqaluit

Impact on Other Communities	Total
Community Specific Set-Up Costs	
Equipment and Furniture (\$000s)	
Equipment	67011
Residential furniture	6,664
Workstations	5,747
Total Equipment and Furniture	13,080
Facilities (S000s)	
Office /Administrative	27,072
Municipal Facilities	1,973
Housing	78,646
Social	0
Educational	5,765
Health	0
Recreational	119
Culture	0
Total Facilities	113,575
Base infrastructure (S000s)	
Water	5,204
Sewage	2,642
Solid Waste Disposal	1,420
Power Supply	1,393
Bulk Fuel Storage	3,989
Air Transportation	0
Marine Transportation	0
Total Base infrastructure	14,647
Total Community Specific Set-Up Costs (\$000s)	141,302

Capital: Iqaluit

A-19.19

Summary		1999-2000
Population Influx		
GN FTEs (including change in regional FTEs)		600.0
GN FTEs - non-Nunavut hires		300.0
GN non-Nunavut households		272.7
GN population influx (inc. household size)		736.4
Incremental private sector and federal FTEs		240.0
Incr'l private sector and federal FTEs - non-Nunavut		120.0
Incr'l private sector and federal non-Nunavut households		109.1
Private sector and federal pop. influx (inc. hshld. size)		294.5
Total Annual Population Influx		1,030.9
Cumulative Population Influx		1,030.91
GN Population		
GN FTEs (net of regional FTEs relocated)		600.0
GN households		545.5
Total GN Population (inc. household size)		1,881.8
Cumulative GN Population		1,881.8
Total Salaries and Wages (excluding benefits) (S000s)		
		28,800
Total Benefits (excluding location dependent benefits) (S000s)		
		3,822
Benefits (location dependent) (S000s)		
settlement Allowances		3,712
Vacation Travel Assistance		2,661
Total Benefits (location dependent)		6,373
Other O&M (S000s)		
		27,070
by Price Differential		1.29
Total Other O&M		34,983
Total Greets and Contributions (S000s)		
		3,256
Total Ongoing Expenditures (including G&Cs) (S000s)		
		77,234
Inflation Factor		0.0%
Total Ongoing Expenditures alter Inflation		77,234

Capital: Iqaluit

A-19.20

Set-Up Costs	
Community Specific Set-Up Costs:	
Equipment and Furniture (\$000s)	
Equipment	1,052
Residential furniture	9,016
Workstations	7,775
Total Equipment and Furniture	17,844
Facilities (\$000s)	
Office / Administrative	49,935
Municipal Facilities	2,286
Housing	107,322
Social	0
Educational	7,759
Health	0
Recreational	208
Culture	0
Total Facilities	167,510
Base Infrastructure (\$000s)	
Water	12,007
sewage	4,018
Solid Waste Disposal	1,926
Power Supp	1,685
Bulk Fuel Storage	4,520
Air Transportation	0
Marine Transportation	0
Total Base Infrastructure	24,356
Total Community Specific Set-Up Costs (\$000s)	209,709

Capital: Iqaluit

A-1921


Government-Wide Set-Up Costs	
New computer systems and software	15,000
Legislation development	1,750
Interim Commissioner	9,654
Training	27,497
Recruitment Costs	
Advertising	370
App an	230
Emp oyee el mm ity es	2,250
Total Recruitment Costs	2 850
Total Gov8rnmaat-Wide Set-Up Costs	
	56,751
Total set-up costs	266,460
Inflation Factor	0.0%
Total Sol-UP Costs after Inflation	266,460

Capital: Iqaluit

A-1922

Cost Implications: Rankin Inlet as Capital

Price Waterhouse



Nunavut Cost Analysis

Capital:

Rankin Inlet

Assumptions

Population Influx

Assumption

Percentage of Headquarters FTEs hired from "Nunavut community"	25%
Percentage of Headquarters FTEs hired from "Nunavut non-community"	25%
Percentage of FTEs hired that are "non-Nunavut"	50%
Number of employees per household	1.1
Average household size for married and single employees - Non-Nunavut hire	2.7
Average household size for married and single employees - Nunavut hire	4.2
Private sector and federal growth as a percentage of GN FTE growth	40%

Salaries and Wages

Average salary per FTE	\$48,000
Core benefits as a percentage of salaries	13.3%
Other benefits (i.e., settlement allowance, vacation travel assistance, removal assistance) as a % of salaries	13.5%

Location Dependent Benefits

Vacation Travel Assistance for employee in Cambridge Bay	\$987
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A-20.3

Capital: Rankin Inlet

Vacation Travel Assistance for employee in Iqaluit	\$1,218
Vacation Travel Assistance for employee in Rankin Inlet	\$1,057
Average Vacation Travel Assistance for employee in other communities	\$1,514
Settlement Allowance for employee in Cambridge Bay	\$6,000
Settlement Allowance for employee in Iqaluit	\$5,100
Settlement Allowance for employee in Rankin Inlet	\$5,500
Average Settlement Allowance for employee in other communities	\$6,496

Price Indices

A-204

Price index for Cambridge Bay	1.36
Price index for Iqaluit	1.23
Price index for Rankin Inlet	1.23
Average price index for Other Communities	1.31

Community Specific Set-Up Costs

Equipment and Furniture

	\$ 1994/95	\$ 1995/96
Equipment - Cambridge Bay	\$26,000	\$26,468

Capital: Rankin Inlet

A-20

Residential furniture - Cambridge Bay	\$221,591	\$225,580
Workstations - Cambridge Bay	\$191,100	\$194,540
Equipment - Iqaluit	\$0	\$0
Residential furniture - Iqaluit	\$35,511	\$36,150
Workstations - Iqaluit	\$30,625	\$31,176
Equipment - Rankin Inlet	\$425,000	\$432,650
Residential furniture - Rankin Inlet	\$3,068,182	\$3,123,409
Workstations - Rankin Inlet	\$2,646,000	\$2,693,628
Equipment - Other Communities	\$825,200	\$840,054
Residential furniture - Other Communities	\$5,402,045	\$5,499,282
Workstations - Other Communities	\$4,658,724	\$4,742,581
Facilities - Cambridge Bay		
Office / Administrative - Cambridge Bay	\$901,672	\$917,902
Municipal Facilities - Cambridge Bay	\$0	\$0
Housing - Cambridge Bay	\$2,614,109	\$2,661,163

Capital: Rankin inlet

A-206

Social - Cambridge Bay	\$0	\$0
Educational - Cambridge Bay	\$176,909	\$180,093
Health - Cambridge Bay	\$0	\$0
Recreational - Cambridge Bay	\$0	\$0
Culture - Cambridge Bay	\$0	\$0
Base Infrastructure - Cambridge Bay		
Water - Cambridge Bay	\$0	\$0
Sewage - Cambridge Bay	\$0	\$0
Solid Waste Disposal - Cambridge Bay	\$0	\$0
Power Supply - Cambridge Bay	\$45,760	\$46,584
Bulk Fuel Storage - Cambridge Bay	\$146,667	\$149,307
Air Transportation - Cambridge Bay	\$0	\$0
Marine Transportation - Cambridge Bay	\$0	\$0
Facilities - Iqaluit		
Office / Administrative - Iqaluit	\$158,949	\$161,810

Capital: Rankin Inlet

A-20.7

Municipal Facilities Iqaluit	\$0	\$0
Housing - Iqaluit	\$435,513	\$443,352
Social - Iqaluit	\$0	\$0
Educational - Iqaluit	\$0	\$0
Health - Iqaluit	\$0	\$0
Recreational - Iqaluit	\$0	\$0
Culture - Iqaluit	\$0	\$0
Base Infrastructure - Iqaluit		
Water - Iqaluit	\$0	\$0
Sewage - Iqaluit	\$0	\$0
Solid Waste Disposal - Iqaluit	\$0	\$0
Power Supply - Iqaluit	\$5,500	\$5,599
Bulk Fuel Storage - Iqaluit	\$0	\$0
Air Transportation - Iqaluit	\$0	\$0
Marine Transportation - Iqaluit	\$0	\$0

Capital: Rankin Inlet

A-208

Facilities - Rankin Inlet

Office / Administrative - Rankin Inlet

\$24,374,488 \$24,813,229

Municipal Facilities - Rankin Inlet

\$681,800 \$694,072

Housing - Rankin Inlet

\$37,682,790 \$38,361,080

Social - Rankin Inlet

\$0 \$0

Educational - Rankin Inlet

\$4,964,478 \$5,053,839

Health - Rankin Inlet

\$1,290,544 \$1,313,774

Recreational - Rankin Inlet

\$1,013,841 \$1,032,090

Culture - Rankin Inlet

\$0 \$0

Base Infrastructure - Rankin Inlet

Water - Rankin Inlet

\$4,808,348 \$4,894,898

Sewage - Rankin Inlet

\$858,619 \$874,074

Solid Waste Disposal - Rankin Inlet

\$375,152 \$381,905

Power Supply - Rankin Inlet

\$641,667 \$653,217

Bulk Fuel Storage - Rankin Inlet

\$2,200,000 \$2,239,600

Air Transportation - Rankin Inlet

\$0 \$0

Capital: Rankin Inlet

A-20.9

Marine Transportation - Rankin Inlet	\$0	\$0
Facilities - Other Communities		
Office / Administrative - Other Communities	\$24,261,988	\$24,698,704
Municipal Facilities - Other Communities	\$1,623,160	\$1,652,377
Housing - Other Communities	\$63,750,106	\$64,897,608
Social - Other Communities	\$0	\$0
Educational - Other Communities	\$5,969,600	\$6,077,053
Health - Other Communities	\$0	\$0
Recreational - Other Communities	\$91,563	\$93,211
Culture - Other Communities	\$0	\$0
Base Infrastructure - Other Communities		
Water - Other Communities	\$4,437,076	\$4,516,943
Sewage - Other Communities	\$2,507,635	\$2,552,772
Solid Waste Disposal - Other Communities	\$1,185,020	\$1,206,350
Power Supply - Other Communities	\$1,133,528	\$1,153,932

Capital: Rankin Inlet

Bulk Fuel Storage - Other Communities	\$3,652,000	\$3,717,736
Air Transportation - Other Communities	\$0	\$0
Marine Transportation - Other Communities	\$0	\$0

Inflation

Inflation rate, 1992-1993 (input in decimal form)	1.1%
Inflation rate, 1993-1994 (input in decimal form)	1.7%
Inflation rate, 1994-1995 (input in decimal form)	1.8%
Inflation rate, 1995-2008 (input in decimal form)	0.0%

Population Driven Components

Population of Northwest Territories, 199	57,649
Population of Nunavut, 1999	26,528

Government-Wide Set-Up Costs

New computer systems and software	\$15,000,000
Legislation development	\$1,750,000

A-20.11

Interim Commissioner FTEs	75
Interim Commissioner (salaries and wages, benefits, O&M, and G&Cs)	\$9,589,179
Training Costs	
Projected training cost for 995-1996101999-2000	\$19,826,000
Recruitment Costs	
Average applicant travel costs per new hire	\$383
Average advertising costs per new hire	\$617
Relocation cost per employee	\$5,000
Capital Costs	
Average cost of a workstation	\$9,800
Construction index for Cambridge Bay	1.30
Construction index for Iqaluit	1.25
Construction index for Rankin inlet	1.25
Average construction index for Other Communities	1.36

Capital: Rankin Inlet

Impact on Cambridge Bay:	1999-2008
Population Influx	
GN FTEs (including change in regional FTEs)	15.0
GN FTEs - non-Nunavut hires	7.5
GN non-Nunavut households	6.8
GN population influx (inc. household size)	18.4
Incremental private sector and federal FTEs	6.0
Incr'l private sector and federal FTEs - non-Nunavut	3.0
Incr'l private sector and federal non-Nunavut households	2.7
Private sector and federal pop. influx (inc. hshld. size)	7.4
Total Annual Population Influx	25.8
GN Population	
GN FTEs (net of regional FTEs relocated)	15.0
GN households	13.6
Total GN Population (inc. household size)	47.0
Cumulative GN Population	47.0
Total Salaries and Wages (excluding benefits) (\$000s)	
	720
Total Benefits (excluding location dependent benefits) (\$000s)	
	96
Benefits (location dependent) (\$000s)	
Settlement Allowances	90
Vacation Travel Assistance	46
Total Benefits (location dependent)	136
Other O&M (\$000s)	
by Price Differential	1.36
Total Other O&M	920
Total Ongoing Expenditures (excluding Grants & Contributions)	
	1,872

Capital: Rankin Inlet

A-20.12

Impact on Cambridge Bay	Total
Community Specific Set-Up Costs:	
Equipment and Furniture (\$000s)	
	6
Res	226
W	95
Eq p m d	
Facilities (\$000s)	
Office / Administrative	918
Municipal Facilities	0
Housing	2,661
Social	0
Educational	180
Health	0
Recreational	0
Culture	0
Total Facilities	3,759
Base Infrastructure (\$000s)	
Water	0
Sewage	0
Solid Waste Disposal	0
Power Supply	47
Bulk Fuel Storage	149
Air Transportation	0
Marine Transportation	0
Total Base infrastructure	196
Total Community Specific Set-UP Costs (\$000s)	
	4,402

Capital: Rankin Inlet

A-20.13

Impact on Igloolik		1999-2000
Population Influx		
GN FTEs (including change in regional FTEs)		2.51
GN FTEs - non-Nunavut hires		1.3
GN non-Nunavut households		1.1
GN population influx (inc. household size)		3.1
Incremental private sector and federal FTEs		1.0
Incr'l private sector and federal FTEs - non-Nunavut		0.5
Incr'l private sector and federal non-Nunavut households		0.5
Private sector and federal pop. influx (inc. hshld. size)		1.2
Total Annual Population Influx		4.3
GN Population		
GN FTEs (net of regional FTEs relocated)		2.5
GN households		2.3
Total GN Population (inc. household size)		7.8
Cumulative GN Population		7.8
Total Salaries and Wages (excluding benefits) (\$000s)		
		120
Total Benefits (excluding location dependent benefits) (\$000s)		
		16
Benefits (location dependent) (\$000s)		
Settlement Allowances		13
Vacation Travel Assistance		10
Total Benefits (location dependent)		22
Other O&M (\$000s)		
Other O&M (\$000s)		113
by Price Differential		1.23
Total Other O&M		139
Total Ongoing Expenditures (excluding Grants & Contributions)		
		297

Capital: Rankin Inlet

Impact on Inlet:	Total
Community Specific Set-Up Costs:	
Equipment and Furniture (\$000s)	
Equipment	0
Residential furniture	36
Workstations	31
Total Equipment and Furniture	67
Facilities (\$000s)	
Office / Administrative	162
Municipal Facilities	0
Housing	443
Social	0
Educational	0
Health	0
Recreational	0
Culture,	0
Total Facilities	605
Base Infrastructure (\$000s)	
Water	0
Sewage	0
Solid Waste Disposal	0
Power supply	6
Bulk Fuel Storage	0
Air Transportation	0
Marine Transportation	0
Total Base Infrastructure	6
Total Community Specific Set-UP Costs (\$000s)	678

Capital: Rankin Inlet

A-20.15

Impact on Rankin Inlet		1999-2000
Population Influx		
GN FTEs (including change in regional FTEs)		216.01
GN FTEs - non-Nunavut hires		108.0
GN non-Nunavut households		98.2
GN population influx (inc. household size)		265.1
Incremental private sector and federal FTEs		86.4
Incr'l private sector and federal FTEs - non-Nunavut		43.2
Incr'l private sector and federal non-Nunavut households		39.3
Private sector and federal pop. influx (inc. hshld. size)		106.0
Total Annual Population Influx		371.1
GN Population		
GN FTEs (net of regional FTEs relocated)		216.0
GN households		196.4
Total GN Population (inc. household size)		677.5
Cumulative GN Population		677.5
Total Salaries and Wages (excluding benefits) (\$000s)		
		10,368
Total Benefits (excluding location dependent benefits) (\$000s)		
		1,376
Benefits (location dependent) (\$000s)		
Settlement Allowances		1,188
Vacation Travel Assistance		716
Total Benefits (location dependent)		1,904
Other O&M (\$000s)		
		9,745
by Price Differential		1.23
Total Other O&M		11,986
Total Ongoing Expenditures (excluding Grants & Contributions)		25,634

Capital: Rankin inlet

A-20.16

Impact on Rankin Inlet	Total
Community Specific Set-Up Costs:	
Equipment and Furniture (\$000s)	
Equipment	433
Residential furniture	3,123
Workstations	2,694
Total Equipment and Furniture	6,250
Facilities \$000	
	24,830
Maintenance	694
	38,360
Social	0
Educational	5,054
Health	1,314
Recreational	1,032
Culture	0
Total Facilities	71,268
Base Infrastructure (\$000s)	
Water	4,895
Sewage	874
Solid Waste Disposal	382
Power Supply	653
Bulk Fuel Storage	2,240
Air Transportation	0
Marine Transportation	0
Total Base Infrastructure	9,044
Total Community Specific Set-Up Costs (\$000s)	86,561

Capital: Rankin Inlet

Impact on Other Communities -		1999-2000
Population Influx		
GN FTEs (including change in regional FTEs)		366.5
GN FTEs - non-Nunavut hires		183.31
GN non-Nunavut households		166.6
GN population influx (inc. household size)		449.8
Incremental private sector and federal FTEs		146.6
Incr'l private sector and federal FTEs - non-Nunavut		73.3
Incr'l private sector and federal non-Nunavut households		66.6
Private sector and federal pop. influx (inc. hshld. size)		179.9
Total Annual Population Influx		629.71
GN Population		
GN FTEs (net of regional FTEs relocated)		366.5
GN households		333.2
Total GN Population (inc. household size)		1,149.5
Cumulative GN Population		1,149.5
Total Salaries and Wages (excluding benefits) (\$000s)		
		17,592
Total Benefits (excluding location dependent benefits) (\$000s) 		
		2,334
Benefits (location dependent) (\$000s)		
Settlement Allowances		2,381
Vacation Travel Assistance		1,740
Total Benefits (location dependent)		4,121
Other O&M (\$000s)		
by Price Differential		1.31
Total Other O&M		21,606
Total Ongoing Expenditures (excluding Grants & Contributions)		
		45,653

Capital: Rankin Inlet

Impact on Other Communities	Total
Community Specific Set-Up Costs	
Equipment and Furniture (\$000s)	
Equipment	840
Residential furniture	5,499
Workstations	4,743
Total Equipment and Furniture	11,082
Facilities (\$000s)	
Office / Administrative	24,699
Municipal Facilities	1,652
Housing	64,898
Social	0
Educational	6,077
Health	0
Recreational	93
Culture	0
Total Facilities	97,419
Base Infrastructure (\$000s)	
Water	4,517
Sewage	2,553
Solid Waste Disposal	1,206
Power Supply	1,154
Bulk Fuel Storage	3,718
Air Transportation	0
Marine Transportation	0
Total Base Infrastructure	13,148
Total Community Specific Set-Up Costs (\$000s)	121,649

Capital: Rankin Inlet

Summary		1999-2000
Population Influx		
GN FTEs (including change in regional FTEs)		600.0
GN FTEs - non-Nunavut hires		300.0
GN non-Nunavut households		272.7
GN population influx (inc. household size)		736.4
Incremental private sector and federal FTEs		240.0
Incr'l private sector and federal FTEs - non-Nunavut		120.0
Incr'l private sector and federal non-Nunavut households		109.1
Private sector and federal pop, influx (inc. hshld. size)		294.5
Total Annual Population Influx		1,030.91
Cumulative Population Influx		1,030.91
GN Population		
GN FTEs (net of regional FTEs relocated)		600.0
GN households		545.5
Total GN Population (inc. household size)		1,881.8
Cumulative GN Population		1,881.8
Total Salaries and Wages (excluding benefits) (\$000s)		
		28,800
Total Benefits (excluding location dependent benefits) (\$000s)		
		3,822
Benefits (location dependent) (\$000s)		
Settlement Allowances		3,671
Vacation Travel Assistance		2,512
Total Benefits (location dependent)		6,184
Other O&M (\$000s)		
Other O&M (\$000s)		27,070
by Price Differential		1.28
Total Other O&M		34,651
Total Grants and Contributions (\$000s)		
		3,256
Total Ongoing Expenditures (including G&Cs) (\$000s)		
		76,713
Inflation Factor		0.0%
Total Ongoing Expenditures after Inflation		76,713

Capital: Rankin Inlet

A-20.20

Summary		1993
Set-Up Costs		
Community Specific Set-Up Costs:		
Equipment and Furniture (\$000s)		
Equipment		1,299
Residential furniture		8,884
Workstations		7,662
Total Equipment and Furniture		17,846
Facilities (S000s)		
Office / Administrative		50,592
Municipal Facilities		2,346
Housing		106,363
Social		0
Educational		11,311
Health		1,314
Recreational		1,125
Culture		0
Total Facilities		173,051
Base Infrastructure (\$000s)		
Water		9,412
Sewage		3,427
Solid Waste Disposal		1,588
Power supply		1,859
Bulk Fuel Storage		6,107
Air Transportation		0
Marine Transportation		0
Total Base Infrastructure		22,393
Total Community Specific Set-Up Costs (S000s)		213,290

Capital: Rankin Inlet

A-20921

Summary:	Total
Government-Wide Set-Up Costs	
New computer systems and software	1 15,000
Legislation development	1,750
Interim Commissioner	9,589
Training	19,826
Recruitment Costs	
Advertising	370
Applicant travel	230
Employee relocation (for non-community hires)	2,250
Total Recruitment Costs	2,850
Total Government-Wide Set-Up Costs	49,0151
Total Set-Up Costs	262,305
Inflation Factor	0.0%
Total Sat-Up Costs after Inflation	262,305

Incremental Full Time Equivalents by Community	Total
Cambridge Bay	255.0
Iqaluit	2.5
Rankin Inlet	(3.0)
Other Communities	345.5
Incremental FTEs	600.0

Capital: Rankin Inlet

List of Recommendations

Chapter 3 Recommendations

Recommendation #3-1

The NIC recommends that the **Nunavut** Government be designed so as to **reflect**:

1. the principles set out in the NIC's June, 1994, discussion paper, as modified by the recommendations set out in the various chapters of this report; and
2. the organizing conclusions set out in this chapter.

Chapter 4 Recommendations

Recommendation #4-1

The NIC recommends that the first **Nunavut** Legislative Assembly have no fewer than 16 members and no more than 24 members.

Recommendation #4-2

The NIC recommends that calculations concerning the cost of the **Nunavut** Government for the purpose of the proposed review by the federal **Cabinet**, be based on the maximum number of members contemplated (24).

Recommendation #4-3

The NIC recommends that it should actively pursue, through a program of research and public consultation, issues associated with

1. the precise size of the first **Nunavut** Legislative Assembly;
2. **two-member** constituencies;

3. *guarantees* of male and female representation on the Assembly; and
4. the direct election of the **Nunavut** Government Leader.

Recommendation #4-4

The NIC recommends that the research and public consultation referred to in Recommendation #4-3 should result in the NIC making precise recommendations with respect to the matters listed in that recommendation in its next comprehensive report and, in any event no later than June 30, 1996.

Recommendation #4-5

The NIC recommends that the writ for the election of the first **Nunavut** Legislative Assembly be issued at the earliest possible date following the coming into force of the **Nunavut** Act (April 1, 1999), the election be held on the earliest possible date (middle of May, 1999), and the Assembly be convened at the earliest possible date (middle of June, 1999).

Recommendation #4-6

The NIC recommends that the cost of organizing and conducting the election of the first **Nunavut** Legislative Assembly be identified as a transitional cost of the setting up of the **Nunavut** Territory and Government and be borne by the **Government** of Canada. The cost of an electoral boundaries commission to determine the electoral boundaries of the **Nunavut** Legislative Assembly prior to 1999 should, in the event that a commission is needed, also be considered a transitional cost and be borne by the **Government** of Canada.

Recommendation #4-7

The NIC recommends that the Interim Commissioner recruit a Clerk of the **Nunavut** Legislative Assembly, and that the Clerk begin work no later than six months prior to the first sitting of the Assembly.

Recommendation #4-8

The NIC recommends that, under the supervision of the Interim Commissioner, the Clerk of the Nunavut Legislative Assembly prepare, for consideration by the Assembly at its first convening

1. draft roles for operations and procedures of the Assembly; and
2. draft legislation concerning the allocation of executive authority among members of the Executive Council of Nunavut (Cabinet).

Recommendation #4-9

The NIC recommends that, as part of its ongoing work, the NIC identify options for how the Nunavut Legislative Assembly might operate as effectively as possible, particularly in relation to the allocation of executive authority among its members and the rendering of accountability for the exercise of such authority.

Recommendation #4-10

The NIC recommends that a Nunavut Legislative Assembly Library be established under the control of the Clerk of the Assembly, as reporting to the Speaker. It is further recommended that this Assembly Library be charged with the mandate of supplying the information deposit and reference needs of the legislative, judicial, and administrative branches of the Nunavut Government. Particular attention should be devoted to providing MLAs with adequate research support.

Chapter 5 Recommendations

Recommendation #5-1

The NIC recommends that the Nunavut Government be designed and established in conformity with the key principles, and key design elements and the organizational structure outlined in this section and elaborated in the following appendices:

Appendix A-10 Organization and Design of the Nunavut Government and HQs Positions;

Appendix A-n: Design of the Nunavut Government: Cambridge Bay as Capital;

Appendix A-12: Design of the Nunavut Government: Iqaluit as Capital;

Appendix A-13: Design of the Nunavut Government: Rankin Inlet as Capital; and

Appendix A-14: Comparison of the Distribution and Demographic Impacts of the Three Decentralized Design Models.

Recommendation #5-2

The NIC recommends that political responsibilities within Nunavut be concentrated at the territorial and community levels, with no new law making bodies being introduced at the regional level.

Recommendation #5-3

The MC recommends that all special purpose boards, agencies, councils and similar bodies that are now operating in Nunavut that are funded, directly or indirectly by the GNWT, should be reviewed as to whether or not they are a necessary part of a smoothly functioning public administration in Nunavut. Only those bodies performing important tasks with acceptable levels of efficiency should be preserved.

Recommendation #5-4

The NIC recommends that, because of their size and significance, the future of regional education and health boards not await the general review of special purpose bodies referred to above. In relation to education, the MC recommends that the three existing regional boards be merged and re-defined as a single Nunavut Board of Education. With respect to health, the MC recommends the abolition of regional health boards and the provisions of health care programs through a Nunavut Department of Health and Social Services.

Recommendation #5-5

The MC recommends that, following on the efforts of Cape Dorset and other communities to secure greater control of programs and services at the local level, it is appropriate to support the continued devolution of additional responsibilities to community governments. Devolution to municipalities should not be carried so far as to impair the coherence of the Nunavut Government or to introduce unacceptable dis-economies of scale.

Recommendation #5-6

The MC recommends that investigations be conducted into the possibility of the Nunavut Government the Government of Canada, and the new institutions of public government created by the Nunavut Agreement achieving cost efficiencies in relation to

1. wildlife research;
2. monitoring and enforcement of **decisions/orders/certificates** of government institutions and departments in relation to **the** use of lands, **waters** and resources, including wildlife;
3. **simplicity/predictability** of environmental assessment procedures; and
4. administrative support for the new institutions of public government.

Recommendation #5-7

The NIC recommends that NTI be fully involved in any investigations into the issues referred to in **Recommendation #5-6** and that the complete financial **dimensions** of the issues be frankly acknowledged and discussed.

Recommendation #5-8

The NIC urges the **parties to the Nunavut Agreement**, in consultation where they have already been established, with the institutions themselves, to decide on the permanent location of the headquarters of the new institutions of public government based *on the* following factors: (1) the need for the institutions to be reasonably proximate to the headquarters of the various territorial **government** departments that deal with related issues; and (2) the desirability of **distributing** job opportunities across various regions and communities. **The NIC further urges that, in order to** facilitate broader planning efforts and to identify possibilities for maximizing cost efficiencies, decisions as to location be made as soon as possible.

Recommendation #5-9

The NIC recommends **that**, based on a ratio of new Government of Canada employees to new Nunavut Government employees of **1:10** and on the number of new Nunavut Government employees contemplated in the previous section, the Government of Canada plan for the addition of 60 full-time **equivalent** positions (FTEs) to its work force in Nunavut.

Recommendation #5-10

The Government of Canada should adhere to the principles set out in this section in determining and establishing its administrative capacity in Nunavut.

Recommendation #5-11

The NIC recommends that the issue of "phasing" the build-up in the **administrative** capacity of the Nunavut Government be recognized as an issue touching on **current** events, not just events occurring *on* and after April 1, 1999.

Recommendation #5-12

The NIC recommends that the GNWT complete a comprehensive plan to re-organize itself in preparation for division. The **re-organization** plan should, to the extent possible, calculate the degree to which positions within the GNWT can be dedicated, entirely or in quantifiable **part**, to activities within the **Nunavut** area. The plan should identify those positions that should be **re-defined** or created within the existing GNWT to assist in the creation of Nunavut; for example, the plan should examine the need to create an assistant deputy minister in relation to preparing human resources for the **Nunavut Government**. The plan should identify appropriate recruitment and training strategies needed for **its** implementation. The plan should be completed, at least **in preliminary form**, and the various **implementation** measures contemplated in the plan costed **out**, in time **to** feed into the federal Cabinet consideration of **Nunavut** issues that is recommended by NIC for the fall of 1995.

Recommendation #5-13

The NIC recommends that the Interim Commissioner for **Nunavut** be recognized to play a key role with regards to a number of aspects of **phasing**, including (1) the offering of employment security to a **number** of individuals who may be willing to step into **senior "Nunavut oriented"** GNWT jobs as described in a GNWT reorganization plan, (2) the entering into on behalf of the **Nunavut Government** with the GNWT of agreements governing the operation of any public sector organizations that are "shared" by the two jurisdictions for at least an initial period following April 1, 1999, and (3) the entering into of any legal agreements that might be required to adapt to circumstances at variance from assumptions as to **phasing** that were built into a federal Cabinet review for the fall of 1995.

Recommendation #5-14

The MC recommends **that**, for the reasons recited in this **section**, planning for the start-up administrative

capacity of the Nunavut Government should proceed on the basis of the Nunavut Government being equipped with fully functioning headquarters in relation to all departments and agencies. Exceptions should be made in the case of the NWT Workers' Compensation Board and the NWT Power Corporation, which should continue, for the indefinite future, to operate as "shared" organizations under the joint political control of the Nunavut Government and the GNWT or its successor. Other suitable candidates for "sharing" may, in the opinion of the Government of Canada, the GNWT and NWT, also exist and warrant additional review by NIC.

Recommendation #5-15

With respect to the continued devolution of federal government responsibilities to the GNWT in the period up to April 1, 1999, the NIC recommends that (1) such devolution not be impeded by division, (2) any jurisdiction devolved to the GNWT adhere to the benefit of Nunavut on at least as favorable terms, (3) devolution not detract from federal government funding obligations in relation to the setting up and running of Nunavut, and (4) the Nunavut Government be equipped with adequate administrative capacity at start-up to take on responsibility for newly devolved jurisdictions.

Recommendation #5-16

The NIC recommends that, in the event that the federal Cabinet, informed by discussions involving the GNWT and NWT, were to determine that a major element of phasing of administrative capacity after 1999 were necessary, the following areas be considered for phasing-in at a later date: (1) certain aspects of regulatory affairs; (2) certain aspects of public works and government services, (3) certain aspects of transportation; and, (4) administration of Crown lands (assuming further devolution occurs in this area).

Recommendation #5-17

The NIC recommends that the Nunavut Government be designated to permit, and in many circumstances promote, part-time and seasonal employment and job-sharing.

Recommendation #5-18

The NIC recommends that training programs leading to and following the establishment of the Nunavut Government should be designed to discourage an excessive intensity of competition among government departments and agencies for promising individuals that may result in disrupted and incomplete pursuit of training activities.

Recommendation #5-19

The NIC recommends that the physical design of new Nunavut Government offices should emphasize accessibility by the public and service to the public.

Recommendation #5-20

The NIC recommends that the physical design of new Nunavut Government offices emphasize requirements for in-house training by government departments and agencies and for close collaboration with educational and training facilities operated outside government.

Recommendation #5-21

The NIC recommends that the physical design of new Nunavut Government offices emphasize the needs of children and parents of children, including the need for government employees to have access to child-care services.

Chapter 6 Recommendations

Recommendation #6-1

The NIC recommends that previous work experience in Nunavut be given significant weighting in the recruitment of individuals to all new public sector positions associated with the creation of the Nunavut Government

Recommendation #6-2

The NIC recommends that a minimum of 50% of the initially recruited senior managers within the Nunavut Government have previous work experience in Nunavut.

Recommendation #6-3

The NIC recommends that the Government of Canada, the GNWT and NWT indicate, as soon as possible, support for the general proposition that every individual employed in a public sector position dealing with the Nunavut area prior to the coming into existence of the Nunavut Government who has a satisfactory performance evaluation, be offered an opportunity to retain that position or to secure a comparable one in the Nunavut public sector.

Recommendation #6-4

The NIC recommends that, subject to the research and consultation process referred to in Recommendation #6-5, the general proposition referred to in Recommendation #6-3 be incorporated in more precise form into the provisions of one or more collective agreements involving the Interim Commissioner for Nunavut, the federal Treasury Board, other public sector employer organizations and the representatives for collective bargaining purposes of public sector employees.

Recommendation #6-5

The NIC recommends that the Government of Canada, the GNWT, the representatives for collective bargaining purposes of current public sector employees, and the NIC devote collective attention as soon as possible to investigating and discussing issues surrounding employer/employee relations in the transition around the Nunavut Government coming into existence.

Recommendation #6-6

The NIC recommends that planning with respect to the organization and design of the new Nunavut Government on the one hand, and with respect to government employment in Nunavut on the other, must be seen as bound together. Issues relating to the size and composition of the Nunavut public sector cannot be dealt with in isolation.

Recommendation #6-7

The NIC recommends that all planning with respect to government employment in Nunavut be built upon the Constitutionally protected commitments with respect to Inuit participation in government employment set out in Article 23 of the Nunavut Agreement.

Recommendation #6-8

The NIC recommends that all planning with respect to government employment in Nunavut proceed from an understanding that implementation of the Nunavut Agreement, and honouring the expectations of the people of Nunavut, require that the new Nunavut Government, at its inception, be at least as representative of the Inuit share of the Nunavut population as is the public sector in Nunavut today (approaching 50% of government employees in Nunavut are Inuit). Accordingly, NIC recommends that all planning proceed from an understanding that, at a minimum,

Nunavut government employment as of April, 1999, be 50% Inuit by way of (1) overall composition, and (2) occupation of senior management positions.

Recommendation #6-9

The NIC recommends that the Inuit employment plans to be completed initially by all government organizations by July 9, 1996, ensure consistent progress, in five year increments, towards the goal of representative levels of Inuit employment. Such plans should provide for the attainment of representative levels as soon as possible and, in any event, not later than 2021 (i.e. 25 years—a generation—after the completion of the first Inuit employment plans).

Recommendation #6-10

The NIC recommends that, in order to facilitate human resource planning and assessment, the Government of Canada, the GNWT and NTI (or its designate) maintain a common data base of all Nunavut based positions, including job descriptions, qualifications, and training paths.

Recommendation #6-11

The NIC recommends that government organizations within the GNWT prepare Inuit employment plans that extend beyond the coming into existence of the Nunavut Government in April, 1999. Such plans should factor in emerging political consensus as to the administrative organization and design of the Nunavut Government after April, 1999. GNWT responsibility for the pursuit of such Inuit employment plans would terminate on the coming into existence of the Nunavut Government.

Recommendation #6-12

The NIC recommends that, given the primacy and urgency of training and human resource planning issues, and mindful of difficulties of inter-organizational co-ordination, the following steps be taken as soon as possible to promote more effective results (where such steps have already been taken, they should be kept up):

1. the GNWT should designate a single individual to co-ordinate training and human resource issues in relation to Nunavut on behalf of territorial government and municipal government organizations; this individual should be situated in the Division Secretariat;
2. the Government of Canada should designate a single individual to co-ordinate training and human

resource issues in relation to Nunavut on behalf of federal government organizations;

3. NTI should **designate a single** individual to represent the interests of **Inuit** organizations with respect to training and human resource issues;
4. upon appointment of an Interim Commissioner for Nunavut, the Interim Commissioner should designate an individual to represent the Government of Nunavut with respect to training and human resource issues; and
5. these designated individuals, along with the training and human resource development **co-ordinator** of the NIC, should meet on a **regular** basis to develop a **shared approach to training and human resource initiatives** and to advise their respective principals on the best use of the combined **financial resources** available; other participants should be invited to take part as needed.

Recommendation #6-13

The NIC recommends that planning for new employment opportunities in Nunavut encourage the full participation of both men and women.

Recommendation #6-14

The NIC recommends that planning for new employment opportunities in Nunavut take into account the private as well as the public sector and accommodate the mobility of workers between sectors.

Recommendation #6-15

The NIC recommends that, the Government of Canada, the GNWT, and NTI, endorse the "An Education and Training Program for the **Nunavut Government Work Force**", referred to in this section and set out in its entirety in Appendix A-15.

Chapter 7 Recommendations

Recommendation #7-1

The NIC recommends that infrastructure be built in Nunavut adequate to meet the overall infrastructure needs associated with the organization of the Nunavut Government along the lines set out in Appendix A-10,

and consistent with the infrastructure and cost assumptions set out in Appendices A-16 and A-17.

Recommendation #7-2

The NIC recommends that planning and implementation of the **Nunavut** Government proceed on the basis that, as a general proposition, new **Nunavut Government** facilities should be **constructed** and maintained through leasehold arrangements with private sector suppliers.

Recommendation W-3

The NIC recommends that the GNWT discontinue the sale of GNWT **staff** housing in the **Nunavut** area until a comprehensive housing policy has been developed which takes fully into account the housing implications of the creation of the **Nunavut** Government.

Recommendation #7-4

The NIC recommends that, in relation to the broad, on-going process of government contracting, the Government of Canada and the GNWT each continue comprehensive discussions with NTI for the purpose of ensuring that **day-to-day** contracting policies, procedures and approaches for the construction and maintenance of government facilities meet fully the letter and spirit of Article 24 of the **Nunavut** Agreement.

Recommendation #7-5

The NIC recommends that, notwithstanding the process referred to in Recommendation #7-4, the provision of new **infrastructure** to support the **Nunavut** Government should, for the purposes of government contracting, be considered as a discrete, stand-alone matter, and subject to a specially defined set of **arrangements**. Such arrangements should maximize the economic stimulus provided to **Nunavut** while, at a minimum, meeting **all** the **Inuit-centred** and **Nunavut-centred** aspects of Article 24 of the **Nunavut** Agreement.

Recommendation #7-6

The NIC recommends that the Government of Canada, the GNWT and NTI make intensive efforts in the three month period April 1, 1995 to June 30, 1995 to reach agreement on appropriate arrangements for govern-

ment contracting in relation to Nunavut Government infrastructure consistent with Article 24 of the Nunavut Agreement. The NIC recommends that:

1. such arrangements should route through the GNWT, by way of an appropriate agreement, the tendering, awarding and management of the construction and leasing of federally-funded infrastructure for the Nunavut Government;
2. such tendering, awarding and management be done through Nunavut-based offices of the GNWT, and not through a Yellowknife office;
3. the tendering, awarding and management of the contracts be subject to a modified form of the GNWT's current Business Incentive Policy (IIP);
4. that modifications to the GNWT's BIP in its application to the federally-funded Nunavut infrastructure entail the replacement of 'northern business preference', with a similar or comparable "Nunavut business preference"; that "Nunavut business preference" be applied only to those firms based in Nunavut, and that no "northern business preference" be applied to northern businesses not based in Nunavut; the replacement of "northern business preference" with "Nunavut business preference" would not effect the local business preference aspect of the existing BIP; and
5. a policy advisory committee be formed, made up of Nunavut residents, to advise on the process for tender, award, management and monitoring of such contracts.

Recommendation #7-7

The NIC recommends that officials of the federal government, the GNWT, community governments, NTL, regional Inuit associations, the Inuit Broadcasting Corporation and selected private sector organizations participate with NIC in a working group which will:

1. review the current state of public and private sector communications systems capabilities, including technologies, facilities, and human resources;
2. identify public and private sector communications needs, and potential users and investors;
3. determine public and private sector communication infrastructure needs and training requirements;

4. develop a corporate model and a financing plan for a Nunavut-wide communications network to serve the public sector, the private sector, and individuals; and
5. prepare a comprehensive telecommunications strategy for Nunavut which will define what should be considered "basic services", assess options for delivering such services and other services, and consider who might be the partners that can provide the infrastructure.

Recommendation #7-8

The NIC recommends that, once appointed, the Interim Commissioner should devote attention to the communications needs of Nunavut, particularly issues associated with the financing of infrastructure installation operation and training.

Chapter 8 Recommendations

Recommendation #8-1

The NIC recommends that the implementation of the Nunavut Agreement, and the design and establishment of the Nunavut Government, be recognized as a unique, two-fold opportunity to bring about substantial and enduring improvements in the socio-economic circumstances and prospects for Nunavut. The NIC further recommends that the design and establishment of the Nunavut Government be carried out so as to buttress and build upon the possibilities for enhanced socio-economic well-being set out in the Nunavut Agreement.

Recommendation #8-2

The NIC recommends that, as set out in Chapter 5 of this report, the Nunavut Government be designed and established in such a manner so as to ensure the distribution of the employment and economic benefits as fairly as possible throughout the regions and communities of Nunavut.

Recommendation #8-3

The NIC recommends that, as described in Chapter 6 of this report, the Nunavut Government be designed and staffed in a way consistent with the objectives and obligations of the Inuit employment within government provisions of the Nunavut Agreement (Article 23).

Recommendation #8-4

The NIC recommends that, as described in Chapter 7 of this report, new infrastructure for the Nunavut Government be provided through a maximum level of leasing with the private sector and through an appropriate approach to the awarding of government infrastructure contracts.

Recommendation #8-5

The NIC recommends that, as soon as practicable after the suggested review of Nunavut issues by the federal Cabinet in the fall of 1995, and the emergence of a clearer picture on the design and financing of the Nunavut Government, the Government of Canada, the GNWT and NIT, with the assistance of the NIC, organize a Nunavut-wide conference devoted to "Building the Economy of Nunavut."

Recommendation #8-6

The NIC recommends that, as soon as practicable after the suggested review of Nunavut issues by the federal Cabinet in the fall of 1995, and the emergence of a clearer picture on the design and financing of the Nunavut Government, the Government of Canada, the GNWT and NIT, with the planning assistance of the NIC, organize a Nunavut-wide conference devoted to "Developing Social and Cultural Well-Being in Nunavut." The conference should address social and cultural issues that have been touched upon in a number of public discussions sponsored by the NIC in the past, and include:

1. ways in which the use of the Inuit language can be promoted as a working language in the Nunavut Government
2. issues involved in the standardization of oral and written forms of the Inuit language with respect to the operations of the Nunavut Government; and
3. the use of traditional knowledge, especially the integration of traditional knowledge into Nunavut Government operations.

Recommendation #8-7

The NIC recommends that the architecture and interior design of new office buildings and other facilities for the Nunavut Government be supportive of the cultural identity and history of Nunavut. A small, fixed per-

centage of the value of all building contracts should be devoted to the acquisition and display of works by Nunavut artists.

Chapter 9 Recommendations

Recommendation #9-1

The NIC recommends that, prior to or contemporaneous with the choice of a capital for Nunavut, commitments be made that each of the Nunavut regions be provided with appropriate facilities (including interpretation equipment, adequate computer hook-ups for Assembly staff, space for the public and journalists), allowing the Nunavut Legislative Assembly to sit in a designated location in each region on a regular basis.

Recommendation #9-2

The NIC recommends that, prior to or contemporaneous with the choice of a capital for Nunavut, commitments be made that the Nunavut Government be a decentralized one to the extent practicable, with conscious efforts made to distribute government functions and activities across the various regions and communities of Nunavut.

Recommendation #9-3

The NIC recommends that the selection of a capital for Nunavut be based on the following factors:

1. existing infrastructure, services and amenities;
2. potential for additional infrastructure, services and amenities;
3. existing and potential transportation links within Nunavut and outside Nunavut;
4. cost of living in the community;
5. position/accessibility within the overall circumpolar region;
6. attitude of the population of the community, taking into account its social, cultural and economic priorities;
7. the extent of regional support; and
8. climate.

Recommendation #9

The NIC recommends that the selection of a capital for Nunavut be limited to Cambridge Bay, Iqaluit, and Rankin Inlet.

Recommendation #9-5

The NIC recommends that the federal Cabinet, exercising its statutory discretion, choose the capital of Nunavut at the first opportunity it has to consider Nunavut issues as a package.

Recommendation #9-6

The NIC recommends that no plebiscite be conducted in Nunavut on the question of the choice of a capital for Nunavut.

Chapter 10 Recommendations

Recommendation #10-1

The NIC recommends that the Government of Nunavut be organized so as to give due weight to the importance of the relationship between the Government of Nunavut and the Government of Canada. In practical terms, the importance of this relationship would suggest that (1) political responsibility for the conduct of relations with the Government of Canada be assigned to the Government Leader of Nunavut, and (2) the Government of Nunavut maintain a small liaison office in Ottawa, comparable to the ones currently maintained by the GNWT and the Government of Yukon.

Recommendation #10-2

The NIC recommends that the Government of Canada maintain a specific policy-making and administrative focus for the co-ordination of federal relations with the Government of Nunavut, and that any changes to the mandate and structure of DIAND respect that need.

Recommendation #10-3

The NIC recommends that the Government of Nunavut participate in federal/provincial/territorial and provincial/territorial inter-governmental activities on the same footing as other territorial governments, and that the Nunavut Government be supplied with the policy-making and administrative capacity to participate effectively. Political responsibility for inter-governmental activities should be vested in the

Government Leader of Nunavut, to be discharged with Nunavut ministers having responsibilities over relevant subject matters.

Recommendation #10-4

The NIC recommends that, within their respective mandates, the Government of Canada, the GNWT and NTI acknowledge the centrality of the following principles:

1. the reference to the Nunavut Territory and Government in Article 4 of the Nunavut Agreement is of fundamental importance;
2. in the context of Nunavut, the concepts of "public government" and "aboriginal self-government" are distinguishable
3. it is to the practical advantage of the Inuit of Nunavut, other residents of Nunavut, and all Canadians, that the Nunavut Government fulfil the expectations on which it is based;
4. while the Nunavut Agreement, and the creation of the Nunavut Territory and Government, do not supplant the rights of the Inuit of Nunavut to self-determination and self-government, (or the mobility rights of all Canadians), the ability of the Nunavut Government to serve the practical political aspirations of the Inuit of Nunavut will be enhanced by Inuit remaining a majority of the residents of Nunavut into the future; and
5. notwithstanding any initiatives that may be taken to dismantle DIAND, the Government of Canada should maintain political and administrative structures designed to promote Inuit/Canada relations and for carrying out specific program responsibilities for Inuit.

Recommendation #10-5

The NIC recommends that the Government of Canada, the GNWT and NTI conduct discussions as to whether the principles referred to in Recommendation #10-4 might form part of a formal written accord or agreement. These discussions might take into account the final report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, which is likely to offer analysis of the relationship between public government and aboriginal self-government throughout Canada.

Recommendation #10-6

The NIC recommends that the Government of Canada develop policies that ensure fairness in the allocation of federal financial resources among the three northern territories in the post-1999 world. Fairness of this kind can best be promoted by equipping territorial governments with financial resources adequate to supply essential public sector goods and services of comparable scope and quality throughout the North. Emphasis should be placed on the needs of the populations of the three territories and the "real" costs of supplying public sector goods and services, not on artificial formulas based on historical levels of funding or on precise per capita equality of revenue support expressed in cost-unadjusted dollars.

Recommendation #10-7

The NIC recommends that the matter of "offsetting" savings associated with the operation of a post-division GNWT (or its successor) be given equally close examination by the federal Cabinet as calculations of the costs of running the new Nunavut Government.

Recommendation #10-8

The NIC recommends that, in the period leading up to April, 1999, the GNWT include provisions within any new or extended inter-governmental agreement or contract indicating that the agreement or contract will not be binding on the Nunavut Government without the subsequent signature of an official specifically authorized to act in the name of the Nunavut Government.

Recommendation #10-9

The NIC recommends that the Interim Commissioner be equipped with *resources* to maintain an office in Yellowknife.

Recommendation #10-10

The NIC recommends that the Nunavut Government consider maintaining an office in Yellowknife in the period following April, 1999.

Recommendation #10-11

The NIC recommends that the long-term relationship between the Nunavut Government and the GNWT be

based on mutual best interests and that the Government of Canada not take any measure that would oblige the Nunavut Government to obtain certain program design or delivery functions only through inter-governmental agreement with the GNWT.

Recommendation #10-12

The NIC recommends that the Nunavut Government play an active role in the development of relations in the circumpolar world, consistent with the Government of Canada's lead responsibilities for the conduct of international relations. The Nunavut Government should establish and maintain a policy-making and administrative capacity with regard to circumpolar affairs within the Department of Executive and Inter-governmental Affairs.

Chapter 11 Recommendations

Recommendation #n-1

The NIC recommends that funding provided to create and run the Nunavut Government be sufficient to meet the assumptions and calculations set out in the following appendices:

Appendix A-16: Government of Nunavut: Financial Model Overview and Comparison with Previous Studies;

Appendix A-17: Government of Nunavut: Financial Model Design and Design Assumptions;

Appendix A-18: Cost Implications Cambridge Bay as Capital;

Appendix A-19: Cost Implications: Iqaluit as Capital; and

Appendix A-20: Cost Implications Rankin Inlet as Capital.

Recommendation #n-2

The NIC recommends that all matters involving how the Nunavut Government will initially be financed, and how its financial resources will initially be administered, be governed by full respect for the provisions of the Nunavut Political Accord as well as the Nunavut Act

Recommendation HI-3

The NIC recommends that formula funding arrangements entered into by the GNWT not purport to deal with costs associated with the setting up of the Nunavut Government or with the costs of running the Nunavut Government after April 1, 1999. Costs incurred by the GNWT prior to April 1, 1999, and , associated with the setting up of the Nunavut Government should be reimbursed by the Government of Canada through a special purpose agreement (a "Preparations for Nunavut Agreement") separate and apart from the formula funding agreement between the GNWT and the Government of Canada. A Preparations for Nunavut Agreement should have a term that expires 60 days after the appointment of an Interim Commissioner for Nunavut. At that point, the Agreement should be replaced with a tri-partite agreement signed by the Interim Commissioner on behalf of the Nunavut Government as well as by appropriate signatories of the federal government and GNWT.

Recommendation #n-4

The NIC recommends that the Interim Commissioner oversee, on behalf of the Nunavut Government, the negotiation of an initial funding agreement with the Government of Canada governing the costs of operating the Nunavut Government in the first year of its operations. The agreement should be concluded, if at all possible, six months in advance of the coming into operation of the Nunavut Government. In addition to respecting the provisions of the Nunavut Political Accord, the agreement should take into account those factors relevant to satisfactory long-term federal/Nunavut relations set out in Chapter 10 of this report. The agreement should contain language acknowledging that its assumptions and calculations have been negotiated in the absence of (1) a Nunavut Legislative Assembly and Executive Council, and (2) a demonstrated history of the costs of operating a Nunavut Government, and further acknowledging that the absence of these things may warrant substantial revisiting of its assumptions and principles.

Recommendation #n-5

The NIC recommends that the division of assets and liabilities between the Nunavut Government and the GNWT be resolved through the conclusion of a comprehensive inter-governmental agreement, prior to April 1, 1999, sorting out the ownership of all classes of assets and liabilities now owned or controlled by the

GNWT at the date of the agreement and all liabilities, established or contingent incumbent on the GNWT at the date of the agreement. Specific exceptions to the complete division of assets and liabilities might be made in relation to those assets and liabilities that are tied to institutions that continue, after April 1, 1999, to carry out functions on behalf of both the residents of Nunavut and the Mackenzie Valley (for example, a workers' compensation board and an electric power corporation).

Recommendation #n-6

The NIC recommends that the GNWT continue its work of assembling and maintaining an inventory of various classes of GNWT assets and liabilities. The GNWT, NTL, the Government of Canada and NIC should continue to consult among themselves as to the practical measures that might be adopted in order to resolve the fair and equitable division of assets and liabilities, but the conclusion of a comprehensive inter-governmental agreement should only follow the appointment of an Interim Commissioner for Nunavut.

Recommendation #n-7

The NIC recommends that the principles set out in this chapter be employed to guide the negotiation of a comprehensive inter-governmental agreement on the fair and equitable division of assets and liabilities between the Nunavut Government and the GNWT.

Recommendation #n-8

The NIC recommends that negotiations towards a comprehensive inter-governmental agreement on the fair and equitable division of assets and liabilities commence sufficiently soon after the appointment of an Interim Commissioner for Nunavut to allow recourse to a binding arbitration process to clear up, prior to April 1, 1999, any outstanding disagreements about appropriate results

Chapter 22 Recommendations

Recommendation #12-1

The NIC recommends that the Governor in Council use the discretion set out in Part IV of the Nunavut Act to

appoint an Interim Commissioner of **Nunavut** prior to **April 1,1999**.

Recommendation #12-2

The **NIC** recommends that the selection of an Interim Commissioner be made in consultation with the **GNWT,NTI** and **NIC**.

Recommendation #12-3

The **NIC** recommends that an Interim Commissioner of **Nunavut** take office on or about **April 1,1997**.

Recommendation #12-4

The **NIC** recommends that the written directions given to an Interim Commissioner be developed in consultation with the **GNWT, NT'I, and NIC**.

Recommendation #12-5

The **NIC** recommends that an Interim Commissioner exercise powers in consultation with a member of the "**Nunavut Caucus**" of the **NWT Legislative Assembly** nominated by members of the **Caucus**, with the **President** of **NTI**, and with the **Chairperson** of **NIC**.

Recommendation #12-6

The **NIC** recommends that the Office of the Interim Commissioner be located in the community chosen as capital of **Nunavut**. The Commissioner should have an adequate budget and staff, and the Office of the Commissioner should have a staff presence **in Yellowknife** and **Ottawa**. Further work should be undertaken by the **NIC, resulting** in recommendations **at an early date, concerning** the relationship between the Office of the Interim Commissioner and the **NIC** in the period following the appointment of the Interim Commissioner.

Recommendation #12-7

The **NIC** recommends that the Office of Statute Review Commissioner be established by legislation of the next **NWT Legislative Assembly, headed by a Statute Review Commissioner appointed by the GNWT** and staffed with persons having appropriate legal and language expertise, to **carry** out the following tasks:

1. to prepare two statutory revision bills, suitable for consideration **in** the first sessions of the **Nunavut**

Legislative Assembly and the NWT Legislative Assembly occurring after **April 1,1999**, drafted to bring the legislation of **Nunavut** and the remaining **NWT** into line with their new jurisdictional **circumstances**;

2. to oversee the preparation of a complete and accurate **Inuit** language version of the statutes and regulations of **Nunavut** as they would appear after the enactment of a statute revision law by the **Nunavut** Legislative Assembly;
3. to prepare an official languages bill, suitable for consideration in the first session of the **Nunavut** Legislative Assembly, confining official language status in **Nunavut** to **English, French, and the Inuit** language; and
4. to advise, in concert with line departments **having relevant responsibilities, on those legislative measures necessary to bring statutes and regulations into line with the Nunavut Agreement.**

Recommendation #12-8

The **NIC** recommends **that, in carrying out his or her work, the Statute Review Commissioner** be directed to consult closely with the **Government of Canada, NTI** and **NIC**.

Recommendation #12-9

The **NIC** recommends that reasonable costs associated with the work of the Statute Review Commissioner be identified as transitional costs associated with the **creation of the Nunavut Territory and Government, and be met by the Government of Canada.** .

Recommendation #12-10

The **NIC** recommends **tha** appropriate symbols, notably a coat of arms and **flag, be developed for Nunavut** consistent with the following points:

1. symbols should meet the standards administered by **the Office of the Chief Herald of Canada, thereby allowing** them to be registered and protected as "official" symbols, taking their proper place in international heraldry;
2. **symbols should reflect the uniqueness of Nunavut;**
3. **symbols, particularly a flag, should be easy to recognize and reproduce, thereby supplying the Govern-**

ment and people of Nunavut with a ready means to identify and market Nunavut to the rest of Canada and to the world; and

4. the process for developing symbols should draw upon the artistic talents of the people of Nunavut and be informed as to their aesthetic preferences; ideas and opinions from the people of Nunavut should be actively solicited.

Recommendation #12-11

The NIC and the Office of the Chief Herald should continue to co-operate in the development of symbols for Nunavut. DIAND, the GNWT, and NTI should be advised as to progress in this regard, and no application for official status for such symbols should be initiated without further consultation with them.

Recommendation #12-12

The NIC recommends that the Constitution Acts, 1867-1982, be amended to make appropriate reference to Nunavut, specifically, to provide for the appointment of one Senator to represent Nunavut and for the explicit application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to the legislature and government of Nunavut.

Recommendation #12-13

The NIC recommends that the Government of Canada, in concert with the GNWT, communicate at the earliest opportunity with the provincial governments to determine their willingness to support Constitutional amendments in respect of Nunavut.

Chapter 1.3 Recommendations

Recommendation #13-1

The NIC recommends that the Government of Canada, the GNWT and NTI follow the short-term steps outlined above.

Recommendation #13-2

Specifically, the NIC recommends that the Government of Canada, the GNWT and NTI commit themsel-

ves to seeking to conclude, upon review of Nunavut issues by the federal Cabinet, a "Statement of Common Outlook and Intent Regarding Nunavut" covering key policy issues concerning finances, human resources, infrastructure and an Interim Commissioner for Nunavut. The NIC would assist in the development of the statement. Development and conclusion of such a statement should not detract from efforts to build as much consensus as possible among the Government of Canada, the GNWT and NTI prior to reference of Nunavut issues to federal Cabinet.

Recommendation #13-3

The NIC recommends that, in the event that both efforts to conclude a "Statement of Common Outlook and Intent Regarding Nunavut" proved fruitless within a reasonable length of time following the federal Cabinet decision, the Government of Canada proceed, on the basis of its legal and moral obligations and in exercise of its best judgement, to take those steps necessary to ensure the Nunavut Government is setup to begin functioning effectively on April 1, 1999.